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Abstract 
Crowded places have been the target of terrorist attacks for many years.  Their inherent 
nature has resulted in a vulnerability to a range of attacks, most notably the threat of vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).  Government agendas have been seeking to 
reduce the extent of this vulnerability, by encouraging those who are responsible for the 
design, construction and operation of such places to incorporate counter-terrorism measures 
(CTMs) into their designs, and where necessary, retro-fit them into existing places.  However, 
little is known about what measures can be used, as well as their performance and 
consequences.  The aim of the research is therefore to identify the aforementioned range of 
measures through the development of a typology that also examines their relative 
performance and consequences for a range of scenarios, in order to inform key decision 
makers who are responsible for the protection of crowded places.  Through the use of a 
qualitative research strategy and respective research methods, interviews, site visits and 
document analysis were carried out in both the UK and in the USA.  A total of 47 participants 
were recruited for the research, with the collection of data spanning 16 months.  A 
preliminary study was undertaken that determined a range of influences on whether crowded 
places are protected, as well as influences on the value of CTMs themselves.  A theoretical 
framework was developed to capture and understand those influences.  Conventional data 
analysis methods and internal validation techniques were used to subject the data to 
methodological rigour, ensuring the validity and reliability of the research. 
While the negative consequences of incorporating CTMs can be profound, every CTM that 
can be used has additional benefits; measures can be incorporated at no cost and can even 
generate revenue; and designing-in CTMs has a number of advantages over retro-fitting 
them.  This research‟s contribution to knowledge in relation to methodology, empiricism, 
theory, industry, and policy has resulted in the creation of a significant amount of guidance 
for key decision makers who are responsible for the design, construction and operation of 
crowded places, as well as providing data on the benefits that can be gained from 
incorporating mitigative measures that is of interest to those who have a role to play in the 
design, construction and operation of the built environment more broadly.  
Recommendations for further research posit that greater understanding is needed in relation 
to the specific monetary costs of CTMs themselves, the experience of users of protected 
places, the implications of „invisible‟ CTMs, and the need for research into the assessment 
and incorporation of proportionality into the built environment.  Practical recommendations 
put forward the need for clarification of legislation in relation to duties of care, the 
dissemination of the incentives to protect, and benefits of protecting, crowded places, the 
need for further debate and transparency regarding proportionality and what constitutes 
proportionate design, and the need to encourage greater engagement between stakeholders 
and the means through which this can occur.   
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The research posits that legislative requirements encompassing the mitigation of terrorist 
attacks are apparent, and that therefore, organisations should incorporate CTMs into 
vulnerable places, yet as previously indicated, such CTMs do not have to cost anything.   
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“To read the ideas of others is an affirmation that we require more than personal 
experience to understand the world” (Brabazon, 2010) 
 
  
1 
 
1.0 Introduction 
“For many years discussions have occurred amongst built environment professionals, 
urban managers and the agencies of security (especially the police) regarding the 
costs and benefits for urban authorities adopting counter-terrorism measures in the 
face of real or perceived terrorist threats” (Coaffee, 2008a, p.300) 
 
1.1 Research Context 
Three important issues are captured in the preceding quote: the multitude of stakeholders 
involved in the design, construction and operation of the built environment; the costs (both 
monetary and in terms of trade-offs and consequences) and the benefits of incorporating 
counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) into vulnerable components of the built environment; 
and the distinction between real and perceived terrorist threats, with actions resulting from 
their assessment directly impacting the way in which the aforementioned stakeholders do or 
do not protect vulnerable places through the incorporation of CTMs.  However, the built 
environment is vulnerable to a plethora of hazards, threats and major accidents, each of 
which have their own individual consequences should they come into contact with the built 
environment itself.  Each also demand attention in their own right, with natural hazards and 
threats (and the resulting emergencies, disasters and criminal acts of varying scales) 
seemingly increasing in both frequency and severity. Each has their own impetus on the 
aforementioned multitude of stakeholders in the form of design considerations, not forgetting 
the vast amount of legislated and non-legislated considerations that do not revolve around 
such phenomena.  The above raises four key questions that this introduction answers in 
order to provide the context in which this research is rooted: 
1. Why does this research focus on the threat of terrorism, and more specifically, the 
threat of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) against crowded 
places? 
2. What is the role of those stakeholders involved in the design, construction and 
operation of the built environment? 
3. What are the cost-benefits of incorporating CTMs into the built environment? 
4. What are the influences of, and distinctions between, real and perceived terrorist 
threats? 
Each of these questions are answered in sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.4 respectively, and the 
answers themselves will lead to the identification and detailing of the research problem 
(section 1.2), the aim and objectives of the research (section 1.2.1), and how this thesis has 
been structured as a result in order to fulfil its purpose (section 1.3). 
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1.1.1 Terrorism, VBIEDs, and crowded places 
A vast array of political, economic, social, technological and environmental considerations, 
some of which are legislated for, some not, influence the design, construction and operation 
of the built environment.  Most notably however, a range of hazards, threats and major 
accidents pose significant risks to the built environment itself (HM Government, 2010a, p.27; 
Mullins and Soetanto, 2010, p.45; Ota, 2010, p.10; Edwards, 2009, p.15; Harre-Young et al., 
2009, p.8), which as highlighted by Bosher and Dainty (2011, p.2), affects everyone, as 
everyone interacts with the built environment.  Whilst there is growing appreciation that the 
identification of every risk is not achievable (Bosher and Dainty, 2011, p.2; Coaffee, 2008a, 
p.307; Dainty and Bosher, 2008, p.259), recognition and investigation of the impacts of the 
aforementioned hazards, threats and major accidents has resulted in a plethora of research 
in relation to Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and resilience, in regard to the built 
environment itself and the socio-institutional systems that are inherent within it.  Whilst 
resulting damages from such risks can be so profound that they can „wipe out‟ years of 
development and investment (Dainty and Bosher, 2008, p.358), one form of risk in particular 
has caused concern over recent years, that being the threat of terrorism, with terrorist groups 
actively seeking to cause harm through the intentional targeting of vulnerable places.   
Richards (2011, p.189) notes that Britain is not a stranger to the threat of terrorism.  Northern 
Ireland-related terrorism has been evident for decades, with responses to that particular 
threat resulting in the emergence and use of physical measures to manipulate the built 
environment in such a way that terrorists are deterred from carrying out their intentions, and 
are unsuccessful in obtaining preferred outcomes through the mitigation of the impacts of an 
attack.  More recently, the threat from international terrorism and most notably, Al Qaeda, its 
supporters and affiliates, has dominated political and security discourses, with a plethora of 
plots and attacks being evident in the UK (Clarke and Soria, 2009; Harre-Young et al., 2009), 
plots which focussed on crowded public places and favoured the use of VBIEDs.  The UK 
government‟s strategy for countering terrorism, known as CONTEST, documents the need 
for such places to be protected, which the National Counter Terrorism Security Office 
(NaCTSO) contribute to through the protection of crowded places, the protection of 
hazardous sites and dangerous substances, and by assisting the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI) to protect critical national infrastructure.  The UK focus of the 
research is due to the evident gaps in knowledge in relation to the aforementioned situation 
within the UK, but also because of the partner to the research, NaCTSO, who were involved 
in the research from its conception; the research needs to be based on the situation within 
the UK. 
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1.1.1.1 Defining hazards, threats and major accidents 
As stated previously, the built environment is vulnerable to a plethora of hazards, threats and 
major accidents; vulnerability meaning the pre-event and inherent characteristics of systems 
that create the potential for harm and can result in damage (Willis et al., 2005; Cutter et al., 
2008), with both physical and social factors influencing vulnerability (McEntire et al., 2002).  
Hazards are defined as naturally occurring phenomenon (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1122), 
and therefore encompass meteorological, geological and other such systems that can result 
in damage to built assets if they interact with them, such as flooding.  Threats, however, are 
distinctly different due to intentionality; they are defined as any action that is carried out with 
intent and malice, and causes or threatens to cause damage to society and the environment 
in which it operates (Harre-Young et al., 2009, p.1286).  Major accidents, therefore, by their 
very nature are risks that do not occur „naturally‟ or through intent or malice, but as a result of 
unintentional means, such as technological failure, yet may still cause damage to society and 
its environment.   
 
1.1.1.2 Defining terrorism, and counter-terrorism measures 
The contested nature of defining terrorism is evident in literature (e.g. Coaffee, 2009a, p.76; 
Flint and Radil, 2009, p.151; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005, p.33; Weidenbaum, 2003, p.9).  
Then and Loosemore (2006, p.158) assert that terrorism is the systematic use of violence, in 
order to achieve a political objective.  Wilkinson (2007a, p.4) highlights that terrorism can be 
distinguished from other forms of violence, due to it being premeditated and designed to 
create a climate of extreme fear, directed at a wider target than its immediate victims, 
inherently involving attacks on random or symbolic targets, considered by the society in 
which is occurs as „extra-normal‟, and that it is used primarily (though not exclusively) to 
influence political behaviour.  However, as stated by Bleiker (2003, p.437): 
“The key to understanding terrorism, then, does not lie with violence as such, but with 
the differences between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force. And this division, in 
turn, is directly linked to issues of statehood and sovereignty” 
Although additional terms for terrorism are evident in the literature, including „superterrorism‟ 
(George and Whatford, 2007, p.158) and „mega-terrorism‟ (Coaffee, 2003a, p.7; Lenain et al., 
2002, p.5), in addition to the use of violence in order to carry out an objective, the 
psychological dimension of terrorism and the instilling of a disproportionate level of fear is 
also a component part (Richards, 2011, p.186; Silke, 2011, p.1; Elliott, 2009, p.5; Dolnik, 
2007, p.19; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001, p.2519; Laqueur, 1996, p.24; Merari, 1993, p.215).  
As purported by Wolfendale (2007, p.78): 
“Because it is possible that a single act of terrorism could wipe out hundreds of 
thousands of people instantly, the mere existence of that possibility is sufficient to 
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make the threat of terrorism far more significant than the threat posed by crime, 
disease and poverty” 
Whilst no international consensus on a definition of terrorism is evident, most notably due to 
the aforementioned issues in relation to the legitimate and illegitimate use of force (and 
therefore state and sovereignty implications), the UK government has defined terrorism 
within the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK Parliament, 2000, p.1), which asserts that: 
(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where –  
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),  
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and  
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause.  
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it –  
(a) involves serious violence against a person,  
(b) involves serious damage to property,  
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the 
action,  
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section 
of the public, or  
(e)  is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system 
Coaffee (2009a, p.78) suggests that: 
“However we choose to define terrorism it is clear that it has led to both reactive and 
proactive measures by many governments and organisations” 
Part of those reactions has been the encouragement of the incorporation of CTMs into the 
built environment, in order to deter and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks on vulnerable 
places.  A CTM is herein defined as any product, or course of action, in which all or part of its 
specification is to reduce the likelihood and/or mitigate the impacts of a terrorist attack 
(Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1124). 
 
1.1.2 Those who design, construct and operate the built environment 
A range of hazards, threats and major accidents pose a risk to the built environment and, as 
a result of the way in which it has been designed and maintained, the vulnerability of built 
assets has become apparent.  DRM and the resilience have emerged in recent years to 
address such vulnerabilities and the mitigation of potential impacts, with the notion that 
human beings, not nature, are the cause of disasters (Mileti, 1999, p.12), most notably 
through the way in which the built environment is designed.  Evident in the literature is the 
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perspective that previous and current construction practices, as well as their governance, are 
insufficient and inappropriate for dealing with hazards, threats and major accidents (ICE, 
2010, p.7; Glass, 2008, p.172; Ofori, 2002, p.18), most notably due to the fragmented nature 
of the construction industry (Bosher and Dainty, 2010, p.6) and the speed and profit motives 
of urban regenerators (Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, p.75).  Whilst the role that those who 
design, construct and operate the built environment should have in DRM and resilience may 
be apparent, the aforementioned impediments to their full involvement remain; change is 
needed through the integration of such principles into the everyday practices of those 
stakeholders (Li, 2010, p.43; Bogunovich, 2009, p.87; Bosher et al., 2009a, p.11; Godschalk, 
2003, p.142; Lorch, 2001, p.416).  Glass (2008, p.184) asserts that there is a clear case for 
stakeholders to have an in-depth understanding of designing and constructing a resilient built 
environment, as part of such reform.  However, the incentives and obligations to adopt such 
practices also requires understanding.  There is therefore a need to understand not just the 
influences that determine whether vulnerable places are protected, but how, what the 
benefits and consequences of the measures used to protect them are, and how they can be 
influenced. 
 
1.1.3 The cost-benefits of incorporating CTMs 
Whilst those responsible for the design, construction and operation of such places are being 
encouraged to incorporate CTMs into their designs, Harre-Young et al. (2010, p.1128; 2009, 
p.1292) assert that little is known about their relative performance (benefits), and their 
consequences (cost, as well as requirements).  The incorporation of physical measures into 
the built environment in order to deter and mitigate the impacts of various crimes has 
occurred throughout history (Briggs, 2005, p.68).  In contrast, the incorporation of CTMs has 
only occurred relatively recently, but the related discourse is informed by a plethora of 
literature on the topic.  „Fortress architecture‟ and „defensible space‟ have been highlighted 
as being extensively used in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s and 1980s to territorially 
control areas (Coaffee, 2004b, p.201), yet the use of such measures arguably emerged 
beforehand, through the onset of influencing human behaviour through the concept of Crime 
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), which is a design concept that asserts 
the improvement of public safety through the design of physical environments (Coaffee, 
2009a; Gunning and Josal, 2004; Thompson and McCarthy, 2004; Crowe, 1991).  Notable 
advancements in relation to this have been the creation of Secured By Design (SBD), which  
is based on physical security, surveillance, access and egress, territoriality, management 
and maintenance (Armitage, 2000) and integrates CPTED principles into housing design, 
which was adopted by the Association of Police Officers in the 1980s (Coaffee, 2009a, p.22).  
Notions of security have developed over the years to encompass urban and building design, 
with further developments in terms of „invisible‟ security and CTMs, and the role of security 
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and counter-terrorism in resilience.  Whilst there is a plethora of literature on the perceived 
consequences of traditional counter-terrorism approaches, which includes contradictory 
accounts of the militarisation and fortification of urban spaces, none of these identify the 
range of CTMs that are available; rather, they focus on individual examples and specific 
implications.  Literature on the development and emergence of „invisible‟ CTMs raises the 
prospect of synergies between urban design and counter-terrorism, as well as the potential 
enhancement of the user experience, through seemingly un-impinged design and 
permeability of places and spaces.  Coupled with the shift that has been evident in the UK, 
moving from the management and mitigation of individual risks on a case-by-case basis, 
through to broader notions of resilience, the role and value of CTMs in this regard requires 
attention.  However, a typology of CTMs and their requirements, performance and 
consequences (defined in section 1.1.3.1) is not evident in the literature.  Therefore, such a 
typology is required to understand CTMs and the protection of crowded places further. 
 
1.1.3.1 Defining requirements, performance and consequences 
Whilst the use of the terms „cost‟ and „benefit‟ are prevalent, the terms „requirements‟, 
„performance‟ and „consequences‟ were used throughout this research.  This was done in 
order to capture in-depth information on specific attributes of CTMs.  Therefore, requirements 
of CTMs encompass the issues that are inherently required for their use, such as the fixtures 
and fittings required for glazing, and foundations required for bollards, for example.  The 
performance of CTMs captures not just their benefits; visual and functional attributes that 
result in the CTM fulfilling its purpose are encompassed in this term, and again enabled the 
inherent performance and characteristics of CTMs to be identified, analysed and compared.  
It was felt that the use of term „benefits‟ was insufficient, as an issue relating to the 
performance of a CTM may not be positive, such as poor aesthetic performance.  The use of 
the term „consequences‟ is more common and so this was adopted to ensure that the 
measurable and immeasurable consequences of incorporating CTMs could be identified, 
such as traffic disruption if certain CTMs were incorporated to exclude or restrict traffic from a 
given area.  These terms are therefore used according to their above definitions throughout 
the thesis. 
 
1.1.4 Real and perceived terrorist threats 
Regan (2006, p.22) states that when Tony Blair watched the events of September 11th 2001, 
he was convinced that those terrorist attacks had changed the world forever, and that he was 
right, not just because it led to the invasion of two countries, but that it embedded terrorism 
into our daily lives that was not the case beforehand.  Similar statements and perspectives 
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are also present in other literature (Rigakos et al., 2009, p.286; Rypkema, 2003, p.9; Briggs 
and Edwards, 2006, p.28).  As questioned by Briggs (2005, p.10): 
“We might question whether September 11 was the point of change or the moment of 
realisation of what had been taking place over the last decade” 
The same influences and perspectives are also evident when considering other threats and 
hazards (Fussey et al., 2011, p.144; Shenoi, 2010, p.1; McEntire et al., 2010, p.50; Coaffee, 
2010, p.939; Coaffee, 2009b, p.348; Little, 2008, p.1; Tierney and Bruneau, 2007, p.14; 
George and Whatford, 2007, p.158; Briggs and Edwards, 2006, p.29; McDonald, 2005, 
p.308).  In relation to the influence that perceived terrorist threats can have and in a study on 
transport patterns, Blalock et al., 2008, p.1717) showed that as many as 2300 road deaths 
were attributable to the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, due to resulting fear of flying.  
Whilst immediate reactions may only be short-term, curtail off, and not endure, terrorist 
attacks, as well as the manifestation of other threats and hazards, can evidently have 
significant implications as to whether vulnerable places are protected.   
However, the above raises a much broader and more significant question: what other factors 
influence the protection of crowded places and determine whether CTMs are incorporated?  
And, to what end do factors influence the value of those measures themselves; can the value 
of protection be undermined?  The beginning of this chapter highlighted three factors that 
needed to be explored in order to understand the context behind this research, those being 
the multitude of stakeholders involved in the design, construction and operation of the built 
environment, the cost-benefits of CTMs, and the influence of real and perceived terrorist 
threats.  Why this research focuses on terrorism and the threat of VBIEDs against crowded 
places was also addressed as a crucial foundation of this research.  How these factors 
transcend into and result in an identifiable and appropriate research problem is addressed in 
the following section. 
 
1.2 The Research Problem 
The plethora of legislated and non-legislated design considerations facing those involved in 
the design, construction and operation of the built environment all demand attention, yet this 
research focuses on the specific threat of terrorism in the form of VBIEDs against crowded 
places.  There is an industrial element to the direction of this research, as NaCTSO is the 
partner to this research and they voiced that this research would be of use.  However, 
examination of the literature reveals that key gaps are evident in relation to knowledge on 
CTMs that can be used to protect crowded places, as well as their requirements, 
performance and consequences, all of which would greatly aid the aforementioned 
stakeholders in making informed decisions regarding incorporating such measures and 
protecting vulnerable places.  Moreover, and as identified above, factors are present that 
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influence whether crowded places are even protected, regardless of whether information on 
CTMs themselves is even known, and it was also questioned whether there are factors that 
influence the value of protecting such places.  All these factors require attention.  The way in 
which the built environment is protected from terrorism has been subject to growing concern 
over recent years; with a sustained threat of terrorism, a trend towards the use of VBIEDs, 
and the resulting need to protect crowded places that have been targeted repeatedly, 
research into the CTMs that can be designed-in and retro-fitted needs to be conducted, 
addressing their relative requirements, performance and consequences.  As such information 
is not currently readily available to those who design, construct and operate crowded places, 
the aim and objectives of this research will now be presented in order to address these 
issues. 
 
1.2.1 The aim and objectives of the research 
As a result of the previous discussions, the aim of the research was to evaluate the relative 
value and systemic implications of CTMs that are used to protect crowded places from 
VBIEDs.  To achieve this aim, the objectives of the research were to: 
1. Examine current research on protecting key components of the built environment 
from terrorism and on the emergence of the terrorist threat. 
2. Develop a typology of CTMs that are used to protect crowded places from terrorist 
attacks, specifically in relation to the mitigation of VBIEDs. 
3. Evaluate the relative performance of CTMs in relation to their cost, effectiveness and 
impact for a range of scenarios. 
4. Identify the impacts, intended and unintended consequences and trade-offs that 
derive through designing in and retro-fitting CTMs. 
5. Produce guidance for key decision makers who are responsible for the protection of 
crowded places, to inform future legislation, guidelines and codes of practice. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
In providing an informed and rigorous account of the research that was undertaken in order 
to fulfil the aim and objectives of the research, the thesis is presented in a logical and 
progressive structure, as highlighted in Figure 1.1.  There are two core aspects of this 
research, those being a typology of CTMs, and a framework capturing the influences on the 
protection of crowded places and on the value of CTMs themselves; the thesis is framed 
around these integral components.  The following three chapters in the thesis (Chapters Two, 
Three and Four) contain the literature review that was conducted for the research.   
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Figure 1.1. Thesis structure and contents 
Chapter Two documents the design and resilience of the built environment, highlighting the 
plethora of design considerations that are evident in construction today and how concepts of 
disaster risk management and resilience have gained prominence over recent years.  
Chapter Three then details the terrorist threat, the UK‟s counter-terrorism strategy and on-
going work, and the relationship between counter-terrorism and the built environment and 
how they combine to facilitate the protection of crowded places.  The chapter also forms a 
theoretical framework that details the influences on the protection of crowded places, as well 
as on the value of CTMs themselves.  Discussions within then lead to the development of a 
provisional typology of CTMs in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Five then discusses the principles of research methodology and design, providing 
an understanding of research methodology, strategy, and methods, from which a valid and 
reliable research design is constructed.  The schedule that was undertaken for the research 
is then presented, leading to accounts of the preliminary and main studies that were 
conducted, and of the development of a scenario-based research instrument to aid in the 
collection of data.  Chapter Six presents the results of the research that further the 
aforementioned theoretical framework and typology, and Chapter Seven discusses the 
relative performance and consequences of the CTMs, and presents the final theoretical 
framework as well as discussions on the emanating issues from the research itself.  The final 
typology of CTMs is presented in Appendix C7.1.  Chapter Seven also utilises the scenario-
based research instrument where appropriate to internally validate and work through the 
discussions themselves.  Chapter Eight then presents the conclusions of the research, 
highlighting its key findings, contributions to knowledge, validity, reliability and limitations, 
and recommendations for further research.  A „final thought‟ is then posited for the reader‟s 
reflection.   
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2.0 The Design and Resilience of the Built Environment 
Geis (2000, p.154) states that the „built environment‟ comprises the substantive physical 
framework that enables society to function in its social, economic, political and institutional 
aspects.  However, not only does the built environment facilitate the functioning of society, it 
also represents the majority of national savings and investment (Little, 2002; Ofori, 2008).  
Yet the built environment itself is not designed purely to accommodate these functions alone, 
a vast array of legislated considerations and other options and pressures can influence the 
design, construction and operation of the built environment.  However, as this chapter will 
explore, it is how (or not) the built environment is designed to be resilient to a plethora of 
natural hazards and human threats that is of particular interest.  As Dainty and Bosher (2008, 
p.358) assert, such impacts can be so profound as to nullify years of investment and 
development.  But what present-day design considerations are encountered by those who 
design, construct and operate the built environment?  Why is there so much emphasis on 
mitigating the impacts of natural hazards and human threats?  What are the perceived and 
empirically founded benefits and consequences of such mitigation?  It is these questions that 
Chapter Two sets to answer.  This will lead to a focus on a particular threat that has been 
internationally and publicly contested and debated for decades, a threat which it is argued is 
having a profound impact on the design and resilience of the built environment; terrorism. 
 
2.1 Present-Day Design Considerations 
A vast array of political, economic, social, technological and environmental considerations, 
only some of which are legislated for, influence the design, construction and operation of the 
built environment.  As noted by Bosher and Dainty (2011, p.2): 
“Everyone interacts with and is affected by, the built environment” 
The link is clear; how the built environment is designed has a direct impact on those who use 
it, whether it be publicly or privately owned space.  This therefore puts pressure on those 
who are responsible for the design, construction and operation of the built environment to not 
only address all the applicable criteria, requirements and risks for such places and spaces, 
but to reconcile and deliver them in such a way that suits the users of those built assets, as 
well as a plethora of others.  From a construction perspective, such considerations are 
shown in Table 2.1.  The sheer scale of considerations and pressures is clear: each issue 
demands attention in their own right.  Table 2.1 does not represent the varying significance 
given to the different items, but it aids in putting into the perspective the scale of 
considerations and pressures that exist today.  However, the „end results‟ of construction 
projects (structures) are vulnerable to a plethora of changing natural and human systems, 
systems which can destroy the structures themselves, systems which will now be explored.
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Table 2.1. Strategic risks in construction (Allan and Davis, 2006, p.10) 
External Origin Internal Origin (7 S’s) 
Political Social Systems 
Government spending, policies and decisions Risk to reputation from involvement in a major 
incident like a major rail accident, dam collapse or 
flooding the M25 
Financial systems 
Amount of work done for governments and 
pseudo-government organisations 
Merging two financial systems 
Introducing a new financial system 
Future of private finance initiative (PFI) / public-
private partnerships 
Health and safety of other people Security 
Demise of the UK skills set and general industry 
demographics 
Hackers into the system and viruses 
Government making commitments that then later 
proved to be unaffordable 
Corruption in business practices 
 State-of-the-art operation of our systems 
War and terrorism and counter-terrorism 
measures 
Technological Failure of a major project 
Pace of technological change within the business  
 The ability to manage information and knowledge Structure 
Economic / Markets Obsolescence Lack of internal communications 
Financial and monetary  Lack of business-to-business level 
understanding Vulnerability to failure or takeover Environmental / Ethical 
Relative share price and growth in share price Sustainability, environmental legislation Lack of transparency 
An acquisition Ethical failure  
Bad debt  Strategy 
Cash and getting paid Legal Failure to grasp or create opportunities 
Currency movements Entering unknowingly into contractual liabilities Getting left behind 
Stability in interest rates and inflation Collateral warranties Poor business strategy 
Sustainable workloads PFI contracts Poor execution of strategy 
Uncertainty of funding Professional indemnity insurance  
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Failure appropriately to fund the business 
because of the deal with the regulator 
A big claim against us Skills and Staff 
Uninsurable losses (e.g. reputation, supply chain 
loss) 
People‟s behaviour 
Pensions The shortage of good people coming to civil 
engineering Markets Uncertainty of legislation 
Failure to react to significant market shifts  The quality of existing people 
Geographic limitations  Scarcity of capable people to do our business 
Shrinking markets  Health and safety of our own people and other 
people Winning work  
Matching competence and opportunity  Loss of key staff 
Narrowness of the market  Loss of key executives 
Supply and demand balance changes   
Loss or failure of a major customer  Style and Shared Values (Culture) 
Failure to achieve sufficient customer satisfaction  The ability to truly operate and understand in 
different cultures Behaviour of most important clients  
Competitiveness  Not learning from the past 
  Complacency and lack of awareness 
  
Lack of transparency or openness of 
communication or information that leaves 
decision makers completely unaware of the real 
issues 
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2.2 From Global Systems to a Single Device… 
“…the built environment in which we live and operate is at risk from a vast range of 
hazards, threats and major accidents” (Harre-Young, 2009, p.8) 
Whilst definitions of such concepts can vary considerably, due to the semantic differences 
that are inherently involved in the terms (Cutter et al., 2008, p.599), a plethora of hazards, 
threats and major accidents pose a risk to the built environment.  Particular emphasis is 
placed on the extent to which human influence plays a part in vulnerability of the built 
environment to such risks, as well as their consequences.  Risks themselves are explored 
first, followed by mitigation and the extent to which human influences are evident. 
 
2.2.1 Hazards, threats and major accidents 
Within the context of the UK, national risk assessment positions the threat of international 
terrorism as the UK‟s uppermost concern, followed by hazards and major accidents that 
require a national response (Cabinet Office, 2012; HM Government, 2010a, p.27). 
 
2.2.1.1 Hazards 
Bosher et al. (2009, p.801) indicate that flooding (riverine, pluvial and coastal), as well as 
severe windstorms, pose the greatest risks to the built environment in terms of hazards.  
Risks posed by flooding are also evident in a plethora of other literature (Mullins and 
Soetanto, 2010, p.45; Ota, 2010, p.10; Edwards, 2009, p.15; Bosher, 2008, p.4; Bosher et al., 
2008, p.5), as is their expected increase in number and severity due to changing climatic 
conditions (Bosher and Dainty, 2011, p.2; Wedawatta et al., 2010, p.313; Crichton, 2008, 
p.130).  Earthquakes (Ota, 2010, p.10; Bosher, 2008, p.4; Vora et al., 2008, p.602), heat 
waves (Edwards, 2009, p.15; Bosher et al., 2007a, p.164) and snow storms (Edwards, 2009, 
p.15) are also cited. 
 
2.2.1.2 Threats 
Terrorism is the most evident threat that faces not just the built environment in broad terms, 
but specific organisations as well (CPNI, 2010, p.3; HM Government, 2010a, p.27; Boin and 
McConnell, 2007, p.54; Bosher et al., 2007a, p.164), with riots (British Council for Offices, 
2009, p.147; Peek and Sutton, 2003), organised crime (CPNI, 2010, p.3; Edwards, 2009, 
p.15), espionage (CPNI, 2010, p.3) and even war (Ota, 2010, p.10) also evident. However, 
the risk of a terrorist attack occurring is less than the occurrence of aforementioned hazards, 
as well as other risks such as fire and transport accidents (NaCTSO, 2010c, p.6; Bux and 
Coyne, 2009, p.2937; Bosher et al., 2008, p.5; Beall, 2007, p.12; Briggs and Edwards, 2006, 
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p.30).  As a result of the intentional dimension that differentiates threats from hazards, the full 
range of threats is consequently unknowable (Little, 2008, p.10), yet the above highlights the 
range of potential threats that is apparent. 
 
2.2.1.3 Major accidents 
Major accidents are seen as one of the UK‟s highest risks (HM Government, 2010a, p.27), 
with such phenomena also evident in literature (Ota, 2010, p.10; Edwards, 2009, p.15; 
Bosher, 2008, p.4; Curtin et al., 2005, p.3).  Examples of such accidents are fires at energy 
plants (Edwards, 2009, p.15) and major transport accidents (Bosher, 2008, p.4).  These have 
the potential for injury and widespread, potentially prolonged, disruption to various systems.  
A growing appreciation of the hazards, threats and major accidents, as well as their inherent 
consequences, is apparent in the literature, along with the acknowledgement that, as 
prescribed by Little (2008, p.10), every risk will never be identifiable (Bosher and Dainty, 
2011, p.2; Coaffee, 2008a, p.307; Dainty and Bosher, 2008, p.259).  In a study by Bosher et 
al. (2007a), stakeholder perceptions of the risks posed by hazards, threats and major 
accidents were investigated.  Whilst the research showed some correlation between the UK‟s 
national assessment of risks in terms of the relatively high prioritisation of flooding, there was 
a lack of correlation in terms of the perceived terrorist threat, i.e. stakeholders perceived the 
threat of terrorism to be less significant than national risk assessments stated it was.   
 
2.2.1.4 The interdependent nature of systems 
Also evident is a growing appreciation of the interdependent nature of systems (natural, 
technological and socio-institutional).  Whilst little is known regarding the inter-connected 
nature of the hazards and threats themselves, as well as the consequences of their 
mitigation (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1128), what is evident is recognition of inter-
connectivity in relation to cities and buildings (Gilbert et al., 2003, p.44; Godschalk, 2003, 
p.136) as well as reliance on technology (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009, p.72; 
Graham, 2001a, p.411), but most notably in relation to critical national infrastructure 
(Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), 2010, p.5; de Brujne and van Eeten, 2007, p.19; Fritzon 
et al., 2007, p.31; Rinaldi et al., 2001, p.11).  The inter-connected nature of such 
infrastructure, referred to as „systems of systems‟ by Haimes and Horowitz (2004, p.33) and 
Haimes and Longstaff (2002, p.440), in relation to the consequences of their failure, is also 
apparent, with such consequences being seen as amplifying and exacerbating implications 
due to their nature (ICE, 2010, p.7; Jowitt, 2010, p.6; Gaynor, 2008, p.1; Zimmerman, 2008; 
Fritzon et al., 2007, p.31; Amin, 2002, p.67).  The consequences of their failure, as well as 
the consequences of hazards, threats and major accidents that manifest, can be disastrous.   
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2.2.1.5 Disasters and their impact 
Whilst the largest loss of life per disaster is observed in under-developed countries (Schipper 
and Pelling, 2006, p.21; Wamsler, 2006, p.151; O‟Keefe et al., 1976, p.566), complexity and 
impacts have increased over the years (Ofori, 2008, p.39; Menoni, 2001, p.106), most 
notably due to changes in the nature of hazards and threats, demographics and economic 
and socio-political issues, such as urbanisation and population growth (Bosher and Dainty, 
2011, p.2).  Such developments, coupled with the fact that disasters will never be completely 
preventable (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009, p.34; von Lubitz et al., 2008, p.561; 
Furedi, 2002, p.7; Ofori, 2002, p.7), result in the need for the holistic consideration and 
mitigation of the plethora of hazards, threats and major accidents and their potential 
consequences. 
 
2.2.2 Disaster Risk Management 
“The concept of hazard mitigation begins with the realization that many disasters are 
not unexpected” (Schneider, 2002, p.142) 
Disaster Risk Management (DRM) therefore involves mitigation of such events to society by 
reducing and, where possible, avoiding the impact a disaster would have (Alexander, 2008, 
p.20).  There are four phases of DRM, those being hazard identification, mitigative 
adaptations, preparedness planning, and recovery and rehabilitation/reconstruction (Bosher 
et al., 2009a, p.11; Bosher, 2008, p.9).  Mileti (1999) asserts that a DRM approach adopts a 
global systems perspective, anticipates ambiguity and change, rejects short-term thinking, 
accounts for social factors and embraces sustainable development, the knowledge base and 
appreciation for which has grown in recent years (Keane, 2005, p.22; Ofori, 2002, p.7).  
Through adopting a global systems perspective, also known as an all-hazards approach 
(Cole, 2010b, p.47), the inter-connected nature of the hazards and their mitigation is 
recognised.  Anticipating ambiguity and change reflects the changing nature of hazards (as 
well as threats and major accidents), in terms of both number and severity, as previously 
highlighted.  Rejecting short-term thinking encompasses two factors, the notion that DRM 
should be and endless process (Haigh and Amaratunga, 2010, p.17) and that it should be 
driven and incorporated in such a way that safeguards future generations (Bosher et al., 
2007a, p.165), which also links to sustainable development.   
The social implications of disasters means that those societal influences resulting in 
vulnerability can be reduced, through adopting community-based and long-term (sustainable 
development) initiatives (Bosher and Dainty, 2011, p.4).  Defining sustainable development 
as the creation and maintenance of prosperous social, economic and ecological systems 
(Folke et al., 2002, p.7), DRM encompasses and builds on these, enhancing the capacity to 
manage such environments whilst safeguarding for future generations (Bosher et al., 2009a, 
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p.10).  With emphasis on pro-activity (Malalgoda et al., 2010, p.426; Wamsler, 2006, p.151; 
Wilbanks, 2005, p.541; Schneider, 2002, p.142) and the use of both structural and non-
structural mitigation measures (Bosher et al., 2009b, p.794; Burby et al., 2000), the UK 
government has recognised the importance of what is known as „the resilience agenda‟ 
(Bosher et al., 2009b, p.793).  Highlighting why such an agenda and its inherent practices 
are needed, Grabosky (2007, p.9) asserts that: 
“If there is one thing the past two decades have taught us, it is nothing ever stays still 
for long.  Problems and solutions that were barely foreseeable in 1986 are 
commonplace today.  One has no reason to doubt that dramatic changes will 
continue to take place between now and the year 2026” 
 
2.2.3 Resilience 
“Designing and constructing resilient built assets requires an in-depth understanding 
of the expertise and knowledge on avoiding and mitigating the effects of disasters in 
order to secure a safe and sustainable future” (Bosher et al., 2008, p.1) 
In defining resilience itself and what constitutes a resilient built asset, it is important to note 
the origins of the term and concept.  Sapountzaki (2007, p.298) and Klein et al. (2003, p.35) 
highlight that the Latin root of the word is „resilio‟, when means to „jump back‟; what could be 
considered as returning to a previous state.  Holling (1973, p.14) is cited as being the first to 
define or identify resilience, in relation to ecological systems (Gunderson et al., 2000, p.425).  
Holling (ibid.) asserted that it is the: 
“…measure of the persistence of systems and their ability to absorb change and 
disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state 
variables” 
Recent definitions of resilience seem lucid and, as highlighted by both Holling (1996) and 
more recently Bosher (2008), vary in distinct ways depending on emphasis.  Definitions in 
terms of engineering put forward the notion that resilience entails the ability and process of 
returning to a previous, stable state (Gunderson et al., 2002) and therefore stay closely 
aligned with the literal Latin meaning of „resilio‟.  Such an adoption of the term is evident in 
literature, encompassing resilience as the means through which organisations or other such 
systems can „bounce back‟ and therefore have an inherent „bouncebackability‟ (Coaffee and 
Rogers, 2008a; Coaffee et al., 2008, p.105; Longstaff and Yang, 2008; Fritzon et al., 2007; 
Coaffee, 2006; Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006; Manyena, 2006, p.433; Burke, 2005, 
p.629).  As asserted by Bosher (2008, p.13) however: 
“…the concept of resilience is also evolving to recognise that in some cases it is not 
sufficient for a system or built asset to merely „bounce back‟ to its original state. It is 
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essential to acknowledge that there is a need to ensure the system or built asset is a 
more robust version of what was there originally” 
The view of resilience as a process as well as an output, its emphasis on prevention and 
mitigation as well as response and recovery, as well as capacity and change, is evident in 
Bosher et al. (2009a, p.11), the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (2009, p.73), 
Cutter et al. (2008, p.599), Tierney and Bruneau (2007, p.14) and Folke (2006, p.253).  As 
notions of resilience can vary considerably, Rose (2007, p.384) asserts that this results in the 
importance of defining the term precisely, as there is a danger that it could become (or is 
becoming) a „vacuous buzzword‟.  Whilst there is no single, over-arching definition of 
resilience, due to the context-specific circumstances and multiple levels of meaning that are 
attributed to resilience (Korhoren and Seager, 2008, p.412; Carpenter et al., 2001, p.765; 
Gunderson et al., 2000, p.425), the IPPR (2009, p.73) have developed a three-generation 
definition of resilience, as summarised below: 
 First Generation resilience is concerned with the ability of systems to absorb shocks 
and to return quickly into operation. 
 Second Generation resilience relates primarily to community resilience and the 
recognition of social and psychological dimensions. 
 Third Generation resilience involves anticipation, as well as recognising that the 
system is often better off not „bouncing back‟ to its original state. 
Whilst such a definition is helpful in providing an overview of resilience and its multi-faceted 
nature, Carpenter et al. (2001, p.779) assert that in relation to any context, confusion can be 
avoided by asking “resilience of what to what?”.  Its relationship to DRM is evident in three 
distinct ways: it encompasses proactive as well as reactive elements, entails an all-inclusive 
approach, and recognises socio-physical systems and their inter-connections (Bosher, 2008, 
p.13).  The emergence of „resilience‟ therefore reflects the recognition that disasters cannot 
always be prevented and the hazards, threats and major accidents that cause them are 
inherently connected to the social-physical systems that have been constructed (Dainty and 
Bosher, 2008, p.357).  Glass (2008, p.183) however believes: 
“…there is no quick-fix solution to the mainstreaming of resilience within building 
design or indeed in the education of building professionals…The complexity inherent 
in design decision-making, professional relationships and higher order issues such as 
planning legislation, provide some specific problem areas for future research and 
policy-making to address” 
In answering Carpenter et al. (2001, p.779, the IPPR (2009, p.73) and Glass (2008, p.183), 
the most evident „form‟ of resilience has been a move towards what is known as „urban 
resilience‟, which Bosher and Coaffee (2008, p.146) assert that: 
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‟…is of growing importance in design, planning and civil engineering and that it 
should it be developed in a transdisciplinary way; incorporating a wide range of 
stakeholders involved with the structural and non-structural approaches that are 
required to attain urban resilience” 
Encompassing all the preceding issues and recognitions, urban resilience encapsulates 
structural and non-structural mitigative actions, as well as socio-political, socio-technological 
and socio-institutional systems and their inter-connections, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. The four interconnected themes of urban resilience (Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Office et al., 2007, p.10) 
As defined by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Office et al. (2007, p.10): 
“What this focus provides is a multi-level understanding of the resilience of urban 
systems which recognises the role of metabolic flows in sustaining urban functions, 
human well-being and quality of life; governance networks and the ability of society to 
learn, adapt and reorganise to meet urban challenges; and the social dynamics of 
people as citizens, members of communities, users of services, consumers of 
products, etc, and their relationships with the built environment which defines the 
physical patterns of urban form and their spatial relations and interconnections” 
In order to provide and maintain such a system, Bosher (2008, p.13) states that the built 
environment itself should therefore be designed, located, built, operated and maintained in 
such a way that maximises the ability and capacity of built assets, as well as the socio-
physical and socio-institutional systems that support and use them, to be able to mitigate and 
anticipate, as well as respond to and recover from, the plethora of hazards, threats and major 
accidents that are apparent.  Within this discourse however, Dainty and Bosher (2008, p.370) 
highlight that two factors are evident, those being the inherent complex and inter-related 
nature of all the systems, as previously highlighted, and the institutional resistance to change 
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that pervades the construction industry and therefore hinders the progress that can be made, 
which will be explored in forthcoming sections. 
 
2.2.4 The human influence 
“Paradoxically, the built environment (and related planning practices) are not only 
affected by disasters; they can also constitute one of its main cause[s]” (Wamsler, 
2008, p.350) 
Ofori (2002, p.2) asserts that the built environment „bears the brunt‟ of the damage that is 
caused by disasters.  Arguably however, disasters are „disasters‟ because of the loss of life, 
or detrimental impact on them, that results from the concentrations of people in buildings.  
Without the aforementioned constructions/built environment, such a high number of people in 
one place would not be possible.  So, disasters are disasters because of the human 
influence, hence it can be questioned as to whether any disasters are „natural‟.  However, 
evident in the literature is a plethora of work citing the use of the term „natural disaster‟ (e.g. 
Be Safe Not Shattered, 2011; Richards, 2011, p.190; HM Government, 2010a, p.25; Perera 
et al., 2010, p.1; Coaffee and O‟Hare, 2008, p.173; Alexander, 2003; McEntire et al., 2002, 
p.268).  Bosher (2008, p.7) summarises the debate: 
“Are „natural disasters‟ really that natural?...a flood event that occurs in the non-tidal 
stretch of the River Thames, inundating people‟s homes, businesses and lifelines will 
typically be referred to as a „natural disaster‟ but the flood event manifests itself as a 
disaster because society (and this is predominantly the case in high-income societies) 
has chosen to build homes, infrastructure and businesses in an area vulnerable to 
floods” 
Moore (2004) finds the idea of citing that human error as an explanation for disasters 
unsatisfying, but the consideration that people are the „real cause‟ of disasters is evident in 
the 1976 work of O‟Keefe et al. (1976, p.567) and other work since then has concurred with 
the socially constructed nature of disasters (Haigh and Amaratunga, 2010; Bosher et al., 
2009a; Bosher, 2008; Spence and Kelman, 2004; Weichselgartner, 2001; Geis, 2000; Mileti, 
1999). 
“Human beings - not nature - are the cause of disaster losses” (Mileti, 1999, p.12) 
Dainty and Bosher (2008, p.358) suggest that the way in which the built environment has 
expanded over the past 30 years has had little regard for such influences and has not only 
caused disasters, but has also exacerbated their effects.  Those who design, construct and 
operate the built environment should therefore consider the influence they can have in 
relation to the hazards, threats and major accidents, in terms of both proactive and reactive 
efforts. 
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2.2.5 The role of those who design, construct and operate the built environment 
Evident in the literature is the perspective that previous and current construction practices, as 
well as their governance, are insufficient and inappropriate for dealing with hazards, threats 
and major accidents (ICE, 2010, p.7; Glass, 2008, p.172; Ofori, 2002, p.18).  Within the 
context of the UK, the ICE (2010, p.7) highlights that: 
“Terrorism is addressed in isolation by the CPNI, emergency planning is dealt with 
separately by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, a new team has only just been set 
up to tackle the effects of climate change, long-term system failure is ignored, and no 
one is overseeing the resilience of the whole infrastructure network” 
Despite resilience being branded as a magnet for built environment professionals in 
satisfying professional and moral duties in ensuring the sustainability and safety of 
communities (Fox, 2008, p.297), widespread adoption of DRM and resilience is not apparent.  
Furthermore, the calls for inter-related responses to the risks, as evident in the above quote, 
seem a distant objective and are fundamentally impeded by the professional fragmentation of 
the construction industry (Bosher and Dainty, 2010, p.6) and the broader socio-political 
landscape in which it sits, as well as the speed and profit motives of urban regenerators 
(Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, p.75).  Whilst the role that those who design, construct and 
operate the built environment should have in DRM and resilience may be apparent, the 
aforementioned impediments to their full involvement remain; change is needed through the 
integration of such principles into the everyday practices of those stakeholders (Li, 2010, 
p.43; Bogunovich, 2009, p.87; Bosher et al., 2009a, p.11; Godschalk, 2003, p.142; Lorch, 
2001, p.416).  Designing and constructing a resilient built environment, as part of such 
reform, demands an in-depth understanding of the mitigation of such risks, as well as an 
understanding of not just the value of such resiliency measures, but the implications of their 
incorporation.  Whilst there is a clear case for built environment professionals to have such 
an understanding (Glass, 2008, p.184), the obligations to adopt such practices and 
incorporate such measures require understanding, as do the benefits of such action in the 
form of not just their cost-effectiveness, but in terms of their inherent value (Harre-Young et 
al., 2010, p.1128; Harre-Young et al., 2009, p.1292). 
 
2.3 The Legislation of and Incentives for Mitigation in the UK 
The legislation of mitigation and the incorporation of resiliency measures influence the 
protection of the built environment, yet legislated duties in relation to the mitigation of 
hazards and threats remain uncertain.  Coupled with this is uncertainty surrounding 
incentives to pro-actively incorporate such measures, not just in terms of their cost-
effectiveness but in relation to their value and how their performance is offset by their 
consequences. 
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2.3.1 Legislation and regulation 
While legislation is evident in the mitigation of major accidents, e.g. Control of Major Accident 
Hazards (COMAH) Regulations of 1999 in relation to industrial sites, which requires 
organisations and sites to implement various resiliency measures (other legislation is also 
apparent in terms of pipelines etc), there is no such legislation in relation to the mitigation of 
hazards and threats.  However, interpretations of existing legislation purport that there are 
specific duties to mitigate such risks under a number of existing Acts.  In regard to broader 
notions of preparedness and response planning, the most and recent legislation that 
influences such issues is the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which places a number of duties 
on stakeholders who are involved in the short- and long-term response to and recovery from 
a large-scale emergency (HM Government, 2005).  Bosher and Dainty (2011, p.10) believe 
that the essence of the Act is multi-disciplinary and encompasses an „all risks‟ approach, 
which in itself reflects a paradigmatic shift in the way such risks are managed compared to 
previous approaches.  The Act does not, however, require such places as shopping centres 
or hotels and restaurants to adopt such practices nor incorporate appropriate resiliency 
measures.   
In relation to the mitigation of threats specifically, two key Acts (the Management of Health 
and Safety at Work Act of 1992 and the Corporate Homicide and Corporate Manslaughter 
Act of 2007) are interpretable in such a way as to place duties on organisations and 
occupiers of buildings that relate specifically to the protection of such places from terrorism.  
Further information on perceived legislative obligations to protect such places from terrorism 
is presented in section 3.4.1.1. 
 
2.3.2 Hazard mitigation incentives 
Studies have highlighted a range of projects that provide a case for changes; they 
demonstrate significant incentives for implementing hazard mitigation.  Benson and Twigg 
(2007, p.6) highlight a number of examples, including: 
 a programme that was run in Vietnam to protect coastal inhabitants from typhoons 
and storms that cost an average $0.13 million a year, but resulted in savings of $7.1 
million a year and aided in the  saving of life and livelihoods, as well as providing 
further livelihood opportunities. 
 a study in the Caribbean that found that through spending 1% of a structure‟s cost on 
resiliency measures, the costs of damage from hurricanes was reduced by 
approximately one third (although whether this offset the invest is unknown). 
 a study that proved that for every $1 spent by FEMA on hazard mitigation, an 
average of $4 was generated in future benefits, including when retro-fitting. 
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 observations of two schools that remained standing in Grenada following a hurricane, 
both of which had been retro-fitted following a World Bank initiative. 
The FEMA study emanates from research conducted by the Multihazard Mitigation Council 
(MMC, 2005), which investigated FEMA‟s initiatives between 1993 and 2003.  The research 
concluded that the initiatives were cost-effective and reduced future losses, resulted in 
significant benefits to society as a whole in terms of such losses, and represented significant 
potential savings in terms of tax and reduced hazard-related expenditures (MMC, 2005, p.5).  
Specifically, the MMC (ibid.) found high cost-benefit ratios (as alluded to above), with the 
initiatives resulting in $14 billion of savings, compared to spending $3.5 billion, which were 
based on conservative assumptions.  Bosher et al. (2007b, p.242) also question whether 
buildings protected from hazards might be sold or let for higher prices, due to their inherent 
resilience and reduced reparation costs, but there is no evidence of this yet. 
 
2.3.3 Threat mitigation incentives 
In a study examining the cost-effectiveness of a specific range of crime prevention measures, 
Armitage (2000, p.3) found that the average cost of the measures themselves was £440, but 
the average cost of a burglary to the victim was £1,670.  The study also found that in the two 
schemes that were investigated, crime-rates before the incorporation of the measures were 
67% and 54% higher (ibid., p.2), providing indicative results in relation to what could be 
expected for more severe crime prevention, but not a „blanket statement‟ that incorporating 
such measures always works (Welsh et al., 2010, p.314); the extent to which the measures 
had a displacement effect is also unknown.  A number of studies identify the costs of terrorist 
attacks, as well as possible incentives in relation to the protection of the built environment.  
These studies will now be explored, first providing an account of the literature on the costs 
that can be incurred as a result of terrorist attacks, then by exploring studies of the cost-
effectiveness and benefits of incorporating measures to protect buildings. 
 
2.3.3.1 The cost of terrorist attacks 
Cost data on a number of terrorist attacks conducted by the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA) is evident in Andrew (2009), who highlights that a bomb in Bishopsgate, London, 
on 24 April 1993 caused damaged estimated at £350 million (ibid., p.783), a bomb on the Isle 
of Dogs in February 1996 caused £85 million worth of damage (ibid., p.794), and a bomb in 
Manchester City Centre in June of that year that caused approximately £450 million worth of 
damage (ibid.).  In relation to the Manchester City Centre attack, another study suggests that 
the loss of turnover from local businesses was estimated at £50 million and the rebuilding 
programme cost over £500 million (Williams et al., 2000).  In relation to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, 2001, in the United States of America (USA), Coaffee (2009a, p.165) states 
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that insurance losses from the attacks totalled over $40 billion, figures that appear 
conservative considering Lenain et al‟s (2002, p.17) assertion that such losses could have 
reached $58 billion.  Whilst Marshall (2002, p.2) highlights that the total costs of the attack 
were estimated at $151 billion, Weidenbaum (2003, p.6) indicates that $135 billion of costs 
were incurred overall, which is in stark contrast to the figure spent in mounting the attack, 
which was estimated at approximately $500,000 (resulting in costs of $270,000 being 
incurred for every $1 spent in mounting the operation, using Weidenbaum‟s (ibid.) figures; 
$320,000 for every $1 using Marshall‟s (2002, p.2) figures).  The devastation that can be 
caused by such attacks is most evident when considering the attack on Manchester City 
Centre in 1996 (Gregory, 2007a, p.187).  Insurance claims following the attack on the Baltic 
Exchange in the City of London in 1992 were even greater than those made following the 
Manchester attack, reaching approximately £800 million (Andrew, 2009, p.782).  What is not 
evident is how these costs might have been affected if CTMs had been incorporated into all 
the buildings and local area.   
 
2.3.3.2 The cost-effectiveness of mitigating terrorist attacks 
Whilst studies highlight examples where the incorporation of CTMs successfully resulted in 
the saving of lives and less damage than would have been caused if such measures had not 
been incorporated (e.g. Andrew‟s (2009, p.772) account of a mortar attack on 10 Downing 
Street in 1991), there is a lack of data on the cost-effectiveness and additional benefits of 
CTMs themselves (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1128; Stewart, 2010, p.30; Harre-Young et al., 
2009, p.1291; Little, 2004a, p.56).  Whilst Cherry et al. (2008, p.87) provide an indication as 
to the potential benefits of certain actions and measures in improving crime and security and 
rates their cost and effectiveness in terms of being low, medium or high, such assertions are 
not evidenced.  Stewart (2008, p.119), based on preliminary economic analysis in 
comparison to hurricanes and seismic hazards, asserts that the incorporation of CTMs can 
be cost-effective for buildings that will incur significantly high damage or which face a specific 
threat (such as key governmental institutions).  These findings are concurred in future 
studies (Stewart, 2011; Stewart, 2010), with the most recent study asserting that a minimum 
of 10% of a building‟s costs should go towards substantial risk reduction (Stewart, 2011).  
Harre-Young et al. (2010, p.1125) question whether organisational CTMs would be the most 
cost-effective, through the use of Business Continuity Planning (BCP) in order to enhance an 
organisation‟s preparedness, response and recovery.   
Whilst the Multihazard Mitigation Council (2005) and Armitage (2000) provide indications of 
what could be expected in relation to other resiliency measures (Bosher and Kappia, 2010, 
p.1149; Harre-Young et al., 2009, p.8) and literature highlights contributing factors to the 
cost-effectiveness of such measures, such as the process of the design stage in which they 
are incorporated (CPNI, 2010, p.14; HM Government, 2010c, p.10), informed or reasoned 
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accounts remain elusive.  Furthermore, considering the inter-related nature of the hazards, 
threats and major accidents that the built environment is at risk from, neither are studies 
forthcoming in providing research in relation to these issues and how they relate to the 
protection of the built environment itself.  Harre-Young et al. (2009, p.8) indicate that those 
studies form a base from which a more holistic account of what benefits and consequences 
such measures can bring and to whom can be developed.   
Fussey (2011b, p.164) explains that two of the most significant and recent influences in the 
shaping of the built environment have been the threats of crime and terrorism, with terrorism 
becoming one of the most high profile societal threats (Bosher et al., 2007b, p.242).  This is 
evident despite terrorism being a relatively small risk compared to hazards in terms of 
likelihood (NaCTSO, 2010c, p.6; Bosher et al., 2009b, p.801; Bux and Coyne, 2009, p.2937; 
Stewart, 2008, p.119; Beall, 2007, p.5; Briggs and Edwards, 2006, p.30).  Drawing on the 
specific scope of this research and in relation to CTMs specifically, in the forthcoming 
sections and chapters it will be made clear that despite such influences (and Government 
strategy that seeks their incorporation – see Harre-Young et al., 2009), further research is 
needed.  With the aforementioned fragmentation of the construction industry (Bosher and 
Dainty, 2011, p.6) and the objective of „least cost‟ being a key decision-making principle 
(Devine-Wright et al., 2003, p.46), a greater understanding of terrorism is required, as is an 
understanding of counter-terrorism and how the such practices and the incorporation of 
CTMs contribute to the resilience agenda, in terms of their benefits and consequences. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted that from a construction perspective, there are numerous risks 
that face organisations, each of which require attention in their own right.  However, a 
plethora of design considerations are evident in the agendas of those who design, construct 
and operate the built environment.  A range of hazards, threats and major accidents pose a 
risk to the built environment and, as a result of the way in which it has been designed and 
maintained, the vulnerability of built assets has become apparent.  DRM and the resilience 
have emerged in recent years to address such vulnerabilities and the mitigation of potential 
impacts, with the notion that human beings, not nature, are the cause of disasters (Mileti, 
1999, p.12), most notably through the way in which the built environment is designed.  There 
is, therefore, a role for those who are responsible for the design, construction and operation 
of the built environment to incorporate resiliency measures into vulnerable places.   
Whilst legislative requirements and incentives aid in the mitigation of such risks, of growing 
concern has been the nature in which the terrorist threat in particular is mitigated, most 
notably in relation to concerns regarding cost and return on investment, design and 
permeability, user experience, and environmental concerns.  However, little is known 
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regarding what measures can be used to protect such assets, with their incorporation into 
crowded places being seen as most important, due to the nature of the threat against them 
and the potential harm that can be caused through their destruction.  The UK government is 
encouraging those responsible for the protection of public places to incorporate CTMs into 
building designs where appropriate (Bosher and Kappia, 2010; Harre-Young et al., 2010; 
Harre-Young et al., 2009). However, numerous and wide-ranging issues are evident in 
incorporating such measures (Harre-Young et al., 2009, p.1289) and they therefore require 
further attention, as whist there is an increasing range of information on these issues, there is 
a lack of suitable guidance on them, most notably in relation to their proactive mitigation 
(Bosher et al., 2008, p.6).  The following chapters therefore aim to explore the relationship 
between counter-terrorism and the built environment further, in order to research what CTMs 
can be used to protect such places, as well as their inherent performance and consequences, 
in order to provide such guidance. 
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3.0 Counter-Terrorism and the Protection of Crowded Places 
The UK‟s history of terrorism is evident in a range of literature (Silke, 2011, p.12; HM 
Government, 2009b, p.3; Keane and Esper, 2009, p.4; Makarenko, 2007, p.37; Loukaitou-
Sideris et al., 2006, p.735; O‟Brien and Read, 2005, p.354; Elliott et al., 1992, p.287).  As 
highlighted by Richards (2011, p.189):  
“The British are, of course, no strangers to the threat of terrorism” 
The threat of terrorism exists in relation to three areas, those being Northern Ireland-related 
terrorism, international terrorism and domestic extremism.  Literature on these threats will 
now be explored, leading to discussions on the UK‟s counter-terrorism strategy and the 
implications it has on the design, construction and operation of the built environment. 
 
3.1 The Terrorist Threat 
Whilst the UK may not be a „stranger to terrorism‟, it faces threats of longstanding and of 
relatively recent emergence.  Northern Ireland-related terrorism has been evident in political 
and security discourses for decades, as has the relatively lower threat of domestic extremism 
(and the occurrence of other threats).  However, the emergent threat from international 
terrorism that has emerged has dominated such discourses in recent years.  Crowded places, 
transport infrastructure and critical national infrastructure are being structurally and non-
structurally protected, which has ramifications on their design and experience.  Explorations 
of the threats are therefore required to understand why these places are considered 
vulnerable and why such actions are being undertaken. 
 
3.1.1 The threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism 
“It is an absolutist ideology with no room for compromise on complete independence, 
with the use of „physical force‟ seen as the means to achieve its political objectives” 
(Richards, 2007, p.82) 
The threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism is synonymous with a protracted terrorist 
campaign that targets crowded places and critical national infrastructure on the mainland.  
While a protracted campaign had been carried out in Northern Ireland, it was felt that the 
campaign was not resulting in sufficient pressure on the British Government and therefore, 
the campaign was extended to England (Coaffee, 2003a, p.75).  The use of violence was 
concentrated in Northern Ireland, but in February 1974 the PIRA began a mainland UK 
campaign, through the targeting of a coach carrying soldiers, an attack which claimed twelve 
lives (Andrew, 2009, p.624) and marked the beginning of decades of terrorist plots and 
attacks.  Evident in the campaign was the targeting of economic points (Andrew, 2009, p.655; 
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Coaffee, 2009a, p.7; Coaffee, 2003c, p.67) and critical national infrastructure (Andrew, 2009, 
p.795), as well as transport infrastructure and crowded places (Cherry et al., 2008, p.77; 
Dolnik, 2007, p.3).  Although there may not have been a coherent strategy encompassing the 
targeting of economic key points (Andrew, 2009, p.695), there was a growing risk posed by 
PIRA (Cole, 2010a, p.18; Briggs, 2005, p.24).  As highlighted by Dolnik (2007, p.3), between 
1991 and 1999, 81 explosive devices were left on the British underground and railway 
systems. PIRA deployed a range of methods including the use of VBIEDs, mortar attacks 
and assassinations (Wilkinson, 2007a, p.13) and attacked the same target more than once 
(Andrew, 2009, p.644), but arguably the most prominent attack that was carried out was the 
attack on Manchester City Centre in 1996 (Harre-Young et al., 2009, p.1286), an attack that 
caused over £500 million of damage (Williams et al., 2000).  The latest edition of the UK‟s 
counter-terrorism strategy (see section 3.2) highlights that over the past two years, the threat 
from such terrorism has increased, with 40 terrorist attacks being carried out in 2010, and 16 
having been carried out up to the 30th June 2011 (HM Government, 2011b, p.5).  More 
recently, assassinations, VBIEDs and an IED that was thrown into the bank have been 
reported (BBC, 2011a; BBC, 2011b).  Hence, the threat posed by Northern Ireland-related 
terrorism is not just seen as continuing to pose a threat (CPNI, 2010, p.3), but is seen as a 
growing concern (HM Government, 2010f, p.41). 
 
3.1.2 The threat from Al Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters 
“Al-Qaeda is the most dangerous international terrorist network in the history of 
modern terrorism. This is because of its commitment to mass killing and economic 
destruction and disruption, and because it has absolutist religio-political beliefs which 
make it incapable of political pragmatism and compromise” (Wilkinson, 2007b, p.34) 
The UK Government asserts that the principal threat from international terrorism is and will 
continue to come from Al Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters (Cabinet Office, 2012; HM 
Government, 2010a, p.28; HM Government, 2010f, p.41).  The most notable differences 
between the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism and this particular threat are 
suicide attacks (Richards, 2011, p.189; Makarenko, 2007, p.51; Wilkinson, 2007b, p.30) and 
mass casualties (CPNI, 2010, p.3; HM Government, 2010a, p.28; Wilkinson, 2007b, p.32).  
Although such differences are evident, most notably demonstrated by the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001, Al Qaeda also aspires to use other methods of attack, including 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons (HM Government, 2010a, p.28; 
British Council for Offices, 2009, p.142; Littlewood and Simpson, 2007, p.59; Makarenko, 
2007, p.52; Wilkinson, 2007b, p.30).  As with the methods of attack used by the PIRA, 
Wilkinson (2007b, p.32) asserts that targets and tactics that are deemed as successful are 
returned to.  In 2003, as many as 100 suicide bombers were reportedly residing in the UK, 
many of whom are likely to be supporters of Al Qaeda (Makarenko, 2007, p.51).  While the 
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leadership of Al Qaeda is at its weakest since the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, 
threats still remain from supporters and groups based on their ideology (HM Government, 
2011a, p.9).  Arguably, the support for such groups has risen due to the „war on terror‟.   
“it is simply ignoring reality to deny that the invasion and occupation have been a big 
boost for Al-Qaeda and a setback for the coalition against terrorism” (Wilkinson, 
2007b, p.28) 
The „war on terror‟ has been exploited by Al Qaeda through the use of the conflict to boost 
their propaganda and increase the „divide‟ between the coalition and Muslim communities 
(Makarenko, 2007, p.40; Wilkinson, 2007c, p.373; Briggs, 2005, p.22).  Arguably therefore, 
as the terrorist threat has implications for the design, construction and operation of the built 
environment (as will be explored in forthcoming sections and chapters), so does the „war on 
terror‟ (Coaffee et al., 2009a, p.262). 
 
3.1.3 Domestic extremism and other threats 
Although no attacks have been carried out in relation to animal rights extremism, considering 
that such experimentation continues, so too will the threat of such attacks being carried out 
(Richards, 2007, p.107).  More recently, threats in relation to crime and disorder have been 
evident, through the undertaking of protests that have resulted in public disorder and criminal 
damage, as well as the widespread rioting that occurred in UK cities in August 2011, which 
resulted in a range of criminal damage and looting of retail outlets (BBC, 2011c).  Between 
January 2009 and December 2010, over 600 people were arrested in the UK for terrorist-
related offences (including in relation to Northern Ireland-related terrorism), more than any 
other country in Europe (HM Government, 2011b, p.5). 
 
3.1.4 The evolution of the terrorist threat 
“Terrorism and counterterrorism are evolutionary processes; once one side gets used 
to certain tactics and developed countermeasures, the other side has to innovate and 
develop new ones, and so on” (Stephens, 2009, p.7) 
There is a constant change in relation to the targeting and protection of evolving assets.  
However, as is evident in relation to the methods of attack adopted in relation to Northern 
Ireland-related terrorism and by Al Qaeda, specific sectors or individual places have been 
targeted repeatedly (Andrew, 2009, p.644; Wilkinson, 2007b, p.32).  The inherent 
vulnerability of the built environment to terrorism is a factor that will continue to result in its 
targeting (Little, 2004a, p.53).  However, as was evident in the terrorist attacks that occurred 
in Mumbai, which involved the use of firearms and hostage-taking, terrorist threats will 
continue to evolve (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1128) as well as be sustained (Clarke and 
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Soria, 2009, p.51; Jenkins, 2001, p.1; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001, p.2524).  What has been 
questioned however, is the extent to which recent evolutions in the terrorist threat, most 
notably the fear of Mumbai-style attacks, will influence security policies (Coaffee, 2009b, 
p.350). 
 
3.2 The UK’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism 
The UK has had a counter-terrorism strategy since 2003, known as CONTEST, which aims 
to reduce the risk of terrorism so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with 
confidence (HM Government, 2011a, p.9; Coaffee, 2010, p.944; Harre-Young et al., 2009, 
p.1285; HM Government, 2009a; HM Government, 2009b).  CONTEST is organised around 
four strands, those being „Pursue‟, the stopping of terrorist attacks taking place; „Prevent‟, 
stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; „Protect‟, the 
strengthening of targets; and „Prepare‟, the mitigation of and preparedness for an attack 
(ibid.).  In 2009, Jonathan Evans (Director General of the UK‟s Security Service (MI5)) added 
that there was a fifth „P‟, perseverance, in an address to Security Service staff (Andrew, 2009, 
p.828).  This, along with the notion of „Prepare‟, alludes to recognition that it may not be 
possible to prevent every terrorist attack that is planned (Silke, 2011, p.12).  The most recent 
edition of CONTEST, published in July 2011, reiterates the objectives of the strategy 
(although more emphasis has emerged on „Prevent‟) and sets out the Government‟s aims for 
the coming years (see HM Government, 2011a; HM Government, 2011b).  Gregory (2007b, 
p.326) highlights research in 2003 that found that the absence of a publicly available 
Government counter-terrorism strategy was criticised, as was the absence of a public 
terrorism threat system.  Such a system, along with CONTEST, now exists and is publicly 
available (see for example www.MI5.gov.uk for up to date information).  The system is based 
on five levels of threat (as shown in Figure 3.1) and corresponds with the enforcement of 
three security levels (as shown in Figure 3.2).   
 
Figure 3.1. UK terrorism threat levels (NaCTSO, 2009b, p.57) 
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An attack is expected imminently
An attack is highly likely
An attack is a strong possibility
An attack is possible but not likely
An attack is unlikely
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Figure 3.2. Corresponding terrorism threat and response levels (NaCTSO, 2009b, p.57) 
Assessments of the threat level is made by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, a centre 
represented by staff from various departments, with the threat levels being designed to 
indicate the likelihood of a terrorist attack and the response levels providing an indication as 
to the extent of security measures that should be applied at any given time (HM Government, 
2006).  Most pertinent to the design, construction and operation of the built environment is 
„Protect‟, as it encompasses the protection of critical national infrastructure, crowded places 
and the transport system, both within the UK and in relation to interests overseas (HM 
Government, 2009a, p.106).  Therefore, whilst CONTEST is non-statutory, the „Protect‟ 
strand has implications for those who are responsible for the design, construction and 
operation of such places (Coaffee, 2010, p.941; Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1123; Harre-
Young et al., 2009, p.1285).  This is congruent with the paradigmatic shift reported by Bosher 
and Dainty (2011, p.13) that has begun to reform how such risks are managed.  A further 
example of such change is highlighted by Coaffee (2010, p.953) who asserts that the 
publication of a suite of guidance documents aimed at the protection of crowded places (HM 
Government, 2010b-d), following a consultation period, denotes a more reflective approach 
to counter-terrorism and how issues such as proportionality, aesthetics and design are being 
considered. 
 
3.2.1 Protecting crowded places 
“National policy makers and the security services now perceive attacks against 
crowded public places as one of their key priorities in the ongoing fight against 
terrorism” (Coaffee et al., 2008, p.105) 
As highlighted in the previous sections, the threats from terrorism that are faced in the UK, 
both in terms of Northern Ireland-related terrorism and the threat from Al Qaeda, show that 
crowded places have been targeted and attacked repeatedly.  While their inherent 
vulnerability (due to their „soft‟ or typically unprotected nature) is a considerable factor 
influencing their targeting, so too is their symbolism of modern-day capitalist living (Fussey, 
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2011a, p.93; Moller, 2007, p.192; Zilbershtein, 2005, p.807; Bleiker, 2003, p.430; Warren, 
2002, p.614).  The definition of a crowded place, purported by HM Government (2010b, p.3) 
is: 
“a location or environment to which members of the public have access that may be 
considered potentially liable to terrorist attack by virtue of its crowd density” 
In terms of a definitive list of such places, HM Government (2010d, p.9) assert that crowded 
places comprise bars, pubs and night clubs, restaurants and hotels, shopping centres, sports 
and entertainment stadia, cinemas and theatres, visitor attractions, major events, commercial 
centres, the health sector, the education sector and religious sites/places of worship.  A 
plethora of plots targeting such places are evident in the literature, including the targeting of 
nightclubs, pubs and shopping centres (Andrew, 2009, p.817) and the intended use of 
radiological materials and firearms (HM Government, 2009b, p.7).  Of all the publicly evident 
cases of terrorism since 2001, transport infrastructure and/or crowded places have always 
been targeted (Clarke and Soria, 2009).  Harre-Young et al. (2009) add that plots before and 
after the studied period still conformed to the same principles.  The emergence of the threat 
towards crowded places is also evident in a range of other literature (Coaffee, 2010, p.942; 
HM Government, 2010b-e; Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1121; RIBA, 2010, p.5; Coaffee et al., 
2008, p.103; Gilbert et al., 2003, p.45).  Evident too is the prominent use of VBIEDs (see 
Clarke and Soria (2009) for details of recent plots), due to their relatively low cost but severe 
consequences, making them one of the most effective methods of attack (Bosher and Kappia, 
2010, p.1143; CPNI, 2010, p.15; HM Government, 2010c, p.5; British Council for Offices, 
2009, p.109; Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.12; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.45; Coaffee et al., 2008, 
p.103).  The use of multiple VBIEDs (or the additional use of other IEDs), during the same or 
simultaneous/sequential attacks is also a possibility (Zilbershtein, 2005, p.807). 
 
3.2.2 Organisations and initiatives 
In order to enhance the security of the UK, a number of organisations and initiatives nave 
been established, i.e. the CPNI and NaCTSO, together with a variety of free-to-attend 
projects.   
 
3.2.2.1 The CPNI and Government Security Advisers 
The CPNI is the Government authority that provides advice on the protection of critical 
national infrastructure from terrorism and other threats, in relation to physical, personnel and 
information security (CPNI, 2011).  The CPNI publishes a range of guidance documents on 
protective security and the protection of assets from terrorism (CPNI, 2010; CPNI, 2007; 
CPNI, 2005), the most recent (and relevant) being a guide specifically advising on integrated 
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security in relation to vehicle-borne threats (CPNI, 2011).  The latest edition of the Protecting 
Against Terrorism series (CPNI, 2010), has one stark difference to its predecessor (CPNI, 
2005), that being the prominence and emphasis given to security culture.  Whereas the 2005 
edition incorporated information on the importance of security culture within and in relation to 
personnel security, it is now a section in its own right and is woven through the entire 
guidance document.  Again, this reflects the recognition of the inter-related nature of risks 
and the over-arching cultures and principles that are required to successfully and holistically 
mitigate them.  Within the CPNI are Government Security Advisers (GSAs), who use 
intelligence regarding terrorist threats and are therefore ideally suited to advise on the 
protection of assets and potential threat methodologies.   
 
3.2.2.2 NaCTSO and Counter Terrorism Security Advisers 
“The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) is a police unit 
responsible for raising awareness of the terrorist threat and for encouraging the 
implementation of protective security measures to reduce the risk and impact of a 
terrorist attack” (HM Government, 2010d, p.12) 
In order to achieve the above, NaCTSO co-ordinate, train and task a network of Counter-
Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs), who are trained to assess the risks faced by crowded 
places and advise on their protection (NaCTSO, 2011, p.1; HM Government, 2010d, p.5).  
NaCTSO have created a vulnerability self-assessment toolkit (available from their website; 
www.nactso.gov.uk), and have also published a range of „counter-terrorism protective 
security‟ guidance documents, for each of the crowded place sectors (NaCTSO, 2006a-
2011). NaCTSO have also produced booklets on insurance, business continuity and risk 
management (NaCTSO, 2010a-c), and have produced a self-assessment tool for assessing 
vulnerability for businesses, which is available from their website.  CTSAs become involved 
in the protection of crowded places either through direct liaison and engagement by 
stakeholders involved in projects, or through referrals by Police Architectural Liaison 
Officers/Crime Prevention Design Advisers, who provide crime risk management advice (HM 
Government, 2010b, p.11).  As asserted by HM Government (2010d, p.22): 
“Many sites across the crowded places sectors have briefed their staff on the 
identification of hostile reconnaissance by suspected terrorists, either through Project 
Argus, Project Griffin or Operation Lightning” 
 Project Argus is a table-top exercise, produced by NaCTSO and delivered by CTSAs, 
that takes businesses (as well as a range of other stakeholders, such as designers), 
through a simulated terrorist attack, prompting discussion and exploration of 
vulnerability and mitigation (HM Government, 2010d, p.23).  The events are free of 
charge, being delivered within businesses themselves or at local or regional events. 
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 Project Griffin is a Police initiative that accredits security personnel to improve their 
skills and knowledge in relation to counter-terrorism, most notably in the identification 
of hostile reconnaissance and the deterrence and detection of crime (HM 
Government, 2010d, p.24). 
 Operation Lightning is a Police-coordinated operation, specifically dealing with the 
identification of and response to hostile reconnaissance, in order to gather 
intelligence and investigate suspicious activity (HM Government, 2010d, p.24). 
The incorporation of physical measures into the built environment in order to deter and 
mitigate the impacts of various crimes has occurred throughout history (Briggs, 2005, p.68).  
In contrast, the incorporation of CTMs has only occurred relatively recently, but the related 
discourse is informed by the plethora of literature on the topic.  How the use of such 
measures emerged will therefore be explored, through their present-day use and envisaged 
incorporation into broader agendas of resilience.  Although the protection of crowded places 
may be promoted and envisaged, a number of factors influence whether such places are 
protected.  Furthermore, factors also influence the value attributed to CTMs. 
 
3.3 Counter-Terrorism and the Built Environment 
While the use of „fortress architecture‟ and „defensible space‟ have been highlighted as being 
extensively used in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s and 1980s to territorially control 
areas (Coaffee, 2004b, p.201), the use of such measures arguably emerged beforehand, 
through the onset of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).  CPTED is 
a design concept that asserts the improvement of public safety through the design of 
physical environments, in order to influence human behaviour (Coaffee, 2009a; Gunning and 
Josal, 2004; Thompson and McCarthy, 2004; Crowe, 1991).  It emerged as a result of 
increasing disillusionment with existing frameworks for the management of crime (Cozens et 
al., 2001, p.147) and encompassed the consideration of territoriality, surveillance, access 
control, target hardening, image and maintenance, as well as the encouragement of activity 
(Cozens et al., 2005), as shown in Figure 3.3.  Studies into CPTED found that the 
incorporation of its principles reduced crime levels and the fear of crime, as well as 
increasing property values and investments in areas where such principles had been 
incorporated (ibid., p.341).  More recent studies have incorporated gender sensitivity into 
CPTED (see Beebeejaun, 2009; DeKeseredy et al., 2009), but the most notable 
advancement has been in relation to the creation of Secured By Design (SBD).  SBD is 
based on physical security, surveillance, access and egress, territoriality, management and 
maintenance (Armitage, 2000), integrating CPTED principles into housing design, which was 
adopted by the Association of Police Officers in the 1980s (Coaffee, 2009a, p.22).   
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Figure 3.3. The seven elements of CPTED (Moffat, 1983, p.23) 
The initiatives lead to a discourse of „defensible space‟, which purported to „design out‟ crime 
through the incorporation of specific measures, or the removal of various features (ibid., p.4).  
Such notions of defensible space then transcended into the specific context of counter-
terrorism, with such principles being used in attempts to „plan out‟ terrorist attacks from 
occurring in Northern Ireland, by incorporating what became known as „rings of steel; 
(Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006, p.505).  Following its perceived success and due to the 
embarking of a mainland terror campaign by the PIRA, a „ring of steel‟ was set up to protect 
the City of London (Coaffee, 2003c, p.69).  The „ring of steel‟ evolved over the coming 
decades in alignment with the nature of the terrorist threat that was faced (Coaffee, 2009a; 
Coaffee, 2003a) and additional means of protection were sought, most notably through urban 
planning and design. 
 
 3.3.1 Urban design and counter-terrorism 
“Urban planning and design is increasingly seen as a universal remedy to an ever-
increasing array of socio-economic problems, policy priorities, and risk and threats 
facing contemporary society” (Bretherton and Coaffee, 2009, p.35) 
Coaffee et al. (2009b, p.489) assert that such measures have traditionally territorially 
controlled areas, through the regulation, restriction and controlling of access, and ensuring 
they were covered by surveillance, but such methods have major implications for the 
experience of such places.  However, complexity is evident in the merging of these methods 
with principles of urban design.  Defining urban design as the process of making better 
places than would have otherwise been produced (Carmona et al., 2003, p.3) and it being 
everything that you can see „out of the window‟ (Tibbalds, 1988, p.1), it is evidently apparent 
how everything that could be seen could be the „enforced territoriality‟ alluded to above.  
Furthermore, with the assertions that better urban design adds value in three ways, those 
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being by increasing the economic viability of developments, delivering enhanced social 
benefits and by encouraging environmentally-supportive development (Carmona, 2004, 
p.119), the implications that the incorporation of CTMs has in relation to this requires 
consideration.  Rogers and Coaffee (2005, p.323) assert that government policy has been 
concerned with making the environment of cities more attractive as a whole, whilst also 
improving safety and security.  HM Government (2010b, p.5) states that the incorporation of 
counter-terrorism into the built environment is to be achieved within the overall aim to create 
high quality public places.  However, Coaffee (2010, p.940) notes: 
“…we need to consider the „physical‟ changes brought about through 
counterterrorism measures being embedded in the urban landscape as a result of 
heightened terror threat levels” 
 
3.3.1.1 Fortress UK? 
The aforementioned „physical changes‟ are apparent in the literature, including notions that 
the incorporation of counter-terrorism into urban design has resulted in the militarisation of 
places and spaces, demised the iconography of cities and buildings, decentralised them, 
increased fear and impeded civil liberties.  Much literature alludes to the relationship between 
counter-terrorism and urban design resulting in the „militarisation‟ of urban space, through the 
use of CTMs that were used in Northern Ireland and London, such as barriers, access 
control and surveillance systems (Coaffee, 2008a, p.300; Benton-Short, 2007, p.430; 
Németh and Schmidt, 2007, p.283; Briggs, 2005, p.70; Coaffee, 2005, p.448; Graham, 
2001a, p.415).  The demise of iconography is raised as a concern due to the potential for 
buildings to be punctuated by an „architecture of fear‟, or become the subject of anonymous 
design (Coaffee and O‟Hare, 2008, p.176; Coaffee, 2003c, p.64).  Furthering the issue of 
iconography and an apparent dichotomy between it and counter-terrorism, Briggs (2005, 
p.71) asserts that: 
“The point at which iconic buildings and ambitious designs seem dangerous decisions 
is precisely the moment we need to embrace them more enthusiastically than ever 
before” 
Coaffee (2009a, p.63) states that cities are becoming spatially and socially restructured, 
incorporating a territorial order that controls and organises space.  Such a perspective is also 
evident in the earlier work of Coaffee (2005, p.448; 2003c, p.64), as well as that of Atkinson 
and Flint (2004).  The creation of „exclusion zones‟ and „gated communities‟ is argued as 
being explicit in the incorporation of CTMs, fragmenting the urban landscape as opposed to 
creating a cohesive (or more „open‟) design.  The emblematic nature of CTMs is cited in a 
range of literature, with authors asserting that there is a disproportionate feeling of fear 
(considering the relatively low likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring compared against 
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other risks), which is influenced by the aforementioned militarisation of urban space 
(Richards, 2011, p.190; Németh and Hollander, 2010, p.22; Button, 2007; Grosskopf, 2006, 
p.7; Troutman, 1997, p.147; Marcuse, 1997, p.102) as well as the nature of its reporting by 
the media (Coaffee and Van Ham, 2008, p.191; Mythen and Walklate, 2006, p.123; Briggs, 
2005, p.29).  As surmised by Wolfendale (2007, p.75): 
“…many of the current counterterrorism practices pose a greater threat to individual 
physical security and well-being than non-state terrorism. We should fear 
counterterrorism more than we fear terrorism” 
The impediment and diminishing ethical accountability in relation to civil liberties was evident 
in Coaffee (2009a, p.254; 2008a, p.304; 2004, p.209; 2003c, p.64) and Vesilind (2003, p.71), 
with the authors claiming that the incorporation of CTMs will occur at the expense of the 
aforementioned accountability, most notably through the „creep‟ of such measures having 
begun to „surge‟.  Whilst there is considerable literature on the aforementioned issues, the 
apparent tension between urban design and counter-terrorism, and the loss of public space 
(Németh and Hollander, 2010, p.24), as asserted by Németh and Schmidt (2007, p.283), few 
studies have empirically tested such perspectives.  Németh and Hollander (2010, p.24) 
showed that across three cities in the USA, approximately 17% of publicly accessible space 
was either closed or severely restricted.  Furthermore, they assert that the measures used to 
enforce such restrictions were „fading into the background‟ (ibid., p.31); becoming increasing 
„invisible‟. 
“This is an important lesson: it is possible to convert security zones into usable and 
useful public spaces” (Németh and Hollander, 2010, p.32) 
Furthermore, Coaffee (2010, p.940) highlights that the forthcoming US Embassy specifically 
seeks not to be associated with notions of „fortification‟, through the incorporation of ponds 
and gardens, instead of fences and walls.  The challenge for stakeholders is to create 
crowded places that incorporate CTMs yet maintain quality of place (RIBA, 2010, p.3).   
 
3.3.1.2 Invisible counter-terrorism 
However, part of the emblematic nature of CTMs is to show that places have been protected 
(Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1124; Coaffee et al., 2009b, p.495), yet as alluded to above, the 
incorporation of „invisible‟ CTMs is apparent, through the incorporation of landscaping and 
nature as opposed to security-explicit barriers.  Whilst its synergy with urban design is 
evident, how such measures relate to the symbolic notion of protection is not.  Briggs (2005, 
p.77) asserts that the „toning down‟ of such measures has been subject to significant 
attempts in recent years and is even evident in the published designs of public areas 
(National Capital Planning Commission, 2002).  Coaffee et al. (2009, p.499) highlight that 
there is an indicative spectrum of visible security, ranging from overt security features (target 
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hardening and fortress architecture), to stealthy security features (such as street furniture 
and water features), through to „invisible‟ security features, such as sacrificial façades.  
Whilst it should be noted that the invisibility of CTMs is not necessarily an objective in its own 
right, certain scenarios will purposefully seek to incorporate visible measures (Coaffee et al., 
2009, p.490; Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, p.80; Zilbershtein, 2005, p.812), the evolution of 
such measures from their traditional beginnings is an important development (Briggs, 2005, 
p.70), especially considering the range of criticisms previously highlighted.  Evident, however, 
are concerns and contrasting opinions regarding the perceived vulnerability of places that 
incorporate such measures, as it could be argued that the use of invisible measures could be 
perceived by its users as being vulnerable to attack (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.499; Zilbershtein, 
2005, p.812).  Yet, Guidry (2007, p.69) highlights that it can alleviate such fears and enhance 
the quality of the area.  The effectiveness of such measures is also raised; Coaffee, O‟Hare 
and Hawkesworth (2009, p.506) highlight that the use of such CTMs has been widely 
publicised.  The publication of the whereabouts of, as opposed to the existence of, such 
CTMs could denote that aesthetics and user experience is a key objective, but it could be 
argued that the use of invisible CTMs could reduce the risk of being attacked as much as 
entirely visible CTMs would, as hostile reconnaissance would identify that the place could not 
be attacked (using certain methods of attack).  What is evident is that the visibility of such 
measures, perceptions of them and the consequences of their use requires further research 
and clarification (Zilbershtein, 2006, p.810). 
 
3.3.2 Towards a turquoise agenda 
The notion of a „turquoise agenda‟ refers to the work of Perelman (2008), who suggested that 
the discourses of security (the blue agenda) and sustainability (the green agenda) were 
currently handled separately, when in fact a challenge exists to develop a new infrastructure 
doctrine that integrates the synergies of both, whilst addressing any trade-offs and therefore 
reaching a „turquoise‟ design theory.  As highlighted in Chapter Two, there has been a 
paradigmatic shift in the way that hazards, threats and major accidents are managed in the 
UK (Bosher and Dainty, 2011, p.10; Coaffee, 2009a, p.298), most notably through the 
emergence of resilience as the key discourse in relation to security, as well as being an 
objective of individual buildings and society more generally.  Perelman (2008) asserts that 
this is the essence of the „turquoise agenda‟, also referred to as resilience; the merging of 
security concerns with the broader goals of sustainability and sustainable development.  
Defining sustainable development as encompassing economic development, social 
development, and environmental protection (Baker, 2008, p.1; Zimmerman, 2008, p.3; Folke 
et al., 2002, p.7), the role of resilience in these objectives is evident.  As asserted by Coaffee 
(2008b, p.4636): 
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“In future decades it is most likely that the sustainability agenda will provide the most 
appropriate policy vehicle for the achievement of resilience, with security seen as an 
essential element of corporate and organisational responsibility alongside economic, 
environmental and social concerns” 
This notion is also evident in UK government policy, with security being held as a key 
component of the government‟s sustainability agenda (Fussey et al., 2011, p.32) and in other 
literature (Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, p.75; Zimmerman, 2008, p.1).  However, while such an 
approach may be evident, how it is carried out in practice, is not (Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, 
p.76).  Coaffee and Bosher (ibid.) assert that there are a number of synergies in relation to 
security and environmental sustainability and that such influences are one way in which their 
integration will be ensured.  Holderman and Harris (2008, p.6) state that such an approach 
will only be achieved if their respective advocates make it happen, with security and 
sustainability converging specifically in the area of urban infrastructure (Zimmerman, 2008, 
p.1), linking directly to notions of urban resilience: 
“In summary, security and sustainability need not be mutually exclusive. We possess 
the knowledge and capability to do both, and to do them well. However, this will not 
occur without a conscious and persistent effort to identify and achieve multiple 
objectives” (Little, 2008, p.10). 
There is a plethora of literature on the perceived consequences of traditional counter-
terrorism approaches, which includes contradictory accounts of the militarisation and 
fortification of urban spaces.  However, none of these identify the range of CTMs that are 
available (rather, they focus on individual examples and specific implications).  Literature on 
the development and emergence of „invisible‟ CTMs raises the prospect of synergies 
between urban design and counter-terrorism, as well as the potential enhancement of the 
user experience, through the seemingly un-impinged design and permeability of places and 
spaces.  Coupled with the shift that has been evident in the UK, moving from the 
management and mitigation of individual risks on a case-by-case basis, through to broader 
notions of resilience, the value of CTMs in this regard requires attention.  However, prior to 
the development of a typology that begins to identify CTMs and their inherent performance 
and consequences, the influences on the protection of crowded places are explored in 
section 3.4 and influences on the value of the CTMs themselves are covered in section 3.5. 
 
3.4 Influences on the Protection of Crowded Places 
“…there appear to be a number of long-standing disagreements among built 
environment professionals regarding the desire and practicalities of terror-proofing 
urban areas and embedding such resilience into the practices of urban regeneration” 
(Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, p.79) 
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Coaffee and Bosher (ibid.) go on to assert that there are three key issues in relation to the 
above, those being proportionality, acceptability and cost, and aesthetics.  The relation of the 
quote to the four prominent agendas that have been previously identified are clear, i.e. 
acceptability referring to user experience, cost relating to the costs of the CTMs themselves 
(as well as any return on investments), and aesthetics relating to un-impinged design and 
permeability.  Environmental and energy concerns are also raised, with the authors debating 
the synergies and conflict between „security‟ and „sustainability‟ agendas.  Whilst the 
aforementioned agendas appear to be at the forefront of the minds of the stakeholders who 
are responsible for the design, construction and operation of the built environment, seven 
factors have been identified that influence whether such places are protected from terrorism 
or not, those being obligations, incentives, threat and risk assessments (TARAs), perceptions 
and moments of terrorism, economic influences, local policy and building stock rotation.  As 
well as this, two factors that influence the value of CTMs themselves were identified, those 
being TARAs and stakeholder engagement and understanding.  To present all these 
influences and how they relate to the protection of crowded places and the value of CTMs, 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 provide an illustrative summary of a theoretical framework, as well as the 
inherent relationships that result in the protection of crowded places and the influences on 
the value of CTMs used to protect such places.  The literature behind the influences that can 
determine whether such places are protected is examined in section 3.4 and the influences 
on the value of CTMs is examined in section 3.5.  As shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, seven 
influences on the protection of crowded places were evident in the literature, those being 
obligations, incentives, TARAs, perceptions and moments of terrorism, economic influences, 
local policy and building stock rotation. 
 
3.4.1 Obligations 
Whilst CONTEST and its four strands are non-statutory (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1123; 
Harre-Young et al., 2009, p.1289), a number of obligations are apparent in terms of 
legislation and insurance, as well as moral obligations to protect crowded places from 
terrorist attack. This section will explore and analyse the literature on each of these factors. 
 
3.4.1.1 Legislative obligations 
The legislative context in which the protection of crowded places from terrorist attack is not 
clear (Coaffee and O‟Hare, 2008, p.178), but a number of sources infer that there are legal 
responsibilities to protect such places that can result in prosecution and liability if an attack 
occurs (CPNI, 2011, p.46; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.5; Veale, 2009, p.291), as well as the possible 
requirement to submit plans and procedures to inquiries after an incident occurs (British 
Council for Offices, 2009, p.149).   
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Figure 3.4. The skeleton theoretical framework  
the protection of 
crowded places
obligations to 
protect crowded 
places
incentives to 
protect crowded 
places
perceptions 
and moments 
of terrorism
economic 
situation
local policy
building stock 
rotation
threat and risk 
assessments
stakeholder 
understanding & 
engagement
the value of 
incorporating
CTMs
influences on the protection 
of crowded places
influences on the value of CTMs 
used to protect crowded places
42 
 
 
Figure 3.5. An expanded skeleton framework
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The main benefit of implementing legislative requirements is the increase in resilience of a 
place or space (Tomlinson and Nelson, 2010, p.51; Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, p.75; Ling 
and Soh, 2005, p.278; Spence, 2004, p.391), an absence of any such requirements results in 
those who are responsible for the design, construction and operation of the built environment 
to avoid incorporating such resiliency measures, regardless of their perceived cost and/or 
benefits (Coaffee and O‟Hare, 2008, p.179).  However, as stated by Coaffee and Bosher 
(2008, p.79): 
“…the forced adoption of counter-terrorist principles within design could lead to less 
visibly pleasing architecture and the increased control of access to public space” 
Such sentiments were also evident in Ling and Soh (2005, p.277), who asserted that such 
„impositions‟ could present stakeholders from obtaining maximum returns on their investment.  
Prominent in the literature, however, are perceived legislative requirements relating to four 
different Acts, the two most prominent being the Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Act of 1992 and the Corporate Homicide and Corporate Manslaughter Act of 2007. 
 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Act 1992 
“Current legal opinion implies that this legislation may be interpreted to include the 
safety of employees when there is a threat of a terrorist act or other violent act” 
(Veale, 2009, p.290) 
The opinion that the aforementioned legislation can be interpreted to include protection from 
terrorist attack is also evident in Fussey (2011b, p.165), CPNI (2010, p.4), British Council for 
Offices (2009, p.148) and the Home Office (1999, p.8).  The implication is that „duty of care‟ 
in the legislation does encompass terrorist acts and „appropriate procedures‟ include the use 
of CTMs (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.148).  Veale (2009, p.291) provides an example 
of legislation used in the event of a terrorist attack, by highlighting that the New York Port 
Authority was found to be negligent in protecting the World Trade Center prior to the 1993 
terrorist attack, after receiving advice from UK and US sources that the parking was 
vulnerable to attack. 
 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
“…companies, organisations and, for the first time, governmental bodies as a 
collective face an unlimited fine, a publicity order and a remedial order if they are 
found to have caused death due to gross corporate health and safety failures (Adams, 
2009, p.70) 
This Act implies that senior management within an organisation will be seen as responsible 
for any breaches in duty of care obligations that fall below what would be reasonably 
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expected (ibid.; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.ix; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.6; Veale, 2009, 
p.ix).  Direct legal action can have significant implications for organisations, including 
compensation (not covered by insurance) and reputation (NaCTSO, 2009b, p.6). 
 
Other legislation 
Veale (2009, p.291) thinks that two further items of legislation should also be considered, 
those being the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007, which clarify risk 
management duties in relation to buildings throughout their lifecycle, and the Construction 
Products Directive of the European Community, which requires products to be fit for their 
intended use, including injury from explosion.  The British Council for Offices (2009, p.ix) 
asserts that the Sustainable and Secure Building Act gave the UK Building Regulations the 
potential to cover security aspects in relation to building design.  Future developments in 
relation to this will need to be monitored. 
 
3.4.1.2 Insurance obligations 
“After IRA terrorist incidents in the early 1990s, reinsurance companies withdrew 
cover for claims resulting for terrorist incidents. Insurance companies then introduced 
a terrorism exclusion clause to their policies for commercial property” (British Council 
for Offices, 2009, p.143) 
The exclusion of terrorism from insurance cover, which was also highlighted by Coaffee 
(2009a, p.142), also entailed the exclusion of other threats, such as civil war, riots and strikes 
(British Council for Offices, 2009, p.147).  Cover was generally limited to £100,000, a figure 
that would be inadequate for most commercial properties and as a result, the Pool 
Reinsurance Company was established, consisting of private insurers who were guaranteed 
by the Government (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.143).  Increases in insurance 
premiums resulting from the establishment of the PoolRe scheme were made apparent in 
Fussey (2011b, p.165), Coaffee (2009a, p.153) and Shillum (2008, p.35).  Whilst, as with 
legislation, requiring buildings to incorporate CTMs would increase their resilience and 
reduce the impacts of an attack (Spence, 2004, p.391), where terrorism cover is established, 
shortcomings (or „loopholes‟) in the policies are being exploited (Bleiker, 2003, p.12). 
 
3.4.1.3 Moral obligations 
“During terrorist attacks and other disasters, peoples‟ safety often depends on the 
facilities they occupy” (Sternberg and Lee, 2006, p.1) 
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Where peoples‟ safety is dependent on an organisation, due to vulnerabilities they face, 
there is therefore a moral obligation to (proportionately) protect them from harm.  Little 
(2004b, p.4060) showed that organisations who focussed on such core values and culture 
performed the best in high-risk environments.  The Institute for Public Policy Research (2009, 
p.20) has advocated that Business Continuity Planning (BCP) should be promoted as an 
element of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  Furthering this, the British Council for 
Offices (2009, p.141) contend that: 
“Exercising the „duty of care‟ by ensuring that the office environment is as safe and 
secure as possible is now viewed as an important facet of corporate social 
responsibility” 
Whilst moral obligations are (or should be) a factor in the protection of crowded places from 
terrorist attack, numerous other factors require attention, including the incentives offered by 
protecting such places. 
 
3.4.2 Incentives 
“…security does add value to the bottom line, and it is equally possible to see security 
as „value-added‟ as it is a cost, but it means generating metrics that show that, and a 
commitment to proving that it provides a worthwhile Return on Investment” (Gill, 2007, 
p.28) 
What is the value of incorporating CTMs into organisations and their premises?  What return 
on investment is achievable?  Evident in the literature are six over-arching incentives for the 
protection of crowded places, those being the reduced risk of being attacked, reduced 
impacts of an attack, competitive advantages, revenue generation, conducive agendas and 
possible insurance incentives.  As terrorist attacks are perceived to be of relatively low 
frequency, building a business case for their incorporation can be difficult (Kappia et al., 2009, 
p.630).  This, coupled with the requirement for organisations to finance the incorporation of 
CTMs using their own resources (Grabosky, 2007, p.10), results in a reliance on the 
incentives and benefits of their use to be understood.  However, with no literature presenting 
all the incentives under one, publicly available publication, it would appear such incentives 
are neither widely known nor understood. 
 
3.4.2.1 Reduced risk of attack 
By incorporating CTMs, the risk of an attack will reduce: 
“The intention of such measures is to manipulate the built environment to reduce the 
attractiveness and physical opportunities to access targets while increasing the 
46 
 
likelihood of apprehension and, thus, the chances that an individual will deem the 
offence too risky” (Fussey, 2011a, p.86) 
However, the risk is reduced through displacement, which is the increased risk of an attack 
occurring at another location (spatial displacement), time (temporal displacement) or through 
different methods of attack (tactical displacement).  Such displacement could occur 
deliberately (where displacement is an objective, as opposed to the reduction of risk), or 
unintentionally (Coaffee, 2009a, p.61).  Spatial displacement is the most evident form of 
displacement in the literature, cited by a plethora of studies (Fussey, 2011a, p.89; Fussey, 
2011b, p.173; Steven, 2011, p.158; Coaffee, 2009a, p.25; Stephens, 2009, p.7; Coaffee and 
O‟Hare, 2008, p.176; Meuller, 2008, p.3; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005; Coaffee, 2003c, 
p.74; Raco, 2003, p.1880).  Temporal displacement is cited by Fussey (2011a, p.89), as is 
tactical displacement, which is also evident in the work of Steven (2011, p.158), Stephens 
(2009, p.7), Dolnik (2007, p.13) and Cozens et al., 2001, p.140).  While a recent study has 
questioned the occurrence of such displacement (Kurawski, 2010, p.273), criticism of it as a 
consequence emerged in literature on CPTED (as referred to in section 3.3).  However, as 
stated by Cozens et al. (2005, p.342), it is a consequence (and criticism) of all crime 
prevention strategies.  Evident in the literature however is the symbolism of a potential target 
(Fussey, 2011a, p.93; Fussey, 2011b, p.173; Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1128) and also the 
notion that protecting places from terrorist attack could also increase their attractiveness as a 
target, as through its protection it has highlighted it has „something to protect‟ (Steven, 2011, 
p.159; Zilbershtein, 2005, p.810), with a resulting escalation in the tactics used to attack such 
a place (Steven, 2011, p.159).  Whilst there are cases where incorporating CTMs reduces 
the risk of an attack and displaces that risk (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1124; Coaffee, 
2003a, p.26), research has shown that targets can be attacked repeatedly (Andrew, 2009, 
p.644).  Also intrinsically linked to displacement is the notion of „invisible‟ CTMs (3.3.1.2), as 
it could be questioned whether the use of such measures would attract targeting or increase 
the fears of those who use the area, if they cannot see that they are protected.  As stated by 
Zilbershtein (2006, p.810): 
“This dilemma concerning visibility of security measures, perceived image and 
consequential responses is an area that demands much more research” 
 
3.4.2.2 Reduced impacts of an attack 
“…a small or medium sized enterprise, with a very localised market, could be 
permanently put out of business by a major incident, as happened to about 60 per 
cent of businesses affected by the 1996 Provisional IRA bombing of Manchester” 
(Gregory, 2007b, p.322) 
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The impacts of an attack, as demonstrated above, can be significant.  However, business 
interruption and loss are just one of the impacts that can be felt, with the immediate impacts 
of the blast itself and the resulting debris, long-term health implications and the damage to 
reputation also contributing to the consequences of an attack.   
 
Damage and debris 
Upon detonation of an explosive device, there will be a blast wave, fireball, a shattering effect 
(also known as brisance), damage from debris (primary and secondary fragments) and 
ground shock (CPNI, 2011, p.8; HM Government, 2010c, p.6; British Council for Offices, 
2009, p.164).   
“The most widespread cause of injuries and internal disruption from an external bomb 
blast is the fragmentation and inward projection of window glass” (British Council for 
Offices, 2009, p.169) 
The lethality and potential of glazing is also evident in Be Safe Not Shattered (2011), Fussey 
(2011b, p.166), HM Government (2010c, p.6), RIBA (2010, p.13), Mays and Hadden (2009, 
p.19), Little (2004c, p.66), Jenkins (2001, p.12) and Mallonee et al. (1996, p.382).  
Consideration should also be given to structural collapse (HM Government, 2010c, p.6) and 
other short-term or long-term debris (HM Government, 2010c, p.6; Mays and Hadden, 2009, 
p.15; Park and Alderson, 2004, p.9.5).  Such damage is not necessarily confined to the 
immediate vicinity of the explosion either, as glass can break 500m away, based on a „car 
bomb‟ (Be Safe Not Shattered, 2011), with impacts being felt 8km away when the „lorry bomb‟ 
exploded in Manchester City Centre in 1996 (Williams et al., 2000, p.296).  The impact of any 
explosion will increase with the density of the surrounding area (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002, 
p.206; Williams et al., 2000, p.296). 
 
Business interruption and loss 
The extent to which business interruption and loss occurs will be dependent on the size of 
the device itself, the effects of the explosion, the nature of buildings (as alluded to above) 
and the wider area that is impacted.  Such impacts will occur in relation to lives lost and 
direct property damage (Multihazard Mitigation Council, 2005, p.2), disruption costs (Bosher 
and Kappia, 2010, p.1149; CPNI, 2010, p.4; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.9) and the 
cost of the response itself (CPNI, 2010, p.4; Multihazard Mitigation Council, 2005, p.2).  As a 
result of the Manchester City Centre bombing, approximately 60% of businesses that were 
affected went out of business completely (Gregory, 2007b, p.322); loss of turnover from local 
businesses was estimated at £50 million and the subsequent rebuilding cost over £500 
million (Williams et al., 2000).  1,200 properties were affected, 672 businesses were 
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displaced and over 100,000m2 of office and retail space was immediately decommissioned, 
as well as damage occurring to residential properties, local transport infrastructure (ibid., 
p.297).  2,500 workers were temporarily laid off, with “a few hundred” losing their jobs 
permanently (ibid., p.298). 
 
Health implications 
Health implications are evident, even for those who were not present or directly impacted by 
the attack (Schuster et al., 2001), most notably due to public panic (Durodié and Wessely, 
2002, p.1901), cardiac arrest (Williams et al., 2000, p.297), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) and depression (Galea et al., 2002, p.952) and resulting absenteeism for 
organisations (Howie, 2009a, p.51). 
 
Reputation 
“The reputational damage of a security breach is something that will concern all 
senior management – the loss of trust following a failure to protect staff, clients or 
even data may prove difficult to recover” (CPNI, 2010, p.4) 
Apparent in the literature was the value companies now place on reputation and brand, as 
shown above but also by Fussey (2011b, p.165), Fussey et al. (2011, p.136), Veale (2009, 
p.292), Briggs (2005, p.55), Curtin et al., 2005, p.x) and Spencer and Winch (2002, p.41).  
Reputation can be damaged prior to an attack, based on inadequate security, as well as after 
an attack in the procedures that were in place and how effective they were in dealing with the 
attack (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.141).  As is evident from the above, the 
consequences an attack can have are profound, resulting in an incentive to ensure they do 
not occur or are mitigated.  Literature on how reputation and brand can be enhanced and 
therefore provide an incentive to protect crowded places is discussed next. 
 
3.4.2.3 Competitive advantages 
The incorporation of resiliency measures (not just CTMs) as a competitive advantage is 
evident in Bosher et al. (2009a; 2007a) and Hamel and Valikangas (2003).  Bosher et al. 
(2007a, p.172) assert that those in the construction sector should embrace and pre-empt 
regulatory change, using it as an opportunity for competition within sectors by incorporating 
CTMs and broader resiliency measures.  Considering economic influences such as 
downturns, any advantage to increase proposal success would be more welcome and could 
simply entail the consideration of certain resiliency measures, as opposed to extensive 
incorporation, showing greater consideration as to the longevity and design of the places and 
spaces.  In the following section, revenue generation from CTMs will be explored; a factor 
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that could increase the benefits of incorporating them into proposals and seeking the 
aforementioned competitive advantages: 
“Threats to the built environment should not be seen as problems but as opportunities 
to develop and provide niche products and solutions related to hazard mitigation” 
(Bosher et al., 2009a, p.18) 
Whilst the above highlights the advantages for those who design, construct and operate the 
built environment, the advantage for businesses to incorporate them (clients or tenants) are 
furthered by Briggs and Edwards (2006, p.18), who assert that security is not merely about 
increasing safety and/or perceptions of it, it is one of the most important sources of 
competitive advantage evident today.  This is reinforced by Hamel and Valikangas (2003, 
p.63): 
“Any company that can make sense of its environment, generate strategic options, 
and realign its resources faster than its rivals will enjoy a decisive advantage. This is 
the essence of resilience. And it will prove to be the ultimate competitive advantage in 
the age of turbulence” 
 
3.4.2.4 Revenue generation 
Not only can the incorporation of CTMs themselves generate revenue, (see Coaffee (2005, 
p.462) for an example of the congestion charge incorporated around the City of London), 
their incorporation can lead to increases in reputation and branding (HM Government, 2010c, 
p.34; Coaffee et al.,2009a, p.215; Coaffee and Van Ham, 2008, p.192), as organisations and 
crowded places can become synonymous with security, enhance their reputations and as a 
result, increase their income through repeat business (thus also leading to possible 
competitive advantage).  Whilst not evident in the literature, it is possible that rental 
premiums could be charged, due to the increased resilience of the buildings themselves, as 
Cozens et al., 2005, p.341) found that property value increases were evident in areas that 
had incorporated CPTED principles into their designs. 
 
3.4.2.5 Conducive agendas 
Considering other agendas that normally influence the design, construction and operation of 
the built environment can also be conducive to counter-terrorism, through providing 
opportunities and synergies to incorporate CTMs whilst enhancing buildings or areas in other 
ways.  Pedestrianisation, regeneration, environmental enhancement and adopting a holistic 
approach are examples of this and are evident in the literature. 
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Pedestrianisation 
“it is possible to convert security zones into usable and useful public spaces” (Németh 
and Hollander, 2010, p.32) 
Through pedestrianisation (the synergy with counter-terrorism being traffic exclusion), the 
safety and security of a wider area could be protected, benefitting more places (HM 
Government, 2010c, p.12), also possibly resulting in a more cost-effective solution.  Welsh et 
al., 2010, p.301) say that through pedestrianisation and increased street usage, natural 
surveillance is increased.  Also evident is how pedestrianisation itself can lead to 
regeneration; as the RIBA (2010, p.16) highlight an example of a project where 
pedestrianising an area for counter-terrorism purposes encouraged cafes, restaurants and 
bars into the area in the long-term; hence the protection of crowded places can increase 
footfall and the revenue of businesses in the protected area. 
 
Regeneration 
“Many cities are now overtly linking security to urban regeneration” (Coaffee, 2009a, 
p.86) 
Such a perspective is also adopted by Fussey et al. (2011, p.109), RIBA (2010, p.16), 
Coaffee and Rogers (2008a, p.215; 2008b, p.107) and Raco (2003, p.1870).  Such 
regeneration can occur across varying spatial scales, with examples of the immediate vicinity 
surrounding crowded places being presented by RIBA (2010, p.16), through to multiple and 
wider spatial scales, as is evident with the merging of regeneration and security in relation to 
the Olympic Games that will be held in London (and elsewhere in the UK) in 2012 (Fussey et 
al., 2011, p.109).  The consequences of merging such agendas can increase the 
attractiveness of areas themselves, especially in relation to being able to host large-scale 
events (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008b, p.107). 
 
Holistic approach 
By not just focussing on the protection of individual crowded places, or even on a specific 
method of attack, more cost-effective solutions can be incorporated, as wider areas could be 
protected (resulting in potential pedestrianisation and regeneration benefits), as well as 
providing an increased deterrent through showing a higher level of consideration in relation 
to the protection of a given area (Little, 2004a, p.56).  CPNI (2011, p.14) highlight the 
importance of adopting a holistic approach in terms of site security, to ensure that individual 
CTMs do not compromise other measures/initiatives.  
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Environmental enhancement 
“…one way to ensure that security features are embedded in an acceptable and 
appropriate manner within planning and design is by integrating such considerations 
with ideas of sustainability and reduced energy consumption” (Coaffee and Bosher, 
2008, p.80) 
The incorporation of counter-terrorism (as well as security more broadly) with environmental 
enhancements is evident in a range of literature (HM Government, 2010c, p.12; Coaffee and 
Bosher, 2008, p.80; Coaffee, 2003c, p.79; Marshall, 2002, p.6).  Coaffee (ibid.) and Marshall 
(ibid.) highlight how excluding and restricting traffic from a given area can decrease pollution, 
a benefit that could result in an increase in users due to improved air quality (Marshall, 2002, 
p.6).  For further information on other synergies between security and sustainability, see 
Coaffee and Bosher (2008). 
 
3.4.2.6 Insurance incentives 
Whilst potential obligations under insurance policies were explored in section 3.4.1.2, 
insurance can be used to incentivise the protection of crowded places from terrorist attack, 
as well as increase the resilience of buildings and areas more broadly.  The insurance 
industry is arguably a key influence in the protection and resilience of such places, through 
their ability to regulate and control the incorporation of such measures (Crichton, 2008, p.130; 
Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005; Gloyn, 1994, p.12).  Insurance policies cannot cover all 
losses, such as lost information and reputation (NaCTSO, 2010a, p.24; 2010c, p.12), but the 
potential for reduced insurance premiums is clear if protective measures are incorporated 
(Bosher and Kappia, 2010, p.1149; Marshall, 2002, p.6), as is the competitive advantages to 
be gained by those who incorporate CTMs through reduced excesses and premiums from 
insurers.  Arguably however, the PoolRe scheme (as discussed in section 3.4.1.2) acts as a 
disincentive for such action, as loss is underwritten by the Government.  However, it could 
also be argued it acts as an incentive, as the reputations of organisations are highly valued, 
therefore it arguably attracts them to protect intangible elements using their own resources.  
As stated by the British Council for Offices (2009, p.x): 
“On the face of it, insurers would appear to be a logical way of encouraging security 
because, ideally, it should reward those who adopt protective measures by reducing 
their insurance premiums to reflect the decreased risks… Unfortunately, the 
commercial insurance market does not follow this practice… However, it is worth 
noting that adopting additional security measures should reduce the likelihood of 
claims on policies and thus could reduce premiums in the long-term” 
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3.4.3 Threat and risk assessments 
TARAs can influence whether crowded places are protected or not, as the outcome of such 
an assessment could be to re-locate (to a less vulnerable or attractive area), or that the risk 
of an attack is low enough to not warrant the incorporation of CTMs; although literature fails 
to highlight this.  However, also evident in the literature is how TARAs can influence the 
value of CTMs used to protect crowded places.  TARAs encompass factors in relation to the 
assessments themselves (section 3.4.3.1), the assessment of the terrorist threat (section 
3.4.3.2), situational context (section 3.4.3.3) and proportionality (section 3.4.3.4).   
 
3.4.3.1 The assessment 
The British Council for Offices (2009, p.13) states there are seven steps to TARAs, those 
being: 
1. Assess the threat potential 
2. Quantify the threat potential 
3. Assess the impact or consequences of the threat being carried out 
4. Quantify the impact or consequences of the threat being carried out 
5. Assess the level of risk and risk appetite 
6. Allocate a management strategy 
7. Decide on appropriate mitigation measures 
The need for engagement between stakeholders is also apparent, as organisations will need 
to not just understand their own business, but also the external threats (CPNI, 2010, p.8; 
Tomlinson and Nelson, 2010, 51; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.13).  As stated by 
Tomlinson and Nelson (2010, p.52): 
“The threat and risk assessment (TARA) is the foundation for all subsequent security 
planning and design work. It is therefore vital that a properly researched, bespoke 
TARA is commissioned, and done in the concept design stage” 
As highlighted in section 3.4.3, the outcome of such a TARA could be to re-locate or choose 
another location to design the required building and should therefore be carried out before a 
site is chosen (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.88).  Yet, it will also influence those 
designs, inform the CTMs (and other resiliency measures) to be incorporated, inform 
organisational plans and procedures, as well as influence overall resilience (British Council 
for Offices, 2009, p.10).  Therefore, if such an assessment is not carried out properly or 
proportionately, the level of influence, the operational requirements and robustness of 
physical CTMs and the quality of plans and procedures could be inappropriate and 
disproportionate to the threats (and other threats and hazards) that are faced (see CPNI 
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(2007) for further information on processes for identifying the operational requirements of 
CTMs). 
 
3.4.3.2 Situational context 
The uniqueness of each crowded place and their surrounding area is commonly cited in 
literature; such factors influence the vulnerability and protection of those places (CPNI, 2011, 
p.1; Cole, 2010b, p.48; Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1121; Lavy and Dixit, 2010, p.561; 
Coaffee et al., 2008, p.107).  The nature of the occupier was also raised, as some 
businesses will be at greater risk than others due to their operations or the number of people 
that they accommodate (CPNI, 2010, p.7), as was the nature of the building itself, as 
historical or heritage buildings would require greater considerations in terms of security to 
ensure their protection (Park and Alderson, 2004, p.9.5).  Adjacent and surrounding buildings 
was also cited, as dense or narrow streets and areas can exacerbate the impacts of blast 
(Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.14), glazing can provide numerous hazards for building 
occupants and evacuees (RIBA, 2010, p.13; Little, 2004b, 66) and the topography and layout 
of the area and buildings will influence the vehicle-borne threats that could be faced, as well 
as their consequences (Forman et al., 2009, p.257).  Existing or planned utilities and 
services will also influence the value of CTMs, as certain circumstances could constrain the 
CTMs that could be used and how they could be installed (ibid., p.272), or could result in the 
relocation and diversion of the utilities themselves that could be achieved, albeit at a cost 
(Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1126).  The nature of the wider area itself can influence the 
value of CTMs: targets of terrorist attacks (or perceived targets) could be in the vicinity, so  
nearby buildings could also be at risk (CPNI, 2011, p.46; HM Government, 2010c, p.3; 
Tomlinson and Nelson, 2010, p.54; Kemp, 2007, p.611; Briggs and Edwards, 2006, p.38; 
Zilbershtein, 2005, p.808). 
 
3.4.3.3 The terrorist threat 
The assessment of the terrorist threat itself can also influence the value of CTMs, as not 
assessing the risk highly enough can result in under-engineered CTMs and vulnerable 
crowded places, and assessing the risk as higher than it is could lead to over-engineered 
and obtrusive CTMs (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1126).  Whilst consideration should also be 
given to the influence that perceptions can have in the assessment of terrorist threats and 
decisions to protect crowded places (see section 3.4.4), how it is assessed also needs to be 
considered.  Although commenting on the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
threat, Littlewood and Simpson (2007, p.58) highlighted that: 
“Difficult as it may be to admit, those outside the intelligence and counter-terrorism 
community or without access to such information are in many cases simply guessing” 
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This highlights the need for GSAs and CTSAs (as discussed in section 3.2.2).  While specific 
intelligence is unobtainable, precedence can be sought from previous terrorist attacks and 
plots, which have predominantly involved VBIEDs in the UK (see section 3.1).  Assessing 
this particular threat requires understanding of different vehicle-borne threats (those being 
parked vehicles, encroachment of unfinished or vulnerable protection, penetrative attack, as 
well as the use of duress and/or deception) (Forman et al., 2009).  By understanding the 
terrorist threat (as much as possible), CTMs can therefore be designed to the most 
appropriate and proportionate blast and impact loading (ibid.).  As stated by Veale (2009, 
p.292): 
“Understanding the terrorists‟ intentions and capabilities – what they might do and 
how they might do it – is crucial to assessing the threat” 
Assessing the intentions and/or capabilities incorrectly, as previously highlighted, could result 
in under-engineered and vulnerable or over-engineered and obtrusive CTMs (Harre-Young et 
al., 2010, p.1126), which could undermine or nullify any value obtained through the use of 
CTMs. 
 
3.4.3.4 Proportionality 
“Although many stakeholders apparently agree that these allocations should reflect 
the magnitude of risks to which different areas are exposed, no consensus has 
emerged on how this might be accomplished” (Willis et al., 2005, p.vii) 
This quote captures the issues in relation to proportionality.  While an intrinsic connection to 
the assessment of risk and terrorist threats is evident, due to possible under-engineered and 
over-engineered outcomes, how proportionality is derived is unclear.  The subjective and 
contextually-specific nature of each crowded place, occupiers and users, as well as adjacent 
and surrounding areas, results in a complex set of circumstances that must be assessed in 
order to achieve a proportionate outcome.  As highlighted by Dainty and Bosher (2008, 
p.363): 
“…the way in which resilience should be built-in is entirely contingent on context” 
Even though security advice asserts that crowded places should be protected proportionately 
(CPNI, 2011, p.5, and 2010, p.14; HM Government, 2010b, p.5, and 2010d, p.5; British 
Council for Offices, 2009, p.39), no processes are offered to aid those responsible for the 
design, construction and operation of crowded places in assessing objectively what is and 
what is not proportionate. 
“Because terrorist threats are not easily quantifiable, it is difficult to determine the 
“right” level of security.  Using cost-benefit analysis as the sole criterion to determine 
the level of security is inadequate” (Jenkins, 2001, p.2) 
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Assessing the cost-effectiveness of varying approaches is more achievable on a case-by-
case basis (Stewart, 2010, p.29; Elliott, 2009, p.5; Willis et al., 2005, p.xv), the value put on a 
human life is one of many questions in determining damages and costs that an attack could 
incur (Stewart, 2010, p.32).  Considering that the statistical likelihood of a crowded place 
being attacked is essentially zero and the number of targets is essentially infinite (Meuller, 
2008): 
“If no real immediate threat exists, and yet nothing can ever be ruled out, how much 
security is enough?” (Dolnik, 2007, p.15) 
What is evident is a lack of literature on the assessment of proportionality, but also an 
acknowledgement that the public only see the CTMs, not the threats that cause their 
incorporation  Such gaps in knowledge contribute to the under-engineering and vulnerability, 
as well as the over-engineering and obtrusiveness, of crowded places (Harre-Young et al., 
2010, p.1126) and as a result, their influence on the value of CTMs can be significant.  
Further research is required in order to provide clarification on these issues, or further debate 
and knowledge in relation to them. 
 
3.4.4 Perceptions and moments of terrorism 
“It is said that when Tony Blair watched the events of 9/11 unfold on CNN, he 
became convinced that the terrorist strike had “changed the world forever”. In one 
sense he has been proven right and not because it has already led to the invasion of 
two countries; more that the fear of further attack has been embedded in the public 
consciousness. People now think about terrorism in a way they simply did not before” 
(Regan 2006, p.22) 
Statements like this in relation to the impact of 9/11 are evident in the literature (Rigakos et 
al., 2009, p.286; Rypkema, 2003, p.9; Briggs and Edwards, 2006, p.28); as evidenced in 
Briggs (2005, p.10): 
“We might question whether September 11 was the point of change or the moment of 
realisation of what had been taking place over the last decade” 
Such a perspective is also adopted by McEntire et al., 2010, p.50) and Little (2008, p.1).  
What is evident is the sheer scale of implications of such attacks, also including the 
Lockerbie terrorist attack (George and Whatford, 2007, p.158), Bali bombing (McDonald, 
2005, p.308), the attacks on the London Underground in 2005 (Fussey et al., 2011, p.144; 
Coaffee, 2010, p.939; Briggs and Edwards, 2006, p.29), the attacks in Mumbai (Coaffee, 
2009b, p.348) and the attempted suicide attack on an airplane in 2009 (more commonly 
referred to as the „underwear bomber‟ plot) (Shenoi, 2010, p.1).  Tierney and Bruneau (2007, 
p.14) highlighted that such implications were also evident as a result of Hurricane Katrina in 
56 
 
August 2005. Immediately after such events, feelings of fear were cited (Fussey et al., 2011, 
p.138; Blalock et al., 2008, p.1728; Thissen, 2004, p.315; Berube and Rivlin, 2002, p.19).  
Such fear, or its prediction, are evident in numerous articles, with the associations of cities 
being under siege being evident in Catterall (2001, p.383), Friedmann (2001, p.391) and 
Marcuse (2001, p.394), all of which were, most notably, published in 2001.  In a study on 
transport patterns, Blalock et al., 2008, p.1717) showed that due to travellers responses to 
the attacks of September 11th 2001, as many as 2300 road deaths were attributable to the 
attacks, due to fear of flying.  A plethora of literature details the appearance of CTMs and 
security measures as a result of those attacks (Gerstenfeld and Berger, 2011; Coaffee et al., 
2009a, p.221; Coaffee and O‟Hare, 2008, p.176; Benton-Short, 2007, p.442; Hollander and 
Whitfield, 2005, p.244; Little, 2004a, p.52; Coaffee, 2003c, p.64; Marcuse, 2001, p.395).  
However, whilst the measures literally „appeared overnight‟ (Little, 2008, p.1), their use was 
as a result of an increase in agendas and policies that were already in existence, as opposed 
to being „new‟ technologies to which the incident lead to their sudden implementation 
(Coaffee, 2009a, p.3; Janz, 2008, p.202; Manunta, 2007; Briggs, 2005, p.71; Lyon, 2003, 
p.666; Warren, 2002, p.614).  Whilst the securitisation of space increased (Guidry, 2007, 
p.55), the attacks also instigated wide-ranging policy changes, although arguably, they too 
were little more than extrapolations of ongoing trends as opposed to „new‟ political directions 
(Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006, p.507).  Most prominent were changes to and creation 
of counter-terrorism legislation and policies (Klausen, 2009, p.403; Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 
2006, p.727; Wulf et al., 2003, p.429; Lyon, 2003, p.666; Light, 2002, p.607), as well as in 
relation to security policies more broadly (Fowler and Sen, 2010, p.1; Coaffee and Van Ham, 
2008, p.191; Thompson and McCarthy, 2004, p.2.1).  The economic consequences of such 
acts resulted in considerable attention (Richardson et al., 2007; Frey et al., 2007, p.2; Bruck 
and Wickstrom, 2004), as did specific policies in relation to critical national infrastructure 
(Medonça and Wallace, 2006; Bunn and Bunn, 2002, p.1), transport (Cox et al., 2011, p.307; 
Elzawi and Eaton, 2010, p.278; Rigakos et al., 2009; Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2006, p.727) 
and „mega-event‟ and „sport mega-event‟ planning (Fussey et al., 2011, p.2; Ciulianotti and 
Klauser, 2010, p.53; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010, p.49; Toohey and Taylor, 2008, p.451).  
Returning to counter-terrorism, evident in the literature was the questioning of whether de-
centralisation should occur, with debates on urban sprawl, the defensive dispersal of 
concentrated areas and the abandonment of building tall buildings (Ling and Soh, 2005, 
p.265; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005, p.40; Godschalk, 2003, p.138; Harrigan and Martin, 2002, 
p.107; Graham, 2001a, p.414; Lorch, 2001, p.415).  As asserted by Graham (2001a, p.414): 
“The iconic power of the skyscraper that has been exposed as a flawed and arrogant 
building type which inevitably builds deep vulnerabilities into the cityscape” 
However, as noted by Regan (2006, p.23) and Coaffee (2004b, p.208), „tall building‟ policies 
have remained.  Terrorist attacks (as well as the manifestation of other threats and hazards) 
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can evidently have significant implications as to whether vulnerable places are protected.  
However, as perhaps demonstrated by the „tall buildings‟ issue above, immediate reactions 
are not enduring, partially due to a short-term focus (Andrew, 2009, p.848) and the fading of 
memories (Gloyn, 1994, p.16).  In relation to changing perceptions, Howie (2007, p.70) 
states: 
“As its meaning changes over time perceptions of the phenomenon take the form of 
its most recent and popularised occurrences” 
How such occurrences are popularised is partially dependent on the media (Howie, 2009a, 
p.8; Wolfendale, 2007, p.86; Briggs and Edwards, 2006, p.30), with Howie (2009a, p.104) 
asserting the „everydayness of terror news‟ that is now evident.  However, whilst such news 
may appear every day: 
“There have been no attacks by international terrorist groups or individuals 
associated with them in the UK during the period covered by this report. This does 
not reflect the absence of a threat; rather it reflects the resources and capabilities put 
in place to deal with it” (HM Government, 2010e, p.27) 
In July 2011, the UK‟s threat level was lowered from „severe‟ (where it had been since 
January 2010), to „substantial‟ (Security Service, 2011).  This, coupled with the death of 
Osama Bin Laden, the identification and targeting of other senior Al Qaeda leadership and 
the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda being „within reach‟ (BBC, 2011d), will unquestionably have 
an influence on perceptions of the terrorist threat in the UK, although the extent and 
implications of the influence are yet to be seen.  Rigakos et al. (2009, p.299) suggest that 
there is a „bipolar reaction‟ to the terrorist threat, either believing it to be a serious concern or 
a problem confined to other cities.  Whilst there is some logic in this, as an organisation could 
believe it is at high risk, or not, their perceptions are influenced heavily by a range of factors 
that have been explored above.  As stated by Little (2008, p.3): 
“there can be little question that current concerns about terrorism and the risk it poses 
to individuals or society are shaped as much by perception as by objective risk 
assessments” 
 
3.4.5 Economic influences 
Whether crowded places are protected from terrorist attack is also about ability as opposed 
to intentions, as CTMs have cost implications, that may be unaffordable and scrutinised in 
times of budgetary limitation and economic downturn (HM Government, 2010a, p.21; Coaffee 
and Bosher, 2008, p.81; Mignone, 2007, p.5409; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005, p.141; 
Swanstrom, 2002, p.138; Carmichael and Gartell, 1994, p.9). 
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3.4.6 Local policy 
Local policy can influence whether crowded places are protected, as different constituencies 
or even regions could have different policies in relation to whether, or how, such places are 
protected.  Coaffee and Murakami Wood (2006) highlight how „rings of steel‟ historically 
entered policy due to their use in relation to „defensible space‟ and also through attempts of 
planners to „plan out‟ terrorism in Northern Ireland.  Whilst security and resilience have been 
increasingly embedded in urban planning and design (Coaffee, 2008b, p.4633), scepticism 
regarding proportionality, acceptability, cost and aesthetics are evident in the minds of those 
responsible for the design, construction and operation of such places (Coaffee and Bosher, 
2008, p.79) and therefore influences the perspectives of other stakeholders, including local 
planning units and councils, and how they consider and implement acceptable solutions. 
 
3.4.7 Building stock rotation 
“There are, however, many more existing structures – and corresponding potential 
terrorist targets – than there are new structures coming on line. Thus the 
opportunities and need for protection in existing structures is much greater in existing 
than in new structures” (Marshall, 2002, p.9) 
The majority of terrorist targets, therefore, already exist today (Harre-Young et al., 2010, 
p.1121).  Ravetz (2008, p.4462) asserts that with a building stock rotation of 1-2% a year (the 
accommodation of past and current economic influences is unclear), 75% of buildings that 
will be present in 2050 already exist.  Not only does this induce a requirement to retro-fit 
CTMs into crowded places (including public spaces), it also raises questions in relation to 
adaptability and how changing threats and users of a building can be incorporated into 
designs, when such factors are unknown (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.87) and 
therefore, by its very nature, the protection of such places will occur at a relatively slow pace.  
The aging and vulnerability of building stock will also influence refurbishment or 
decommissioning (Vora et al., 2008, p.602). 
 
3.5 Influences on the Value of Counter-Terrorism Measures 
As shown in Figure 3.4, there were two influences on the value of CTMs, those being TARAs 
(as explored in section 3.4.3) and stakeholder engagement and understanding (section 
3.5.1). 
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3.5.1 Stakeholder engagement and understanding 
Stakeholder engagement and understanding encompasses how and whether stakeholders 
engage with each other (and how such interactions, or a lack of them, can influence the 
value of CTMs), as well as their understanding in relation to CTMs themselves, risk, potential 
vulnerability in designs and training, testing and exercising. 
 
3.5.1.1 Stakeholder engagement 
As was raised in section 2.2.5, there is a definitive role for those who design, construct and 
operate the built environment to protect vulnerable infrastructure from a range of hazards, 
threats and major accidents, but professional fragmentation is a „hallmark‟ of the construction 
industry (Bosher and Dainty, 2010, p.6).  How engagement (or a lack of it) influences the 
value of CTMs will now be explored. 
“Protective counterterrorism in urban areas is no longer just a police and security 
services issue: many professional practice communities, and the general public, are 
being enrolled in the fight against terrorism…we are all counterterrorists” (Coaffee, 
2010, p.953) 
The emphasis here is on responsibility (whether taken on voluntarily or through imposition), 
with design in relation to counter-terrorism involving a plethora of stakeholders (Bosher and 
Kappia, 2010, p.1150; Coaffee, 2010, p.340; HM Government, 2010d, p.16; RIBA, 2010, p.3; 
Coaffee et al., 2008, p.107; Briggs, 2005, p.20; Little, 2004a, p.56; Thompson and McCarthy, 
2004, p.2.1).  Furthermore, there is a particular emphasis on the need for engagement at the 
earliest opportunity, emphasising stakeholders being proactive in identifying the need for, as 
well as the design and incorporation of CTMs (RIBA, 2010, p.3; Tomlinson and Nelson, 2010, 
p.51; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.86; Coaffee et al., 2008, p.107; General Services 
Administration, 2005, p.235). 
“A security department alone cannot „do‟ security for a company or organisation. 
While all these people and entities provide valuable input, experience and structures, 
they are only part of the picture. In reality, security is a participatory activity; without 
the active engagement of the full range of actors, security is patchy and partial” 
(Briggs, 2005, p.20) 
The value of CTMs used to protect crowded places can therefore be influenced in a number 
of ways; if appropriate stakeholders are not engaged, the threat could be assessed 
incorrectly, inadequate or over-engineered CTMs could be purchased, designed and 
incorporated, CTMs themselves could even be misunderstood and incorporated incorrectly, 
leaving vulnerable points in the protection of crowded places (see section 3.5.1.3).  Those 
who are involved in the design, construction and operation of the built environment need to 
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change how they perceive, plan and design, as well as incorporate CTMs (Harre-Young et al., 
2009, p.1289), but it is not clear how they should trade-off issues pertinent to CTMs.  That 
said, Glass (2008, p.180) suggests that architects could invite relevant stakeholders (such as 
security experts) into charette-type meetings in order to enhance the quality of the design 
being produced, as well as enhance their own learning and understanding about designing in 
such measures.  Arguably, such an approach would facilitate the relatively expedient 
identification of potential solutions and their relative value and implications, aiding in 
understanding how they relate to the various needs and aspirations of the stakeholders 
involved, of which the architect is of paramount importance in understanding (Emmitt, 2007, 
p.11; Lawson, 2006, p.30), thereby identifying potential issues or costs that could occur or 
influence a project later on in the process (Forman et al., 2009, p.252).  Earlier identification 
and assessment of potential solutions could also facilitate opportunities to incorporate 
communal security arrangements (CPNI, 2010, p.14), potentially increasing the cost-
effectiveness of the CTMs used.  The need for inter-professional solutions and inter-
disciplinary perspectives is clear in relation to the protection of such places (Bosher and 
Kappia (2010, p.1146): 
“Achieving a positive relationship between counter-terrorism and the built 
environment will rest on our ability to find ways of bringing together those who design 
spaces with those who secure it and those who use it” (Briggs, 2005, p.85) 
 
3.5.1.2 Understanding of CTMs 
The literature suggests a need for greater understanding of CTMs, most notably in relation to 
perceptions of „target hardening‟, the relationship between CTMs and „lesser‟ crime 
prevention measures, as well as the understanding of what CTMs can be used to protect 
crowded places.  As will be shown in Chapter Four, the protection of crowded places 
involves more than just „target hardening‟; three categories of CTMs can be used, those 
being external to the building (hostile vehicle mitigation), as a part of the building itself 
(protective construction) and as a part the occupiers‟ business operations (planning, 
detection and procedures).  Even within „protective construction‟, whilst target hardening is 
evident, other CTMs can be incorporated that do not inherently involve the „hardening‟ of 
particular assets.  Yet, target hardening is cited in a plethora of sources (Silke, 2011, p.12; 
Fussey, 2011a, p.86, and 2011b, p.164; Steven, 2011, p.158; British Council for Offices, 
2009; Stephens, 2009).  Cozens et al. (2005, p.338) claim that excessive use of such 
hardening measures can create a fortress mentality, but so too could the use of the term, as 
well as the measures themselves.  If perceptions of CTMs are that they all result in target 
hardening, criticisms in relation to the symbolism of, and fear emanating from, CTMs will 
remain. 
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Also evident is the assertion that measures used for crime prevention (such as CPTED or 
SBD, as referred to in section 3.3) are not appropriate for counter-terrorism purposes 
(Fussey, 2011a, p.86; Forman et al., 2009, p.251; Zilbershtein, 2005, p.807), most notably 
due to different psychological mindsets, especially when considering the threat of suicide 
attacks (Coaffee et al., 2008, p.107; Roach et al., 2005, p.7; Zilbershtein, 2005, p.814).  
Coupled with the complexity that is inherent in the protection of crowded places (see for 
example, section 3.4.3.2 on situational context) is a lack of knowledge on what CTMs exist 
and can be incorporated into the protection of such places, which only exacerbates the 
potential for such places to be designed or retro-fitted in vulnerable or over-engineered ways 
(Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1128).  A typology of CTMs is therefore required that not only 
identifies what CTMs can be used, but also identifies their relative value and systemic 
implications in order to provide and inform solutions to the aforementioned problems (ibid.).  
Such a typology is initiated in Chapter Four. 
 
3.5.1.3 Vulnerable points in protection 
“There is also a danger that we place misguided trust in technology to deliver security, 
forgetting that technological „kit‟ is only as effective as the socio-technical systems it 
is employed within, and the humans operating it” (Briggs, 2005, p.24) 
Not only can such issues result in vulnerable points in the protection of crowded places, 
thereby potentially nullifying any value of CTMs used to perform such functions, but the 
design of CTMs themselves could also lead to such vulnerability, if for example, CTMs used 
to prevent hostile vehicles from being able to travel through to a certain area are spaced too 
far apart, or not at the right height, facilitating their encroachment and the overcoming of 
such obstacles.  Literature on requirements of CTMs will be presented in Chapter Four; see 
also CPNI (2011) and Forman et al. (2009) for further information in relation to encroachment 
and types of vehicle-borne threat. 
 
3.5.1.4 Training, testing and exercising 
“Too many plans are based around what the company would like to happen in a crisis 
rather than what might happen…On paper the plans may appear to work fine. 
However, the real test would be in a crisis situation. During a real crisis is not the time 
to be testing procedures for the first time” (Curtin et al., 2005, p.155) 
Unless CTMs (such as those evident in the planning and procedures of organisations) are 
tested and tested properly, their value could be nullified (Dolnik, 2007, p.17; French, 2006, 
p.13).  Apparent is a lack of literature on how the testing of such CTMs could influence their 
value, as well as the implications of not undertaking such practices. 
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3.5.1.5 Understanding of risk 
“…no building can ever be considered 100% secure” (Guidry, 2007, p.69) 
Such a notion that „absolute security‟ is impossible is present in a plethora of literature, both 
academic and industrial (CPNI, 2010, p.4; Howie, 2009b, p.101; Veale, 2009, p.290; Meuller, 
2008, p.4; Dolnik, 2007, p.19; Wolfendale, 2007, p.76; Briggs and Edwards, 2006, p.15; 
Elliott, 2009, p.5), as is the notion that risk is the sum of the threat, the vulnerability and the 
consequences (R = T x V x C) (Tomlinson and Nelson, 2010, p.54; Cox, 2008, p.1749; Little, 
2008, p.2).  Its influence on the value of CTMs in terms of over-sensitivity, as such emphasis 
could result in over-engineered and somewhat standardised places (HM Government, 2010c, 
p.9).  In understanding how notions of „absolute security‟ relate to the terrorist threat, HM 
Government (2006, p.1) highlight that therefore, guarantees of attacks not occurring cannot 
be made, yet efforts can be (and are being) made to reduce the risk as much as possible.  Its 
relation to perceptions is also evident (see section 3.4.4), with perceptions of risk rarely 
reflecting reality (Briggs, 2005, p.27).  Whilst there may be risks for which mitigation would be 
neither practical nor realistic (Little, 2004a, p.57), the evident implication is that organisations 
should accept some level of risk and take those risks with a greater level of certainty (Briggs, 
2005, p.40; Lorch, 2001, p.415).  Briggs and Edwards (2006, p.14) offer a comment on those 
advising on the security of organisations: 
“…their role is to help the company to take risks rather than eliminate them, and to 
have contingencies in place to minimise damage when things go wrong” 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The relationship between counter-terrorism and the built environment has been made 
apparent in this chapter, with a literature review highlighting how the relationship emerged 
and developed over time, most notably due to perceived and real changes in the nature of 
the terrorist threats that are faced and their mitigation through urban planning and design.  
Notions of fortress architecture (and „fortress UK‟) and defensible space were explored and 
questioned, leading to recent developments in the use of CTMs the emergence of „invisible‟ 
CTMs in protecting crowded places.  Influences on the protection of such places were 
forthcoming, with obligations, incentives, TARAs, perceptions and moments of terrorism, 
economic influences, local policy, and building stock rotation each influencing whether 
crowded places are protected.  Literature highlights the statutory duties do encompass the 
protection of places from terrorist attack and that, therefore, obligations exist not only under 
moral duties but also under legislation.  Incentives to protect crowded places were presented, 
with reductions in risk and the impacts of an attack, competitive advantages to be gained and 
revenue generation through incorporating CTMs, conducive agendas, and insurance 
incentives cited.  TARAs were noted as influencing the protection of crowded places and the 
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value of CTMs used, as their outcomes can determine whether CTMs are incorporated, as 
well as their robustness and engineering.  Stakeholder understanding and engagement was 
cited as also influencing the value of CTMs, with engagement between stakeholders 
themselves, understanding of CTMs and of risk, vulnerability in design, and testing, training 
and exercising all having the potential to undermine any benefits of the incorporating CTMs.  
Through such discussions, a number of design considerations and agendas have also begun 
to appear, with issues in relation to cost and return on investment, un-impinged design and 
permeability (most notably through the use of „invisible‟ CTMs), user experience, and 
environmental concerns being evident.  Influences on the protection of crowded places were 
also identified, as were influences on the value of CTMs that can be used to protect them.  In 
order to fully understand how such measures relate to the aforementioned issues, a typology 
is required that classifies them, identifies inherent performance, and identifies consequences 
of their use.  This typology is formed in the following chapter. 
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4.0 Towards a Typology of Counter-Terrorism Measures 
A typology of CTMs will be formed in this chapter.  As has been highlighted in Chapters Two 
and Three, there is a lack of knowledge on CTMs, their performance and their consequences 
(Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1128).  Therefore, this chapter will define the boundaries of the 
typology, the design philosophy behind it, and classify the CTMs that can be used to protect 
crowded places from VBIEDs.  Following this, the performance and consequences of the 
CTMs will be discussed, with the framework of a provisional typology being presented at the 
end of the chapter, prior to its development and validation as a result of the research 
methods used (Chapter Five). 
 
4.1 Defining the Boundaries of the Typology 
There are four factors that demarcate the boundaries of the typology, those being CONTEST, 
vulnerable places, terrorist methods of attack and types of security.  How these factors form 
the boundaries of the typology is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1. The boundaries of the typology 
As highlighted in section 3.2, the „Protect‟ strand of CONTEST has inherent implications for 
the design, construction and operation of the built environment.  It has resulted in a number 
of areas of security enhancements and in terms of the built environment, encompasses the 
protection of vulnerable places, those being crowded places, transport infrastructure and 
critical national infrastructure.  Section 3.2.1 highlighted that the use of VBIEDs was of 
particular concern, with recent terrorist plots and attacks concentrating on crowded places 
CONTEST
prevent
pursue protect
prepare
vulnerable 
places
CNI
transport
crowded 
places
methods 
of attack
VBIED
PBIED
IED
CBRN
protective 
security
physical 
security
personnel 
security
information 
security
other
the boundaries of 
the typology
65 
 
and involving the use of such devices (Clarke and Soria, 2009; Harre-Young et al., 2009).  
The typology is based on the principle that there are five types of vehicle-borne threat, as 
detailed by the CPNI (2011; 2010), British Council for Offices (2009) and Forman et al. 
(2009).  The CPNI (2011, p.6) detail the five types of threat as follows: 
 Parked vehicles: An attack may come from a VBIED in a parking area of unscreened 
vehicles which may be underneath or adjacent to an intended target 
 Encroachment: Incomplete or incorrectly spaced countermeasures can allow a hostile 
vehicle to enter an area without the need for impact.  A hostile vehicle may also be 
able to tailgate a legitimate vehicle through a Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP) 
 Penetrative attack: The use of the front or rear of a vehicle as a ram to breach a 
perimeter of target premises in order to get a hostile vehicle closer to the intended 
target 
 Deception: Various forms include use of stolen or cloned ID, verbal deception or 
Trojan (disguised) vehicle 
 Duress: Duress imposed on the occupant of a legitimate vehicle to carry a hostile 
payload into a protected site or duress imposed on a guard to grant vehicular access 
through a vehicle access control point 
„Layered‟ attack scenarios could be an option, with a vehicle penetrating any vehicle security 
barriers (VSBs) and another vehicle encroaching through the resultant gap in the measures 
(ibid.).  In relation to security and the mitigation of the aforementioned threats, physical 
security has been raised as having significant implications for the protection of crowded 
places from VBIEDs (Harre-Young et al., 2010; 2009), which together demarcate the 
boundaries of the typology. 
 
4.2 Counter-Terrorism Design Philosophy 
Counter-terrorism design philosophy encompasses the design principles on which physical 
security is based and how those principles influence TARAs, site selection and highlight the 
inherent benefits of stand-off. 
 
4.2.1 Design principles 
“Protection is not an absolute concept” (Elliott, 2009, p.5) 
As was evident in section 3.5.1.5 of Chapter Three, understanding risk dictates that certainly 
in relation to the protection of crowded places from VBIEDs, the risk can only be mitigated, 
not eliminated.  Nor can security ultimately be delivered to an organisation, or for an 
organisation; it must be an inclusive process and undertaken by all those within an 
organisation in order to mitigate the risk as high as reasonably practicable (Briggs, 2005, 
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p.40).  With this in mind, a set of principles (Elliott, 2009, p.7) aim to therefore mitigate the 
aforementioned risk through the use of design to, where possible and appropriate: 
 Deflect an attack by showing that the chance of success for the terrorist is small 
 Disguise valuable parts of a potential target so that the focus of an attack is centred 
on an area that would not have the desired impact 
 Disperse a potential target so that an attack could not cover a large enough area to 
cause a significant impact 
 Stop an attack reaching its intended target through the use of physical CTMs 
 Blunt the attack should it reach its target or occurs anyway, by incorporating CTMs 
into the building itself 
Elliott (2009, p.7) states that steps 1-3 can often be incorporated at no cost.  However, this is 
debatable as deflection would occur through, as Elliott says, “layout, security and defences” 
(ibid.), which can have a cost as those defences would more than likely be the CTMs used to 
stop and blunt an attack from being successful.  Whilst disguising an asset may not bear 
additional costs, dispersing a target could, via increases in land costs and disruption to day-
to-day business operations.  CTMs do not have to be physical products, as referring back to 
the definition of a CTM (see section 1.1.3.2), it can encompass the removal of items from a 
site or building, such as litter bins (see for example Cherry et al., 2008, p.79; Dolnik, 2007, 
p.16), as well as organisational, or „non-structural‟ measures (Harre-Young et al., 2009, 
p.1288).  The use of such CTMs, the typology of which will begin to be developed from 
section 4.3 onwards, should be proportionate to the threat that each individual building or site 
faces (CPNI, 2011, p.5; NaCTSO, 2006-2011).  As put forward by Grosskopf (2006, p.1): 
“…strategies seek to change the fundamental nature of terrorist targets by lessening 
their real and symbolic value to terrorists while simultaneously reducing their physical 
vulnerability to terrorist threats” 
Such reduction in real and symbolic value, as well as vulnerability, occurs through the 
consideration and incorporation of CTMs, based on a TARA being carried out, which will now 
be discussed. 
 
4.2.2 Threat and risk assessments 
TARAs are a risk management process, through which threats and vulnerabilities are 
identified and the measures required to mitigate them are incorporated, followed by 
periodical review and rehearsal, as shown in Figure 4.2.  TARAs and their outcomes should 
consider, and where possible be adaptable to, evolving threats and the ability to increase 
security levels in response to heightened threats (General Services Administration, 2005, 
p.235; Jenkins, 2001, p.20). 
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Figure 4.2. Risk management cycle (NaCTSO, 2011, p.6) 
The incorporation of CTMs to reduce the risk, following the identification of proportionate 
solutions through a TARA being carried out, will need to be subject to a cost-benefit analysis, 
with the ultimate question being… 
“…is the reduction in risk worth the additional expenditure?” (Stewart, 2008, p.116) 
 
4.2.3 The right site? 
An outcome of the TARA could be that a more cost-effective solution could be to change the 
current location of the potential site or asset (Little, 2004a, p.55; CPNI, 2011, p.46), hence 
why such planning and assessments should be conducted at the earliest possible 
opportunity (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.87).  The feasibility of such a solution being 
chosen is dependent on the nature of the crowded place being designed or assessed, as 
certain built assets may be more suited to city-centre locations, which could negate the 
possibility to relocate and therefore restrict the options available.  The literature raises that, 
from a counter-terrorism perspective, the incorporation and benefits of stand-off are of 
particular importance   As cited by Robinson (2004, p.39): 
“When we identify a site which we want to buy and develop we reach for our architect 
or engineer to help us explore how we can maximise its potential and minimise any 
drawbacks it may have” 
 
4.2.4 Stand-off 
„Stand-off‟ is generally defined as the distance between a bomb and a building (Lavy and 
Dixit, 2010, p.545; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.104; Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.12; 
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Little, 2008, p.3; National Research Council, 2001, p.3; Holtrop, 1993, p.237).  However, if 
stand-off is defined as the distance between a bomb and a target (as opposed to simply „a 
building‟), the space plan inside a building becomes a factor, resulting in stand-off being 
achieved in two ways: 
“First, it is accomplished by a physical barrier, such as a ditch, a low concrete wall or 
bollards, that prevents vehicles driving close to a target…Second, stand-off is 
accomplished by rearranging the inside of a building so that valuable assets are as 
remote as possible from the greatest threat” (Elliott, Mays and Smith, 1992, p.296) 
Whilst stand-off may be the most important factor in determining the extent of damage that 
could be caused by a VBIED (CPNI, 2011, p.8; Tomlinson and Nelson, 2010, p.56), it is not 
always an entirely controllable parameter, as city-centre locations and high value land can 
render its incorporation impossible or unrealistic (ibid.; Bosher and Kappia, 2010, p.1145; 
Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.12).  Considering such potential restriction, specialist advice 
should therefore always be sought when determining localised blast impacts and their 
mitigation (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.163).  Ideal stand-off distances are 30m for a 
car and at least 90m for larger vans and lorries (CPNI, 2010, p.16); an increase in distance 
decreases the measures required to enhance the building to mitigate the impact of a blast 
(CPNI, 2011, p.20; HM Government, 2010b, p.7; Lavy and Dixit, 2010, p.545; British Council 
for Offices, 2009, p.162; Forman et al., 2009, p.254).  Benefits include easier surveillance of 
a site / surrounding area and therefore, easier detection of intruders and hostile vehicles 
(British Council for Offices, 2009, p.104). 
Inherent consequences of stand-off involve complexity in relation to its enforcement in 
relation to existing utilities and infrastructure (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1125), as well as 
(depending on the CTMs used to enforce it) an increase in the urban heat island effect 
(Coaffee and Bosher (2008, p.80; McEvoy et al., 2006, p.190) and lower usable floor ratios 
(Then and Loosemore, 2006, p.161).  The internal incorporation of stand-off however, could 
be achieved at no additional cost (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.105; Guidry, 2007, 
p.69).  The costs associated with hardening a building due to a lack of enforceable stand-off 
could be greater than installing hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measures at a sufficient 
distance (Forman et al., 2009, p.12).  Therefore, it can be envisaged that for each project, 
there would be an optimum stand-off distance at which the total cost of providing the stand-
off, combined with the cost of enhancing the building itself, is minimised (Mays and Hadden, 
2009, p.12).  Considering the variability of the aforementioned factors however, such 
assessments and cost-benefit analyses are entirely contingent on the site-specific context 
and attributes of chosen CTMs for a given project. 
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4.3 Classifying Counter-Terrorism Measures 
A classification of CTMs is publicly available, with HM Government (2010b, p.7) classifying 
them under four categories, those being in relation to blast resistance, building management 
facilities, HVM and better oversight.  Specifically in relation to the mitigation of VBIEDs, 
Cormie et al. (2009) categorise CTMs as: CTMs external to the building (HVM), CTMs 
incorporated into the building itself to protect it, and the organisational planning and 
procedures inherent in preparing for and responding to an attack.  It is this classification that 
is adopted for the provisional typology of CTMs used to protect crowded places from VBIEDs, 
i.e. a pre-existing typology is used currently, although such classifications may change as a 
result of data collection (Chapter 6).  A review of literature on CTMs will now be presented, 
exploring the performance and consequences of CTMs under their respective categories, 
those being hostile vehicle mitigation (section 4.4), protective construction (section 4.5), and 
planning, detection and procedures (section 4.6).  Exploration of the literature in each of 
these areas will determine the CTMs that are evident, as well as their performance and 
consequences. 
 
4.4 Hostile Vehicle Mitigation 
HVM encompasses the use of traffic management, vehicle access control and traffic calming, 
enforced through the use of CTMs (more commonly known as vehicle security barriers 
(VSBs), when being used in relation to HVM).  Through such planning external to a building, 
the need for the incorporation of protective construction CTMs can be reduced or removed 
(Forman et al., 2009, p.259; General Services Administration, 2005, p.257).  CPNI (2011, 
p.14) state that: 
“Successful security is most effective when implemented on a number of 
geographical layers. In terms of HVM, layers can feature access control and vehicle 
management on a district level, design of approach routes, further vehicle 
management and stand-off distances within the local site context and finally, control 
of stand-off distances and secure threshold design to the immediate vicinity of the 
asset” 
The CPNI define a „district‟ as being the wider site context and of varying scale, but generally 
with multiple sites and land ownerships, with the „site‟ being the local context that can also 
include multiple land ownerships and the threshold (typically the incorporated stand-off 
distance) being the zone immediately around the asset (CPNI, 2011, p.15).  It is within the 
district and the site that traffic management, vehicle access control and traffic calming occur, 
each of which will be explored, followed by literature on VSBs.  Such an approach to HVM is 
evident in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. A layered approach to HVM (CPNI, 2011, p.14) 
4.4.1 Traffic management 
Four traffic management approaches are evident, those being traffic exclusion, traffic 
restriction, traffic inclusion and temporary barriers.  Whilst the CPNI (2011, p.18) and Forman 
et al. (2009, p.258) classify the approaches as being exclusion (total exclusion and exclusion 
coupled with screening), inclusion and temporary barriers, the aforementioned four options 
are used to clearly differentiate between the different options.  Each option has different 
benefits and implications, as will be described below.  In relation to the selection and 
incorporation of a traffic management approach, Forman et al. (2009, p.257) put forward that 
accommodating an existing traffic pattern when retro-fitting is inherently less effective and 
more expensive.  An example of such a situation could be that existing traffic routes could 
facilitate vehicles being able to reach high speeds, through the use of straight roads.  Not 
changing the layout would result in the need for more robust and obtrusiveness CTMs than 
would be required if the route was changed to slow the vehicles down and reduce the impact 
they could have.  Further exploration of traffic calming is presented in section 4.4.3. 
 
4.4.1.1 Traffic exclusion 
From a security perspective, traffic exclusion should be the starting point in terms of effective 
protection, with remote or off-site car parking resulting in extra confidence (Forman et al., 
2009, p.258).  The requirements of excluding traffic will be its enforcement through VSBs and 
will therefore negate the need for vehicle access control or traffic calming measures inside 
the threshold itself, although traffic calming measures could be incorporated external to the 
VSBs in order to reduce potential impact speeds (see section 4.4.3).  Depending on the size 
of the site or district within which traffic exclusions are incorporated, such an approach can 
negate the need for areas of traffic restriction, traffic calming and their enforcement through 
the use of VSBs, thereby reducing issues in relation to traffic displacement and congestion 
(HM Government, 2010b, p.8).  Reductions in air and noise pollution and therefore, less 
soiling of buildings are evident (Coaffee, 2003a, p.175; Coaffee, 2003c, p.73), as are 
Asset Threshold Site District
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reductions in crime and traffic accidents (Coaffee, 2003c, p.73) and reductions in workdays 
lost as a result of the improved air quality (Marshall, 2002, p.6).  Such benefits can be 
applicable to wider areas, through the assessment of possible schemes being incorporated 
over multiple land ownership boundaries (CPNI, 2011, p.46).  Consequences of excluding 
traffic encompass the impact on the day-to-day operations of an organisation/organisations 
due to increased walking time (Stewart, 2010, p.34) and elimination, restricted and/or 
reduced parking (Stewart, 2008, p.116) and the potential impact on disabled persons (HM 
Government, 2010b, p.8.). Most evident however is the displacement of traffic, with Coaffee 
(2003a, p.175) highlighting that levels of traffic around an area that excluded traffic may not 
change, implying that congestion increased in the surrounding areas, which has its own 
consequences in terms of increasing air and noise pollution and the soiling of buildings in 
that area (Coaffee, 2003a, p.176). 
 
4.4.1.2 Traffic restriction 
The restriction of traffic, which should imply that some form(s) of screening will occur, 
increases the likelihood of a hostile vehicle being identified.  Such an approach will need to 
ensure that the ability to reject vehicles is incorporated, without the need to allow such 
vehicles past the access control point (CPNI, 2010, p.16; British Council for Offices, 2009, 
p.109).  If less than 100% of the vehicles are screened, the risk of a hostile vehicle being 
successful in an attack attempt is increased, resulting in a more profound requirement for 
VSBs within the restricted area (Forman et al., 2009, p.258).  The performance of traffic 
restriction encompasses the reduction in the consequences arising from traffic exclusion (see 
previous section) and therefore reduces the impact on day-to-day business operations.  
Coaffee (2003a, p.176) noted that public transport journey times can be reduced, depending 
on the size of the traffic restriction (which in this case was „the Square Mile‟ in the City of 
London).  Forman et al. (2009, p.258) have noted that off-site screening can result in the 
reduction of the number of vehicles that need access to a site, as well as environmental, 
safety and cost benefits that may also arise from incorporating such an approach.  
Consequences of traffic restriction would therefore encompass displacement to a lesser 
extent, but risk of an attack being carried out would increase, due to the ability of a hostile to 
potentially exploit vehicle access control point vulnerabilities. 
 
4.4.1.3 Traffic inclusion 
Traffic inclusion implies that neither exclusion nor restriction occurs and that traffic is 
therefore un-impinged in its movement around a district or site.  However, buildings would 
therefore require individual protection, reducing stand-off distances and potentially resulting 
in the need for more robust and obtrusive VSBs (Forman et al., 2009, p.258).  The benefits 
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arising from such an approach therefore encompass un-impinged day-to-day business 
operations and vehicle permeability, however the consequences are such that the risk of an 
attack and its impacts are much higher. 
 
4.4.1.4 Temporary barriers 
The use of temporary barriers is also a traffic management approach, as they could be used 
at times of heightened threat (Forman et al., 2009, p.258).  A number of issues in relation to 
their requirements and consequences are evident.  As highlighted by Forman et al. (ibid.), 
deployment may be intelligence based and may therefore indicate to adversaries that there is 
intelligence about their plans,  they could be deployed too late, they may require specialist 
equipment to deploy and be transported from afar, they may be less effective against 
penetrative impact than permanent solutions, they are not always effective to use on 
undulating or unmade ground, their appearance may preclude their application in certain 
environments, their mass may preclude their use on elevated slabs, few systems incorporate 
active barrier elements, effective designs (from a security perspective) are not always 
appropriate at sites where pedestrian routes are not clearly demarcated, and the need for 
them to be pedestrian permeable such as at transport interchanges and shopping centres 
may reduce their structural effectiveness. 
 
4.4.2 Vehicle access control 
Forman et al. (2009, p.265) highlight three types of vehicle access control point (VACP); a 
single line of barriers, an inter-lock system (two lines of barriers allowing access to one 
vehicle at a time, whereby the second line does not open until the first line closes) and a final 
denial system (whereby the route a vehicle must take is enforced through the use of VSBs, 
with a barrier at the end being ready to stop hostile vehicles).  Regardless of the VACP used, 
the checking of vehicle and occupant legitimacy is of importance, as is the ability to reject 
vehicles without their admission past the barriers (Tomlinson and Nelson, 2010, p.56).  
Details of deliveries and visitors should be obtained prior to arrival (with entry refused if prior 
notification has not been received), logged upon arrival and their status checked after a 
period of time, as well as searched prior to admission past the barriers themselves (HM 
Government, 2010d, p.21).  As noted by Forman et al. (2009, p.258), less than 100% 
screening increases the risk of an attack being carried out and tailgating should be 
addressed (French, 2006, p.14). 
Three means of access control are apparent, those being a single line of barriers, an inter-
lock system, and a final denial system.  Comprising of an access control method and a single 
line of barriers, the single-line system this is the simplest VACP.  However, such a method is 
prone to tailgating, with hostile vehicles being able to encroach through the barriers, 
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exploiting the inherent weakness of the system itself.  An inter-lock system comprises of an 
additional layer of barriers (than a single-line system) and the restriction of the vehicle in 
between the two sets of barriers to be unable to encroach around them, enforced through 
CTMs.  The second line of barriers must only be opened upon the closing of the first set, 
reducing the risk of tailgating and increasing the security of the VACP, but has inherent cost 
implications and reduces vehicle throughput (Forman et al., 2009, p.265).  A final denial 
system can exist with or without restricting access, with the vehicle route(s) being enforced 
through the use of CTMs to stop vehicles being able to encroach or overcome the desired 
route.  Whilst vehicle throughput can be un-impinged, the system is totally reliant on the 
guard force identifying and reacting to a hostile vehicle and lowering the final barrier, which 
also raises questions regarding its deterrent value (Forman et al., 2009, p.265). 
 
4.4.3 Traffic calming 
Traffic calming involves the reduction in speed of vehicles, so as to reduce the energy that 
can be transferred to a building or VSBs (BCO, 2009, p.109).  The energy that can be 
transferred depending on different vehicle types, weight and speed is evident in Table 4.1, 
which shows that traffic calming has significant security benefits in reducing the impact 
speed and kinetic energy of hostile vehicles, therefore resulting in any CTM being less robust 
and obtrusive, as well as allowing any security personnel (or capable others) to act if hostile 
intentions are identified (Forman et al., 2009, p.259; HM Government, 2010, p.26).  Traffic 
calming can be facilitated through the use of vertical deflections (speed bumps) and 
horizontal deflections (bends, chicanes, or off-setting routes). 
Table 4.1. Kinetic energy for various vehicle types and impact speeds (Forman et al., 2009, p.270) 
Nominal speed Kinetic energy: kJ 
 Car 4x4 Goods vehicle 
Mph kph 1500kg 2500kg 3500kg 7500kg 30000kg 
10 16 15 25 35 74 296 
20 32 59 99 138 296 1185 
30 48 133 222 311 667 2667 
40 64 237 395 553 1185 4741 
50 80 370 617 864 1852 7407 
60 96 533 889 1244 2667 10667 
70 112 726 1210 1694 3630  
80 128 948 1580 2212   
90 144 1200 200    
Note: all values are approximate 
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4.4.4 Vehicle security barriers 
“A VSB provides the hard stop for penetrative vehicle attack.  VSBs are structural in 
nature and can be either active (powered or manual) or passive” (Forman et al., 2009, 
p.261) 
Within literature, VSBs are evident under eight categories, those being public art and culture, 
water, play, seating, street furniture, topography and levels, walls and fences, and incidental 
street elements (CPNI, 2011, p.26).  A barrier is defined as any: 
“Symbolic, physical or electronic limits set with the purpose of creating partitions 
between a certain area and its surroundings” (British Standards Institution, 2006b, p.5) 
In relation to physical barriers, structural elements can be incorporated into a variety of street 
furniture and landscaping, creating numerous opportunities in relation to the creation and 
incorporation of VSBs (HM Government, 2010c, p.26).  Whilst the CPNI‟s (2011, p.26) 
aforementioned categorisation of VSBs is detailed, certain categories overlap, such as 
„seating‟ and „street furniture‟.  Therefore, a broader categorisation is adopted, encompassing 
security-explicit barriers, street furniture, and landscaping and nature.  Common principles 
concerning the incorporation of VSBs, especially considering security-explicit barriers and 
street furniture, as well as trees, is the distance between and height of the VSBs themselves.  
The maximum clear gap between VSBs must not exceed 1200mm (measured at a height of 
600mm above ground level), with the minimum height of such barriers being a minimum of 
500mm (CPNI, 2011, p.23; HM Government, 2010c, p.27; Forman et al., 2009, p.263).   
“All barriers have advantages and disadvantages that must be considered before they 
are deployed” (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.160) 
 
4.4.4.1 Security-explicit barriers 
Evident in the literature is a category of VSBs that perform solely security functions and do 
not provide further amenity (such as street furniture) or environmental benefits (such as 
landscaping and nature).  Drawing on the work of the CPNI (2011; 2010) and Forman et al. 
(2009), security-explicit barriers encompass barriers, blockers, bollards, fencing, gates, 
planters and walls.  The inherent benefits of passive measures (those that are not automated 
or „active‟) are that they remove the risk of attacks occurring through deception and duress, 
as well as removing the risk of tailgating if such measures are incorporated to exclude traffic 
or simply protect an individual building (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.159).  Such 
measures can require shallow foundations or even be surface mounted, reducing the 
complexity and costs inherent in installing such CTMs (Forman et al., 2009, p.272).  Their 
acceptability is dependent on the extent to which they restrict permeability (Kappia et al., 
2009, p.632), with potential consequences being raised by Harre-Young et al. (2010, p.1125) 
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as to whether certain VSBs increase the risk and severity of flooding at neighbouring 
locations. 
 
4.4.4.2 Street furniture 
VSBs in the form of street furniture are also evident in the aforementioned literature (CPNI, 
2011; CPNI, 2010; Forman et al., 2009), with furniture, art and bicycle racks being examples 
of such measures.  Whilst they inherently provide additional functions and benefits, further 
exploration of such measures is not evident.  As highlighted in the previous section, VSBs 
with shallower foundations have inherent benefits in terms of reduced complexity and costs 
involved in their installation (Forman et al., 2009, p.272), a factor that will also apply to street 
furniture.  Further examination of these measures is required in order to provide a more in-
depth exploration of the measures as well as their inherent attributes. 
 
4.4.4.3 Landscaping and nature 
These VSBs include bunds, collapsible areas, ditches, topography, trees and water 
(Collapsible areas are highlighted in Harre-Young et al. (2010); other VSBs are drawn from 
CPNI (2011; 2010) and Forman et al. (2009)).  Other sources cited such measures because 
of their inherent aesthetic and environmental benefits (Lavy and Dixit, 2010, p.559; British 
Council for Offices, 2009, p.107).  Synergies between security and other agendas, such as 
environmental issues, are evident (Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, p.81; Coaffee (2008b, p.4636), 
through not only using such VSBs to perform security functions, but also through the possible 
incorporation of sustainable urban drainage systems into the VSBs.  Yet, complexity exists in 
terms of inherent consequences in relation to health and safety (British Council for Offices, 
2009, p.107) and the requirements for trees, which would need to be of substantial girth 
(British Council for Offices, 2009, p.160; Forman et al., 2009, p.263). 
 
4.5 Protective Construction 
“Protection is generally achieved through a combination of standoff, redundancy, and 
hardening” (Tomasetti and Abruzzo, 2004, p.22.4) 
Redundancy and hardening are inherent in protective construction, the objectives of which 
are furthered by Little (2007, p.107), who states that it relates to the prevention of glazing 
and façades shattering and entering occupied space, keeping blast energy outside of the 
building, protecting occupants from fragmentation and by preventing structural collapse.  The 
achievement of this has been stated to cost between 0-5% of overall construction costs 
(Crawford, 1995b, p.9; Elliottt et al., 1992, p.296).  Brand (1994) highlights the layers of a 
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building, and to categorise the CTMs inherent in protective construction, those layers are 
adopted, as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4. Layers of change (Brand, 1994, p.13) 
Two of Brand‟s (1994) layers are not applicable to CTMs used within protective construction, 
those being „site‟ (CTMs external to the building fall under HVM) and „stuff‟ (the layout and 
enhancement of space plans are applicable, but not the „things‟ that are placed within or 
around them).  Accordingly, literature on the protection of the structure of a building is 
explored in section 4.5.2, the protection of the skin of a building is explored in section 4.5.1, 
the services in 4.6.3 and the space plan in section 4.5.3.  A relationship between protective 
construction and HVM is evident, with sufficient stand-off negating the need for any CTMs 
under protective construction to be incorporated.  However, as stated by HM Government 
(2010c, p.24): 
“Costs associated with fully hardening a building due to lack of blast stand-off can be 
significantly greater than installing vehicle counter-terrorism measures at a suitable 
distance…However, each site will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis as 
land costs, ownership, available room, planning permission, business needs and re-
location costs may eliminate any cost-benefit” 
The protection of a building, however, has been cited as having numerous benefits, with 
such enhancement being synonymous with „invisible security‟ as the building can appear the 
same as a conventional construction (Guidry, 2007, p.67) and the building will also be more 
resilient to other threats, hazards and major accident (Rose et al., 2007, p.529; Sternberg 
and Lee, 2006, p.16; Marshall, 2002, p.9; National Research Council, 2001, p.3).  The CTMs 
within protective construction will now be explored, highlighting their requirements, 
performance and consequences where possible, including any information on their potential 
costs.   
 
Stuff
Space Plan
Services
Skin
Structure
Site
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4.5.1 Skin 
The protection of the „skin‟ of a building encompasses its cladding and façades, the most 
notable of the latter being glazing.  Cladding should be attached directly to floor slabs as 
opposed to perimeter columns (HM Government, 2010c, p.20; Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.10) 
and have easily accessible fixings and panels that can allow inspection and, if necessary, 
replacement after an explosion (Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.10).  The British Council for 
Offices (2009, p.172) state that fixings should be designed to remain elastic under blast 
loads so that they can be re-used after an explosion, even if the panels themselves need 
replacing.  In relation to the form of façades, the exterior geometry of a building should be 
convex as such a geometry facilitates the dissipation of blast loads more than other forms 
and no re-entrant corners or recesses should be incorporated, as these can exacerbate the 
effects of an explosion and provide a location to conceal smaller devices (HM Government, 
2010c, p.19; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.107; Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.9). 
The British Council for Offices (2009, p.169) state that there are three main types of glazing, 
those being annealed, toughened and laminated, although the use of heat-strengthened 
glazing is also evident.  Also applicable is the use of anti-shatter film (ASF) and bomb blast 
net curtains (BBNC).  The purpose of protecting glazing is to reduce or eliminate its 
fragmentation (Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.19) and the blast pressures which could enter the 
interior of the building (Smith and Cormie, 2009, p.178).  Glass is the weakest part of the 
exterior façade and can be damaged from greater distances than any other façade material 
(Little, 2004b, p.66; Elliott et al., 1992, p.297).  Whilst it has been stated that open-able 
windows in the façade should be avoided, outward-opening windows are generally more 
robust (to external explosions) than inward-opening ones (Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.10).  
Glazing that does not fail or shatter will inherently be of benefit in the event of any explosion, 
not just one emanating from a terrorist attack (Marshall, 2002, p.9).  Annealed glass, when 
unprotected, results in elongated shards that can be angular and jagged, resulting in an 
immediately hazardous environment for any occupants nearby such glazing (Be Safe Not 
Shattered, 2011; Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.19; Smith and Cormie, 2009, p.180).  ASF is a 
transparent adhesive film that is applied to the inside surface of glazing panes and can also 
be anchored under frames, in order to hold any fragments together, regardless of whether 
the pane becomes detached from the frame itself (Be Safe Not Shattered, 2011; Smith and 
Cormie, 2009, p.184; Holtrop, 1993, p.237).  Although ASF can reduce transparency (British 
Council for Offices, 2009, p.171) and is relatively less effective than laminated glazing (Smith 
and Cormie, 2009, p.185), it reduces risk of injury by 50% (compared to no protection), can 
be installed during working hours (reducing disruption), can provide energy-saving benefits 
and last over 10 years (Be Safe Not Shattered, 2011). 
BBNCs are used to capture glass fragments (although annealed shards can penetrate the 
curtain itself) and panes, and allow blast pressures to flow through, removing any airborne 
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threats to building occupants (Smith and Cormie, 2009, p.185; Carmichael and Gartell, 1994, 
p.11).  As with ASF, they suit retro-fit situations and can allow existing window frames to 
remain, which can be of particular benefit to heritage buildings (British Council for Offices, 
2009, p.171).  However, they have inherent consequences in terms of reduced visibility, light 
permeability, ventilation and aesthetics (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.171; Smith and 
Cormie, 2009, p.185).  They are also less effective than laminated glass (Smith and Cormie, 
2009, p.185).  Smith and Cormie (2009, p.183) state that the strength of this glass is 
between that of annealed and toughened, the difference being that this glass will break into 
larger, but fewer, sharp-edged fragments compared to annealed glazing.  Whilst toughened 
glass offers a four- to six-fold increase in strength compared to annealed glass (Smith and 
Cormie, 2009, p.181), it will still shatter when it breaks, resulting in fragmentation that will be 
smaller than that of annealed glass (Be Safe Not Shattered, 2011; Mays and Hadden, 2009, 
p.19). 
 “…the safest type of glass to use” (Be Safe Not Shattered, 2011) 
Laminated glass, consisting of two or more plates of glass held together by a flexible plastic 
layer (PVB layer), has the capability to retain its integrity as it deforms, resulting in little or no 
fragmentation, and shorter repair times  (Be Safe Not Shattered, 2011; Mays and Hadden, 
2009, p.19).  The PVB layer should be not less than 0.76mm and should be secured into the 
frame (HM Government, 2010c, p.21).  Smith and Cormie (2009, p.183) assert that an 
essential part of the design of such glazing is the detailing of the edge retention and the 
supporting of the glass in its frame and fixings, which should allow it to absorb strain.  Smith 
and Cormie (ibid.) also state that the performance of such glazing is superior to annealed 
and toughened glass in a number of ways and that as a result, it should be considered to be 
the minimum baseline standard for new buildings: 
1. The excellent bond between glass and pvb, which substantially remains active after 
the glass cracks 
2. The large strain energy capacity of the pane after the glass piles have cracked 
3. A ductile failure mechanism in which highly hazardous conditions do not immediately 
occur when the pvb reaches its limit of tearing, but which increase only gradually 
beyond this point. This gives an added built-in margin of safety, although this is 
difficult to quantify 
4. An in-built resistance to physical attack 
Additional benefits are cited by Crawford (1995b, p.6): 
 “Safety and security are not the only benefits of laminated glass – it absorbs 99.5 per 
cent of ultraviolet rays, to the benefit of staff, furniture and fittings. Additionally, the 
interlayer absorbs high- and low- frequency noise, particularly when used in a double-
glazed unit. This is currently the best form of protection against blast, but can be the 
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most expensive, however, on large projects, if performance criteria are taken into 
account, it can be the most cost-effective” 
 
4.5.2 Structure 
Evident in the literature is the protection of three particular structural components, those 
being columns and frames, floors, and stairwells.  Whilst detailed literature on the design of 
element in various structures can be found in Cormie et al. (2009), the construction and 
layout of columns and frames is widely cited as pertinent to the structural integrity of a 
building, most notably in order to ensure a building does not disproportionately or 
progressively collapse (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.165; Mays and Hadden, 2009, 
p.22), which according to HM Government (2010c, p.19), can be achieved through using (as 
a minimum) the measures for robustness against such collapse for Class 2B building as 
described in Part A3 of the current Building Regulations.  As stated by Mays and Hadden 
(2009, p.24): 
“…the principal measure to ensure robustness is to design a structure which can 
develop alternate load paths” 
Mays and Hadden (2009, p.10) assert that an essential requirement for a structure is that it is 
well tied together and sustains localised damage without widespread collapse, which 
requires tensile capacity and ductility in the design of the elements and their connections.  
Evident in the literature is a preference for steel or reinforced concrete frames (HM 
Government, 2010c, p.19; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.164; Cormie, 2009, p.218; 
Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.10), with appropriate connections and ties (see HM Government, 
2010c, for information on such requirements).  In relation to floors, Mays and Hadden (2009, 
p.11) say they should be tied into structural frames and be able to withstand load reversal, as 
the impact of a blast and the resulting uplift pressures will overcome gravity loads on the floor 
itself.  Also, particularly on lower floors where the blast impact will be highest, there should 
be continuity of floor spans and their reinforcement in both of the slab faces should be 
incorporated (ibid.).  Regarding stairwells, at least two should be incorporated and designed 
so that they are spaced no more than 50m apart, are orientated toward different escape 
routes (HM Government, 2010c, p.21). 
 
4.5.3 Services 
Services will need to be protected, as damage can disrupt services over both the short-term 
and long-term (Taylor, 2009, p.275).  Their ability to improve air quality and therefore reduce 
occupant sickness and increase productivity is cited (Marshall, 2002, p.9).  Further 
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exploration of the protection of services is required, especially to identify further benefits and 
consequences of their protection. 
 
4.5.4 Space plan 
Also inherent in the protection of crowded places is the space plan (circulation design) that 
can be designed and incorporated internally.  Evident in the literature is the use of 
evacuation routes, internal partitions, protected spaces and sacrificial design.  Guidry (2007, 
p.69) asserts that when designing-in such measures, they can be incorporated at no or little 
cost and can provide an „invisible‟ means of protecting a building.  Evacuation routes should 
resist the impacts of any blast and fragmentation, with exit routes being at least duplicated 
(HM Government, 2010c, p.20).  Whilst providing means of egress from a building, they 
should also lead to protected spaces if applicable (see section 4.5.4).  Lightweight internal 
partitions can cause secondary fragmentation in the event of an explosion, however if 
designed properly, they can act as barriers for fragmentation, through dividing up internal 
areas of a building, therefore reducing loss of life, injury and damage to the internal areas of 
a building (HM Government, 2010c, p.21; Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.11; Holtrop, 1993, 
p.237).  Protected spaces are internal, structural core areas, that are preferably reinforced 
and large enough to accommodate the occupants of the building (Mays and Hadden, 2009, 
p.11; HM Government, 2010c, p.20; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.33).  A minimum clear floor space 
allowance of 0.6m2 per person is recommended, although 0.8m2 is advised (Mays and 
Hadden, 2009, p.26).  Whilst, as with all structurally-based CTMs, their design and 
construction should be done in consultation with specialist advice, Mays and Hadden (2009, 
p.26) assert that such spaces should: 
 be clearly identified as a protected space; clear signage directing people to the 
nearest Protected Space is recommended 
 be located remote from windows, external doors and walls 
 be located remote from structural bays and from areas prone to structural collapse 
 be located away from areas exposed to high blast and fragment hazards 
 be surrounded by full-height reinforced concrete walls; fire stairs and lift lobbies 
should preferably not be used where there are alternatives, but may provide practical 
solutions 
 be away from areas with additional hazards, e.g. hazardous stores, fuel 
 accommodate people with impaired mobility 
 be located on each and every floor 
 be located in similar positions on each floorplate 
 be located in areas that will not disrupt normal escape routes 
 be designed for at least 3 hours occupancy 
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Such spaces could be used to invacuate occupants, when the location of an explosive device 
is unknown or known to be outside (NaCTSO, 2009b, p.33; Jenkins, 2001, p.12).  They 
should also, ideally, have toilet and drinking water faciltiies, as well as reliable 
communication links (including a public address system) and adequate ventilation (British 
Council for Offices, 2009, p.179).  Sacrificial design is presented in the literature, through the 
use of the layout (or re-organisation) of rooms and services.  Reorganising such facilities can 
prevent their exposure to vulnerable areas (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.113) and 
where glazing is used, it should face areas that do not have open access, such as internal 
courtyards (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.177).  Secondary layers of glazing could also 
be used, providing an internal stand-off distance (Carmichael and Gartell, 1994, p.11). 
 
4.6 Planning, Detection and Procedures 
Planning, detection and procedures (PDP) encompasses the use of procedures and 
competent staff to deal prevent, prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks.  The need for 
competency is highlighted by NaCTSO (2011, p.5) and HM Government (2010d, p.21), which 
places emphasis on the training, testing and exercising of plans and procedures, although it 
may not be practical to carry out regular tests or exercises, especially in public buildings 
(Proulx, 1999, p.335); it may be costly in terms of resources required to run such events and 
in terms of disruption to day-to-day activities (Maestas et al., 2007, p.529).  There are three 
elements to PDP, those being security culture, people and technology, and planning and 
procedures, which will now be explored. 
 
4.6.1 Security culture 
The security culture an organisation adopts is an essential part of counter-terrorism planning 
(CPNI, 2010, p.36).  The encouragement of staff to adopt „security first‟ habits theoretically 
impacts the effectiveness of all CTMs, especially those which rely on human interaction, as a 
poor willingness to participate or lack of interest could lead to CTMs being left in vulnerable 
positions etc.   
“How the organisation engages and communicates with staff reflects its commitment 
to security” (CPNI, 2010, p.37) 
Evident in incorporating and facilitating a security culture are staff communications, 
management support, line management relations and employee welfare, with such initiatives 
as a security hotline being usable to encourage participation and awareness (ibid.).  As 
stated by Briggs and Edwards (2006, p.13): 
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“…security is achieved through the everyday actions of employees right across the 
company. It is not something that the corporate security department can do to or for 
the company on its behalf”. 
 
4.6.2 People and technology 
„People and technology‟ encompasses capable guardians, closed circuit television cameras 
(CCTV), communication systems, intruder detection alarms, lighting and security guards.  
The term „capable guardian‟ refers to any person who is able to identify suspicious behaviour 
and act on it (British Standards Institution, 2006b, p.7), meaning that users of crowded 
places (not just staff), can aid in the protection of the place they are at (Welsh et al., 2010, 
p.315; Smith, 2009, p.239).  Therefore, appropriate procedures for staff to deal with such 
incidents should be developed.  Regarding CCTV, whilst studies have questioned its 
effectiveness in reducing crime (Briggs, 2005, p.24), specifically in relation to the mitigation 
of VBIEDs, its effectiveness is dependent on the method of attack, as a suicide attack would 
not be impacted by deterrence, but the abandonment of a device might be impacted by such 
means (Cherry et al., 2008, p.87).  Its performance is dependent on the abilities of those 
using it, as cameras could be left in positions that leave vulnerabilities in a scheme (see 
section 3.5.1.3 for further information „weak points‟), but has multiple uses in terms of 
monitoring and detection, as well as post-incident investigations (Regan, 2006, p.22; Graham, 
2001b, p.237).  Communication systems could be incorporated and/or used for emergency 
situations, benefitting a range of situations (HM Government, 2010c, p.26; British Council for 
Offices, 2009, p.179).  Intruder detection alarms are cited as being of importance in 
integrating security systems, so that CCTV, lighting and alarm systems are all interconnected 
(ibid.).  They benefit a range of threats and aid in both deterrence and detection. 
“External lighting provides an obvious means of deterrence as well as detection” 
(NaCTSO, 2011, p.13) 
Whilst lighting benefits a range of situations, its use must be carefully considered, as it could 
disrupt and disturb adjacent buildings and occupiers, and could interfere with other CTMs, 
such as CCTV (ibid.).  Security guards have an inherent impact on deterrence and are 
therefore also able to identify and potentially prevent an attack from occurring (Mahoney, 
1994, p.16), as a result of disrupting hostile reconnaissance or an attack itself.  Coaffee 
(2003c, p.71) showed that when such visible deterrents were reduced, crime levels began to 
increase. 
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4.6.3 Planning and procedures 
Planning and procedures encompasses awareness, Business Continuity Planning (BCP), 
contingency planning, evacuation and invacuation planning, housekeeping and search 
planning.  Awareness of staff to hostile reconnaissance and suspect packages and/or 
vehicles reduces the likelihood of an attack from occurring (HM Government, 2010d, p.21; 
Lavy and Dixit, 2010, p.558; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.15; Dolnik, 2007, p.17; Prenzler, 2007, p.35).  
Ensuring that staff have the confidence and procedures in place to act on suspicions is 
pertinent (CPNI, 2010, p.39; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.15), although other users of the building or 
space could also report activity to staff, for which appropriate procedures should be in place 
(Welsh et al., 2010, p.315).  As raised in section 3.2.2.2, awareness can be raised through 
Project Argus and Griffin events, schemes developed to heighten safety, responses and 
continuity in relation to terrorist attacks (Coaffee et al., 2008, p.107).  A relevant point is the 
identification of hostile reconnaissance, which is undertaken to assess the vulnerability of a 
target and to practice its attack (NaCTSO, 2009b, p.51; Stephens, 2009, p.7; Elliottt et al., 
1992, p.288).  Identifying such practices and therefore stopping an attack from occurring is 
therefore a highly effective solution. 
BCP encompasses the planning arrangements that ensure the organisation and its assets 
are able to cope with an incident and return to normality (albeit a new one) as soon as 
possible following an incident (Veale, 2009, p.291). It should be constantly updated as 
organisations change, with regular testing to ensure staff competency and plan validation 
(CPNI, 2010, p.28).  BCP is beneficial in mitigating limitless disruptions and is therefore a 
cost-effective measure, especially where it is already being undertaken.  Contingency 
planning encompasses the arrangements made to respond to various incidents, with plans 
being activated as part of BCP, or in response to specific situations and the need to recover 
from an incident (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.152; Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.25; 
Veale, 2009, p.292).  As stated by Veale (2009, p.295): 
“A post-event contingency plan is essential for business survival. It is not only 
necessary for dealing with terrorist outrages but also for many other forms of disaster, 
from flooding to fire and from a major communication failure to a plane crash” 
As with BCP, such arrangements are usable in a variety of situations and are not explicit to 
counter-terrorism.  Evacuation and invacuation planning is a very pertinent issue here.  Of 
particular importance was invacuation (the „inward evacuation‟ of building users), which 
would be required if the location of a bomb was unknown or known to be external to the 
building (CPNI, 2010, p.17; HM Government, 2010d, p.21; British Council for Offices, 2009, 
p.192; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.31).  As stated by Maestas et al. (2007, p.530): 
“Evacuating large crowds of people under any circumstance is a 
challenge…Determining the most effective evacuation plan for a large public facility 
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requires in-depth analysis of multiple factors. Determining the best routes, foreseeing 
potential problems, addressing the chaos/panic factor, and orchestrating the 
evacuation are all crucial aspects that should be evaluated” (Maestas et al., 2007, 
p.530) 
In relation to such planning, communication systems can be used to aid in the facilitation of 
the evacuation or invacuation (Williams et al., 2000, p.302; Proulx, 1999, p.335).  Escape 
routes should be diverse, so that the risk of routes being impaired by an attack are reduced 
(Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.11); they should be regularly checked and checked prior to any 
commencement of evacuations or invacuations, as should pre-arranged muster points (CPNI, 
2010, p.35; Mahoney, 1994, p.18).  The inter-related nature of the CTMs is evident in relation 
to evacuation and invacuation planning, as lighting can assist in aiding building users in their 
movements (Ling and Soh, 2005, p.279) and CTMs could obstruct or impinge evacuation 
(British Council for Offices, 2009, p.39).  The use of „grab bags‟ can aid in ensuring vital 
information and equipment are taken when evacuating or invacuating (NaCTSO, 2011, p.15), 
with orderly and efficient evacuations being shown to save lives, as was evident in the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, in the USA (Maestas et al., 2007, p.529).  
Evacuating users of a building may expose them to further risks, such as injury from debris 
(Mays and Hadden, 2009, p.25). The British Council for Offices (2009, p.151) states that 
when evacuating, assembly points should be remote from the evacuated building and be not 
less than 500m away, with consideration also needing to be given to alternative assembly 
areas and the avoidance of tall and heavily-glazed buildings.  Whilst the implications of 
testing such arrangements would result in disruptions to businesses and productivity 
reductions (Then and Loosemore, 2006, p.161), analyses would need to consider whether 
the long-term implications of not testing such arrangements and the implications this could 
have in the event of an attack would be worth the avoidance of such disruption. 
Housekeeping is seen as an important factor in protecting crowded places from terrorist 
attack, as it facilitates the easier identification of suspicious packages (and persons), as well 
as inherently benefitting the tidiness and aesthetic appearance of buildings and areas (HM 
Government, 2010d, p.23; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.19).  Linked to housekeeping is search 
planning, which should be undertaken as part of ongoing routines and heightened in times of 
increased or specific threat (CPNI, 2010, p.35; NaCTSO, 2009b, p.29).  As previously stated 
in relation to evacuation and invacuation planning (section 4.6.3), this is relevant to the 
security and safety of evacuation and invacuation routes and assembly points, as well as 
prior to re-occupation of buildings by staff (CPNI, 2010, p.35).  NaCTSO (2009b, p.30) state 
that there are seven key instructions: 
1. Do not touch suspicious items 
2. Move everyone away to a safe distance 
3. Prevent others from approaching 
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4. Communicate safely to staff, visitors and the public 
5. Use hand-held radios or mobile phones away from the immediate vicinity of a suspect 
item, remaining out of line of sight and behind hard cover 
6. Notify the police 
7. Ensure that whoever found the item or witnessed the incident remains on hand to 
brief the police  
 
4.7 Attributes of Performance and Consequences 
The literature on CTMs that can be incorporated to protect crowded places has been 
examined and a provisional classification and categorisation of CTMs has been presented.  
In order to develop a typology of CTMs, attributes of performance and consequences need to 
be identified, from which a provisional framework of the typology that can be developed to be 
populated by data obtained from adopted research methods.  Evident in the previous 
sections have been attributes in relation to the requirements of CTMs, their resulting 
performance, consequences and additional information, such as how they can reconcile 
agendas.  It is these attributes that are now explored and validated, in order to form the 
aforementioned framework. 
 
4.7.1 Requirements 
Requirements of CTMs are evident in terms of their construction, installation and 
management operations.  Examples of the importance of the construction requirements of 
CTMs are evident in section 3.5.1.2, where it was shown that CTMs need to be appropriately 
constructed to ensure they are sufficiently robust.  The installation requirements of CTMs can 
vary, as for example, foundation depths of VSBs are influenced by a number of factors, 
including the location of local utilities (Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1126).  Management 
requirements have been typically shown to be pertinent to CTMs that inherently require 
human interaction, such as with the operation of CCTV or the maintenance of landscaping 
and nature.  One example is the maintenance requirements inherent in the use of trees as 
VSBs, where maintenance must ensure that limbs do not provide means of access over 
perimeters, or foliage does not obscure surveillance or other CTMs (Forman et al., 2009, 
p.263).  
 
4.7.2 Performance 
The performance of CTMs encompasses their visual and functional performance.  Aesthetics 
and permeability are evident in terms of visual performance, with functions entailing not just 
their impact in the event of a blast, but any environmental benefits, the ability to escalate and 
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de-escalate levels of security, the mitigation of other threats, hazards and major accidents, 
permeability in relation to people and vehicles, public amenity and revenue generation. 
Visual performance encompasses aesthetic issues in relation to CTMs, which are a pertinent 
issue within the literature, both in terms of symbolism and in terms of aesthetic performance.  
Examples of both include Coaffee and Bosher‟s (2008, p.79) assertion that incorporating 
CTMs could lead to less visibly pleasing architecture, and the relatively poor aesthetic 
performance of BBNC, due to the resulting reduction in visibility, light and ventilation (British 
Council for Offices, 2009, p.171; Smith and Cormie, 2009, p.185).  Visual permeability 
encompasses surveillance opportunities, user experience and the aesthetics of a given area, 
as well as the visual permeability of the CTMs, with the British Council for Offices (2009, 
p.171) highlighting that ASF can reduce such visibility (Guidry, 2007, p.67).  It could also be 
argued that bollards could allow greater visual permeability compared to planters for example, 
due to their relatively smaller dimensions. 
Functional performance includes environmental benefits, with examples including the 
potential for sustainable urban drainage systems to be incorporated into VSBs (Coaffee and 
Bosher, 2008, p.81; Coaffee, 2008b, p.4636) and reductions in pollution and soiling of 
buildings that occurs by excluding traffic from a given area (Coaffee, 2003c, p.73) and the 
resulting reduction in sick days from improvements to air quality (Marshall, 2002, p.6).  The 
ability to escalate and de-escalate CTMs was also raised, in order to adapt to evolving and 
heightened levels of threat (General Services Administration, 2005, p.235; Jenkins, 2001, 
p.20).  The mitigation of other threats, as well as hazards and major accidents was widely 
cited, with protective construction mitigating the impacts of all the aforementioned risks 
(Rose et al., 2007, p.529; Sternberg and Lee, 2006, p.16; Marshall, 2002, p.9; National 
Research Council, 2001, p.3).and VSBs mitigating a range of threats, not just terrorist attack 
(Forman et al., 2009, p.264).  Permeability in terms of pedestrian and vehicle movement was 
also evident, with examples including the differences in permeability inherent in the 
incorporation of traffic exclusion, restriction or inclusion, and how this can influence 
acceptability (Kappia et al., 2009, p.632).  Public amenity was also raised as being an aspect 
of functional performance, with CTMs inherently being able to provide such amenity, such as 
the enhancement of street furniture to become VSBs.  Revenue generation was also cited as 
a performance benefit of CTMs and resulting from their incorporation, through such means 
as improving the quality of an area and acting as a catalyst for regeneration. 
 
4.7.3 Consequences 
Inherent consequences of CTMs encompass whether their incorporation creates risks, 
whether they impact the day-to-day operations of a business, the impact they have on 
vehicles and any trade-offs that have to be made in order to accommodate them.  The 
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creation of risk could be a consequence of incorporating CTMs, as queues could be 
increased and therefore become a target themselves (Fussey et al., 2011, p.138; Coaffee et 
al., 2008, p.105) and CTMs could potentially increase the risk of flooding (Harre-Young et al., 
2010, p.1125).  Day-to-day impacts on business could entail increased walking time due to 
traffic exclusions or restrictions (Stewart, 2010, p.34) and the productivity implications of 
testing and exercising CTMs themselves (Then and Loosemore, 2006, p.161).  Linked to the 
impact on day-to-day operations is the impact on traffic that could result from the use of 
CTMs, most notably in relation to the exclusion or restriction of traffic, which will result in 
reduced throughput and potential delays (Forman et al., 2009, p.258). 
“Tradeoffs are inevitable” (Ellig et al., 2006, p.6) 
Evident in the literature is the assertion that in order to incorporate CTMs, trade-offs will need 
to occur (Forman et al., 2009, p.251; Kappia et al., 2009, p.630; Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, 
p.80; Then and Loosemore, 2006, p.161).  An example of a trade-off is the incorporation of 
stand-off, which if incorporated within a site, could result in lower usable floor ratios (Then 
and Loosemore, 2006, p.161). 
 
4.7.4 Additional information 
Whilst each CTM has inherent requirements, visual and functional performance, and 
consequences, it is important to consider the need for capturing additional information during 
the course of the research.  Such information could encompass cost data, how cost relates 
to the design stage in which they are incorporated and how certain CTMs or broader 
solutions can reconcile seemingly disparate or conflicting agendas. 
“…early inclusion of such measures at the design and pre planning stage are often 
cost neutral and highly desirable” (Construction Industry Research and Information 
Association, 2008, p.28) 
The capturing of such information will therefore help to verify or dispel such statements as 
those above, which are reaffirmed by a number of sources (RIBA, 2010, p.3; British Council 
for Offices, 2009, p.86; Thompson and McCarthy, 2004, p.2.13), with no literature presenting 
an informed and evidenced case as to why costs will be less when CTMs are incorporated at 
the earliest opportunity, although such a statement may appear logical. 
 
4.8 A Provisional Framework for the Typology 
A provisional framework for the typology can therefore be established, as CTMs that can be 
used to protect crowded places have been identified (shown in Table 4.2), as have inherent 
attributes they can possess (shown in Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.2. The CTMs identified in the literature 
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Protective Construction Planning, Detection and Procedures 
Security-Explicit Barriers Skin Security Culture 
Barriers Cladding Security Culture 
Blockers Façades   
Bollards Glazing People and Technology 
Fencing  Capable Guardians 
Gates Structure CCTV 
Planters Columns and Frames Communication Systems 
Walls Floors Intruder Detection Alarms 
 Stairwells Lighting 
Street Furniture (examples)  Security Guards 
Art Services  
Bicycle Racks Services Planning and Procedures 
Furniture  Awareness 
 Space Plan Business Continuity Planning 
Landscaping and Nature Evacuation Routes Contingency Planning 
Bunds Internal Partitions Evacuation and Invacuation 
Collapsible Areas Protected Spaces Housekeeping 
Ditches Sacrificial Design Search Planning 
Topography   
Trees   
Water   
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Table 4.3. Example attributes of CTMs within a provisional framework for the typology 
Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Construction requirements Visual Day-to-day business 
operations not restricted 
Creation of a new risk Cost 
Installation requirements Aesthetics 
Disruption to day-to-day 
business operations 
Participant comments 
Management 
requirements 
Permeability Reduction in damage Reconciliation information 
  Reduction in risk Increased damage to 
neighbouring buildings 
Relationship to other 
CTMs 
 Functional  Trade-offs 
 Blast impact    
 Environmental benefits    
 
Escalation and de-
escalation 
   
 Mitigation of hazards, 
threats and major 
accidents 
   
    
 Permeability    
 Public amenity    
 Revenue generation    
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4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has begun to develop the typology of CTMs that can be used to protect 
crowded places, as well as provide indications of their relative performance and 
consequences.  Through the undertaking of an extensive literature review, the boundaries of 
the typology were formed, encompassing the protection of crowded places from VBIEDs, 
through incorporating physical security measures, all of which is directly relevant to the 
„Protect‟ strand of CONTEST (as well as elements of „Prepare‟).  Design philosophy was 
explored, with the choice of site and incorporation of stand-off noted as important factors in 
the protection of vulnerable places.  A classification of CTMs was presented that 
encompassed all the means by which crowded places (and their occupiers) can protect 
themselves from a vehicle-borne terrorist attack, through the use of HVM, protective 
construction, and planning, detection and procedures.  Literature on CTMs was then 
presented, from which attributes of the typology have been formed and can be used to 
assess the relative performance and consequences of them.   
“The questions of whether counter-terrorism measures are cost-effective, what value 
they bring, to whom and if they can contribute to increased sustainability by mitigating 
the impacts of more than just the particular threat are of vital importance” (Harre-
Young, 2009, p.8) 
The research methodology and design that was adopted, in order to develop and validate the 
typology and answer the aforementioned questions will now be explored in the following 
chapter, with the results of the research itself being presented in Chapter Six. 
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5.0 Research Methodology and Design 
Understanding and adoption of research methodology, strategy and methods is discussed in 
this chapter, firstly by identifying methodological paradigms and the research strategies and 
methods that are traditionally used in conjunction with them, and how the resulting data can 
be analysed.  Each of these discussions will also highlight the adopted design of the 
research itself, which will then be followed by the presentation of the plan for the research 
and the schedule that was undertaken.  The development and undertaking of preliminary and 
main studies, as well as the creation of a scenario-based research instrument, will then be 
explored and the chapter will culminate in discussions on the validity and reliability of the 
methodology and research itself.  It is important to highlight that during the course of the 
research, sensitive information was divulged by a number of participants and evident in a 
number of site visits.  Such information was shared with (and already known by) the 
appropriate authorities (see section 5.2.6 for ethical considerations in relation to this).  Its 
publication would be of use to those intent on causing harm, so whilst such information or 
observations are referred to in the thesis, details that would nullify their anonymity are 
omitted, but replaced with as much context as possible in order to provide, as far as is 
practicable, an open and evidenced account.  The withholding of such information is also 
evident in a number of discussions that occurred over the course of the research.  The 
occasional quoting of, or referral to, an „un-attributable source‟ is therefore evident within the 
thesis.  Such withholding is a result of confidentiality as well as security, with each participant 
given the option to be completely un-attributable, as opposed to being anonymous yet coded 
 
5.1 Research Methodology, Strategy and Methods 
Research methodology in social enquiry refers not just to the research methods adopted, but 
also to the philosophical assumptions that a study is based on, which themselves influence 
the actual research methods used to collect, analyse and interpret data; the research 
methods cannot be viewed in isolation from the ontological and epistemological positions that 
are adopted by a researcher (Dainty, 2008, p.3).  Emanating from and evident in the 
literature on research methodology are a plethora of such frameworks, all of which 
encompass three distinct yet inter-related elements (as referred to above), those being 
philosophical assumptions regarding knowledge and reality (methodological paradigms), 
general approaches to research (research strategies) and their resulting procedures for data 
collection (research methods).  An overview of these elements and their key components are 
highlighted in Figure 5.1, each of which will be explored in greater depth, in order to ascertain 
an in-depth understanding of their nature and prominence in order to develop a valid and 
reliable research design. 
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Figure 5.1. An overview of research methodology, strategy, methods and analytical techniques 
 
5.1.1 Methodological paradigms 
A paradigm can be seen as a theoretical framework, or lens, through which events can be 
viewed (Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.17).  The creation of theory can be viewed as being 
deduced from observations and findings, known as deduction, or as emerging from 
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observations and findings, known as induction (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.35).  These two 
perspectives encapsulate the two methodological paradigms that dominate research 
methodology, both of which entail their own philosophical assumptions regarding knowledge 
and reality (epistemology and ontology, respectively). 
 
5.1.1.1 Epistemology and ontology 
Epistemology is concerned with the nature and acceptability of knowledge and how we 
acquire it (Knight and Turnbull, 2008, p.65; Runeson and Skitmore, 2008, p.75; Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, p.16; Walliman, 2006, p.15).  Knowledge can be acquired two ways, through 
sensory experience using inductive reasoning, known as empiricism, and through deductive 
reasoning, known as rationalism (Knight and Turnbull, 2008, p.68; Walliman, 2006, p.15).  
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality and whether social phenomenon and their 
meanings exist independently of social actors (Dainty, 2008, p.3; Runeson and Skitmore, 
2008, p.76; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.22; Walliman, 2006, p.15).  Both induction and 
deduction are traditionally associated with their own epistemological and ontological 
assumptions, as well as their own research strategies, methods and analytical techniques.  It 
is these two paradigms (and their interconnectivity) that will now be explored. 
 
5.1.1.2 Deduction 
Deduction encompasses observations and findings being derived from theory, through the 
deduction of a hypothesis or hypotheses that are based on existing theory and then 
empirically investigated (Robson, 2011, p.18; Bryman, 2008, p.9; Bryman and Bell, 2007, 
p.11), as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2. The process of deduction (Bryman, 2008, p.10) 
Epistemologically, deduction is associated with positivism, which asserts that the methods 
used to study the natural sciences can be used to study social reality (Robson, 2011, p.21; 
Bryman, 2008, p.13; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.16; Walliman, 2006, p.15) and that therefore, 
the researcher can remain independent of and uninfluenced by their observations and 
methods (Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.17; Silverman, 2006, p.409).  Ontologically, deduction is 
associated with objectivism, which posits that social phenomenon and their meanings exist 
independently of social actors (Bryman, 2008, p.19; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.22; Walliman, 
2006, p.15).  Deduction also traditionally encompasses the use of a quantitative research 
strategy and research methods (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.14), which are explored in 
sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.3.1 respectively. 
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5.1.1.3 Induction 
Conversely to deduction, induction posits that theory is the outcome of observations and 
findings (Robson, 2011, p.19; Bryman, 2008, p.11; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.12), with the 
difference between induction and deduction emphasised in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3. The difference between deduction and induction (Bryman, 2008, p.11) 
Epistemologically, induction is associated with interpretivism, which asserts that the social 
sciences are fundamentally different from the natural sciences and that subjective meaning is 
needed to understand them (Bryman, 2008, p.16; Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.18; Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, p.19; Walliman, 2006, p.15).  Ontologically, induction is associated with 
constructionism, which posits that social phenomenon and their meanings are continually 
accomplished and revised by social actors themselves (Bryman, 2008, p.19; Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, p.23; Silverman, 2006, p.400; Walliman, 2006, p.15).  Induction is therefore also 
associated with the use of a qualitative research strategy and the use of qualitative research 
methods (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.14), which are discussed in sections 5.1.2.2 and 5.1.3.2 
respectively.  Whilst the two paradigms could be perceived to be dichotomous, as apparent 
in Figure 5.1, their inter-relatedness and ability to both be used in terms of methodological 
pluralism is a matter of growing precedence. 
 
5.1.1.4 Iterative or dichotomous paradigms? 
“The basic principle of methodological pluralism is that the use of multiple theoretical 
models and multiple methodological approaches is both legitimate and desirable if 
established models and understandings are to be questioned and knowledge 
furthered” (Dainty, 2008, p.8) 
Whilst Dainty (ibid.) asserts that methodological pluralism is achievable and even desirable, it 
could be argued that such pluralism is inherent in the paradigms themselves, with deduction 
entailing elements of induction and vice versa; they are iterative processes that „weave‟ back 
and forth between data and theory (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.14).  The distinction between 
the two paradigms is therefore questionable, with the terminology themselves purporting to 
there being two dichotomous paradigms, a factor Bryman and Bell (2007, p.15) argue is a 
reason to think of deduction and induction as methodological tendencies as opposed to „hard 
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and fast distinction‟.  Robson (2011, p.31) argues that the task of science is to create theory 
that explains reality and to test those theories using rational criteria, implying an inherently 
iterative process of induction and deduction, an approach also known as realism (also critical 
realism), a reconciliatory approach whereby a natural order is recognised as existing in social 
phenomena (positivism), yet the understanding of this is subjective and requires 
interpretation (interpretivism) (Walliman, 2006, p.20). 
 
5.1.1.5 The inductive nature of the research 
As previously highlighted, a fundamental question confronting those undertaking social 
research is the adoption of philosophical positions in relation to their enquiries (Dainty, 2008, 
p.1).  The nature of the research is inductive, as demonstrated by the creation of a 
theoretical framework that captures the influences on the protection of crowded places and 
the influences on the CTMs that can be used to protect such places (Chapter Three), as well 
as the development of a provisional typology of the aforementioned CTMs (Chapter Four).  
Whilst, therefore, the research was also somewhat deductive in the sense of validating and 
furthering the „created theory‟ regarding the protection of crowded places, subjective 
understanding of and insights into stakeholder perspectives and action was required, ideally 
suiting a qualitative research strategy and the use of qualitative research methods.  
Epistemologically, the research adopts an interpretivist stance due to the aforementioned 
subjective meaning needing to be understood, with the theoretical framework identifying 
constant and variable influences, and the typology presenting the performance and 
consequences of CTMs.  The research adopts an ontological stance of critical realism, as it 
aims to understand (and therefore change or influence) the social world through the 
identification of the „structures at work‟ (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.18), as aforementioned; 
the research aims to explain the reality of the situation, create theory as a result of that 
understanding, and to test said theory.  Therefore, the research is iterative in nature due to 
being inherently inductive and deductive, and requires the adoption of a reconciliatory stance 
and approach in order to adhere to that.  In doing so, the order within the social phenomen 
being studied can be appropriately examined and understood, recognising that such 
understanding is subjective and requires interpretation (Robson, 2011, p.31; Walliman, 2006, 
p.20). 
 
5.1.2 Research strategies 
Viewed as iterative or dichotomous and as previously highlighted by Dainty (2008, p.3), the 
philosophical assumptions made regarding research methodology inherently influence and 
determine the quantitative and/or qualitative research strategies that are adopted, strategies 
that will now be explored. 
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5.1.2.1 Quantitative research 
“Quantitative approaches tend to relate to positivism and seek to gather factual data, 
to study relationships between facts and how such facts and relationships accord with 
theories and the findings of any research executed previously” (Fellows and Liu, 2008, 
p.27) 
 
Figure 5.4. The process of quantitative research (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.155) 
Qualitative research, as shown in Figure 5.4 above, is inherently deductive, embodying the 
positivist view that social reality is an external, objective (and therefore measureable) reality 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.28).  Four preoccupations of quantitative research are apparent, 
those being measurement, causality, generalisation and replication and that as a result of 
these factors, a number of criticisms of such research have been raised, those being that 
social phenomenon and their meanings are not distinguished, the measurement process 
possesses an „artificial and spurious sense of precision and accuracy‟, the reliance on 
instruments and procedures hinders the connection between the research itself and 
everyday life, and a static view of social reality is evident in the analysis of relationships 
between variables (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.174). 
 
5.1.2.2 Qualitative research 
“Qualitative research begins with assumptions, a worldview, the possible use of a 
theoretical lens, and the study of research problems inquiring into the meaning 
individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (Creswell, 2007, p.37) 
The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is the subjective nature of the 
assumptions being made, emphasising words as opposed to quantification, as well as the 
rejection of positivism for interpretivism and the resulting need for subjective meanings to be 
understood (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.28).  The difference in the process of qualitative 
research is shown in Figure 5.5.  Whilst qualitative research is associated with the generation 
of theory, it can also be used to test them (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.29) as for example, the 
research question could be to investigate all or part of an existing theory, highlighting the 
inter-related nature of induction and deduction further.  As with quantitative research, 
apparent preoccupations and criticisms attributed to qualitative research have been put 
forward, with qualitative research seeing through the eyes of the participants, therefore 
describing and emphasising context and process, with the resulting concepts and theory 
being grounded in the collected data (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Criticisms of qualitative 
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research encompass the subjective nature of the research and the resulting complexity 
inherent in trying to replicate and generalise it, as well as potential lack in transparency (ibid.).   
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Figure 5.5. The process of qualitative research (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.406) 
Creswell (2007) asserts that there are five qualitative approaches, those being narrative 
research (reporting the life of a single individual), phenomenological research (the meaning 
for several individuals of their lived experiences), grounded theory research (the generation 
or discovery of a theory through an abstract analytical process), ethnographic research (the 
examination of shared patterns in a cultural group) and case study research (the study of an 
issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system).  Whilst case study 
research can be as a qualitative research design in which a „case‟ or „bounded system‟ is 
investigated using research methods, it can also be understood as a unit of analysis (Stake, 
2005, cited in Creswell, 2007, p.73).  Therefore, use of term „case study‟ should be carefully 
considered, as such terminology can have multiple meanings and resonances (Robson, 
2011, p.156; Proverbs and Gameson, 2008, p.99).  Grounded theory is also seen as a 
qualitative research design (Robson, 2011, p.146; Hunter and Kelly, 2008, p.86), whereby 
theory is generated through a systematic process of data collection and analysis and is 
therefore grounded in the data.  However, as posited by Bryman and Bell (2007, p.29): 
“Whilst it is useful to contrast the two research strategies, it is necessary to be careful 
about hammering a wedge between them too deeply” 
 
5.1.2.3 Multi-strategy research 
As with the inter-related nature of research methodologies, research strategies themselves 
are inter-connected and can be used in conjunction with each other and as asserted by 
Robson (2011, p.29), such combined use is becoming increasingly popular as the 
appreciation that such multi-strategy designs can be undertaken without „dire consequences‟.  
In a study into the construction industry‟s use of, and adherence to, research methodology, 
strategy and methods, Dainty (2008, p.10) highlighted that there was “an apparent reluctance 
to embrace paradigmatic change”, with an evident reliance on positivist 
(deductive/quantitative) methods and open-ended interviews when qualitative research 
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methods were used.  Dainty (ibid.) argued that such reluctance to embrace paradigmatic 
change results in insights into industry practice lacking richness that a greater appreciation of 
qualitative strategies and methods could provide. 
 
5.1.3 Research methods 
Whilst research methods are not only individual tools or techniques in their own right, but 
representations of a researcher‟s philosophical assumptions regarding knowledge and reality 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.4), they are able to be broadly classified and explored, in order to 
gain an understanding into how they are used to collect quantitative and qualitative data. 
 
5.1.3.1 Quantitative research methods 
Evident in the literature on research methods is prominent use of experiments and survey as 
quantitative data collection techniques.  Experiments and quasi-experiments (studies that do 
not fulfil all the internal validity requirements of experiments) seek to manipulate variables in 
order to ascertain causal relationships and dependent variables (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
Surveys, which can be carried out through a variety of means (such as face-to-face, postal 
and internet-based, or through structured interviews) aim to record data on variables from 
which patterns of association can be detected (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.56).   
 
5.1.3.2 Qualitative research methods 
Semi-structured and un-structured interviews are widely used in qualitative research (Robson, 
2011; Bryman and Bell, 2007; May, 2001), as are observation and audio/visual materials 
(Silverman, 2006).  Surveys can also be used (Robson, 2011), with their qualitative use 
allowing additional probing of responses from participants.  Interviews can occur face-to-face, 
over the telephone or via the internet, and encompass one-on-one situations as well as with 
multiple participants, more commonly referred to as group interviews or focus groups.  Whilst 
the two terms are used interchangeably (Robson, 2011, p.293), herein a focus group is 
defined as a form of interview in which multiple participants interact, moderated by the 
researcher, in order to construct meaning in relation to a specific and defined topic (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007, p.511).  A group interview is therefore defined as a form of interview in which 
multiple participants construct meaning in relation to a number of topics, with less emphasis 
on moderation (ibid.). 
 
5.1.3.3 Mixed-methods research 
Mixed-methods research encompasses the use of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods in a single project, with capitalisation of strengths and the offsetting of weaknesses 
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being a key attraction in relation to their combined use (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.643).  For 
example, a semi-structured interview could be conducted, exploring a participant‟s 
perspective of a given area (qualitative), yet then content analysis of the interview transcript 
could be used to objectively measure patterns and associations in relation to specific words 
or phrases (quantitative).  Two prominent arguments against the use of such methods are 
that research methods themselves entail epistemological commitments (note here the use of 
the commitments, as opposed to them being seen as tendencies, as previously discussed) 
and the view that qualitative and quantitative research are separate paradigms themselves 
(ibid.).  Criticism of such an approach arises as a result of questioning the reliability and 
validity of the research if mixed-methods are used, yet potential to enhance such attributes is 
also evident, through triangulation.  Triangulation is the use of more than one method or 
source of data in order to enhance the reliability and validity of the findings (Robson, 2011, 
p.158; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.412).  Denzin (1988, cited in Robson, 2011, p.158) asserts 
that there are four types of triangulation, those being data triangulation (the use of more 
method of data collection), observer triangulation (the use of more than one observer during 
a study), methodological triangulation (the use of multi-strategy research) and theory 
triangulation (the use of multiple theories or perspectives).  Of pertinence in the debate for 
and against the use of qualitative versus quantitative research methods is the issue of 
generalisation; how applicable is the research to those outside of its scope.  A key issue in 
relation to this is sampling (the methods used to recruit a representative (or not) group of 
participants from a certain population, which will now be explored. 
 
5.1.3.4 Using a qualitative strategy and qualitative research methods 
As previously stated, Dainty (2008, p.10) asserts that qualitative research can provide rich 
insights into practice, an outcome that is pertinent to the aim and objectives of this research.  
With the research also adopting an interpretivist and constructivist stance through its 
inductive nature, the need for a qualitative strategy to explore the meanings given to various 
factors and the interpretation of them was prevalent.  Whilst there was a deductive element 
to the research, the use of a quantitative strategy would have entailed significant challenges, 
as no prior research had been undertaken in relation to the specific scope of the research 
and complexity was inherent in terms of sampling (discussed in forthcoming section 5.2.5), 
resulting in such a strategy not being used.  In relation to the qualitative research methods 
that were used, these entailed the use of focus groups and interviews, discussions (defined 
as „informal interviews‟, whereby the same data collection protocol was adhered to, but the 
interviews occurred either as a result of a pre-arranged meeting or alternative reason, yet 
participation in the research was requested), as well as observations during site visits and 
the collection and analysis of documents received during one interview.  The use of such 
qualitative research methods allowed the probing and exploration of participants‟ 
perspectives in order to validate and further the theoretical framework and typology. 
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5.1.3.5 Sampling 
“The objective of sampling is to provide a practical means of enabling the data 
collection and processing components of research to be carried out whilst ensuring 
that the sample provides a good representation of the population” (Fellows and Liu, 
2008, p.159) 
Sampling encompasses the probability sampling (random selection) or non-probability 
sampling (non-random selection) (Robson, 2011; Walliman, 2006) of a target population.  
Traditionally, non-random sampling, such as systematic, stratified or cluster sampling 
(Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.161), is associated with quantitative research due to its inherent 
preoccupation with generalisation and statistical significance, ensuring representativeness 
and the ability to make broader inferences (Silverman, 2010, p.139).  Sampling in relation to 
qualitative research is purported to be less important, as such research generates in-depth 
analysis of a specific context and is thereby grounded in data (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.497; 
Silverman, 2000, p.105).  Such sampling methods include theoretical sampling, where the 
researcher contacts potential participants who are perceived to contribute positively to the 
research (Walliman, 2006, p.79); snowball sampling, which is where the researcher contacts 
a number of potential participants who then provide further participants for the researcher 
(ibid.); and convenience sampling, which is where the researcher contacts participants due to 
the nature of their accessibility (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.197). 
The role of three stakeholders was most evident in the literature, those being architects, 
developers and engineers.  Architects were targeted due to their growing importance in 
contributing to the resilience and security agendas (Coaffee, 2010, p.340; Malagoda, 
Amaratunga and Pathirage, 2010, p.429; Crichton, 2008, p.117; Regan, 2006, p.23; Ling and 
Soh, 2005), through the making of design decisions, conveying of information to clients 
(Glass, 2008, p.174; National Research Council, 2001, p.3) and by delivering value to their 
clients, building users and community (Emmitt, 2007, p.1; Robinson, 2004, p.39).  
Developers were targeted due to perceived centrality in positively or negatively contributing 
to the aforementioned agendas (Bosher et al., 2009a, p.16; British Council for Offices, 2009, 
p.105; Bosher et al., 2007a, p.173), most notably due to perceived inappropriate motivations 
(Bosher et al., 2007a, p.174) and lack of understanding regarding what CTMs can be used 
(Harre-Young et al., 2010, p.1126).  Engineers are of importance in assessing the potential 
implications of an attack (British Council for Offices, 2009, p.13), designing and incorporating 
appropriate CTMs (Malagoda, Amaratunga and Pathirage, 2010, p.429; Clarke, 2004, p.303), 
conveying information to clients and end-users (National Research Council, 2001, p.3) and 
again, as with architects, maximising value through their designs and resulting decisions 
(Robinson, 2004, p.39).  The role of insurers was also raised as they have the ability to 
regulate or incentivise the use of CTMs and therefore aid in the adaptation to and mitigation 
of such risks (Crichton, 2008, p.130), although uncertainty surrounds the extent to which the 
incorporation of CTMs is obligated or incentivised.  The targeting of Local Authorities was 
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also made, due to their role in ensuring the safety and security of public places (Ling and 
Soh, 2005) and because of the identified local policy issues (section 3.4.6) that can influence 
whether such places are protected. 
As raised in section 5.1.3.4, the objective of sampling is to provide a means of data collection 
that provides a good representation (Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.159).  Fixation with sampling in 
relation to qualitative research is due to the in-depth analysis of specific context (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, p.497; Silverman, 2000, p.159).  Considering the targeting of specific 
stakeholders, as well as the research requiring those with understanding of CTMs, 
theoretical sampling and snowball sampling methods were used.  Theoretical sampling was 
chosen so that, as alluded to above, positive contributions could be made to the research 
(Walliman, 2006, p.79), reducing the risk of participants being engaged with who could not 
contribute to the typology or the understanding of the CTMs that can be used.  Snowball 
sampling was also used in conjunction with the above, taking the opportunity to engage with 
recommended contacts, who again, were known to be able to positively contribute to the 
research.  Arguably, whilst random-sampling would have resulted in greater 
representativeness, specific information on CTMs was required that would only be obtainable 
by those who have carried out such work previously, or during the course of the research 
itself.  By being informed by the literature on this particular area, and needing specific 
information in relation to the objectives of this research, it was felt that such a strategy was 
appropriate and valid.   
 
5.1.4 Data analysis 
The methods through which the data will be analysed are also of importance, in order to 
ensure the reliability and validity of the research and its findings.  Whilst quantitative data 
analysis encompasses univariate analysis (one variable at a time), bivariate analysis (two 
variables at a time) and multivariate analysis (three or more variables) with statistical 
significance validating findings (Bryman and Bell, 2007), qualitative data analysis is cited as 
being considerably more complex due to the need for filtering, sorting and other 
manipulations of what is often large quantities of data (Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.27; Groat, 
2002, p.174).  The aim of such analysis is therefore to organise, reduce and present the 
findings of the research, with the coding of the data in the aforementioned themes being a 
key component (Creswell, 2007, p.148; Walliman, 2006, p.132).  Literature on qualitative 
data analysis often depicts two techniques, those being grounded theory, and analytic 
induction (as expressed in Figure 5.1).  However, as previously highlighted, grounded theory 
can be seen as a qualitative research strategy in its own right, due to the specific and 
systematic process through which theory is created by the collection, coding and analysis of 
data (Robson, 2011, p.489; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Creswell, 2007, p.160; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p.12).  Analytic induction, however, as shown in shown in Figure 5.6: 
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“…is an approach to the analysis of data in which the researcher seeks universal 
explanations of phenomena by pursuing the collection of data until no cases that are 
inconsistent with a hypothetical explanation (deviant or negative cases) of a 
phenomenon are found” (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.583) 
Rough Definition of 
Research Question/Problem
Hypothetical Explanation of 
Research Question/Problem
Examination of Cases
Deviant Case to 
Hypothetical Explanation
No Deviant Cases. 
Hypothesis Confirmed
Reformulate Hypothesis
Examining of Cases and 
Data Collection Ceases
Hypothetical Explanation 
Redefined to Exclude Case
 
Figure 5.6. The process of analytic induction (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.582) 
Whilst quantitative data analysis can require the use of computer software, its use in relation 
to qualitative data analysis is questionable.  The process through which data is analysed is 
the same, whether conducting such analysis „by hand‟ (through a paper-based system or 
standard word processing software), or by using specialist analysis software, as the 
organisation and coding of data is carried out by the researcher (Creswell, 2007, p.164).  The 
use of specialist software will also more than likely require the researcher to gain an 
enhanced understanding of it, which will have time implications and will also put a layer, or 
barrier, between the researcher and their data, potentially increasing the amount of time 
taken to modify the organisation and/or coding of their data as the research progresses 
(Robson, 2011, p.472; King, 2008, p.137; Creswell, 2007, p.165).  The use of specialist 
software could also instil complacency within the researcher, who could assume that the 
software will analyse the data for them (Robson, 2011, p.472).  Whilst the choice of whether 
to use such software should be made on a case by case basis, as purported by Silverman 
(2010, p.257), not using such software could actually be better. 
 
5.1.4.1 Analytic induction and the analysis of data 
Analytic induction was used in order to seek verified explanations of the theoretical 
framework and of the typology, by pursuing the collection of data until no cases that were 
inconsistent with the theoretical framework and typology were found.  The process through 
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which this occurred was presented in Figure 5.6.  The construction of the framework, as 
shown in Chapter 3, enabled the expression of, through illustrations and narrative, influences 
that are applicable to this study (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.18, cited in Robson, 2011, 
p.67).  Through developing the framework and the typology, it ensured that the research was 
explicitly understood and that the analysis and coding of data was as relevant and 
accountable as possible.  In accordance with the features of qualitative data analysis, as 
asserted by Robson (2011, p.469), such an approach facilitated the labelling of elements of 
interest, incorporation of comments and reflections, using the constructed and emerging 
themes and patterns to influence further data collection, gradually elaborating sets of 
generalisations, and the linking of those generalisations back to the literature.  The 
construction of the provisional framework and typology also facilitated the incorporation of a 
coding frame into the design of the questions and scenario-based research instrument, 
ensuring the coding of data was as simple and consistent as possible during the analysis 
stages of the research (Walliman, 2006, p.91).  Thematic coding analysis was then used as 
the primary means of structuring data, as outlined above and as alluded to by Robson (2011, 
p.469), yet it incorporated the use of the themes and the summaries of them to supplement 
and illustrate the explorative nature of the research in line with the theoretical framework 
(Robson, 2011, p.467).  The following phases of thematic coding analysis were used, quoted 
from Robson (2011, p.476): 
1. Familiarizing yourself with your data.  Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and 
re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas 
2. Generating initial codes.  May be done by first devising a framework or template or 
inductively by interaction with the data.  Extracts from the data are given codes in a 
systematic fashion across the entire data set, with similar extracts being given the 
same code 
3. Identifying themes.  Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant 
to each potential theme.  Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded 
extracts and the entire data set.  Revising the initial codes and/or themes if necessary 
4. Constructing thematic networks.  Developing a thematic „map‟ of the analysis 
5. Integration and interpretation.  Making comparisons between different aspects of the 
data using display techniques such as tables and networks.  Exploring, describing, 
summarizing and interpreting the patterns.  Demonstrating the quality of the analysis 
As purported by Fellows and Liu (2008, p.187), the analysis of qualitative data can be 
laborious and difficult, with the data requiring systematic management to ensure reliability 
and at least two „passes‟ or „rounds‟ of the data to ensure that emerging concepts or themes 
identified towards the end of the first „round‟ are checked for in the previous data during the 
second „round‟.  Such an approach was therefore adopted to ensure the accuracy and 
reliability of the data.  Whilst the process of coding itself can result in the context in which the 
data was collected being lost (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.597), the theoretical framework 
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facilitated the capturing of the context, framing the circumstances in which the data was 
given.  The receiving of documents from interview participants and the resulting analysis of 
data within them was also considered, due to the subjective aspects that are apparent in 
such material (Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.234), most notably the authenticity of those materials, 
their credibility, representativeness, and their meaning (Scott, 1990, p.6, cited in Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, p.555).  Referring to Figure 5.5, the adopted qualitative strategy and analytical 
techniques resulted in the following process: 
Research Design
Data Collection
Interpretation of Data
Conceptual and 
Theoretical Work
Write-Up Findings / 
Conclusions
Further Data 
Collection
Tighter Specification 
of Research Question
 
Figure 5.7. The process used to carry out the data collection and analysis 
The above process was therefore used to analyse the data that was collected for the 
research.  Upon the completion of the interviews and discussions (the distinction between 
them having been defined in section 5.1.3.4) and in line with Robson‟s (2011, p.476) phases 
of analysis, familiarisation with the data was developed, which lead to the generation of initial 
codes.  Constructing networks and interpretation of the codes resulted in three over-arching 
categories of data forming, those being influences on the protection of crowded places, 
influencing on the value of CTMs used to protect crowded places, and CTMs and their 
attributes within the typology of measures that can be used to protect such places.  Themes 
within these categories therefore emerged (such as TARAs, auditing, and stakeholder 
understanding and engagement each influencing the value of CTMs) and the data from the 
study could be re-analysed to ensure all applicable data was appropriately coded.  These 
developments in the analysis of data therefore aided in the research design for the main 
study and the narrowing of the questions asked during the discussions and interviews, 
ensuring that participants were asked the questions whilst adopting a semi-structured 
interview structure, so that the significance of issues according to stakeholders could be 
captured.  Once all the interviews and discussions had been carried out and initially analysed, 
they were all analysed for a second time, to ensure that any emergent issues towards the 
end of the data collection process were analysed in conjunction with interviews and 
discussions that were carried out earlier in the process. 
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5.1.5 The role and potential bias of the researcher 
“…there is a growing recognition that it is not feasible to keep the values that a 
researcher holds totally in check” (Bryman, 2008, p.24) 
Bryman (ibid.) asserts that there are several areas where such influences can be apparent, 
those being the choice of research area, the formulation of research question, the choice of 
methods, the formulation of research designs and data collection techniques, the 
implementation of data collection, the analysis of data, the interpretation of data and in 
relation to the conclusions of the research.  The potential bias of a researcher can influence 
every component of a research project itself, as well as its design.  Such perspectives are 
also evident in Bryman and Bell (2007, p.30) and May (2001, p.51).  Preventing bias, 
therefore, seems impossible, at the very least insurmountable.  Therefore, a reflexive 
approach seemed prudent, being aware of personal values and their potential to influence 
the aforementioned components of the research.  As asserted by Creswell (2007, p.206), 
researchers interact with the subject matter to co-create derived interpretations.  Bias in 
relation to interpretations seems most apparent, with the researcher framing their research in 
a particular way, interpreting the interpretations of their participants, as well as then 
interpreting that data in relation to the reviewed literature (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.21).  
Such considerations were not solely dealt with prior to undertaking the research, reflection of 
the personal input of the researcher was a constant factor in the collection and analysis of 
data, as personal values or perspectives, such as sympathies or disagreement, can occur 
during such processes (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.30) or even afterwards, influencing the 
findings of the research itself and the prominence given to them.  Through clearly stating the 
process that was taken to carry out the research, being reflexive yet thorough and using 
informed and appropriate protocols and frameworks, any incursion of values was identified 
and visible (see section 5.5.2.1 for more information).   
 
5.1.6 Ethical and confidentiality considerations 
“The value of research depends as much on its ethical veracity as on the novelty of 
its discoveries.  How can we believe in the results of a research project if we doubt 
the honesty of the researchers and the integrity of the research methods used?” 
(Walliman, 2006, p.147) 
Whilst culturally bounds (Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.249), such considerations most notably 
encompass the potential for harm, informed consent, invasions of privacy and the use of 
deception (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.132; Silverman, 2006, p.317) and are therefore crucial 
in recognising and responding to „human issues‟ involved in undertaking research (Silverman, 
2006, p.315) and the adherence to a moral behaviour (May, 2001, p.59).  The adherence to 
data protection legislation is also apparent, through ensuring that personal data is processed 
fairly and lawfully, be obtained and used lawfully in relation to a given purpose, not be 
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excessive in relation to said purpose, be accurate and up-to-data, be secured so as to not 
allow unlawful process or accidental loss or damage, and not be transferred outside of the 
European Economic Area (Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.258; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.143).  
Data that was collected therefore adhered to the aforementioned principles and will be kept 
until the need for its use, most notably through the cessation of the project and its 
publications, has ceased (Fellows and Liu, 2008, p.256).  Loughborough University required 
an ethical approval form to be undertaken prior to permission being given to conduct the 
research.  Once approval was granted, a participant information and ethical consent form 
was created (see Appendix C5.1), with copies being signed by participants and the 
researcher undertaking the interview.  
As referred to at the beginning of Chapter Five, occasions occurred during the course of the 
research where sensitive information was divulged to the interviewer, by participants.  A 
procedure was put in place to deal with such situations, which encompassed the matter 
being brought to the attention of the interviewer‟s supervisor and also to the attention of the 
interviewer‟s contact at NaCTSO.  The supervisor was part of the project team and was 
therefore allowed to see the specific details of the interview, as the project team members 
were identified in the participant information and informed consent form (Appendix C5.1).  
The NaCTSO contact, however, was not included in such a way, so the specific details of the 
interview and participants were not divulged. 
 
5.2 The Research Plan and Schedule 
As a result of the aforementioned understanding of research methodology and the 
formulated research design, a research plan was formed, as shown in Figure 5.8.  The 
schedule of research that was undertaken is shown in Figure 5.9.  As is evident from the 
aforementioned Figure, the sources of data used were 27 interviews, 8 discussions, three 
site visits, two received sets of documents, three telephone calls and four emails.  Also 
evident in Figure 5.9 and in line with the sampling methods adopted (see section 5.2.4), 
architects, developers, engineers and Local Authorities were engaged with, as were 
academics, design consultants, NaCTSO and urban designers. 
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Identification of gaps in knowledge
Formulation of research objectives
Development of framework and typology
Investigation of research methodology
Formulation of research design
Stage 1
Literature 
Review
Preparation of sample
Validation of  interview protocol and questions
Assessment of the scope of the research
Analysis of the data
Stage 2
Preliminary 
Study
Design and validation of research instrument
Preparation of sample
Conduction of interviews
Analysis of data
Stage 3
Main Study
Presentation of research findings
Presentation and evidencing of final typology
Validation of framework and findings
Presentation of conclusions
Stage 4
Presentation 
& Validation 
of Findings
Chapters 1-4
Chapter 7
Chapter 6
Chapter 5
Chapter 8
 
Figure 5.8.  The research plan 
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Figure 5.9. The schedule of research that was undertaken
Q3
2009
3 Discussions
Acad. CT
NaCTSO Rep.
Q4
3 Interviews
Acad. Terrorism
2 Design Cnslt‟s
3 CTSAs
Q1 Q2
2010
1 Discussion
NaCTSO Rep.
+ 1 Document
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Architect
2 Discussions
NaCTSO Rep.
Crime Mgr.
Q3 Q4
7 Interviews
Urban Dsgnr.
Engineer
3 Design Cnslt‟s 
& 1 Cost Conslt.
Un-attributable
8 Interviews
Architect
Engineer
3 CTSAs
Planning Dir.
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1 Engineer
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1 Ex-Practitioner
1 Telephone Call
1 NaCTSO Rep.
6 Interviews
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Engineer
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Architect
Architect
Architect
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Design Cnslt.
Engineer
Engineer
2 Engineers
Engineer
Engineer
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Engineer
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Engineer,  
Architect & 3 
Documents
2 CTSAs
2 Engineers
Engineer & Site 
Visit
1 Telephone Call
1 Interview
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Visit
NaCTSO Rep.
1 Telephone Call
Preliminary Study 
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5.3 Research Studies and Instrument 
This section will now explore the creation of the preliminary and main studies that were used 
to carry out the research, as well as the development of a scenario-based research 
instrument that was used during a number of the interviews.  Table 5.1 provides information 
on the participants who contributed to the research, in line with ethical, data protection, and 
anonymity arrangements that were put in place and agreed on prior to the collection of data. 
Table 5.1. An overview of participant information 
Source 
No. 
Participant 
No. 
Stage Role / Tag Organisation 
>5 years’ CT 
experience? 
D1 1 
Q3 2009 
Academic, Urban Planning University Yes 
D2 2 NaCTSO Representative NaCTSO Yes 
D3 3 Academic, Construction Mgt University No 
I1 4 
Q4 2009 
Academic, Terrorism University Yes 
I2 
5 Design Consultant A Design Consultancy Yes 
6 Design Consultant B Design Consultancy No 
I3 
7 CTSA A Police Force Yes 
8 CTSA B Police Force No 
9 CTSA C Police Force Yes 
D4 2 Q1 2010 NaCTSO Representative NaCTSO Yes 
D5 2 
Q2 2010 
NaCTSO Representative NaCTSO Yes 
E1 10 Architect Architects No 
D6 11 Crime Specialist Police Force Yes 
I4 12 Director Construction Company Yes 
I5 13 Architect Architects No 
I6 14 Urban Designer Local Authority No 
I7 
15 Strategic Consultant A Design Consultancy No 
16 Cost Consultant Construction Company No 
17 Strategic Consultant B Design Consultancy No 
18 Associate Director Design Consultancy No 
I8 19 Architect Architects Yes 
I9 20 Director Design Consultancy Yes 
E2 17 Strategic Consultant B Design Consultancy No 
I10 21 Architect Construction Company No 
E3 22 
Q3 2010 
Associate Director Construction Company Yes 
E4 23 PhD Student, Crime Reduction University No 
D7 24 Un-attributable source Yes 
I11 25 Director Construction Company Yes 
I12 22 Associate Director Construction Company Yes 
I13 26 Design Manager Construction Company No 
I14 
27 Director A Construction Company Yes 
28 Director B Construction Company Yes 
I15 
29 Director Developers Yes 
30 Executive Director A Developers Yes 
31 Executive Director B Developers Yes 
I16 32 Director Construction Company Yes 
T1 2 NaCTSO Representative NaCTSO Yes 
I17 33 Director Construction Company Yes 
I18 34 Director Construction Company Yes 
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D8 24 Un-attributable source Yes 
I19 35 
Q4 2010 
Principal Consultant Construction Company Yes 
I20 36 Architect Architects Yes 
I21 
37 Technical Director Construction Company Yes 
38 Architect Architects No 
I22 
39 CTSA A Police Force Yes 
40 CTSA B Police Force Yes 
I23 
41 Director A Construction Company Yes 
42 Director B Construction Company Yes 
I24 
8 CTSA A Police Force No 
43 CTSA B Police Force Yes 
44 CTSA C Police Force Yes 
I25 45 Assistant Director Local Authority Yes 
I26 46 Engineer Local Authority No 
T2 24 Un-attributable source Yes 
I27 47 CTSA Police Force Yes 
T3 2 NaCTSO Representative NaCTSO Yes 
 
5.3.1 The preliminary study 
The preliminary study ran from July 2009 to June 2010, the objectives of which were to 
ascertain the extent to which the aim and objectives of the research itself were justified, valid 
and appropriate given the state of the art, to test data collection and analysis techniques, and 
to collect data, where possible, in relation to the fulfilment of the objectives themselves.  The 
study was conducted during the literature review into counter-terrorism and the resilience of 
the built environment, as well as that of research methodology and design.  As shown in 
Figure 5.10, of those stakeholders engaged with, a number of participants were recruited 
through known contacts of colleagues who work in the Department of Civil and Building 
Engineering, in line with the adopted sampling methods. 
 
Figure 5.10. The sample and schedule of the preliminary study 
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5.3.1.1 Data collection protocol 
When the participants were contacted, a pre-interview letter was sent (appendix C5.2).  The 
letter detailed the nature of the research itself and what the participants could expect from 
being interviewed, as well as outlining the questions that would be asked.  The study also 
acted as a means of testing the interview questions, ensuring that the use of ambiguous or 
technical terms were avoided, overly long or general questions were avoided (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007) and to see if a research instrument would be needed to aid in extracting the 
required information. It also facilitated the use of cognitive mapping to record participants 
perspectives (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.431) and the testing of the interview protocol more 
generally, in terms of introductions, the main body of the interview and closures (Robson, 
2011, p.284).  Post-interview letters were then sent to participants (Appendix C5.3), to thank 
them for their time and reflect on the individual contributions that were made. 
 
5.3.1.2 Influences of the preliminary study 
The study determined that no amendments were needed to the existing interview questions 
and protocols themselves.  However, emanating from the participants were a range of 
influences on the protection of crowded places, as well as influences on the value of CTMs 
that can be used to protect such places.  Therefore, a theoretical framework was formed (in 
conjunction with returning to the literature following the interviews), in order to construct such 
a framework and inform the future questioning of participants.  This influence is evident 
through the nature of the thesis itself, with the literature review being framed around the 
theoretical framework itself (see Chapter Three for the provisional framework determined by 
the literature itself and Chapter Eight for the validated framework).  Such influences highlight 
the inductive nature of the research and the influences that can result from them, as well as 
the need to be able to accommodate such developments in relation to the collection and 
analysis of data.  As previously noted, the length of the preliminary study was approximately 
12 months, most notably due to the accommodation of these influences and the creation of a 
research instrument.  Whilst all the participants who were engaged with had prior or current 
knowledge of counter-terrorism in relation to the protection of crowded places (as a result of 
the theoretical and snowball sampling methods that were adopted), the expression of 
potential implications of CTMs, for example spatially in terms of traffic displacement, resulted 
in the need to create a visual and usable research instrument, to aid in resolving these 
issues.  The study resulted in the following process. 
 
5.3.2 The research instrument 
In order to aid in capturing the aforementioned attributes of crowded places and CTMs, a 
realistic scenario was required.   
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Figure 5.11. The influences of the preliminary study 
The city of Nottingham hosts the second largest square in England (Nottingham City Council, 
2009, p.5) and the square itself, surrounded by varying infrastructure, provided an ideal 
setting upon which to base the instrument.  Therefore, research was undertaken (in the form 
of observation and photography of the area, as well as the use of on-line map resources), in 
order to graphically map the area and develop the instrument itself.  Two documents 
published by Nottingham City Council were also used (Nottingham City Council, 2009; 2005), 
as they explored the Council‟s policies in relation to master plans and urban design, and also 
provided information on Old Market Square, which was the focus of the research instrument.  
Google SketchUp software (version 7) was used in order to create a two-dimensional and 
scaled construct of the area surrounding plot (Old Market Square), as shown in Figure 5.12.   
 
Figure 5.12. The scenario-based research instrument 
Research Scope
Literature Review
Research Methodology 
and Design
Preliminary Study
Research Instrument
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The site was chosen due to the plethora of factors that are inherent in the situational context 
that crowded places can be located within, as transport infrastructure, historic and modern 
buildings, outside dining facilities and existing CTMs were evident, as shown in Figure 5.13.  
Blank handouts of the research instrument were printed on A3 paper, in order to allow room 
for participants to illustrate examples freely and within plenty of space.  It was envisaged that 
the coding of any data would be done so against the existing framework and typology.  Two 
interviews were used to test the scenario-based research instrument, with one participant 
highlighting its potential benefit, but not requiring it themselves, with the other participant 
using the handout to sketch out ideas and highlight points that they were making; using the 
instrument as an aide-memoire as well as a platform on which to illustrate points.  The 
illustrations were coded against the existing analytic framework, with no problems or 
modifications required to it.  The instrument was then used as it was, when required, for the 
main study. 
 
5.3.3 The main study 
The main study ran from June to November 2010, the objectives of which were solely to 
collect data in relation to the aim and objectives of the researcher, as the testing and 
validation of the interview protocol and research instrument had been undertaken within the 
preliminary study.  As is evident in Figure 5.14, a number of participants were recruited 
through snowball sampling, through being contacts of colleagues, or of a participant.  The 
study was conducted during the literature review into counter-terrorism and the resilience of 
the built environment, as well as that of research methodology and design.  As shown in 
Figure 5.10, of those stakeholders engaged with, a number of participants were recruited 
through known contacts of the researcher‟s supervisors, in line with the adopted sampling 
methods. 
 
5.3.3.1 Data collection protocol 
The same data collection protocol used during the preliminary study was also used during 
the main study.  All but two of the interviews carried out during quarter two of 2010 were 
carried out in New York City, in the USA.  Funding was received by the IMCRC to conduct 
research, which also required no additional or modified protocols.  Instead of posting post-
interview letters, which was done to participants in the UK, electronic versions were sent. 
 
5.3.3.2 Encountered barriers to the collection of data 
A significant barrier to the collection of data was the inability to obtain all the desired 
monetary costs of the CTMs themselves, with relatively few being given ranges.   
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Figure 5.13. Examples of situational context at Old Market Square
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Participants felt that obtaining such Figures, or „rules of thumb‟, was not possible, due to the 
inherent variables that exist within projects that make each place or space unique.  This is of 
considerable detriment considering part of an objective was to identify the cost-effectiveness 
of CTMs.   
 
Figure 5.14. The sample and schedule of the main study 
However, data on the requirements, performance and consequences of CTMs was collected, 
resulting in the research still being able to analyse and present findings in relation to those 
factors and contributing to knowledge in those ways.  Not being able to obtain specific cost 
data nonetheless highlights the complexity that is inherent in protecting crowded places, and 
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as will be shown in Chapter Six, aids those who are responsible for the protection of crowded 
places to be able to identify scenarios that can contribute to the cost of projects. 
5.4 Research Validity and Reliability 
Reliability and validity are two significant terms in relation to research and the methodology, 
design and methods used to collect and analyse data.  Reliability can be seen as the extent 
to which the study is repeatable, through the presentation and rigour of the processes used 
to carry out the research (Bryman, 2008, p.31; Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.40).  Validity can be 
seen as another word for „truth‟ (Silverman, 2010, p.275), as research presents findings that 
may or may not reflection the „actual‟ circumstances that were investigated, if incorrect or 
inappropriate methods were used (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.41) and therefore may or may 
not research or present findings on what the aims and objectives said it would. 
 
5.4.1 Reliability of the research 
The reliability of the research has been demonstrated through the informed discussion and 
use of, as well as presentation of illustrations showing, the processes that were used to 
conduct the research.  The examination of literature on research methodology and design 
lead to the choosing of a qualitative research strategy in order to explore and understand the 
subjective nature of the topic being researched, with set processes identified for the 
collection and analysis of the data.  As the analysis of data occurred through the use of a 
provisional theoretical framework and typology, how they were formed was also made 
apparent.  It was noted that the formation of the framework was as a result of the preliminary 
study, whereby participants had raised a number of influences on the protection of crowded 
places and on the value of CTMs themselves.  How that particular output of the preliminary 
study related to the literature review, research methodology and design, and future study 
was made clear.  The sampling methods that were used were documented, with the use of 
analytic induction and theoretical saturation denoting when data collected ceased.  It is 
therefore argued that in terms of reliability and the ability of a researcher to replicate this 
study, as much clarity that could be presented, has been, and is sufficient in itself to replicate 
such an inductive and qualitative study as is possible. 
 
5.4.2 Validity of the research 
The validity of the research has been demonstrated through the appropriate selection of 
research methods and reflexivity surrounding potential bias, in order to ensure that the 
research methods used (and how they were used) resulted in valid data that was directly 
related to the aim and objectives of the research.  Two factors are pertinent in this instance, 
those being methodological constraints and the role and potential bias of the researcher.  
  
117 
 
The inductive nature of the research led to the adoption of a purely qualitative research 
strategy and the use of qualitative research methods to understand and probe the subjective 
responses of participants.  The use of such a strategy resulted in significant findings early on 
in the research, with the preliminary study identifying that whilst the CTMs evident in the 
typology were valid each had inherent requirements, performance and consequences, a 
range of factors were identified that influenced whether crowded places were protected or 
not, as were factors that influenced the value of the CTMs themselves.  Therefore, the 
literature review was re-visited and a theoretical framework was constructed in order to 
capture and analyse data that had been obtained and would be in the future.  As was raised, 
the complexity surrounding the identification of monetary costs of incorporating CTMs was 
raised and inhibited the researcher from being able to collect the desired data in relation to 
this.  Whilst it could be argued that with the formation of the typology, time could have been 
spent on creating an objective research instrument that, for example, identified ranges of 
costs that stakeholders thought could be an accurate reflection of the costs of such 
measures, the inductive nature of the research (and arguably, the values of the researcher) 
lead to the pursuit of data on the influences that determined whether CTMs were 
incorporated or not.  The role and potential bias of the researcher also influences the validity 
of the research, as pre-existing or emergent values of a researcher could incur on a number 
of stages of the research process, as was made evident in this chapter.  It‟s argued that two 
such incursions occurred during the research process, to which the awareness of reflexivity 
prior to the data collection occurring aided in their identification and relative resolution.   
 
5.4.2.1 Personal values of the researcher 
Personal motivations and perspectives of participants (why they were in the job that they 
were and how they felt about this topic) were raised in a number of interviews.  During two 
interviews where such matters were addressed, participants stated that money was their sole 
purpose, and/or the morality of protecting crowded places was not a value they held.  This 
impacted the researcher‟s personal values and, whilst responses were recorded objectively, 
impinged the researcher‟s chain of thought, due to the personal differences in values that 
had been made apparent.  However, it‟s argued that through the recognition of such issues 
occurring prior to the data collection being started, the use of cognitive mapping to 
understand participants and the adherence to and exploration of pre-set (yet semi-structured) 
questions, facilitated the data collection to carry on un-impinged.   
 
5.4.2.2 Perceived importance of the findings 
The preliminary study resulted in the identification of a number of factors that influenced 
whether crowded places were protected, as well as the value of CTMs themselves (as 
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previously highlighted).  Coupled with the complexity and questioned possibility of collecting 
data on the monetary costs of CTMs, such a situation presented two possible routes that the 
research could have traversed.  Either an objective research instrument was constructed that 
facilitated the collected of cost data through ranges, thereby requiring a quantitative 
approach, as well as qualitative methods to understand reasoning and interpretations, or, a 
purely qualitative research instrument was constructed to further investigate the influences 
on the protection of crowded places and on the value of CTMs themselves.  Such 
circumstances reflect the need for a decision that had to be made and it is apparent that the 
value judgements and bias of the researcher partially influenced the decision itself.  It was 
decided that as opposed to creating a research instrument to explore one attribute of CTMs 
(the success of which was questionable due to participants feeling the collection of such data 
was not achievable in any case), the findings of the preliminary study should have been 
followed.  The inductive nature of the research had lead to provisional, yet significant, 
findings that the researcher felt indicated the reality of the area more than the pursuit of 
specific cost data would have done.  Therefore, it is argued that the research that was 
conducted was valid, as it represented the reality of the situation in which it is positioned, and 
used appropriate methods to collect and analyse the data. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the methodological position that was adopted in order to 
undertake the research and the resulting qualitative research strategy and methods that were 
used in order to fulfil the objectives of the inductive research.  It has presented a short 
literature review and understanding on research methodology, strategy and methods, which 
was followed by the presentation and reasoning of the research design that was adopted for 
the research itself.  The schedule that was undertaken was also presented, and the research 
instrument and studies themselves were explored, identifying how the research design 
informed the valid and reliable collection and analysis of data.  Reflections on the validity and 
reliability of the research methodology and design were then purported, which highlighted the 
impact of the researchers own personal values on the research, as well as how those values 
and the perspectives of participants shaped and informed the direction of the research itself.  
The direction that the research took resulted in the identification of a number of influences on 
the protection of crowded places, as well as on the value of CTMs themselves.  The results 
of the research, presented in the following chapter, therefore explore these influences, as 
well as the data that was obtained on the CTMs themselves, their value, and their 
implications.  
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6.0 Results of the Research 
This chapter presents and discusses the substantive analysis of the data that was collected 
from the preliminary and main studies of the research.  As was raised in the previous chapter, 
the preliminary study highlighted that a number of factors influenced the protection of 
crowded places and the value of CTMs themselves, which were explored and incorporated 
into the research design, given the inductive and interpretative nature of this research.  The 
analysis of data from the main study furthered the influences (that were incorporated into the 
theoretical framework), highlighting that eight high level influences that can determine 
whether crowded places are protected (or not) and that three factors can influence the value 
the CTMs used to protect them, either by nullifying and voiding or positively impacting any 
perceived or actual value of the CTMs themselves.  How the participants (an overview of 
whom was presented in Table 5.1) contributed to the collection of data in relation to those 
influences is presented in Table 6.1.  Evident from Figure 6.1 is that TARAs, as well as 
stakeholder understanding and engagement, can influence both the protection of crowded 
places, as well as the value of the CTMs used to protect them.  These influences, as well as 
the performance, requirements and consequences of CTMs will now be explored. 
 
Figure 6.1.  Influences on the protection of, and value of protecting, crowded places 
 
6.1 Influences on the Protection of Crowded Places 
There are eight factors that can influence the protection of crowded places, as shown in 
Figure 6.2.  The results in relation to obligations, incentives, threat and risk assessments, 
perceptions and moments of terrorism, stakeholder understanding and engagement, 
economic influences, local policy, and building stock rotation will now be explored. 
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Table 6.1. Data contributions made by participants 
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Influences within the framework 
Obligations # #  # # #     # #   # #  # #   # #   # # # # #  #   # # # # # # # # 28 
Incentives   #       # #  #  #       # #  # #   # #  # # # #  # # #  #  19 
TARAs  # # # # # #  #  # # # # # #  #   # # # # # # #  # #  # # # # # # # #  #  32 
Perc‟s and Moments of Terrorism    # # #   #  # # #  # #       # # # # #  # #  # # # #  #  #  #  23 
Economic Influences      #     #              #  #   #      #       6 
Local Policy                          #                 1 
Building Stock Rotation                          #                 1 
Stakeholder Und‟g and Eng‟t  #  # # #  #  # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # #   # #  # # #  # # # #  # # 32 
Auditing     #                      #                2 
CTMs within the typology 
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation   # # # # #    # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # #    # #  # #    # #  #  27 
Protective Construction     # # # #   # # # # # #  # #   # #  # # #  # #  #    # # # #  #  25 
Planning, Detection & Procedures   #  # # #    #   # # #  # #   # # # # #    #  # #  # # #  #    22 
  
# = Contribution 
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Figure 6.2.  Influences on the protection of crowded places 
This section will show that whilst influences that contain elements of confusion have resulted 
and can result in the protection of crowded places, such as the extent to which existing 
legislation encompasses the incorporation of CTMs, more often than not, the confusion and 
uncertainty is exploited or directly results in the protection of crowded places not occurring.  
This is expressed in Figure 6.3, which presents a fish-bone diagram to show such influences 
on the protection of crowded places. 
 
6.1.1 Obligations 
Obligations encompass legislation, insurance policies and organisational values, all of which 
were raised as influencing the protection of crowded places.   
 
6.1.1.1 Legislation 
“…as soon as people find out it‟s not mandatory, you‟ve got a battle on your hands” 
(I2. Design Consultant A, Design Consultancy) 
This sentiment was echoed by 12 other participants, all from security-orientated positions.  In 
particular, it was raised that interpretations of the Health and Safety at Work Act are varied 
and as a result of no clear policy, this circumstance is exploited, resulting in the protection of 
crowded places not occurring.  Two participants felt that existing legislation could be used 
and that obligations exist under duties of care, through the aforementioned Act (I4. Director, 
Construction Company; I12. Associate Director, Construction Company).  Any potential for 
stakeholders to be prosecuted under existing legislation highlights incentives to incorporate 
CTMs (not necessarily physical measures) into buildings and sites, through the reduction in 
risk of being prosecuted (I4. Director, Construction Company). 
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Figure 6.3: A fish-bone diagram expressing the negative influences on the protection of crowded places
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The reduced damages to reputation and the retention of business that could occur as a result 
of not incorporating such measures are also worthy of consideration in such situations.  
Corporate manslaughter was also raised, with prosecutions being feasible in the event of an 
attack where lives were lost and injuries caused, and where CTMs had not been 
incorporated (I17. Technical Director, Construction Company; I18. Director, Construction 
Company; I27. CTSA).  Liability is the emanating issue surrounding this, with the following 
quote summarising the thoughts of numerous participants: 
“…if your assessment is that that is a true statement of risk and you don‟t follow it, 
could you then be taking on liability; the fact that you were aware of it and you chose 
to ignore it” (I5. Architect) 
Considering the confusion and varying perspectives, it was highlighted by one participant 
that it will need to be tried and tested in court in order for the „real‟ answers to emerge (I18. 
Director, Construction Company).  The potential for existing legislation to be used seems to 
have significant implications for the protection of crowded places, yet this issue seems to be 
„down-played‟ by those in Government, with CTSAs being instructed not to refer to possible 
legislative implications when consulting with stakeholders (T3. NaCTSO Representative).  
Regarding governmental or other authoritative perspectives in relation to legislation, the 
following was raised: 
“I don‟t see an appetite from the top, down and then that allows the people in the 
middle, the developers, to wriggle like mad and get out of as much as they possibly 
can” (I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority) 
The amount of „wriggling‟ that organisations will do to avoid incorporating CTMs into 
buildings was highlighted by one CTSA during a site visit, who stated that three employees 
had been fired from their jobs for recommending spending money on CTMs and that, despite 
the current employee having made progress and incorporating some CTMs, at every 
opportunity, cheaper alternatives had been sought and purchased (I27. CTSA; Site Visit 3).  
The majority of these CTMs were found to not be fit-for-purpose, requiring their removal and 
replacement with new, fit-for-purpose measures, thus costing the organisation more money 
than it would have had the advice been followed initially (further exploration of the 
reproduction of CTMs can be found in section 6.2.2.2).  This all took place at an 
internationally renowned crowded place who had been targeted in terrorist plots, information 
which is publicly known and has been reported in the media.  Similar, although not as 
extreme, examples were given in other regions, with one CTSA reporting the following during 
part of an interview regarding the avoidance of incorporating CTMs: 
“Certainly big companies know that and they use it to their advantage, because I 
certainly know on two occasions where a company in **** kept the ALOs at a distance 
until actually, the plans had been approved by the council” (I24. CTSA C) 
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Without enforceable legislation (or evidenced benefits of CTMs that inspire changes in 
culture and industry), how these issues influence the protection of crowded places, as well as 
the reconciliation of differing priorities and agendas, was summarised by this CTSA: 
“what it means is, if and when an attack does take place, then there‟ll be a lot more 
casualties than would have otherwise been the case” (I24. CTSA B) 
 
6.1.1.2 Insurance obligations 
Issues in relation to insurance revolve around existing systems and responses in the event of 
an attack.  Regarding existing systems, the PoolRe scheme was raised as detrimentally 
influencing the protection of crowded places.  The PoolRe scheme results in any loss being 
underwritten by the Government in the event of a terrorist attack, which it was argued acts as 
a disincentive to release expenditure incorporating CTMs over and above current statutory 
obligations (I11. Director, Construction Company).  A link between insurance and legislation 
was made clear by one participant, who stated that if the incorporation of CTMs was made a 
statutory obligation, then insurers would take a much more active role (I4. Director, 
Construction Company).  However, as with legislative obligations, the uncertainty is 
facilitating the protection of crowded places not occurring, which in itself poses questions that 
require further investigation… 
“…we know we‟re a target, but if we don‟t do anything, will the insurance companies 
still pay out?” (I18. Director, Construction Company) 
It is this thought that emanated from several participants.  Again, liability seems the 
prominent issue, with the need for clarification only being solved through a court case that 
occurs (I18. Director, Construction Company).  The PoolRe scheme was also raised as 
influencing the value of protecting crowded places, as occupiers can recoup certain losses 
without the need to insure themselves for those losses (I11. Director, Construction Company).  
However, such a perspective fails to consider that the scheme only covers certain losses, 
with losses through damage to reputation, diminished retention of business etc being un-
reimbursable.  It could be argued that where CTMs have purposefully not been incorporated, 
especially after CTSA advice, damage to reputation and revenue will be even more profound, 
highlighting the benefits in incorporating such measures. 
 
6.1.1.3 Moral obligations 
 “It‟s our people, it‟s important, so we‟ve got to do whatever we need to do to ensure 
the protection of our people” (I17. Technical Director, Construction Company) 
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The above quote demonstrates a moral obligation to protect crowded places, especially 
considering the aforementioned lack of clarity surrounding legislation and possible liability.  It 
was raised that in such circumstances, action is made on the basis of the values and 
leadership of the specific organisations themselves (I16. Director, Construction Company).   
“…there‟s a moral obligation if nothing else, but again, a moral obligation, what value 
do you put on it?” (I18. Director, Construction Company) 
Whilst it was argued that counter-terrorism seems a part of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) (D3. Academic, Construction Management), the current tendency is for occupiers to 
protect their own building and not consider the performance and consequences of protecting 
a wider area (I4. Director, Construction Company) and construct places and spaces that 
honour the broader goals of society (I8. Architect).  What‟s not clear is how counter-terrorism 
can further CSR and contribute to those broader goals.  However, it was raised that 
„economics‟ often trumps such moral or broader societal perspectives, due to the absence of 
clarity regarding legislation: 
“Why should a developer spend an extra 5% if they don‟t have to?  If what they do is 
totally legitimate, why should they have to spend it?  And if you‟re there taking the 
moral high-ground saying „you should be doing this‟, they‟re going to say „why? Do I 
need to do it?  Is there a statutory requirement for me to do it?‟.  If there isn‟t, then 
they won‟t do it, it‟s as simple as that.  It‟s economics” (I4. Director, Construction 
Company) 
So, in the absence of legislation, there is a need for the incentives of protecting such places 
to be examined, an exploration which is presented in the following section. 
 
6.1.2 Incentives 
“What is the incentive for a company to actually put in security?...there‟s a business 
case there, that actually, we want to ensure people keep coming here.  There‟s then 
the consequence of resilience and continuity in the event, if something happens.  But 
has this all been quantified in a potential benefit?  I‟m not aware of it” (I18. Director, 
Construction Company) 
Six overarching incentives, as presented in Figure 6.4, are the reduction in the risk of being 
targeted, reduced impacts of an attack, competitive advantages, revenue generation, 
conducive agendas and insurance incentives.    
 
 
  
  
126 
 
 
Figure 6.4. A concept map of the incentives to protect crowded places 
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6.1.2.1 Reducing the risk of being targeted 
Firstly, it is important to note that any reduction in risk occurs because the terrorist threat is 
displaced (as shown in Figure 6.4).  Displacement, therefore, is a consequence of the use of 
incorporating CTMs to protect crowded places.  Emerging from the participants was a clear 
sense of visible CTM‟s leading to a perception of protection and therefore displacement, yet 
the use of invisible measures would result in a perception of vulnerability and the attraction of 
an attack.  Intrinsically linked to this is the public promotion of incorporated CTMs and the 
significance of the target itself.  If the incorporation of CTMs had been publically promoted, 
this would influence perceived notions of protection and vulnerability.  However, the 
significance of a crowded place could result in its repeated targeting, regardless of any 
incorporated CTMs.  Such influences are expressed in Figure 6.5 below. 
 
Figure 6.5. Perceptions regarding displacement 
Interestingly, all three participants who commented on the visibility of CTM‟s were in security-
specific positions and cited its importance in terms of security, whereas all five participants 
who commented on the invisibility of CTM‟s were architects or designers, in non-security-
specific positions and spoke about it in relation to design and aesthetics, resulting user 
experiences, as well as security.  The stated aim of such „invisible‟ designs would be to 
create places that would „look like they would have looked without incorporating any CTM‟s‟.  
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“…half the value of a camera is knowing the camera‟s there…if you don‟t make it 
foreboding enough, then maybe you‟re actually encouraging threats”. (I7. Associate 
Director). 
 Whilst there appears to be a dichotomy between the „security‟ and „design‟ agendas in 
relation to displacement and the use of visible/invisible measures, the reduction in the risk of 
an attack occurring is an incentive for any (perceived or real) „at risk‟ organisation, although 
what remains unclear is the impact of invisible CTM‟s in terms of perceptions of security, 
from the perspective of potential offenders as well as end users. 
 
6.1.2.2 Reducing the impacts of an attack 
Such impacts encompass the physical results of an attack in terms of loss of life and damage 
to property and other assets, as well as the impacts on business reputation and the retention 
of business.  Less loss of life and damage was cited by numerous participants, with 
assessments at each site needed to fully gauge, in conjunction with the proposed or 
incorporated CTMs, damage estimations.  Disproportionate collapse and primary/secondary 
fragments were seen as the most important aspects from which protection will reduce 
impacts (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company; I17. Technical Director, 
Construction Company; I19. Consultant, Construction Company).    Incentives to protect in 
terms of the protection of reputation were cited by numerous participants, with the loss in 
revenue from this aspect alone being perceived by participants to potentially far exceed the 
cost of incorporating any CTMs (I4. Director, Construction Company; I11. Director, 
Construction Company; I18. Director, Construction Company).  An example of a company 
who incorporated CTMs into their site due to fears over potential harm to their reputation was 
cited during one interview, however, as also stated by the CTSA, such examples 
organisations “are very much in the minority” (I24. CTSA B). 
 
6.1.2.3 Competitive advantages 
Competitive advantages were only raised by one participant.  As part of a bid for the design 
and construction of a crowded place, the participant and their colleagues researched the 
occupier and surrounding area, resulting in their decision to consider counter-terrorism and 
flood mitigation measures in their proposal.  Such considerations were not presented in any 
other proposal that the occupier received and was a part of the decision to award the bid to 
the participant‟s proposal (I21. Technical Director, Construction Company).  Therefore, the 
consideration and incorporation of CTMs can be seen as uncommon practice, especially 
considering the aforementioned legislative and insurance policy issues.  This provides 
developers, designers and planners with an incentive to consider and where appropriate, 
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incorporate, CTMs and other mitigation measures, resulting in relatively higher success in 
being awarded bids and an increase in reputation.  Therefore, turnover and revenue could 
increase. 
 
6.1.2.4 Revenue generation 
Revenue generation encompasses certain CTMs being able to generate revenue themselves, 
as well as the increase of rental values that can be achieved as a result of the increased 
protection and resilience of a building and/or site.  CTMs can generate income, as 
advertising boards or measures where surfaces can be used for such advertising purposes, 
can be structurally enhanced to fulfil counter-terrorism purposes (I2. Design Consultant A, 
Design Consultancy; D7. Un-attributable Source; I23. Director A, Construction Company).  
An example of such an advertising board was observed during site visit 1, as shown in 
Figure 6.6.  Whether they were incorporated as HVM measures (and were constructed for 
that purpose) is unknown, however it provides a visual example of the street furniture that 
can be used to protect crowded places.  A further example was given by one participant, 
where ASF had advertising printed on it (I2. Design Consultant A, Design Consultancy).  As 
certain CTMs can generate revenue, it can therefore be argued that over time, they would 
„pay for themselves‟ and therefore also have the potential to return the costs incurred for an 
entire protection scheme and thereby after, generate further revenue and profit.  It was 
raised that incorporated protection into a building could enable tenants to be charged higher 
rents, due to the increased security and the decreased costs being incurred in the result of 
an attack or other similar event (I11. Director, Construction Consultancy).  How the 
incorporation of CTMs can generate revenue via regeneration and subsequent increases in 
property and rental values was also raised, and is discussed in section 6.1.2.5. 
 
Figure 6.6. Advertising boards in Lower Manhattan, New York 
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6.1.2.5 Conducive agendas 
Pedestrianisation and regeneration are discussed within this section, as participants raised 
these two agendas as being conducive to counter-terrorism (and vice versa).  These 
agendas, more often than not incorporated into building and urban design separately, 
highlight the benefits and implications of adopting a holistic approach to the mitigation of 
hazards and threats, as well as incorporating the needs resulting from other policies and 
agendas, such as environmental enhancement and de-cluttering of the built environment. 
 
Pedestrianisation 
Whilst it was argued that pedestrianisation is the „only way‟ that the exclusion of all vehicles 
within any given area will be facilitated (I21. Technical Director, Construction Company), a 
range of perspectives and experiences were raised.  Of importance, however, was the need 
for pedestrianisation to occur in areas where there is a constant „energy‟ or use of that space, 
otherwise such places can become desolate (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority) and it 
could be argued, attract crime.  In an interview in New York (I6. Urban Designer, Local 
Authority), it was raised that pedestrianisation has not worked well in some areas, due to 
buildings closing after office hours, with no other amenities available there.  In relation to the 
implications of pedestrianisation, traffic displacement was raised (I4. Director, Construction 
Company; I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority) as well as the prevention of vehicles being 
able to physically reach buildings, for delivering goods or dropping off/collecting people (I6. 
Urban Designer, Local Authority).  Whilst traffic displacement was raised as an issue, it was 
highlighted that a key issue is where traffic is only restricted, not excluded, as queues can 
form and congest areas (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority). 
The benefits of pedestrianisation were cited by numerous participants, with increases in 
footfall (and therefore increases in revenue for businesses within the pedestrianised areas) 
being raised most often (I4. Director, Construction Company; I6. Urban Designer, Local 
Authority; I15. Director, Construction Company; I21. Technical Director, Construction 
Company; I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority; T2. Un-attributable Source).  
Environmental and pollution-related benefits were also raised as benefits of pedestrianisation 
(I4. Director, Construction Company; I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority), as were 
reductions in injuries and deaths resulting from incidents involving vehicles and pedestrians 
(I4. Director, Construction Company).  It was raised by two participants that where 
pedestrianisation was being incorporated for counter-terrorism purposes, often there was an 
existing conflict between traffic and pedestrians (I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority; I26. 
Engineer, Local Authority).  A reduction in crime was also noted in areas where 
pedestrianisation had occurred, as had better access provisions for disabled persons, due to 
the nature of pedestrianisation itself, as well as (in some cases) the additional use of high-
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quality materials (I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority).  The benefits and implications of 
pedestrianisation are not widely recognised however, as evidence of misconceptions 
emanated from projects where pedestrianisation was being incorporated into certain areas.  
Some businesses objected to pedestrianisation, due to fears of downturns in footfall and 
revenue (I4. Director, Construction Company; I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority), however 
after the pedestrianisation occurred (and as demonstrated in the previous paragraphs), 
footfall and resulting revenues increased, due to perceived increases in the quality and 
comfort of the space (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority).  Despite the benefits of 
pedestrianisation (in relation to counter-terrorism), one participant noted: 
“…but obviously, you can‟t pedestrianise everywhere” (I15. Director, Development 
Company) 
 
Regeneration 
The protection of crowded places was also raised as being conducive to regeneration, with 
an example given of a project where the exclusion of traffic and the pedestrianisation of an 
area resulted in landlords increasing rents (due to the increase in the quality of the area), 
which lead to their tenants (existing low-quality outlets) being effectively forced out, for new 
and higher-quality outlets to take their place, who in turn invested in their properties to 
increase their attractiveness and use, which in turn increased footfall to the area and 
revenues for those businesses (I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority).  The following quote 
is taken from part of an interview whereby counter-terrorism and its conduciveness to 
regeneration and pedestrianisation (and vice versa) was being discussed: 
“…for every pound you spend on street enhancement, you can usually equate it to 
five pounds increase in value and so if it's a £1 million project, it releases £5 million in 
value to premises and I think that's probably a similar kind of thing that would happen 
with counter-terrorism and the way that we implement street enhancement projects 
as well” (I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority) 
Whilst somewhat anecdotal, the 1:5 ratio, which relates specifically to monetary value, is 
based on experience of numerous projects and offers some insight into the benefits that can 
arise when incorporating CTMs.  Further research is needed however, in order to provide 
objective and substantiated findings in relation to this. 
 
A holistic approach 
The need for a holistic approach, not just in terms of security but in regard to protection from 
other threats, hazards and major accidents, as well as the incorporation of other agendas, 
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was raised by numerous participants.  In terms of why such an approach is rarely taken, one 
participant felt the cause was because of: 
“…fiefdoms.  People are very precious about their knowledge.  You‟ve got this inner 
circle of consultants that make their money selling man hours…people try and make it 
more complicated than it really is” (I18. Director, Construction Company) 
The consequences of this are summarised by another participant: 
“…it‟s about community and it‟s about holistic vision of place and I think that as soon 
as you start fracturing and breaking down that, you end up with divided communities” 
(I20. Architect) 
In the context of the interview, „communities‟ was meant in terms of people, however not 
taking a holistic vision of any project can result in fractured, redundant and more complex 
infrastructure.  An example of a project where numerous technological systems were 
incorporated, as opposed to joined-up thinking being able to result in more inclusive and 
refined systems, was highlighted by one participant who called the consequences of such 
action as “counter-terrorism acne” (I15. Executive Director A, Development Company).  The 
benefits of adopting such an approach were highlighted through three projects that had been 
completed.  At one site, a critical national infrastructure site, a construction company reduced 
planned counter-terrorism expenditure by 60%, simply by adopting a holistic approach to the 
site, albeit only from a security perspective (I14. Directors A and B, Construction Company).  
By enforcing a perimeter to the site, less obtrusive CTMs (if required at all), were installed 
further into the site itself.  An example of specific CTMs entails blast-resistant glazing having 
been recommended for all of the buildings, yet due to the aforementioned perimeter 
protection, the need for such CTMs on every building was significantly reduced.  An even 
more inclusive project was cited, with the exclusion of traffic for counter-terrorism purposes 
being furthered to exclude traffic from a wider area, pedestrianising routes to local parks and 
increasing the attractiveness of the area, as well as benefitting from reduction in air and 
noise pollution (I21. Technical Director, Construction Company).  Another project was raised 
whereby a crowded place was being protected, so the opportunity was taken to pedestrianise 
a wider area, in order to tackle abuses of existing traffic orders in the area (I26. Engineer, 
Local Authority).  However, in this instance, an adjoining building had an inadequately 
protected underground area (with the occupier exploiting the lack of obligations to protect 
crowded places), which ran underneath the protected crowded place itself, which left the 
scheme vulnerable to attack, undermining the work carried out (and money spent) to date. 
These examples, whilst highlighting the benefits that can be gained from adopting a holistic 
approach in relation to security, do not reflect a completely holistic approach to the design of 
crowded places and surrounding areas in terms of the consideration and reconciliation of 
other agendas.  Projects seem to be undertaken with a somewhat „silo‟ mentality.  As 
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highlighted above, there are benefits to be gained from adopting a holistic approach, but this, 
as well as the protection of crowded places from VBIEDs specifically, seem dependent on 
stakeholder understanding and engagement and their awareness of the inherent benefits 
and available opportunities. 
 
6.1.2.6 Insurance incentives 
Whilst previous discussions have centred on how uncertainty in relation to insurance policies 
influences the protection of crowded places, a minority of participants raised that insurance 
acts as an incentive to protect, as current perceptions are that while premiums will not be 
reduced if CTMs are incorporated, excesses will be (D5. NaCTSO Representative; I18. 
Director, Construction Company).  Whether the reduction in excesses, depending on the 
damage caused and the cost of the CTMs incorporated, could cover the cost of the CTMs 
themselves, was not highlighted by any participant.  As an incentive to protect, this seems an 
attractive proposition and one which requires further research, along with the other, 
aforementioned, issues in relation to insurance, as well as the competitive advantages that 
could be gained by those seeking to be insured through incorporating CTMs and insurers 
competing to insure them at the reduced risk. 
 
6.1.3 Threat and risk assessments 
The data that was collected on TARAs revolved around the influence those assessments can 
have on the value of the CTMs used to protect crowded places, through proportionate, 
under-engineered and vulnerable, or over-engineered and obtrusive, responses.  However, it 
should not be overlooked that such assessments can determine whether crowded places are 
protected, as the result of such an assessment could be to relocate or not build in a particular 
location, due to inherent, adjacent or nearby (potential) targets.  The issues that emerged 
from the participants encompassed the assessments themselves, situational context, threats 
and proportionality, all of which influence the value of the CTMs used as a result.  Issues in 
relation to TARAs, or specific components of them, were raised in 34 out of the 42 sources of 
data collection.  These issues also feature heavily in the set of project documents given 
during an interview.  Influence on the value of protecting crowded places is not only made by 
the carrying out of, contents and interpretation of the TARA itself, but on the situational 
context that inherently determines the assessment, the terrorist threat faced and issues in 
relation to proportionality.  It is these influences that this section considers.  
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6.1.3.1 The assessment itself 
The TARA is fundamental in assessing the situational context (i.e. the nature of the 
occupier/tenant, the design of the building and site, adjacent or nearby threats, the level of 
protection required), the national and localised terrorist threat, and the proportionate 
solutions available to mitigate the assessed risks.  When considering the protection of a 
crowded place and the incorporation of CTMs, the first task is to carry out a TARA, as the 
result of the assessment may be to relocate, whether designing a new building or retro-fitting 
an existing one (I11. Director, Construction Company; I23. Director A, Construction 
Company).  Emanating from participants were three clear issues in relation to the 
assessments, those being their inclusion of future scenarios, their inclusion of all affected 
stakeholders and their transparency.  The issues surrounding future scenarios are 
highlighted in the following quote: 
“You might not be a target today, but if you‟re putting up a structure, who are the 
occupiers of this structure going to be in 5-10 years time?  What are the terrorist 
threats going to be?  It‟s got to be in your interest to make a reasonable design, to 
take reasonable steps to protect the structure.  The extent to which you do that, that‟s 
the difficult one” (I11. Director, Construction Company) 
Such potential change could result in the tenants being in a building that is over-engineered 
(in counter-terrorism terms) for their needs and is therefore, dis-proportionate.  Whilst they 
will reap the inherent benefits of those CTMs, the impact they have on permeability and user 
experience is unclear.  Further research is needed into the longevity of crowded place 
occupancy and how their incorporation of CTMs relates to this.  The importance of including 
stakeholders in the assessment and its recommendations was made apparent by one 
participant, who gave an example of a project where bollards has been incorporated into a 
site, but were removed and relocated due to executives wanting to drive through areas that 
had been protected, incurring additional and unintended costs (E4. Ex-Practitioner, Crime 
Reduction).  Issues in relation to stakeholder engagement are explored further in section 
6.2.2.1.  The transparency of TARAs carried out by CTSAs was also raised, with participants 
being „told‟ what level of threat they faced (high, medium or low) without the reasoning being 
explained to them (I21. Architect; I21. Technical Director, Construction Company) and that 
this can cause difficulties in discussing protection with clients, when contractors are not told 
the reasoning either (I25. Assistant Director, Construction Company). 
 
6.1.3.2 Situational context 
Situational context encompasses the nature of the occupier themselves, their symbolism and 
iconography and that of their buildings, the topography surrounding the building, surrounding 
infrastructure (both above ground and under-ground), the density of the space in which it is 
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posited and the „adjacency risk‟.  Adjacency risk was cited by one participant in terms of the 
proximity of potential targets to an existing or potential occupier (I19. Consultant, 
Construction Company).  Two scenarios are incumbent in regard to adjacency risk.  Firstly, 
an occupier may be adjacent or nearby to a perceived target, which would increase their own 
risk of being impacted by a terrorist attack.  Secondly, a neighbouring building to a protected 
building is also at increased risk, due to blast waves reflecting off the protected building more 
than would have occurred if the building was not protected, worsening the damage to 
surrounding buildings (I17. Technical Director, Construction Company). 
 
6.1.3.3 The terrorist threat 
It was raised that the protection of crowded places from vehicle-borne terrorist attack was the 
most important, due to the impacts that it can cause and the numerous plots and attacks that 
have involved their use (I3. CTSA A).  The situational context will determine the 
vulnerabilities faced in terms of approach speeds and access routes, yet the likely method(s) 
of attack also determine the charge size of an explosive device (based on an attack using an 
IED), which will have consequences for any CTMs in regard to their robustness.  The TARA 
should therefore breakdown the likelihood and impact of each type of attack, identifying 
vulnerabilities to each and potential solutions (I19. Consultant, Construction Company).  
Based on the situational context (of which the threat is a part), a proportionate solution can 
then be determined. 
 
6.1.3.4 Proportionality 
“It‟s what you don‟t do, as much as what you do do” (I2. Academic, Terrorism Studies) 
The above quote captures the essence of proportionality, yet determining what to incorporate 
and what not to was the prominent issue raised by participants.  Proportionality was known to 
be the stance adopted by Government and NaCTSO, yet how proportionate assessments 
are carried out and solutions designed was questioned repeatedly.  An example of a project 
was given where a crowded place was to be constructed in a city-centre location and a 
CTSA had advised the designers that monster trucks could be used to travel up any steps 
and that ditches would be required to prevent this method of attack from occurring (I21. 
Architect).  Examples were also given of occupiers who had hired consultants to carry out 
TARAs to verify those conducted by CTSAs.  Considering what has just been presented and 
the issues in relation to transparency that have been discussed previously, there is an 
apparent need for further research and development in this area, as whilst the proportionality 
„stance‟ is clear, how it is assessed and determined in relation to solutions is not evident and 
as highlighted above, is causing scepticism surrounding the expertise of CTSAs.  However, 
  
136 
 
whilst the „monster truck‟ example highlights interesting issues, that was the only such 
example given during the course of the research.  As noted by one CTSA: 
“Proportionality only comes with experience” (I22. CTSA A) 
Yet, considering the above comments, it appears that proportionality might also arise through 
more transparent assessments, but could also only be truly assessed at the end of the 
building‟s life.  However, it must also be noted that the „true picture‟ surrounding terrorist 
threats will never be known, due to the necessary secrecy surrounding intelligence; a factor 
that must also be acknowledged. 
 
6.1.4 Perceptions and moments of terrorism 
Perceptions and moments of terrorism were raised in just under half of the interviews, 
discussions and communications as an influence on the protection of crowded places.  The 
most significant influence emanating from the data was „moments of terrorism‟, most notably 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 in the USA and July 7th 2005 in the UK.   
 
6.1.4.1 Perceptions of terrorism 
“There is always going to be some level of threat and there‟s „real threat‟ and 
„perceived threat‟, because if something hasn‟t happened for two years, they think the 
threat is reducing” (I18. Director, Construction Company) 
How perceptions of terrorism can influence the protection of crowded places is summarised 
by the above quote.  Where perceptions of terrorism are low and/or perceived to be less than 
the „real‟ threat, CTMs are not incorporated into crowded places as it is felt that they are not 
needed.  However, it became clear over the course of the research study that there is a lack 
of awareness, specifically outside of security-focussed departments and/or organisations, 
regarding the threat that is faced, which is demonstrated through this quote, taken from an 
interview in the midst of discussions surrounding the change and expenditure that has 
occurred as a result of terrorist attacks: 
“How many incidents have there actually been since 9/11, apart from the 2005 events 
here, how many have actually affected the UK, in a big way, apart from the Glasgow 
thing, really, there hasn‟t been anything” (I16. Director, Construction Company) 
The literature review highlighted a plethora of terrorist attacks and plots (section 3.1.2) that 
demonstrate that whilst the number of attacks that have been carried out have been sparse, 
the number of attempts have been numerous.  It would therefore appear that there is a need 
for those who encounter counter-terrorism practices to be more informed of the threat, 
especially considering the perceived changing nature of the threats that is occurring (and 
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therefore, the changing nature of the planning for those threats).  Most notably, participants 
highlighted that planning for Mumbai-style attacks is increasing (I26. Engineer, Local 
Authority; I27. CTSA).  An example was given of a crowded place that had incorporated 
CTMs to enforce a stand-off distance around the building, only for future stages of the 
scheme to be called into question due to worries regarding Mumbai-style attacks.  It was 
envisaged that the funding for the remaining HVM would then be used elsewhere, leaving the 
building vulnerable to attack due to the „unfinished‟ HVM scheme.  What became clear 
through the research study however, was the influence that individual attacks, or „moments 
of terrorism‟, can have and how they shape and inform broader perceptions. 
 
6.1.4.2 Moments of terrorism 
 “…there are always going to be events” (I1. Academic, Terrorism) 
It is these „events‟, these moments of terrorism, that influence a person‟s overall perception 
of the terrorist threat and act as catalysts for action on a plethora of scales, including whether 
and how crowded places are protected.  Examples were given of how the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001 in the USA and attacks on London‟s transport network on the 7th July 
2005 and Glasgow International Airport in 2007 caused a plethora of responses; the 
responses to the attacks of September 11th 2001 could not be over-emphasised by 
participants.  It has been seen as the “marker in the ground” (I4. Director, Construction 
Company), the moment which transcended international policies and discourse, through to 
the policies and security responses of individual buildings.  It was highlighted that a 
completely new environment exists, an environment in which the threat of terrorism, both 
nationally and internationally, has been completely re-assessed (I16. Director, Construction 
Company) and that as a result of this, counter-terrorism has been thrust into the realm of 
building and urban design (I9. Director, Design Consultancy).  After the attacks themselves, it 
was raised that a range of „makeshift‟ and „haphazard‟ responses were made, not 
necessarily because of a perception that other attacks were imminent, but because 
organisations had to be „seen to be doing something‟ (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority), 
responses such as those demonstrated through the following quote: 
“You couldn‟t even walk on the streets because there‟s people standing outside trying 
to get into a building, or you‟d walk into a building lobby and there‟d be very long lines 
just to get in the building and so, if you had a 2 o‟clock meeting, you‟d better get there 
by 1.30, otherwise you weren‟t going to be on time” (I9. Director, Design Consultancy) 
Moments of terrorism also reduced ignorance to the threat of terrorism, with numerous 
examples given of such events bringing terrorism to the forefront of peoples‟ minds again (I3. 
CTSA B) and how it takes such an event to get people to incorporate and request CTMs (I22. 
CTSA A; I24. CTSA C).  This was highlighted as being the case with the attack on Glasgow 
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International Airport and the responses made by airports afterwards (I2. Design Consultant A, 
Design Consultancy; I3. CTSA C).  How these perceptions and moments of terrorism directly 
influence the protection of crowded places is demonstrated through the following quote: 
“After 9/11, whoosh, straight up!  After the London bombings, whoosh, straight up!  
It‟s cyclic.  If a bomb goes off now, my phone won‟t stop ringing tomorrow, all the 
projects I‟ve got on hold will be in the pipeline” (I18. Director, Construction Company) 
 
6.1.5 Stakeholder understanding and engagement 
Two evident influences on the protection of crowded places were the intentional „sidelining‟ 
or ignoring of CTSAs and Architectural Liaison Officers/Crime Prevention Design Advisers 
whilst planning and designing crowded places (I24. CTSAs B and C), as well as stakeholders 
whose businesses were neighbouring and adjacent to crowded places perceiving their 
property to not be at risk because they were not going to be the specific target of an attack 
(I24. CTSAs A and C).  While such places may not be the intended target of an attack, a 
blast will still impact their property, the extent to which will be dependent on the nature and 
location of the blast itself and its proximity to the neighbouring properties.  A greater 
understanding of risk is therefore required (see section 6.2.2.5 for further details). 
 
6.1.6 Economic influences 
Economic influences were raised as influencing the protection of crowded places, as the 
current economic climate reduces willingness to spend on CTMs (I15. Executive Director B, 
Development Company; I18. Director, Construction Company).  An example was also given 
by a CTSA who highlighted that a company wanted their staff to attend Project Argus and 
Griffin events, but the staff couldn‟t get cover to attend due to cut-backs (I3. CTSA A).  This 
highlights that there are circumstances where even though the CTMs are „free‟, releasing 
staff to get the benefits are not feasible, despite the value of those specific events.  
Considering the current economic climate, such influences are particularly pertinent and 
therefore increase the strain on the need for cost-effective  CTMs, if they have to cost 
anything at all. 
 
6.1.7 Local policy 
Local policy was highlighted in a focus group with a development company, who articulated 
that within and around the City of London, different constituencies have different approaches 
to the protection of buildings and how such policies can be at odds with other policies and 
objectives.   
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“…putting buildings on the backs of footpaths, we have to put in this deep concrete 
wall, which was effectively a metre high and about 500mm deep, anchored back to 
the buildings and we‟re supposed to have a retail environment.  Now, you know, 
having this big bunker around the building is exactly counter to the other policies that 
City have, in terms of actually attracting high-quality retail” (I15. Director, 
Development Company) 
It was raised that not only does such a situation result in CTMs no longer being considered 
(due to the exploitation of no apparent legislation), but also that in terms of excluding 
vehicles from an area, thereby removing the need to enhance the structure of a building as 
described in the previous quote, some constituencies are more open to this approach than 
others.  How influential and renowned tenants and occupiers were was also raised in relation 
to this, in being able to exclude traffic from a wider area, despite reservation from the local 
authority.  Whilst results in relation to the performance and consequences of the different 
traffic management approaches are presented in section 6.4.1, it appears that local 
authorities need to be more aware of the performance and consequences of the different 
approaches in order to ensure that differing objectives and policies are consistent and 
reconciled wherever possible, informing decision-making and not developing or enforcing 
them in an ad-hoc manner. 
 
6.1.8 Building stock rotation 
Building stock rotation was raised by one participant, a Director of a development company, 
who highlighted the longevity of the process of protecting all the at-risk places and how 
standards can change over such a period of time: 
“The relative change in building stock is about 2% a year…so if you want to get the 
standards we‟re doing now across all the buildings in the City…it‟ll take you 50 years 
to get there” (I15. Director, Development Company) 
Whilst such a perspective does not take into consideration that not all the buildings may 
require protection, and the aging (and resulting vulnerability) of such places, it raises a 
relevant point regarding the longevity of the process and the issue of proportionality and how 
current versus future threats are incorporated into designs.  Such discussions and supporting 
data in relation to proportionality are presented in section 6.1.3.4. 
 
6.2 Influences on the Value of Counter-Terrorism Measures 
As shown by Figure 6.7, there are three factors that each influence the value of CTMs used 
to protect crowded places, those being TARAs, stakeholder understanding and engagement, 
as well as auditing. 
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Figure 6.7. Influences on the value of protecting crowded places 
TARAs also influence the protection of crowded places and will be discussed in section 6.1.3. 
 
6.2.1 Stakeholder understanding and engagement 
This section explores how stakeholder engagement and understanding influences the value 
of the CTMs used to protect crowded places and encompasses engagement between 
stakeholders themselves, their understanding of CTMs, vulnerable points in protection, 
understanding of risk and training, testing and exercising.  Figure 6.8 displays these 
influences and their key components. 
 
6.2.1.1 Stakeholder engagement 
Stakeholder engagement encompasses the different requirements and wishes of 
stakeholders, their sharing of information, the design stage in which they‟re engaged with, 
the importance of the end-user and as raised by one participant, how they can be „a voice in 
the wilderness‟. 
 
Differing requirements and wishes 
“…stakeholders are at odds with each other because they have different needs” (I6. 
Urban Designer, Local Authority) 
It is this factor that is most pertinent to issues in relation to stakeholder engagement.  
Examples were given by participants on how different needs and wishes impacted projects, 
where those differing perspectives had not been recognised and accommodated.   
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Figure 6.8. A concept map presenting the issues in relation to stakeholder engagement and understanding 
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Where such issues had not been recognised and addressed, CTMs were incorporated that 
blocked access routes for certain employees and resulted in the measures being removed 
and replaced at additional expense (E4. Ex-Practitioner, Crime Reduction), or impinged on 
the end-user and the time it took them to carry out routine tasks (I14. Director B, 
Construction Company).  Where the different needs and wishes had been recognised, 
engagement with those issues resulted in solutions that were better for everyone, with 
examples given of planned blast-resistant glazing being changed to accommodate staff 
within a building being able to open windows, as the contractor knew of products that fulfilled 
both functions (I14. Director B, Construction Company) and the engagement of a Local 
Authority with commercial companies who would be affected by traffic restriction and the 
creation of memorandum of understandings to minimise disruption (I26. Engineer, Local 
Authority).  Whilst stakeholders will always have different needs and wishes, what‟s clear is 
that through engaging with them, the most accommodating solution can often be developed 
and even if such accommodations cannot be made, the fact that those stakeholders have 
been consulted and engaged with, with attempts made to accommodate certain needs and 
wishes, will result in them being more receptive to any consequences or trade-offs (I14. 
Director, Construction Company). 
 
Sharing of information 
The sharing of information was raised as being an issue in relation to stakeholder 
engagement, with participants repeatedly stating that it does not occur amongst 
organisations, due to them being protective over the information that they own/have and/or 
the size of the organisation itself (D6. Crime Specialist, Police Force; I18. Director, 
Construction Company; I21. Technical Director, Construction Company; I27. CTSA; T3. 
NaCTSO Representative).  An example was also raised of an emergency service 
organisation who was unable to participate in planning arrangements for a high-risk site due 
to not having the facilities to store restricted information (I27. CTSA).  Participants felt that 
the best way to share information, as well as engage with and understand the involved 
stakeholders, was to „get everyone around the table‟ (I13. Design Manager, Construction 
Company), with the benefits of organising such a feat being the involvement and input of all 
those stakeholders who will use or be affected by the CTMs, as well as less „hassle hours‟ 
later on (I13. Design Manager, Construction Company).  It was raised by one participant that 
unintended consequences, such as bollards being removed and replaced due to 
stakeholders wishing to have access to certain areas (as previously raised), are simply a 
consequence of bad planning (I17. Technical Director, Construction Company); a 
consequence that can be avoided by the sharing of information and engagement with all 
affected stakeholders. 
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Importance of the end-user 
The importance of the end-user was cited by six participants, with the consequences of not 
engaging with or addressing the needs of end-users bearing additional costs later on, due to 
the replacement or modification of incorporated CTMs.  The majority of examples that were 
raised highlighted where CTMs had to be replaced or removed due to impingement on 
essential or routine working practices (E4. Ex-Practitioner, Crime Reduction; I11. Director, 
Construction Company; I14. Director, Construction Company; I17. Technical Director, 
Construction Company).  However, an example was raised of a project where end-users of a 
protected scheme were engaged with and the solution being developed was modified to 
accommodate their wishes.  The project, involving traffic restriction in a certain area, 
modified the CTMs (rising/lowering bollards) so that the restricted area could be accessed or 
exited from either side of the CTMs, benefitting emergency service (as well as any other) 
access and egress (I26. Engineer, Local Authority). 
 
Design stage 
“You see it all the time, people coming in far too late in the development process” (I25. 
Assistant Director, Local Authority) 
Whilst in this instance the participant was talking about end-users who were requesting the 
incorporation of bollards around their building, aforementioned examples have raised the 
same issue in relation to CTSAs and security consultants.  The design stage in which 
stakeholders incorporate CTMs can have major implications on a project, with one example 
being highlighted by a participant who showed that stand-off distances impact the 
appropriate sizes of glazing and windows, so identifying this at the earliest opportunity will 
allow parameters for the design to be set, whereas if this occurred later on in the project, 
costs in relation to re-designs and modifications will only increase (I8. Architect).  As 
summarised by one participant: 
“You need to get those sorts of things agreed, bottomed out, very early on because it 
does have big implications” (I21. Architect) 
 
‘A voice in the wilderness’ 
“A voice in the wilderness” (I11. Director, Construction Company) is a quote from a 
participant who used it to reflect their perspective on what it is like to promote the benefits of 
stakeholder engagement and incorporate a solution that benefits more than just one 
stakeholder or organisation. 
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“…all bollards do and stand-off distances, what do they protect?  They protect a 
particular asset and they‟ll protect the people in that particular asset, but you‟ve got 
the adjacent assets…” (I4. Director, Construction Company) 
As highlighted in section 6.1.3.2, buildings that incorporate particular CTMs are more robust 
and blast-resistant, increasing the damage that adjacent buildings can incur due to the 
increased reflection of blast waves.  The link between this issue and above point is the 
benefits of traffic exclusion (or at least restriction), in order to protect those adjacent buildings 
and reduce their risk.  However, the benefits of these approaches, as well as the benefits of 
CTMs more generally, remain „lost in the wilderness‟ and unengaged with by stakeholders, 
emphasising the need for publicly available information on these issues.   
 
6.2.1.2 Understanding of CTMs 
This section encompasses stakeholder understanding of the CTMs that are available, their 
performance, their requirements and issues in relation to their reproduction. 
 
Available CTMs 
 “…we have our bollards” (I9. Director, Design Consultancy) 
 “…what else can you do?” (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority) 
The aforementioned sentiments were consistent when discussing associations with counter-
terrorism and what can be done to protect crowded places.  Examples were given of 
stakeholders assuming that sufficient stand-off distances cannot be created when dealing 
with existing buildings (I23. Director B, Construction Company), protecting crowded places 
encompasses incorporating layer after layer of CTMs (E4. Ex-Practitioner, Crime Reduction; 
I14. Director A, Construction Company) and stakeholders choosing products purely because 
of their appearance in brochures (I14. Director A, Construction Company).  Awareness of the 
range of CTMs that can be used was inconsistent, however, as stated by one participant: 
“…there‟s all sorts of way to secure a building” (I23. Director B, Construction 
Company) 
 
Performance of CTMs 
Whilst data on the performance of individual CTMs is presented in their respective and 
forthcoming sections, broader understanding of the performance of such measures was 
inconsistent.  It was stated by one participant that CTMs are not seen as adding value to 
projects currently (I15. Director, Development Company).  Although this concurs with 
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aforementioned and forthcoming presentations of data that highlight a widespread lack of 
awareness regarding what CTMs can be used, as well as their benefits and consequences, 
the following was raised by one participant… 
 “…if you look at it purely as a product cost, you won‟t see the benefit” (I14. Director A, 
Construction Company) 
Forthcoming sections and chapters will demonstrate where value is inherent and obtainable 
in the protection of crowded places, yet such understanding of CTMs was not consistent, 
with the perception that such value is not evident yet, otherwise further progress would have 
been made in protecting such places (I15. Director, Development Company).  The following 
quote highlights the general consensus: 
“…there are not really any synergies with security and anything…it‟s an entire 
additional overlay that you have to add to a project” (I8. Architect) 
 
Requirements of CTMs 
Four examples of stakeholders not understanding the requirements of CTMs were evident 
and raised, encompassing the security of CTM infrastructure itself, the frames and fixings 
required for enhanced glazing, stand-off and air gaps between VSBs.  An example of a 
project was given whereby a cabinet which contained control systems for an automated VSB 
was secured using a lock and key available from local hardware stores (I2. Design 
Consultant A).  Whilst this also highlights the potential weaknesses that can be exploited 
(see section 6.2.2.3 for further information), it indicates a lack of understanding surrounding 
the requirements and supporting infrastructure of CTMs, as well as the aforementioned lack 
of understanding surrounding the CTMs themselves.  Understanding in relation to the 
enhancement of glazing itself, as well as the frames and fixings it requires was also raised, 
with one participant stating that they were dealing with projects where millions of pounds 
worth of glazing had failed, because the supplier had supplied glazing that was not specified, 
the frames and fixings were insufficient to support the load of the enhanced glazing and 
potential issues in relation to thermal stress were not understood (I2. Design Consultant A).  
Potential implications of such errors are profound and do not just encompass issues in 
relation to cost.  If enhanced glazing is not supported properly, in the event of a blast, the 
impact will simply propel the intact glazing inwards, causing a major hazard for occupants.  
An example of a project where 30m of stand-off had been incorporated was also raised, with 
the occupier then wanting to put retail outlets in the protected distance to sell amenities such 
as coffee (I2. Design Consultant A).  Whilst this was raised as creating a new risk and 
diminished the effectiveness of the stand-off, the level of risk posed to any users of that 
space will be significantly less than if no stand-off distances were incorporated, as the 
building would be completely vulnerable to vehicle penetration and more likely to be targeted.  
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The ability to incorporate mobile or relatively small outlets/amenities therefore acts as 
reconciliation between enforcing stand-off and restricting user experience.  The importance 
of the air gap between VSBs was also raised as not being fully understood, with an example 
of a project being raised where two bollards were going to be incorporated, to block a 
potential access route between two buildings.  However, the occupier did not understand the 
importance of the maximum gap between such VSBs and only wanted one to be installed for 
aesthetic reasons (I26. CTSA).  Such errors would leave the crowded place vulnerable to the 
encroachment of their CTMs and again highlights the impact that weaknesses in designs can 
have, as raised in section 6.2.2.3. 
 
Reproduction of CTMs 
Two participants gave examples of numerous projects where stakeholders they consulted 
and advised either constructed their own versions of CTMs using individual components that 
were obtained cheaper than if a recommended CTM was used (I2. Design Consultant A), or 
where a CTM was simply chosen because it was cheaper than the recommended ones (I27. 
CTSA).  One example that was given highlighted that at every opportunity, the occupier of a 
crowded place would go against CTSA advice and incorporate a VSB that was not 
recommended, which upon inspection was found to be insufficient and ineffective, resulting 
in the need to remove it and replace it with an appropriate VSB, negating any saved costs 
(I27. CTSA). 
 
6.2.1.3 Vulnerable points in the protection 
Stakeholder understanding in relation to vulnerable points in protective schemes was also 
raised, with issues regarding passive versus active VSBs, human error and unreliable or 
inappropriate CTMs being relied upon.  Two participants raised that they had much more 
„faith‟ in passive CTMs, as human error could not negate their effectiveness (I12. Associate 
Director, Construction Company; I13. Design Manager, Construction Company).  Human 
error was raised by several participants, with examples of CCTV cameras being moved and 
left in positions that facilitated undetected access.  Reliance on inappropriate products or 
activities was also raised, with examples given of occupiers placing parking bays at the ends 
of car parks, assuming parked cars would be able to stop hostile vehicles and that any 
parked cars in those places would not be hostile themselves.  The following quote also 
demonstrates the consequences of vulnerable points in designs, although it should be noted 
that the vulnerability exists at an adjoining scheme to the crowded place that has enforced a 
standoff: 
  
147 
 
“The most damage can be done by going in the undercroft.  Apparently, there‟s a 
column under here that a suitable blast would bring the entire ground floor down in 
the ****…If you wanted to have a walk around all of this later, you would see just a 
single barrier arm there with a bloke standing there and it would be very, very easy to 
get in there.  All the deliveries to the shops come in and out of the undercroft and 
then go upstairs, so there‟s all sorts of vehicle movements.  Members of the public go 
in there to pick their telly up as well, so it is just not secure” (I26. Engineer, Local 
Authority) 
 
6.2.1.4 Training, testing and exercising 
“…whilst they might have the paperwork, how good are the individuals?” (I4. Director, 
Construction Company) 
Whilst only being raised by two participants, the influence of such planning can detrimentally 
impact preparedness for and responses to a terrorist attack, as well as a range of other 
scenarios that can result in the evacuation or invacuation of users.  An example of a crowded 
place was given by one participant, who stated that in relation to emergency planning, they 
would not test their procedures „live‟, i.e. actually conduct an evacuation, as they would not 
be generating any income during that time (I27. CTSA).  Whilst day-to-day activities would 
stop, occupiers and business owners would need to evaluate the potential implications of not 
testing their procedures and the costs and other implications that would occur as a result of 
their untested procedures. 
 
6.2.1.5 Understanding of risk 
“You‟ll mitigate the risk, you‟ll never eliminate the risk” (I4. Director, Construction 
Company) 
This idea was raised by a further three participants, who stated that clients often assume that 
by incorporating CTMs into their buildings or sites, the risk of a terrorist attack will be zero.  
However, as outlined in the aforementioned sections, the risk is only reduced and/or 
displaced, with impacts of a blast still being possible if adjacent or nearby buildings are 
targeted.  Also evident, as raised previously (section 6.1.5), was a lack of understanding on 
the part of occupiers being adjacent to larger or more renowned crowded places; they felt 
that they were not at risk because they would not be the target of an attack, although in 
practice they would incur major implications in terms of potential loss of life and damage (I24. 
CTSAs A and C).  Assessing the likelihood in terms of risks manifesting themselves was also 
raised, with the assessment of this one factor having significant implications in terms of the 
extent to which CTMs are incorporated.  As stated by one participant: 
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“…we try and take it back a step or two, just to see what is the genuine 
likelihood?...the big bit that really tends to sort the wheat from the chaff is normally 
likelihood" (I19. Consultant, Construction Company) 
This is also influenced by the identification and assessment of „real‟ versus „perceived‟ risks 
and threats, which was raised by three participants.  An example was given by one 
participant who stated that if the threat of terrorism was not evident in a community risk 
register (a risk register compiled by local authorities, emergency services etc of risks faced in 
their conurbation), then they would not feel duty-bound to incorporate CTMs (I10. Architect).  
However, such a perspective and course of action fails to address that the risk registers are 
a regional assessment of risks and may not therefore identify local or individual threats, and 
that secondly, the construction of a new crowded place or other at-risk building could itself 
influence the register and cause it to be updated in the future.  Risk registers will always be a 
past reflection of perceived risks and relying on them to decide whether certain buildings are 
protected is not wholly reliable. 
Also evident was a binary perception of risk, with participants perceiving that risks would 
either happen, or they would not (I15. Director, Development Company; I18. Director, 
Construction Company).  The same principle was also raised as being applicable to security 
and how secure a building was, i.e. it is either secure, or it isn‟t (I8. Architect).  Previous 
discussions have identified that there the likelihood of varying risks will vary considerably and 
in this instance, protecting crowded places from VBIEDs will reduce the likelihood and 
mitigate the impact of attack occurring, not eliminating the risk entirely. 
 
6.2.2 Auditing 
“…millions of pounds worth of glass going wrong, because the supplier supplied glass 
that was not what he said he would.  Consequentially, it‟s got to be replaced…If there 
was an attack, it would fail and it would fail dangerously” (I2. Design Consultant A, 
Design Consultancy) 
Although only raised by two participants, auditing (or the lack thereof), as demonstrated 
above, has the potential to significantly influence the value of protecting crowded places.  
There are two elements to the above quote.  Firstly, the sheer scale of what can potentially 
go wrong even without a terrorist attack having occurred.  The design consultant highlighted 
that the glazing was failing regardless of any catalyst, such as an explosion, which has 
aforementioned cost implications.  Secondly, in the event of an attack, the incorporated 
measures would be worthless, the implications of which would be profound.  It was stated by 
the other participant that the value of the effort is in saving money (I16. Director, Construction 
Company), however this perspective fails to reflect the wider cost implications, in terms of 
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lives, damage to the skin, structure and services of the building, as well as costs in terms of 
reputation and retention of business. 
 
6.3 The Classification of the Counter-Terrorism Measures 
Having presented the data on the influences on the protection of and value of protecting 
crowded places, data on the performance and consequences of the CTMs that can be used 
will now be explored.  The basis of the typology is the underlying classification and 
organisation of the CTMs themselves, which was initially presented in section 4.3, using a 
pre-existing typology.  The classification of CTMs was not changed as a result of the data 
collection, as participants found the classification appropriate, as it classifies the purpose and 
location of the CTMs themselves, e.g. Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures clearly identify 
their purpose and location, which would be external to any building or space.  The final 
typology is therefore based on the classification of CTMs that is expressed in Figure 6.9.  
The Figure expresses the overarching structure in which the CTMs reside.  Individual CTMs 
are identified in their respective sections, with data on the performance and consequences of 
hostile vehicle mitigation being presented in section 6.4, protective construction in section 6.4 
and planning, detection and procedures in section 6.5. 
 
6.4 The Performance and Consequences of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation 
This section will now present data on the performance and consequences HVM, with 
components of HVM being raised in just over half of the sources of data collection.  HVM 
encompasses the management, access/egress and calming of traffic, through the use of 
VSBs (as shown in Figure 6.9). 
 
6.4.1 Traffic management 
As identified in the literature review, there are four approaches to traffic management, those 
being total traffic exclusion (section 6.4.1.1), the restriction of traffic (section 6.4.1.2) and 
screening), the inclusion of traffic (section 6.4.1.3) and temporary barriers (section 6.4.1.4). 
 
6.4.1.1 Traffic exclusion 
Participants had a fixed perspective on the benefits and implications of traffic exclusion. In 
terms of benefits, the public reclamation of streets was cited by four participants, with areas 
of traffic exclusion and pedestrianisation enabling those within and those who use said areas 
to use them how they wish, returning an amenity to the area.   
  
150 
 
 
Figure 6.9. The classification of CTMs used to protect crowded places
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The increased safety of pedestrians through reductions in accidents and deaths was cited (I4. 
Director, Construction Company; I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority), as was the 
reduction in vehicle emissions and noise pollution (I4. Director, Construction Company).  It 
was also raised that traffic exclusion has ideally suited areas where vehicle and pedestrian 
movement already conflicted (I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority) and where existing 
traffic regulations were being abused (I26. Engineer, Local Authority).  However, as raised by 
one participant after discussing the range of benefits in relation to traffic exclusion and 
pedestrianisation: 
“…for me that‟s then all heading in the right direction because you‟re seeing some 
improvements to the streets, seeing some amenity and it‟s doing a function as well 
and it‟s finding mechanisms that try to find the „win win‟, but obviously, you can‟t 
pedestrianise everywhere” (I15. Director, Development Company) 
The only implications raised by participants were the inability of vehicles to get close to 
buildings, impacting commercial viability though the inability of delivery vehicles and users of 
the buildings to get to their destinations (I4. Director, Construction Company; I6. Urban 
Designer, Local Authority; I21. Received Documentation) and the potential need for the 
existing road networks surrounding the excluded area to be upgraded (I4. Director, 
Construction Company).  There are also parking implications for disabled users of buildings 
(I10. Architect) and able-bodied users of buildings, as highlighted by this participant: 
“…your shopping centre wants a car park next door.  They‟re all the same.  They 
want people to travel there, that‟s why they built a car park next door.  They don‟t 
want people to walk there” (I3. CTSA C) 
During interviews with participants on traffic exclusion, two projects where traffic exclusion 
had been incorporated were explored further, with an example in London (UK) and one in 
Lower Manhattan, New York (USA).  In Lower Manhattan, traffic exclusion had been 
successful due to it being constantly busy (no 9-5 working, resulting in a desolate area 
outside of these hours) and because, despite fears that business would decrease, footfall 
and revenues increased due to the safer and „more comfortable‟ space (I6. Urban Designer, 
Local Authority).  A project in London where traffic exclusion had been incorporated was also 
seen as successful, as it was a catalyst for regeneration of the area (see section 6.2.2.5) and 
aided in the use of the area, with users of the buildings in the protected area frequently 
visiting nearby buildings (again, within the protected area), which decreased the time it took 
them to travel to meetings and increased their safety and enjoyment of the area, especially 
considering the regeneration that occurred as a result of the exclusion (I25. Assistant 
Director, Local Authority).  What is evident above is a notion of the benefits and implications 
of traffic exclusion, however the benefits seem poorly publicised, as misconceptions surfaced 
during the interviews, as it was made clear that businesses within the exclusion zone feared 
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for losses in footfall and therefore revenue.  Yet, where traffic exclusions were incorporated, 
footfall and revenue had increased.  The restriction of traffic, therefore, could aid in the 
reconciliation of the implications raised during the interviews. 
 
6.4.1.2 Traffic restriction 
Traffic restriction was raised by two participants and observed in each of the three site visits.  
It is used to restrict access to a particular area, site or part of a site, through the incorporation 
of vehicle access control points, as shown in Figure 6.10. 
 
Figure 6.10. Enforced traffic restriction in Lower Manhattan, New York 
As noted in section 6.4.1.1, traffic exclusion was shown to result in no or limited impact in 
relation to traffic flow, yet traffic restriction was raised as potentially causing such disruption 
on a larger scale (depending on design, planning and staged arrivals), due to the need to 
search vehicles and therefore increase the amount of time it takes vehicles to gain access, 
resulting in queues and the disruption of traffic flows external to the site (I6. Urban Designer, 
Local Authority).  This implication was observed during Site Visit 1, where the number of 
vehicles wishing to gain access to the restricted area exceeded the amount of space 
available to accommodate waiting vehicles, so vehicles were forced to wait on the main road, 
disrupting one lane of traffic and causing congestion. 
“…somebody tried to escape a robbery and they actually ended up going down the 
wrong lane and actually being tangled up in the closure” (I25. Assistant Director, 
Local Authority) 
Traffic restrictions were also observed during site visits 2 and 3, where CTMs had been 
incorporated to restrict access to specific parts of an area.  During Site Visit 2, it was 
highlighted that the area where traffic restriction was being incorporated was partially 
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influenced by the abuse of existing traffic regulations and the restriction would therefore aid 
in its resolution (I26. Engineer, Local Authority).  During Site Visit 3, it was observed that 
traffic restriction was used to restrict access to delivery areas only. 
 
6.4.1.3 Traffic inclusion 
Traffic inclusion was not directly referred to by any participant as a CTM.  However, the 
benefits and implications of it can be drawn from data (and its subsequent analysis) 
regarding traffic exclusion (section 6.4.1.1.), traffic restriction (section 6.4.1.2) and in relation 
to stand-off (section 6.4.5).  Section 6.4.1.1 on traffic exclusion highlighted misconceptions, 
with business fears of decreased footfall and revenue being proved incorrect, with increases 
in footfall and revenue occurring and the only implication being the inability of users of places 
and spaces being unable to drive or be driven „to their doorsteps‟.  The benefits of traffic 
exclusion in relation to counter-terrorism were clear, with greater potential for no protective 
construction CTMs needing to be incorporated.  In relation to traffic inclusion, the possibility 
of incorporating such stand-off is significantly reduced, with traffic being within short 
distances of places and spaces.  Therefore, traffic inclusion is less desirable from a security 
perspective and a public perspective (due to the aforementioned increases in footfall gained 
through traffic exclusion), yet from a business perspective, it allows such users of buildings to 
travel undisrupted, directly to the buildings themselves. 
 
6.4.1.4 Temporary barriers 
Temporary barriers were mentioned by two participants, each highlighting a different factor in 
relation to them.  While they were seen as an inconvenience, the inconvenience is a trade-off 
for not incorporating permanent CTMs into the site or building (I8. Architect), therefore having 
a cost incentive and also, it was argued, can contribute to sustainability and environmental 
agendas, as they can be re-used and last for at least 200 years (I18. Director, Construction 
Company).  It was also noted that temporary barriers will move upon impact, so the „final‟ 
stand-off distance needs to be taken into consideration in determining their placement (I18. 
Director, Construction Company). 
 
6.4.2 Vehicle access control points 
Vehicle access control points (VACPs) were raised by two participants, evident in received 
documentation and observed during all three site visits.  The participants who commented on 
VACPs, an architect and an urban designer, felt that any impediment to access is „not 
wanted‟ (I10. Architect) and that the restriction of traffic causes queuing and impacts the flow 
of traffic (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority).  Whilst restricting access has permeability and 
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traffic implications, from a security perspective, it allows the movement of vehicles on-site 
(after screening) and can therefore reduce the risk of being targeted.  It also reduces the 
impacts of an attack, should a VBIED detonate at the VACP itself, a certain distance away 
from the building, rather than directly outside (or in a worst-case scenario, inside), the 
building.  Figures 6.11 and 6.12 were taken during Site Visit 1.   
  
Figure 6.11. A vehicle being searched inside a 
VACP 
Figure 6.12. The searched vehicle leaving the 
VACP 
Here, a vehicle and driver‟s credentials were checked prior to be allowed to pass through the 
first set of bollards (which were on a rotating turntable).  However, as shown in Figure 6.11, 
once „trapped‟ between the two sets of bollards, the vehicle was then searched (no rejection 
lanes or anticipation for a scenario involving the discovery of an explosive device or 
suspicious material).  Once the vehicle had been approved to pass through, the second set 
of bollards were rotated and the vehicle progressed to its destination (Figure 6.12).  While 
this VACP highlights how they can be incorporated into dense and urban settings, how the 
security staff would respond to a vehicle that was found to have explosives inside, or be 
suspicious, are unclear.  The only „rejection‟ route possible was for the vehicle to be reversed 
back through the first set of bollards.  However, the vehicle had been „trapped‟ and would not 
be able to reach its intended target or make its intended impact. 
 
6.4.3 Traffic calming 
Traffic calming was raised by three participants, who each highlighted that through reducing 
the speed vehicles can reach in attempting to penetrate CTMs, through such means as 
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chicanes, the potential size, robustness and obtrusiveness of the CTMs can be reduced (D4. 
NaCTSO Representative; I11. Director, Construction Company; I27. CTSA). 
 
6.4.4 Vehicle security barriers 
The vehicle security barriers (VSBs) that were commented on, evident in received 
documentation or observed during the research are highlighted in Figure 6.13.  Data on the 
benefits and implications of VSBs will now be presented, with three overarching categories of 
measures, those being security-explicit barriers (section 6.4.5.1), street furniture (section 
6.4.5.2) and landscaping and nature (section 6.4.5.3). 
 
Figure 6.13. Vehicle security barriers cited in documentation or observed during the research 
In relation to the benefits and implications of VSBs generally, one participant raised that they 
had much more faith in passive, physical CTMs than in people- and/or more technology-
orientated CTMs, due to the potential for such measures to be overcome or left in 
vulnerable/ineffective positions (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company).   
 
6.4.4.1 Security-explicit barriers 
Security-explicit barriers are those CTMs that only fulfil security purposes; they include 
barriers, blockers, bollards, fencing, gates, planters and walls. 
 
Barriers 
Barriers were cited by one participant, observed during all three site visits and were evident 
in documentation received during one interview.  Documentation cited barriers as being 
required to aid in demarking the boundary between public and private space whilst ensuring 
secure access/egress (I21. Received Documentation).  This function was also evident during 
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the interview and site visits (Site Visits 1-3).   Barriers (and any other traffic-restricting CTM) 
increase the amount of time taken to process vehicles.  During one site visit, it was 
highlighted that the barriers were kept raised, in order to negate this issue, with a trade-off 
having been made in terms of security.  The barriers‟ safety systems were switched on when 
the national threat level was at „Substantial‟ or below, whereas if the threat level was at 
„Severe‟ or „Critical‟, the safety systems were switched off.  The implications of this are that 
vehicles failing to adhere to warning signs to stop prior to the barrier will go underneath the 
barrier and be crushed by the arm lowering (due to the removed safety systems).  It was 
highlighted that the likelihood of such an incident occurring was minimal, with the trade-off 
ensuring CTMs were incorporated (I27. CTSA; Site Visit 3).  The cost of such a barrier (the 
product cost of a raising-arm barrier) was thought to be approximately £30,000. 
 
Blockers 
Blockers, as pictured in Figure 6.14 (a photograph taken during Site Visit 3), were cited by 
two participants and evident in one site visit.  As with barriers, blockers are used to 
demarcate boundaries and facilitate access/egress.  One participant said that a potential 
limitation with blockers (and any automated CTMs) is that the technology controlling them 
also needs to be secured properly in order to avoid being overcome.  An example was given 
of an automated blocker whose control cabinet had been secured with a lock and key that 
was available from any hardware store (I2. Design Consultant).  
 
Figure 6.14. A blocker in Lower Manhattan, New York 
Bollards 
Bollards were discussed by numerous participants and were evident in all three site visits.  
The benefits of automated bollards (also known as rising/lowering bollards) were cited by two 
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participants, with the facilitation of access and egress to and from the protected area (I13. 
Design Manager, Construction Company; I26. Engineer, Local Authority).  The permeability 
of bollards was thought to be relatively high compared with other CTMs, such as planters (I6. 
Urban Designer, Local Authority; I26. Engineer, Local Authority).  However, as with blockers, 
their management needs consideration.  One participant said that a memorandum of 
understanding was being drawn up with the local Police to operate the bollards, however it 
was feared that in the long-term, operators would become complacent and simply lower the 
bollards whenever they saw a vehicle waiting (I26. Engineer, Local Authority).  Such CTMs 
also need their own infrastructure to supply and operate the movement of the bollards, which 
has to be within a certain distance of the CTMs themselves.  Retro-fitting such measures 
was also cited as requiring a 1m wide, 2m deep hole for each bollard, with such CTMs 
costing approximately £1,000 each (product cost) (I26. Engineer, Local Authority).  The 
green and red lamps often installed with such measures are not officially recognised as a 
legitimate traffic signal by Highway Authorities under the Traffic Signs Regulations, resulting 
in the need for exemption by the Department of Transport (I26. Engineer, Local Authority). 
Evident in Site Visit 1 was the incorporation of bollards into a turntable, as shown in Figure 
6.15.  Whilst the benefits of such a device were the access and egress of vehicles into and 
out of the protected area, the design itself did not incorporate the ability to reject vehicles that 
failed a screening process, a process that only occurred once the vehicle was confined 
between two sets of the rotating bollards.  How the vehicle would be dealt with if explosives 
were found or it was deemed suspicious were unclear. 
 
Figure 6.15. Bollards on a turntable in Lower Manhattan, New York 
Fencing 
Fencing was raised by five participants and evident in one site visit, with the demarcation and 
broader security functions cited the most.  One participant highlighted a project where a 
  
158 
 
fence had incorporated bollards into its structure, an incorporation that was not visible, 
portraying the image of a „normal‟ fence (I8. Architect).  Whilst there are aesthetic benefits to 
this, consideration should be drawn to the implications of visible/invisible CTMs (see section 
6.1.3.4). 
 
Gates 
Gates were evident in documentation received during an interview, documentation which 
highlighted that (at the time) there was no crash rating for vehicle access gates, due to their 
bespoke design (I21. Received Documentation).   
 
Planters 
Planters were noted by two participants, evident in documentation received during an 
interview and observed during two site visits.  The most prominent factor raised in relation to 
planters (an example of a non-enhanced planter can be seen in Figure 6.16) was the need 
for their considered management. One participant spoke of „half-dead plants‟ and „cigarette 
butts‟ being constantly visible (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority) and documentation noted 
that the species of planting inside would be chosen so as to ensure that surveillance was not 
compromised (I21. Received Documentation). 
 
Figure 6.16. Planters in Lower Manhattan, New York 
Walls 
Walls were raised by three participants as being a CTM, with no benefits or implications 
raised.  Aesthetically and in relation to movement, their permeability is relatively poor 
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compared to other CTMs, such as bollards.  However, there is potential for advertising to be 
positioned on the walls themselves, facilitating the generation of income. 
 
6.4.4.2 Street furniture 
Street furniture that was evident or observed during the research included advertising boards, 
art, bicycle racks and furniture.  These perform counter-terrorist/security functions provide 
another, non-security-explicit, function. 
 
Advertising boards 
Advertising boards were observed during one site visit (as shown in Figure 6.6).  Whether 
they had been constructed as VSBs was unclear, however they demonstrate that such street 
furniture can be used and have benefits, herein being the ability to generate income and 
therefore, have the potential to (over time) recoup the costs of the measures themselves and 
generate profit by taking into consideration their management. 
 
Art 
Art was raised by one participant, who highlighted a project where Figures of soldiers had 
been constructed as replacements for bollards (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority).  Whilst 
in this instance, the „soldiers‟ were constructed to demonstrate political motives, their use 
demonstrates the ability of such constructed items to be used as VSBs and therefore provide 
aesthetic and cultural benefits, as well as in some instances providing additional amenity 
through seating etc. 
 
Bicycle racks 
The use of bicycle racks as VSBs was raised by two participants and evident in 
documentation received during an interview.  Both the participants stated that bicycle racks 
had been used because they were less obtrusive than other CTMs (such as bollards and 
planters) and because they provided a public amenity (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority; 
I26. Engineer, Local Authority).  The information within the received documentation also 
made these points. 
 
Furniture 
Furniture as VSBs was raised by three participants, as well as providing public amenity (I6. 
Urban Designer, Local Authority; I13. Design Manager, Construction Company; D8. Un-
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attributable Source), the implications being the need for the foundations of the furniture, as 
well as the seating itself, to be more robust and potentially deeper (than „normal‟ furniture). 
 
6.4.4.3 Landscaping and nature 
Landscaping and nature encompasses bunds, collapsible areas, ditches, topography, trees 
and water, all of which can be used to protect crowded places from VBIEDs through their use 
to enforce traffic management, traffic calming and vehicle access control points. 
 
Bunds 
Bunds were raised by two participants; if incorporated during the planning and design phases, 
bunds could be constructed using spoil from the site where they are being incorporated, 
saving money (D7. Un-attributable Source; I11. Director, Construction Company).  Despite 
this clear monetary advantage (in the right circumstances), incorporating bunds is dependent 
on the size of the site.  Therefore, it is a CTM that is not feasible for city-centre or densely 
populated areas. 
 
Collapsible areas 
Collapsible areas were raised by one participant, with their construction resulting in their 
ability to accommodate the weight of pedestrians, but not that of a vehicle, so if a vehicle 
traverses the area, it collapses and traps the vehicle (see section 6.1.3.4 for the perceived 
implications of invisible CTMs).  Note: Prior to the final submission of this thesis, the 
technical viability of collapsible areas was called in to question (un-attributable source), as 
lighter vehicles than that which the area is designed to collapse under can still traverse the 
area.  Therefore, collapsible areas are not referred to in the remainder of the thesis.   
 
Ditches 
The use of ditches was raised by two participants.  It was highlighted that they are rarely 
used in crowded places, due to more aesthetic CTMs being desired (D8. Un-attributable 
Source).  Their use was offered by a CTSA who was giving advice to designers of a building, 
despite the building being in a city-centre location (I21. Architect).  „Health and Safety‟ issues 
seem somewhat pertinent in relation to ditches, other CTMs also easily accommodating 
aesthetic or environmental benefits, such as through the use of topography or water. 
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Topography 
Topography was raised by two participants, with the ability of topography for traffic 
management and calming functions, enforcing stand-off distances through creating a terrain 
that is not traversable (D4. NaCTSO Representative).  Spoil from a site could also be used to 
create the topography, reducing costs through recycling (I11. Director, Construction 
Company). 
 
Trees 
The use of trees was only raised by one participant, during a discussion on the use of 
landscaping and nature to create stand-off distances and mitigate the impact of VBIEDs.  It 
was raised that, whilst feasible, the trees need to be of a certain girth, rooting and space 
between one another, often resulting in their use being rarely achieved or found (D8. Un-
attributable Source). 
 
Water 
The use of water was not raised by any participant and was only observed during one site 
visit, where due to the size of the site, large-scale water features had been incorporated into 
surrounding parts of the building in order to enforce stand-off distances, as well as providing 
aesthetic and environmental benefits (Site Visit 3).   
 
6.4.5 Stand-off 
The majority of participants with little or no experience of design in relation to counter-
terrorism (and a minority of those who do have such experience), viewed stand-off as the 
enforced distance between an explosive device and a building; it is external.  However, there 
was growing recognition of the need for, as well as the performance and consequences of, 
internal stand-off that can be created through the design of internal space.  In terms of 
„external stand-off‟, its essence is captured through the following quote: 
“…the closer the stand-off distance is, the stronger the building has to be” (I6. Urban 
Designer, Local Authority) 
This was stated by several participants and captures the implications of being unable or 
unwilling to incorporate sufficient stand-off distance around a building.  The „sufficient 
distance‟ was highlighted by numerous participants as being approximately 30m (I11. 
Director, Construction Company; I12. Associate Director, Construction Company; I17. 
Director, Construction Company; I19. Consultant, Construction Company).  „The 30m rule‟ 
exists due to analysis of blast dissipation, yet should not be solely relied on, as unique 
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factors at each location (such as distance between buildings) can affect blast dynamics and 
loads, as does the size of the device itself (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company).  
Specific assessment of each individual site and set of circumstances is always required. 
The difficulty in achieving such distances was emphasised by an architect (I8), principal 
consultants, associate directors and directors of construction companies (I12; I18; I19; I23), a 
director of a development company (I15) and project documents given during an interview 
(I21).  The difficulty surrounds the density of urban spaces and being physically unable to 
find or incorporate sufficient stand-off distances into new or existing locations.  As previously 
raised, this then results in the need for protective construction measures to be incorporated.  
An example of a project in this situation was raised during an interview.  The building, in 
construction at the time of writing and already internationally renowned for its architectural 
design and use of materials, has only been able to incorporate limited stand-off, so the 
structure of the building was designed so that it can withstand the loss of two columns (I11. 
Director, Construction Company).  However, stand-off can be incorporated in such 
circumstances, as raised by one participant: 
“…the only way you‟re going to do it is to pedestrianise places” (I21. Technical 
Director, Construction Company) 
Where stand-off cannot be incorporated in an individual site and especially considering the 
heightened threat considering the nature of the building in question, pedestrianisation of a 
wider area could have been incorporated, which would have resulted in the benefits (and 
implications) of pedestrianisation itself (see section 6.2.2.5) and less or no protective 
construction measures being incorporated.  When such stand-off distances are incorporated, 
the implications of this for the occupier of the building are lower usable site and floor space 
ratios (I5. Architect; I15. Executive Director B, Development Company), which as highlighted 
by one participant, comes at a cost: 
”…that has a significant impact on value, because you‟re using up site area, which is 
of premium value in places like the City” (I15. Executive Director B, Development 
Company) 
Some projects were mentioned that, in an attempt to reconcile such costs, incorporated 
revenue-generating assets into the area between the building and the vehicle security 
barriers, which can create new risks in itself and therefore, potentially undermining the 
effectiveness and use of the stand-off distances.  Examples included mobile refreshment 
outlets (I2. Design Consultant) and private events hosted by the occupier, an issue of even 
more prominence in this particular example due to the building being protected through 
public funds (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority).  When external stand-off distances cannot 
be incorporated, or are not sufficient to warrant little or no protective construction measures 
being installed, the internal layout and structure of the building can be designed to enforce an 
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„internal stand-off‟ distance, with other measures including moving people away from 
windows (I17. Director, Construction Company) and from where potential devices could 
detonate (I18. Director, Construction Company).  Data on the measures involved, with, as 
well as the performance and consequences of, internal space and layout are presented in 
section 6.5.4.  The relationship between HVM and protective construction is clear; 
incorporating stand-off has benefits in terms of better blast protection for the individual site 
(and wider approaches to stand-off offer benefits for wider areas) and results in no or less 
need to modify the design and structure of the building itself.  The implications of insufficient 
stand-off, however, result in the need for protective construction measures to be incorporated, 
which can have significant implications for the design and structure of the building itself, and 
which will be explored in the following section.  
 
6.5 The Performance and Consequences of Protective Construction 
This section presents data on the performance and consequences of protective construction, 
which encompasses the skin, services, structure and space layout of buildings (as shown in 
Figure 6.17).   
 
Figure 6.17. Protective construction CTMs evident in received documentation or observed during the 
research 
In terms of the cost of protective construction, where sufficient stand-off cannot be 
incorporated to result in no protective construction measures needing to be incorporated, this 
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“…relatively small amounts.  It usually has very, very little impact on the structural 
design, a few percent.  So, the cost, a lot of the cost turns out to be in the cost of the 
glass, so if you‟ve got a building with not very much glass, you‟re talking 4-5%.  If 
you‟ve got a lot of glass, 10-15%.  It can be quite a big penalty (I17.  Technical 
Director, Construction Company) 
When retro-fitting, however, perceived cost implications that were raised by one participant 
lead to them stating that the „economics‟ results in window replacement and creating 
protected spaces (I23.  Director B, Construction Company).  The implications of protective 
construction can be detrimental to adjacent or nearby buildings, as by enhancing the 
robustness of the structure and the blast-resistance of the skin of a building, this will result in 
the increased reflection of blast waves from an explosion, resulting in increased damage to 
those surrounding the protected building (I17. Technical Director, Construction Company).  
This issue adds to the benefits of traffic exclusion from an area that encompasses adjacent 
and nearby buildings to a high-risk or prominent target, as adjacent occupiers (if they are 
even aware of this issue) will not wish to be put in such a position. 
 
6.5.1 Skin 
Cladding, facades and glazing (including the frames and fixings) are discussed in this section.  
Whilst it is acknowledged that glazing is part of a façade, here it has been distinguished 
separately due to the particular importance of glazing, as will be explained. 
 
6.5.1.1 Cladding 
“Cladding to be robust as possible (preferably two layers of masonry or pre-cast 
concrete panels) and tied to frame to resist positive and negative loading” (D4.  
Received Document) 
The above is taken from a document used by the CPNI, which details construction 
requirements in terms of counter-terrorism.  As with all of the protective construction 
measures, it was raised that sufficient stand-off can result in the need to not incorporate such 
measures in relation to cladding (I11.  Director, Construction Company).  Concern was raised 
over the extent to which cladding can be safe after an attack, despite it appearing relatively 
undamaged or safe, highlighting the importance of formal assessments after an attack, 
regardless of perceived minimal damage (I4.  Director, Construction Company). 
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6.5.1.2 Façades  
The façade was seen as the „last line of defence‟ where blast loads had (or had not) been 
reduced through HVM (I12.  Associate Director, Construction Company).  The construction of 
façades should ensure that they do not become shrapnel in the event of an explosion (I19.  
Principal Consultant, Construction Company) and should be designed as to not „trap‟ blast, 
through overhangs and deep recesses (D4.  Received Document).  In relation to the cost of 
enhancing façades, the following was raised: 
“the sort of rule of thumb that we‟ve been working on with facades is in effect, if you 
take an extra 2% on the façade budget, you can do a lot with that” (I12.  Associate 
Director, Construction Company) 
This participant went on to discuss how glazing is the most important of the façade materials, 
in relation to counter-terrorism, due to it being “the most fragile of the façades” (I12.  
Associate Director, Construction Company). 
 
6.5.1.3 Glazing 
Whilst it is possible for annealed glazing to be used, with no protective action taken with the 
glazing or its framing and fixings, the stand-off required would be in excess of 100m (I11.  
Director, Construction Company).  The importance of ensuring the protection of glazing is 
due to the damage it can cause, as the vast majority of deaths and injuries are caused by 
flying glass (I17. Technical Director, Construction Company; I24. CTSA B), a hazard which 
can be made worse in the context of tall buildings, due to glass falling faster the further it 
travels (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company).  The benefit of protecting glazing is 
therefore to reduce the loss of life and the causation of injuries in the event of an explosion, 
especially when considering that annealed glazing can be damaged from explosions 400m 
away (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company).  An example was given by one 
participant of the relationship between the distance from a blast and the type of protection, 
with high-hazard damage not occurring beyond 50m when using annealed glass, 40m when 
using anti-shatter film (ASF) and 25-30m for laminated glazing, based on a 100kg car bomb; 
the participant went on to say the following: 
“It is nigh on impossible to get, in any built-up area, a stand-off from a lorry bomb that 
means you don‟t have to do something about your glazing” (I12. Associate Director) 
It was suggested that there are a number of trends and no single answer (I12. Associate 
Director, Construction Company), but a number of general principles emerged from 
participants, which add to the complexity and potential unreliability in providing „rules of 
thumb‟ to potential costs of such CTMs.  Principles specified in advice from the CPNI are to 
avoid atria and use minimal glazing, ensuring that glazing is as low down as possible and 
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panes are no larger than 3m2, as these are more resilient (D4. Received Document).  The 
size of the device matters, as does the size of pane, as for example, longer duration blasts 
(such as from lorry bombs) are worse for large panes, but better for car bombs, as they have 
relatively less longer blast durations (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company).  The 
frames and fixings are of equal importance to the protection of the glazing itself (I2. Design 
Consultant A; I18. Director, Construction Company; I19. Consultant, Construction Company), 
with numerous examples of projects given by one participant where the glazing had been 
protected, but the frames and fixings had not been designed for the increased weight, so the 
glazing itself failed, causing major costs for the occupiers (I2. Design Consultant A).  It was 
raised that the protection of glazing will result in less damage in the event of crime, civil 
unrest and protests (I10. Architect); there are also products available that can be opened and 
still retain a level of blast resistance due to auto-close mechanisms (I14. Director B, 
Construction Company).  Low-level walling systems can be used on ground floors, to allow 
glazing yet stop vehicles from being able to penetrate the façade and it was also noted that, 
subject to blast analysis, protection of glazing can lessen as the height of the building 
increases, due to the dissipation of blast loads (I18. Director, Construction Company).   
In relation to costs (generally), 2-5% of the façade budget when designing in glazing was 
highlighted as being the norm, whereas the cost when retro-fitting was cited as being double, 
excluding any operational and disruption costs (I17. Technical Director, Construction 
Company).  However, specific data was obtained on each type of glazing protection, which 
will now be explored.  Relatively, ASF and bomb-blast net curtains (BBNC) were cited as 
being the cheapest forms of glazing protection, although unless anchored into the frame and 
fixings, glazing protected through ASF can then becomes a single projectile (I18. Director, 
Construction Company) and BBNC restrict visibility to the outside (I15. Director, 
Development Company; I23. Director B, Construction Company), although they remove any 
air-borne hazards and allow blast pressures to move through the building (I23. Director B, 
Construction Company). 
In relation to laminated glass, the minimum thickness for it to be classed as blast resistant 
was given as 7.5mm (I21. Received documents, quoting CPNI specifications).  
Environmental benefits of laminated glazing were raised by participants from a design 
consultancy, construction company and development company, indicating a level of 
awareness regarding the additional benefits of such protection.  Examples were given 
whereby energy costs were reduced due to the reflection of UV light (I15. Director, 
Development Company), as well as museums using such glazing, primarily for protecting 
their artwork from UV light, not from blast (I7. Associate Director, Design Consultancy).  An 
example of laminated glass being used at a heritage site was also given, whereby stained-
glass windows were present and to prevent their modification, a secondary layer of 
(laminated) glazing was incorporated behind the stained-glass, retaining  the appearance of 
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the building from the outside (I13. Design Manager, Construction Company).  When retro-
fitting, a sacrificial approach to the skin of the building could be more cost-effective than 
replacing existing glazing, frames and fixings.  Data on this approach is in section 6.5.4.4. 
 
6.5.2 Structure 
The structure of the building encompasses the columns, floors, roofs and stairwells of 
buildings.  As with issues in relation to building services, points were made on principles of 
protection, with only one example of such performance being raised, which was in relation to 
the design of the columns of a particular building. 
 
6.5.2.1 Columns 
The essence of protective construction in relation to columns is the robustness of the building, 
with specifications given by the CPNI encompassing the use of framed reinforced concrete or 
framed structural steel, allowing for positive and reverse loading and the spreading of shear 
stability throughout (D4. Received Document).  HVM has a direct relationship with the 
columns of a structure, as with sufficient stand-off, the need for such measures diminishes.  
An example of a project where such stand-off could not be incorporated was highlighted by 
one participant, with redundancy in the structure being incorporated so that, in the event of a 
blast, the structure could withstand the loss of two columns (I11. Director, Construction 
Consultancy). 
 
6.5.2.2 Floors 
Floors were raised by one participant, who stated that their construction needs to be 
considered due to the impacts of blast (I18. Director, Construction Company), with 
specifications encompassing floors being tied continuously with beams and columns, with 
mechanical connections, allowing for positive and reverse loading (D4. Received Document).  
Such specifications will have implications for the structure of the building itself under blast 
loading, contributing further to the need for individual analysis of the affects of blast on the 
proposed or constructed building itself. 
 
6.5.2.3 Roofs 
Roofs were highlighted by one participant, who stated that, as with floors, their construction 
requires attention due to the impacts of blast (I18. Director, Construction Company).  Roofs 
and components of roofs should be 150mm thick reinforced concrete, with additional benefits 
of protection from mortar attacks (D4. Received Document).  Such materials will have 
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implications for the structure of the building itself, due to the support required by the 
reinforced roof, and again furthers the need for individual analysis of the building itself. 
 
6.5.2.4 Stairwells 
Stairwells have everyday functions, as well as use as evacuation routes and protected 
spaces, if designed sufficiently for those purposes (I9. Director, Design Consultancy).  CPNI 
specifications detail that there should be at least two staircases, with preferably no more than 
50m between them (D4. Received Document). 
 
6.5.3 Services 
Issues in relation to the protection of services were only raised by one participant, and 
evident in one document that was received.  Only principles in relation to their protection 
were mentioned, with essential services needing to be placed away from vulnerable façades 
(D4. Received Document).  Heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems should 
be at least three storeys above ground level, stopping persons from throwing in materials 
(I19. Consultant, Construction Company), as well as avoiding any direct penetration from 
vehicles.  Such systems should also have the ability to be rapidly shut-off (D4. Received 
Document). 
 
6.5.4 Space plan 
Space layout encompasses the design and construction of the internal space of a building, 
through the incorporation and use of evacuation routes, internal partitions, protected spaces 
and sacrificial design. 
 
6.5.4.1 Evacuation routes 
The essence of protective construction involves the protection of a building, to facilitate the 
safe evacuation (or invacuation) of building users at the time (I19. Consultant, Construction 
Company), with the need for evacuation routes to be sufficiently protected to withstand the 
impact of a blast (D4. Received Document).  Evacuation routes are beneficial not just in 
terrorist attack scenarios, but can be used in response to a variety of hazards and threats. 
 
6.5.4.2 Internal partitions 
Whilst no participants contributed any perspectives in relation to internal partitions 
specifically, it was noted how sacrificial design and such internal layouts can impact 
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productivity (I7. Associate Director, Design Consultancy).  As will be seen in the following 
section on protected spaces, their construction must prevent penetration of fragmentation.  
Such requirements are also evident in relation to partitioning, however any physical „barrier‟ 
will affect fragmentation in relation to velocity.  Further research is required into the 
implications of CTMs on staff productivity. 
 
6.5.4.3 Protected spaces 
As will be demonstrated in an upcoming section on evacuation and invacuation planning (see 
section 6.6.3.4), not every response to a real or potential attack, or other applicable scenario, 
will result in the evacuation of a building.  At times, the invacuation of the users of the 
building will be necessary, invacuation to protected areas of a building (I15. Executive 
Director A, Development Company; I19. Consultant, Construction Company).  These areas 
should be positioned deep within buildings, with no glazing (I9. Director, Design Consultancy; 
I12. Associate Director, Construction Company) and be based on a minimum of 0.66m2 per 
person, in relation to building occupancy (D4. Received Document).  Such spaces can be 
incorporated at no cost when designed in (I23. Director B, Construction Company; I24. CTSA 
B). 
 
6.5.4.4 Sacrificial design 
Sacrificial design, as with structural measures, encompasses the incorporation of 
redundancy into the layout of a building, protecting the critical or important (human and other) 
assets of a building, by placing them further away from where a blast could occur, thereby 
limiting any damage.  The following analogy was given by one participant: 
“It‟s like a car isn‟t it.  You crash a car and it‟s got crumple zones.  You‟re not actually 
worried about the shape of the boot at the end of the crash, but you are very worried 
about the passenger and yourself” (I5. Architect) 
Through moving persons or other assets away from vulnerable façades (I17. Technical 
Director, Construction Company; I18. Director, Construction Company) or simply moving 
assets inwards (I6. Urban Designer, Local Authority; I12. Associate Director, Construction 
Company), the risk of death and injury is reduced, as is the level of damage to other assets 
that were relocated.  Such relocations could be achieved with only minimal disruption costs 
being incurred (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company), although by moving a 
workforce away from windows/glazing, productivity could reduce, thereby reducing revenue 
(I17. Technical Director, Construction Company).  Examples were given of buildings where a 
secondary layer of (laminated) glazing was incorporated into the internal layout, thus 
removing the need to do any work on the „skin‟ of the building, benefitting existing buildings 
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(I12. Associate Director, Construction Company), most notably heritage sites (I13. Design 
Manager, Construction Company).  By incorporating such sacrificial design and in the event 
of an attack (dependent on the blast loads), business could continue whilst repair work was 
carried out, reducing costs and other impacts of an attack, or the impacts of the 
manifestation of other threats and hazards (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company).   
Internal partitions are also important in terms of limiting the penetration of fragmentation 
occupancy (D4. Received Document).  Despite measures that can be incorporated at no cost 
and applicable to many other hazardous events, the impact on workplace interaction and 
productivity is of concern (I7. Associate Director, Design Consultancy) and is therefore a 
potential trade-off, which requires further investigation. 
 
6.6 The Performance and Consequences of Planning, Detection and 
Procedures 
The performance and consequences of planning, detection and procedures seemed 
underemphasised and largely unknown by participants, despite all of the CTMs within this 
category being applicable to the mitigation of other forms of threats and hazards.  Security 
culture, which influences the effectiveness and management of the individual CTMs as well 
as the management of the whole strategy (as expressed in Figure 6.18), was not even 
commented on by one participant.  Planning, detection and procedures encompasses the 
aforementioned culture of an organisation (here, in relation to security and counter-terrorism), 
the people and technology that can identify and respond to hostile reconnaissance and 
attacks, as well as the planning and procedures that goes hand-in-hand in facilitating said 
responses. 
 
Figure 6.18. CTMs relating to planning, detection and procedures 
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6.6.1 Security culture 
None of the participants raised the importance of security culture in relation to counter-
terrorism.  Whilst such culture influences and is influenced by the values of an organisation 
and therefore, in relation to counter-terrorism, how such security is valued and incorporated 
within an organisation is of significance in embedding measures involving users of the 
buildings.   
 
6.6.2 People and technology 
“It‟s easier to raise and lower security levels with people than technology” (I10. 
Architect) 
Although people and technology mutually benefit one another, there is a clear additional 
benefit of the „people‟ side of the partnership, as demonstrated above, through the easier 
ability to escalate and de-escalate human provisions than technological ones.  Both are of 
value when considering they are relatively easier to incorporate once a building is 
constructed, as opposed to other CTMs in terms of HVM and protective construction (I10.  
Architect).  In terms of such provisions, this section covers capable guardians and security 
guards, with technological measures consisting of closed circuit television cameras (CCTV), 
intruder detection alarms and lighting. 
 
6.6.2.1 Capable guardians 
„Capable guardians‟ encompass anyone who is able to observe and act on anything 
suspicious and therefore encompasses the identification and reporting of hostile 
reconnaissance and possible attacks, as well as other forms of crime.  Whilst the term 
includes staff, it suggests that any users of places have a role.  Although only raised by two 
participants, the benefits in facilitating this, through such means as clear lines of sight and 
open areas, is obvious (D4. NaCTSO representative; I7. Associate Director, Design 
Consultancy). 
 
6.6.2.2 CCTV 
Whilst it was argued that CCTV is “more about deterrence than about real prevention” (I12. 
Associate Director, Construction Company), this perspective does not fully capture the use of 
such technology, as attacks can be prevented through the identification of hostile 
reconnaissance.  Their effectiveness varies in relation to the threat that is faced, as the IRA 
were concerned with being caught, whereas suicide bombers are not discouraged by CCTV 
(I12.  Associate Director, Construction Company).  CCTV also allows for off-site observation 
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(I10.  Architect), yet its effectiveness is influenced by two distinct factors.  Firstly, human 
error was raised, as with movable, or pan-tilt-zoom, cameras, the operator can leave them in 
a position that does not cover the area it should, allowing this weakness to be exploited (I13. 
Design Manager, Construction Company; I19. Consultant, Construction Company).  
Secondly, their effectiveness can be impaired by other CTMs, street furniture or technology.  
Examples were given of a project whereby the placement of CCTV and lighting caused 
problems, due to the brightness of the lighting and the need for  small number of discrete 
cameras (I13. Design Manager, Construction Company).  There seems to be a growing trend 
for such technology to replace security guards, with a pan-tilt-zoom camera noted as costing 
£5,000 fully installed and a security guard for 365 days a year costing £100,000; as quoted 
by the participant, “technology, that will always win” (I11. Director, Construction Company). 
 
6.6.2.3 Communication systems 
Communication systems, despite only being raised by three participants, can benefit 
responses to a range of attacks, and incidents resulting from other threats and hazards, 
through informing those affected by such events on how to proceed, including aiding in 
directing such users as to whether to evacuate or invacuate, which is of particular interest 
due to the complexity involved in facilitating such arrangements (see section 6.6.3.4).   
 
6.6.2.4 Intruder detection alarms 
Alarm systems were only raised by two participants, most probably due to their 
disassociation with perceived notions of „counter-terrorism measures‟, i.e., their association 
with petty crime and „security‟ more generally.  It was raised, however, that they contribute to 
deterring threats, as well as aiding in preventing and responding to the other threats (I12. 
Associate Director, Construction Company). 
 
6.6.2.5 Lighting 
As with intruder detection alarms, lighting was only mentioned in two sources of data, with its 
potential to impair CCTV being raised by one participant (I13.  Design Manager, Construction 
Company) and its benefits in deterring and identifying crime more generally, increasing 
perceptions of safety and security, as well as aiding in surveillance for counter-terrorism 
purposes, being documented in project information. 
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6.6.2.6 Security guards 
As with the other CTMs in this category, security guards are able to aid in the deterrence, 
identification of and response to a variety of threats.  Benefits were cited as including their 
ability to be escalated and de-escalated (I10.  Architect), as well as providing a reassuring 
presence to places (I23.  Director A, Construction Company).   
“…there are downsides to using security guards though.  Number one, they‟re not the 
brightest of people, otherwise they wouldn‟t be a security guard. They‟re not the best 
paid people, again, otherwise they wouldn‟t be a security guard.  Having said that, the 
cost of having a security guard for a 35 year period is a million quid, so it‟s a damned 
expensive piece of resource” (I15.  Executive Director A, Development Company) 
Their effectiveness can be undermined through a lack of appropriate management (e.g. 
avoiding static positions that could be spotted by hostile reconnaissance) (I15.  Executive 
Director B, Development Company).   
 
6.6.3 Planning and procedures 
Planning and procedures encompass the measures that need to be incorporated in order to 
effectively prevent, mitigate and respond to an attack.  It encompasses awareness within 
organisations, Business Continuity Planning (BCP), contingency planning and procedures, 
evacuation and invacuation planning, housekeeping and search planning. 
 
6.6.3.1 Awareness 
“…the awareness side is the easier battle, it‟s cheap” (I3. CTSA A) 
The CTSA perspective on and experience of incorporating and encouraging awareness is 
clear, a perspective that was echoed in all interactions with CTSAs, due the „quick wins‟ it 
produces, at low costs (I22. CTSA A).  It was awareness, most notably being raised through 
the Project Argus and Griffin initiatives, that were raised by CTSAs and participants from 
within industry (I4. Director, Construction Company).  Awareness covers not just VBIED 
types of attack, but a range of other methods, predominantly through the identification of 
hostile reconnaissance (I24. CTSA A).  In relation to the Project Argus and Griffin events, it 
was raised that more could be done in terms of engaging with the management of national 
and international organisations who own crowded places in the UK;  CTSAs put forward that 
NaCTSO could engage more with such organisations; where such engagement has occurred, 
attendance at the events increased significantly (I24. CTSAs B and C).   
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6.6.3.2 Business Continuity Planning 
Business continuity planning (BCP) was seen as being of significant benefit to organisations, 
due to its use and effectiveness for a range of other risks (D3.  Academic, Construction 
Management; I3. CTSA A).  BCP incorporates measures to prepare for and mitigate the 
impacts of such risks, as well as aiding in the response to and recovery from said risks.  
CTSAs are increasingly adopting this perspective, through promoting counter-terrorism in 
terms of business continuity: 
“When you think about that, think about terrorism…it‟s another in, it‟s another way to 
spread awareness of terrorism” (I3. CTSA A) 
An example of how CTMs aid in business continuity was offered by one participant, who 
highlighted that a sacrificial stance was taken in terms of the building itself, with a secondary 
layer of enhanced glazing being incorporated and set back from the original (and unprotected) 
glazing, with business being able to carry on in the event of an attack (or other hazard or 
threat causing damage) (I12. Associate Director, Construction Company). 
 
6.6.3.3 Contingency planning 
Although the following quote is taken from a discussion within the context of the identification 
of a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED), it highlights the importance of the 
procedures that are intrinsically linked and of vital importance to such other CTMs as 
awareness, housekeeping and search planning: 
“The problem with that is, what next?  So you‟ve got somebody in a crowd with 
explosives, you‟ve got this knowledge, what are you going to do with it?  How do you 
separate him from the crowd or do you say, actually, the crowd are going to be 
sacrificial, what we won‟t do is let him into the building, where the effects of the bomb 
and the consequences of the bomb would be worse” (I12. Associate Director, 
Construction Company) 
The circumstances easily relate to a VBIED or hostile reconnaissance.  The importance of 
CTMs like awareness and search planning is not in question, but there is a need for 
contingency planning and procedures to be raised as being of equal importance.  By 
ensuring procedures are in place and are understood, then the correct action will be taken in 
any of these events.  Such procedures could include communication networks between 
organisations in the same area, to aid in prevention, through the identification of suspicious 
behaviour etc, as well as in responding to events (I15. Executive Director A, Development 
Company). 
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6.6.3.4 Evacuation and invacuation planning 
The potential complexity and confusion involved in evacuation and invacuation planning was 
raised by four participants.  Typical reactions in the event of any incident are to evacuate, 
however it may be safer to invacuate (I15. Executive Director A, Development Company; I19. 
Consultant, Construction Company).  Issues with evacuation planning stem from the risk of 
secondary explosive devices being positioned at or nearby evacuation points or routes.  
During a site visit to an internationally renowned crowded place (Site Visit 3), it was raised 
that this location did not have any signage directing people to evacuation points, specifically 
to minimise the risk of secondary devices being positioned at those locations (I27. CTSA).  
This highlights the importance of housekeeping (section 6.5.2.5) and search planning 
(section 6.5.2.5), but also the need to consider invacuation, although as raised by one 
participant, this has its own complexities: 
“If you‟re in a shopping centre and somebody‟s telling you to run into it, you might say 
„sod off mate‟, and he can‟t physically stop you” (I4. Director, Construction Company) 
This point highlights that even if sufficient protected spaces are present in a building and can 
accommodate invacuations, human instinct may override any of those precautionary 
measures, especially with those unfamiliar to the building or organisation.  Solutions are 
therefore dependent to the individual and unique context of each site, building and 
organisation, solutions being compounded by possible layered attack scenarios, as 
demonstrated through this quote: 
“How far do you take it?  If you look at ****, you‟ve got a number of cinemas there.  If 
you had a co-ordinated attack, some incendiary devices go off in the cinema and then 
you have a larger device in the Square, if an incendiary device goes off in the cinema, 
what are you going to do, you‟re going to evacuate.  The only place they can 
evacuate is out into ****, how do you deal with that?” (I4. Director, Construction 
Company) 
Planning arrangements at one site were highlighted during a visit, whereby in the event of a 
bomb alert, a small section of the surrounding area will be cordoned off whilst investigations 
occur (depending on the size of the package), in order for business to carry on (I27. CTSA).  
While no live training or exercising of the arrangements have been carried out at this location, 
due to daily business not wanting to be impinged upon, the management envisaged that due 
to the sheer number of fire exit doors around the building, it would be clear that people would 
be dispersing over a large area and planning the position of a secondary device (or devices) 
would be problematic (I27. CTSA).  The importance of planning lies in the preparation and 
having a plan in place (I4. Director, Construction Company), so that arrangements are made 
to aid in the safe evacuation or invacuation of people. 
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6.6.3.5 Housekeeping 
Housekeeping was only raised by one participant.  From a classification of CTMs perspective, 
this is not of particular interest, as housekeeping was present in the provisional typology; the 
participant noted that “cleaners are more likely to see things than the security guard” (I3. 
CTSA C).  Primary or secondary devices could be positioned on CTMs, amongst or nearby 
crowds and/or at evacuation points.  Housekeeping, therefore, is of importance in aiding the 
identification of any suspicious or real devices and is inextricably linked to awareness, as 
well as search planning. 
 
6.6.3.6 Search planning 
As with housekeeping, search planning was only commented on by one participant, who 
highlighted its importance in relation to not only being aware of suspicious packages, but 
suspicious persons or vehicles as well (I3. CTSA A).  Search planning is intricately linked to 
evacuation planning, as primary and/or secondary devices could be left at or nearby 
evacuation points and routes.  This was not raised by any of the participants.   
 
6.7 Conclusion 
The results of the research have highlighted that whilst there are inherent requirements, 
performance and consequences of each CTM that can be used to protect crowded places 
(as presented in the typology of CTMs in Appendix C7.1), a number of influences that 
determine whether such places are protected are also evident, as are influences on the value 
of CTMs themselves.  Uncertainty surrounding legislative requirements to incorporate CTMs 
emanated from participants, although a range of incentives were highlighted that aid in 
forming a business case for the incorporation of such measures.  The importance of TARAs, 
and stakeholder understanding and engagement were noted, with their ability to both 
influence the protection of crowded places and the value of CTMs themselves.  Perceptions 
of terrorism, economic influences, local policy, and building stock rotation were also raised, 
most pertinent in the current climate being the influence that the economy can have on the 
protection of crowded places, one example being the inability of organisations to spare 
employees to attend free Argus Professional events, simply because of cut-backs.   
A lack of specific data in relation to the monetary costs of CTMs, the examination of which 
was a component of one of the objectives of the research (objective three), as was made 
apparent and discussed in the previous chapter.  Although this therefore influences the ability 
of the research to purport findings in relation to the cost and cost-effectiveness of the 
majority of CTMs, the findings of the literature review and of the results of the research have 
nonetheless helped to form a typology of such measures.  The typology, which presents 
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information on the requirements, performance and consequences of the CTMs that can be 
used to protect crowded places, is presented and evidenced in the Appendix C7.1.  Further 
exploration of the identified influences, as well as discussions on the emanating design 
considerations and agendas, is presented in Chapter Seven.  The implications of the 
apparent lack of cost-based data, as well as other potential issues in relation to the findings, 
reliability and validity of the research, are reported in Chapter Eight. 
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7.0 The Protection of Crowded Places from VBIEDs 
The performance and consequences of CTMs used to protect crowded places from VBIEDs 
is discussed first in this chapter; the typology of CTMs itself is presented in Appendix C7.1.  
Discussion of the relative attributes of CTMs are presented first, followed by the explorations 
of the theoretical framework and two pertinent design considerations that were evident 
through the research, those being designing-in and retro-fitting CTMs, and sufficient versus 
insufficient stand-off.  Also apparent throughout the research has been the presence of four 
agendas, those being cost and return on investment, un-impinged design and permeability, 
user experience, and environmental and energy concerns; these agendas are discussed, 
followed by the presentation of a design that reconciles those four agendas.  The boundaries 
of the typology (and therefore the results and discussions of the research) were set in 
Chapter Four (see Figure 4.1).  Following the creation of the typology and its inherent 
relevance, an updated version is presented in Figure 7.1, highlighting the boundaries and 
relevance of the research. 
 
Figure 7.1. The updated boundaries and relevance of the typology and research 
Whilst the direct relevance is unchanged, the potential relevance of the typology extends 
beyond the remit of the research.  In relation to methods of attack, the typology has shown 
that CTMs can mitigate other forms of attack, as for instance, evacuation and invacuation 
planning is applicable to the detonation of IEDs, CBRN attacks and other forms of threat, 
such as the use of firearms.  The typology is however only applicable to physical security and 
the „Protect‟ strand of CONTEST.  Whilst the typology should not be understood to contain all 
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the CTMs that can be used to protect transport infrastructure and critical national 
infrastructure (as this was neither the remit of the research nor evident from the data), the 
CTMs within the typology are applicable to those places. 
 
7.1 The Relative Performance and Consequences of CTMs 
The typology of CTMs that can be used to protect crowded places from VBIEDs, which 
highlights the relative performance and consequences of the CTMs, is presented in Appendix 
C7.1.  The components of the provisional framework of the typology were established in 
Chapter Four (see Table 4.2), with a classification of CTMs made evident in that chapter also.  
No changes were made to the classification of the CTMs themselves, with the results of the 
research concurring with the findings of the literature review.  All the components that were 
identified in the aforementioned table were also evident in the results of the research, with no 
additions being made.  The only difference that became apparent was the need to distinguish 
between positive and negative consequences, as their very nature was different.  The 
identified attributes of such consequences did not change however, only the intentionality of 
their occurrence.  An example is the unintentional creation of a new risk, which was identified 
in the literature review, as for example, reflection of blast waves from enhanced and 
protected buildings detrimentally impacts neighbouring buildings.  This also therefore affirms 
the definitions of performance, requirements and consequences that were originally 
presented in section 1.1.3.1; the use of the terms was incorporated in order to capture all the 
attributes of CTMs themselves, rather than conform to the prevalent use of „cost‟, „cost-
benefits‟ and „cost-effectiveness‟, as they did not fully encompass all potential attributes of 
CTMs.  Also, as sufficient cost data was not collected from which to reliably base any 
theories on such matters as cost-effectiveness, the adherence to the above terms enabled all 
possible subjective opinion of CTMs and their attributes to be collected. 
 
7.1.1 Hostile vehicle mitigation 
The relative performance and consequences of HVM will now be explored in relation to such 
attributes of traffic management, VACP, traffic calming and VSBs. Literature on HVM can be 
found in section 4.4 and the results on HVM can be found in section 6.4. 
 
7.1.1.1 Traffic management 
In terms of performance and benefits, the relative performance of traffic exclusion is greater 
than any other option.  The increases in footfall and revenues of businesses, increases in 
safety, reductions in pollution and the soiling of buildings, as well as its influence on 
regeneration and conduciveness to broader schemes of pedestrianisation result in it being 
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the most effective traffic management option.  A case study example is provided by Lu et al. 
(2010, p.16) where the exclusion of traffic and incorporation of pedestrianisation is resulting 
in regeneration of the area as the area becomes a more attractive location for the public and 
retail outlets.  The most notable negative consequence of excluding traffic however, is the 
disruption to businesses (in terms of deliveries, cars being able to get to the building itself 
etc), a consequence that is overcome through traffic restriction and traffic inclusion.  
However, whilst traffic restriction facilitates the ability of vehicles to get onto sites and near 
buildings (albeit following minor disruption in the form of access control), the benefits 
experienced above diminish.  Whereas traffic exclusion, if enforced at a sufficient distance 
away, can result in no requirements for protective construction, traffic restriction will.  A 
necessary reconciliation and assessment is therefore required, to subjectively analyse (in 
each unique instance) whether the benefits of on-site traffic (which can result in incorporating 
HVM and protective construction measures) outweigh the benefits of excluding traffic 
(arguably enforced through a relatively small number of VSBs).  Traffic inclusion, however, 
results in greater risk of attack and would require HVM and maximum levels of protective 
construction, due to the ability of vehicles to get within a small number of metres to buildings.  
Whilst traffic is un-impinged, the cost of protective construction was raised as potentially 
reaching 15% of budgets, again resulting in the importance of the subjective assessment of 
values and requirements of stakeholders, in order to evaluate and incorporate the best suited 
option for them.  The use of temporary barriers, inherently having the capacity to be 
escalated and de-escalated, is dependent on the timely assessment of the terrorist threat 
and therefore increases the risk of an attack.  Relative cost benefits would need to be 
reconciled against its relatively lower effectiveness, as a result of its low aesthetic 
performance and permeability, as well as its performance on impact.  The consideration of 
traffic management, and the different approaches within it, is evident in publicly available 
guidance that has been published by the Royal Institute of British Architects (Lu et al., 2010), 
where case studies have been given to show how different approaches and CTMs have 
been used; traffic exclusion has been incorporated at the National Assembly in Wales, Cabot 
Circus in Bristol (shopping centre), and at an undisclosed location in London where an 
international headquarters of a corporation is based, in order to allow those locations to be 
accessible by the public, but be relatively more secure and less vulnerable to attack.   
 
7.1.1.2 Vehicle access control points 
In terms of security, the inter-lock system performs the highest, as it removes the risk of 
tailgating, although it has the most severe negative consequences, as a result of the 
increased disruption to vehicle throughput and will be more costly than a single line of 
barriers, which may relatively cheaper, but is inherently more vulnerable to encroachment 
through tailgating.  However, of more cost and also of increased risk is the use of a final 
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denial system, as VSBs are used to line the route to ensure vehicles cannot traverse 
elsewhere, but the ability to stop vehicles is completely reliant on guard force reactions.  The 
same vulnerability can be said for each form of VACP, as the vehicles and their occupants 
have to be searched and checked prior to their admission to a site.  If this is not done 
appropriately, VACPs could be overcome.  Where traffic is only restricted, the increased cost 
and risk of incorporating VACPs is evident. 
 
7.1.1.3 Traffic calming 
Traffic calming results in the reduction in speed of vehicles, thereby reducing the potential 
impact energy they could exert on a VSB, which in turn reduces the robustness (and 
potentially obtrusiveness) of the VSBs themselves.  Relatively minor disruption to traffic, in 
the form of reduced speeds, would be reconciled against these benefits, however the 
complexity involved in incorporating chicanes needs to be acknowledged, especially when 
maintaining two-way traffic flow.   
 
7.1.1.4 Vehicle security barriers 
The intended (and positive) consequence of any VSB is the mitigation of an attack, however 
the relative performance and consequences of the different types of VSBs, as well as the 
individual VSBs, vary considerably.  SEBs mitigate the impacts of a range of threats, 
however compared against street furniture and the use of landscaping and nature, offer little 
benefit elsewhere, with the least aesthetic performance and visual permeability.  Street 
furniture offers public amenity as well as the potential for revenue generation, whereas the 
use of landscaping and nature most notably has environmental benefits and provides 
amenity, although there could be potential health and safety risks in relation to some CTMs. 
 
Security-explicit barriers 
Bollards, the most commonly associated CTM, offer the most permeability of all the SEBs.  
Whilst planters could be construed as having a relatively higher aesthetic performance, they 
are less permeable and significantly larger in size, and therefore arguably perform less well 
in relation to aesthetics.  Measures more commonly associated with broader crime 
prevention and the demarcation of property boundaries (walls, fences and gates), therefore 
mitigate more than just terrorism, as is the case with all the SEBs, but offer less aesthetic 
performance when used in dense, urban settings, due to their relatively low aesthetic 
performance and permeability.  This therefore provides insight into the prominence of 
bollards and planters in urban settings, due to their performance in terms of aesthetics and 
permeability.  
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Street furniture 
The relative performance of street furniture, however, is higher than that of SEBs, as the 
furniture provides public amenities and higher aesthetic performance.  Whilst the cost 
implications of the measures arguably vary more than those of SEBs (especially in relation to 
art and its sheer uniqueness), their performance lends themselves to offer more benefits 
than the aforementioned SEBs.  Whilst a number of street furniture were addressed, the 
opportunities are potentially limitless, with all forms of „street elements‟ being able to be 
structurally enhanced and made fit-for-purpose in relation to counter-terrorism.  Their 
inherent benefits of providing amenity and in some cases generating revenue, results in their 
higher relative performance than SEBs and arguably landscaping and nature too, although 
the latter measures offer greater environmental benefits that could lead to increased quality 
of space.  The use of street furniture is prevalent in publicly available guidance (Lu et al., 
2010), with the incorporation of such measures evident in a number of locations.   
 
Landscaping and nature 
The inherent environmental benefits of VSBs within landscaping and nature result in their 
relative performance being higher than that of SEBs in relation to the additional benefits.  
Cost savings can be accrued through the recycling of spoil, with general aesthetic 
performance also being, arguably, the highest of all the VSBs.  However, as with street 
furniture, their benefits in terms of user experience (in relation to counter-terrorism) is 
unknown, with further research being required.  Whilst negative consequences are evident in 
the form of increased health and safety risks for users of the protected places and spaces, 
they increase the quality of space, which as highlighted in the literature review, is a factor in 
the increased usage of such areas.  However, the space required to incorporate such VSBs 
is relatively higher than what is required for the incorporation of SEBs and street furniture, 
resulting in them being conducive to larger sites than are evident in dense, urban settings.  
Nonetheless, and as with street furniture, they provide the same security benefits as all the 
other VSBs, yet with additional benefits.  The use of landscaping and nature is evident in 
case studies published by Lu et al. (2010, p.12), where staircases have been incorporated to 
exclude vehicle access to a building, and where stand-off has also been incorporated to 
enforce stand-off distances at the National Assembly in Wales. 
 
7.1.2 Protective construction 
The relative performance and consequences of protective construction will now be explored, 
through discussions on such attributes of the skin of a building, its structure, services and 
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space plan.  The literature on protective construction can be found in section 4.5 and the 
results on HVM can be found in section 6.5. 
 
7.1.2.1 Skin 
The protection of the cladding, façades and glazing of a building all have inherent benefits in 
their ability to mitigate the impacts of hazards, threats and major accidents.  However, in 
relation to the mitigation of blast, a negative consequence of such protection is the 
detrimental impact it has on the vulnerability of the built assets that surround such a building, 
as they will be more badly affected due to the increased reflection of blast waves.  Aesthetic 
performance is not impinged, as all the CTMs (with the exception of BBNCBs) can appear as 
if they are unprotected, although literature indicates ASF does reduce transparency slightly.  
The environmental benefits offered by ASF and laminated glazing offer incentivise their 
incorporation, with ASF being cited as the least expensive option (and ideally suiting retro-
fitting) and laminated glazing being the most cost-effective if designed in from the outset. 
 
7.1.2.2 Structure 
The structural CTMs all mitigate the impacts of hazards, threats and major accidents, 
enhancing the robustness of a building to ensure it does not disproportionately collapse.  The 
most revered methods of achieving this are through the use of steel or reinforced concrete 
frames.  There are evident cost implications as a result of the increased robustness of the 
structural elements and their connections, but such expenditure would be reconciled against 
the reductions in damage that would occur as a result of a blast or other such event. 
 
7.1.2.3 Services 
The protection of services most notably occurs through the protection of the skin and 
structure of a building.  When considering the potential for chemical or other such threats to 
occur, the location of HVAC systems at least three floors above ground level (which can be 
achieved at no additional cost if designed in from the outset) results in the mitigation of such 
threats and combined with filters for such threats, increases the internal air quality of the 
building, arguably reducing absence through sickness. 
 
7.1.2.4 Space plan 
Evacuation routes, protected spaces and the location of offices (sacrificial design) can be 
incorporated at no additional cost and aid in the mitigation of and response to hazards, 
threats, major accidents and other disruptive events.  While these also have no negative 
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consequences, the same cannot be said for internal partitions and the use of secondary 
layers of glazing (sacrificial design).  Internal partitions can exacerbate the effects of a blast, 
by increasing the amount of fragmentation.  The location and organisation of offices can also, 
arguably and as with internal partitions, influence workspace productivity.  However, the 
incorporation of a layer of protected glazing and/or the re-location of offices or personnel can 
be the most cost-effective CTMs in retro-fit situations, due to the cost and disruption 
implications of replacing existing glazing, frames and fixings. 
 
7.1.3 Planning, detection and procedures 
The relative performance and consequences of planning, detection and procedures will now 
be explored, through discussions on such attributes of a security culture, of people and 
technology, and of planning and procedures.  The literature on such CTMs can be found in 
section 4.6 and the results on HVM can be found in section 6.6. 
 
7.1.3.1 Security culture 
Management, support and communications infrastructure are typically already incorporated 
into organisations, resulting in the need for an inclusion of security into such practices, to the 
extent required for counter-terrorism purposes.  A negative consequence of such a culture 
could be the disproportionate fear of a terrorist attack occurring (or other crime), but its 
importance is demonstrated through the effectiveness of awareness and the inherent 
vulnerability of CTMs that require human interaction.  Raising awareness can be one of the 
most cost-effective CTMs, especially if conducted through Project Argus and Griffin events, 
which only require staff attendance (the events themselves are free to attend).  Such a 
culture would embrace and require awareness, which can aid in the identification of hostile 
reconnaissance and suspicious behaviour, potentially interrupting plots prior to their 
manifestation.  Where human interaction is required in relation to the use of CTMs, a security 
culture would ensure that adequate training for and monitoring of such interactions results in 
CTMs not being left in vulnerable positions, which could potentially undermine all other 
incorporated CTMs and nullify any value from their use. 
 
7.1.3.2 People and technology 
All the CTMs within „people and technology‟ typically already exist in crowded places, albeit 
for other crime prevention functions.  Capable guardians and security guards could physically 
stop an attack from occurring, but no such measure can mitigate the impacts of an attack on 
the structure of a building itself, should an attack occur.  Rather, security guards who had 
been trained in the appropriate plans and procedures would aid in the response to such an 
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event, potentially alleviating some of the others issues inherent in the aftermath of an attack, 
most notably evacuation and invacuation, as well as first aid.  Negative consequences of 
such CTMs could be the impingement of one CTM on another (such as lighting on CCTV, 
placement of VSBs in lines of sight) and as previously highlighted, CTMs being left in 
vulnerable positions. 
 
7.1.3.3 Planning and procedures 
The aforementioned benefits of awareness are evident and are a cost-effective solution to 
aiding in the identification and mitigation of an attack (especially when considering that 
training programs are free and the skills learnt within them could stop an attack from 
occurring).  BCP, contingency planning, evacuation/invacuation planning and housekeeping 
all typically exist in crowded places, requiring certain additions when dealing with terrorist 
attacks, as for instance, search planning needs to be incorporated into arrangements to 
ensure that IEDs are not left at rendezvous points and/or along routes to them.  Such 
arrangements are arguably relatively cost-effective too, as one such check could identify an 
IED and result in evacuees being lead away from that route, instead of being lead to it and 
having the impacts of the blast that would occur in that instance.  BCP is arguably the most 
cost-effective, as it not only aids in the preparation and mitigation of, response to and 
recovery from hazards, threats and major accidents, but a range of other risks and disruptive 
events that can impede organisations. 
 
7.2 A Theoretical Framework of the Protection of Crowded Places 
Derived from the literature review and the results of the research are eight factors that 
influence whether crowded places are protected and three factors that influence the value of 
CTMs.  These inherent components of the theoretical framework are shown in Figure 7.2.  
The skeleton framework and its expanded contents are shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4. 
 
Figure 7.2. The inherent components of the theoretical framework 
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Figure 7.3. The skeleton theoretical framework 
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Figure 7.4. The expanded contents of the theoretical framework 
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7.2.1 Influences on the protection of crowded places 
Eight influences on the protection of crowded places are apparent, those being obligations, 
incentives, TARAs, perceptions and moments of terrorism, stakeholder understanding and 
engagement, economic influences, local policy, and building stock rotation.  Discussions on 
each of these influences will now be presented, drawing on the appropriate literature and 
results of the research. 
 
7.2.1.1 Obligations 
Obligations in terms of legislation, insurance policies and the values and leadership of 
organisations were evident in both the literature and the results of the research. 
 
Legislation 
Whilst the literature was relatively clear in stating that interpretations of existing legislation 
were such that „duties of care‟ did encompass terrorist acts (Fussey, 2011b, p.165; CPNI, 
2010, p.4; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.148; NaCTSO, 2009c, p.4; Home Office, 1999, 
p.8), only two of the participants held such assertive opinions (in relation to the Health and 
Safety at Work Act).  All other opinions suggested an uncertainty surrounding interpretations, 
which most notably allowed developers and other stakeholders to not incorporate CTMs.  
Such uncertainty is also apparent considering CTSAs have been instructed not to state that 
there seems to be potential for prosecution, a factor which appears at odds with published 
guidance and other literature.  Veale (2009, p.291) asserted that existing legislation has been 
used to prosecute where advice had been received, yet was not acted on.  This has potential 
ramifications for all of the crowded places that have been assessed by CTSAs, as in the 
event of an attack, the assessments can be used as evidence, although it should be noted 
that legislation involves gross negligence.  The dichotomy between published advice and 
given advice is resulting in crowded places not being protected.   
“What it means is, if and when an attack does take place, then there‟ll be a lot more 
casualties than would have otherwise been the case” (I24. CTSA B) 
 
Insurance policies 
Lack of clarity is also evident in relation to insurance, with liability being of key concern in the 
event of an attack.  A link was also made between CTSA advice and liability, with one 
participant posing the following question:  
“…we know we‟re a target, but if we don‟t do anything, will the insurance companies 
still pay out?” (I18. Director, Construction Company) 
  
189 
 
Emanating from the results was the perspective that excesses would be reduced in the event 
of an attack, therefore creating an incentive for organisations to incorporate CTMs, especially 
if the excesses cost less than the incorporation of CTMs themselves.  As with the apparent 
lack of clarity regarding legislation, the same is evident in terms of insurance, with no 
perceived obligations resulting in the incorporation of CTMs being avoided. 
 
Organisational values and leadership 
“…there‟s a moral obligation if nothing else, but again, a moral obligation, what value 
do you put on it?” (I18. Director, Construction Company) 
With the perceived lack of clarity regarding legislation and insurance (and the exploitation of 
it), protection could occur as a result of the values and leadership of the organisation.  Duties 
of care are increasingly seen as integral parts of corporate social responsibility (British 
Council for Offices, 2009, p.141) and it could be argued that by engaging with wider areas 
and not just focussing on individual buildings, such efforts would justifiably contribute to such 
social responsibilities.   
 
7.2.1.2 Incentives 
“If you want to account for the value of architecture to companies, what you actually 
talk about is value to business” (Rouse, 2004, p.64) 
What are the benefits of incorporating CTMs, what are the incentives?.  Emphasis on 
incentives seems more apparent considering the lack of clarity regarding the aforementioned 
obligations.  Six over-arching incentives were evident in the literature, albeit not contained in 
one publication, and were concurred with and further informed through the results of the 
research, yet public knowledge of them appears sporadic.  This is especially apparent given 
the emphasis on avoiding obligations, as opposed to capitalising on incentives.  The 
incentives to protect crowded places, those being the reduced risk of attack, reduced impacts 
of an attack, competitive advantages, revenue generation, conducive agendas and possible 
insurance incentives, are summarised in Figure 7.5.  Evident are factors that provide 
substantial incentives for organisations to consider the use of and incorporate CTMs. 
 
Reduced risk of attack 
The intention of incorporating CTMs is to reduce the risk of an attack occurring, by reducing 
the attractiveness of the target and the opportunities to attack it (Fussey, 2011a, p.86). 
However, the reduction of risk could result in displacement; a consequence of all crime 
prevention strategies (Cozens et al., 2005, p.342).   
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Figure 7.5. The incentives to protect crowded places
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Yet, displacement might not occur, even if CTMs are incorporated, as the symbolism of a 
particular place and any promotion of its security (as highlighted in Figure 6.4) may result in 
its targeting regardless of any incorporated CTMs.  The results of the research highlighted 
that security professionals emphasised the visibility of CTMs, whereas those within design 
professions emphasised the importance of their inconspicuousness or „invisibility‟.  While it 
can be argued that „invisible‟ CTMs do not increase the risk of an attack, as hostile 
reconnaissance or „trained eyes‟ will be able to identify that vehicle-borne methods are not 
physically possible (if such CTMs were incorporated to this effect), the impact on user 
experience is relatively unknown.  Such perceptions of security and insecurity and how the 
incorporation of CTMs relates to user experience remain unclear and require further research. 
 
Reduced impacts of an attack 
Impacts in relation to damage and debris, business interruption and loss, health, and 
reputation were all evident in the literature.  Depending on the size of the organisation and 
the nature of an attack, the cost of just one of those factors could far outweigh the cost of 
incorporating CTMs, most notably when considering reputation, the importance of which was 
evident in both the literature and the results of the research.  Reputation can be damaged 
prior to an attack, due to inadequate security, as well as after an attack, based on the 
procedures and CTMs that were in place and how effective they were (British Council for 
Offices, 2009, p.141).  Although such instances are „very much in the minority‟, an example 
of a project was given whereby a company incorporated CTMs over fears of damage to their 
reputation (I24. CTSA B). 
 
Competitive advantages 
The literature suggests that competitive advantages are available to those who pre-empt 
regulatory change (Bosher et al., 2007a, p.172) and embrace hazard and threat mitigation 
(Bosher et al., 2009a, p.18); most evident here was the competitive advantage available 
through incorporating resilience: 
“Any company that can make sense of its environment, generate strategic options, 
and realign its resources faster than its rivals will enjoy a decisive advantage. This is 
the essence of resilience. And it will prove to be the ultimate competitive advantage in 
the age of turbulence” (Hamel and Valikangas, 2003, p.63) 
Whilst existing legislation is interpreted as encompassing the mitigation of terrorist attacks, 
meaning that such regulation needs to not be pre-empted, but recognised, the obtaining of 
competitive advantages was also evident in the results of the research.  During one interview, 
it was highlighted that a construction company had carried out research indicating that the 
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proposed project was at risk from terrorism and flooding, and therefore considered those 
risks in their proposals.  The company was successful in winning that bid, which was partially 
due to their identification of potential risks to the building that no other proposal had identified.  
Whilst this indicates that the incorporation of threat and hazard mitigation into buildings is not 
common practice, it also highlights the advantages of considering and, where deemed 
appropriate, incorporating such resiliency measures.  Developers and those involved in the 
design of crowded places could therefore expect greater success in the awarding of bids and 
increases in their reputation, which in turn will increase their revenues. 
 
Revenue generation 
Whilst the incorporation of CTMs (and other resiliency measures) can lead to increases in 
revenue for those who design vulnerable places, such benefits can also be obtained by those 
who occupy and/or own such places.  Whilst the literature highlighted that this can occur 
through congestion charging as a part of wide-scale traffic restriction (Coaffee, 2005, p.462) 
and through increased reputation and branding (HM Government, 2010c, p.34; Coaffee et 
al.,2009a, p.215; Coaffee and Van Ham, 2008, p.192), the results of the research highlighted 
that CTMs themselves can generate revenue and can lead to increased property values and 
the ability to charge higher rent (of benefit to those who lease or own such places).  
Advertising boards have the capacity to be structurally enhanced in order to provide HVM 
functions, resulting in the ability of CTMs to be able to generate long-term income streams.  
An example was also given of advertising being printed on ASF, providing another instance 
of the ability of CTMs to generate revenue.  Also evident in the results of the research was 
the increase in property and rental values of protected buildings, due to their increased 
security and reduced impact that would be incurred in the event of an attack or other 
damaging event.  This is a benefit to those who own and lease such places (as well as those 
who occupy them, as arguably they are at less risk of being disrupted and incurring damage), 
and such gains are also influenced by conducive agendas. 
 
Conducive agendas 
The conducive nature of pedestrianisation to counter-terrorism was evident in both the 
literature and in the results of the research.  The literature argued for a potential increase in 
footfall and revenues for local businesses, which was confirmed by the results of the 
research.  In areas where traffic exclusion and pedestrianisation had been enforced, footfall 
increased and revenues of businesses in those areas did increase, contrary to their 
perceptions prior to the traffic exclusions being incorporated.  Reductions in pollution and 
evident increases in safety were also cited, although a consequence of such measures is the 
displacement of traffic and the increased congestion in surrounding areas.  The exclusion of 
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traffic and resulting pedestrianisation can also act as a catalyst for the regeneration of areas.  
Literature highlighted that the incorporation of such an approach, in the long-term, will attract 
higher retail offer to the area and increase the footfall and revenue of businesses (RIBA, 
2010, p.16).  Such assertions were concurred with in the results of the research, as 
examples were given of similar projects, where the exclusion of traffic gradually resulted in 
regeneration and increased use of protected areas.  A ratio of expenditure and return on 
investment was given, in relation to the increased quality of areas that can result from such 
protection.  It was stated that for every £1 that was spent on enhancement that could be 
equated to a £5 increase in value (I25. Assistant Director, Local Authority).  Although 
somewhat anecdotal, the ratio is based on experience of numerous projects and offers some 
insight into the benefits that can arise when incorporating CTMs.  Further research is needed 
however, in order to provide objective and substantiated findings. 
Environmental enhancement was raised in the literature as being a means through which the 
incorporation of CTMs could be encouraged (Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, p.80).  Coaffee 
(2003c, p.79) and Marshall (2002, p.6) highlighted how excluding and restricting traffic from a 
given area can decrease pollution, a benefit that could result in a reduction in absence of 
users of such protected places due to the improved air quality.  Such enhancement was also 
evident in local planning considerations, where the incorporation of CTMs typically resulted in 
enhancements to areas, whether through environmental enhancement or simply by 
increasing the quality of the construction materials used (I25. Assistant Director, Local 
Authority).  For further information on other synergies between security and environmental 
issues, see Coaffee and Bosher (2008).  The need for a holistic approach to the design of 
vulnerable places was also evident in both the literature and the results of the research.  
Literature asserted that through adopting such an approach (as opposed to silo mentalities 
and the consideration of individual agendas), deterrence would be increased through having 
shown a higher level of consideration in relation to the protection of such an area (Little, 
2004a, p.56).  It was also highlighted how such an approach aids in ensuring resiliency 
measures do not compromise others (CPNI, 2011, p.14).  This research supports such 
statements; examples of numerous projects were given where by taking a holistic approach, 
significant cost savings were gained and benefits accrued through considering multiple 
agendas (see section 6.1.2.5 for further information on the aforementioned projects).  
Adopting such an approach would require greater stakeholder engagement, which is 
explored further in section 7.2.1.5. 
 
Insurance incentives 
“On the face of it, insurers would appear to be a logical way of encouraging security 
because, ideally, it should reward those who adopt protective measures by reducing 
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their insurance premiums to reflect the decreased risks… Unfortunately, the 
commercial insurance market does not follow this practice… However, it is worth 
noting that adopting additional security measures should reduce the likelihood of 
claims on policies and thus could reduce premiums in the long-term” (British Council 
for Offices, 2009, p.x) 
The reduction in premiums in the long-term and the reduction of excesses immediately after 
an event, where CTMs had been incorporated, was also evident in the results of the research.  
The incentivising of such practices, whilst an attractive proposition, is intrinsically linked to 
the perceived obligations under policies and potential liability issues that have been 
previously cited.  Such issues in relation to insurance therefore require greater clarity in order 
to further understanding and promote the possible benefits that can be gained from 
protecting crowded places.  Competitive advantages that can be gained through the 
incorporation of CTMs, resulting in insurance companies offering competitive premiums and 
policies, also incentivises the incorporate of such measures by businesses. 
 
7.2.1.3 Threat and risk assessments 
It was questioned in the literature review (section 3.4.3) that despite no supporting literature, 
the outcome of such an assessment could be to not protect, or to re-locate so as to not 
require protection.  The results of the research highlighted the importance of undertaking a 
TARA at the beginning of any project, due to the possibility of such implications, most notably 
influencing the consideration and selection of appropriate sites.  TARAs, as highlighted in the 
literature review and results of the research, also influence the value of CTMs in relation to 
four aspects, those being the assessments themselves, situational context, the terrorist 
threat, and proportionality.  Emanating from the participants were three clear issues on 
content, those being their inclusion of future scenarios, their inclusion of all affected 
stakeholders and their transparency.  The assessments themselves determine whether, and 
the extent to which, crowded places are protected, yet no one guidance document provides 
detailed guidance on their undertaking and attributes.  The transparency of TARAs carried 
out by CTSAs was raised, with participants being „told‟ what level of threat they faced without 
the reasoning being explained to them, which results in problems discussing such matters 
with clients and contractors. 
Situational context also influences TARAs, as the nature of the crowded places and 
occupiers influences the risk they face, as does existing or planned utilities and services, the 
topography of the built environment and the nature of surrounding buildings.  Such factors 
were evident in both the literature and the results of the research.  Most notable however, 
was what one participant termed „adjacency risk‟; denoting the risk buildings and businesses 
may face by being adjacent or near to potential targets.  This also relates to previous 
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discussions of buildings near protected places that incur more severe impacts of an attack 
due to the increased reflection of blast waves, resulting in an additional aspect in relation to 
„adjacency risk‟.  Also apparent is the importance of understanding the terrorist threat, 
particularly in relation to the specific threats that could be apparent at each crowded place.  
As stated by Veale (2009, p.292): 
“Understanding the terrorists‟ intentions and capabilities – what they might do and 
how they might do it – is crucial to assessing the threat” 
Assessing the intentions and/or capabilities incorrectly could result in under-engineered and 
vulnerable, or over-engineered and obtrusive CTMs and crowded places (Harre-Young et al., 
2010, p.1126), which could also undermine or nullify any value obtained through the use of 
CTMs themselves.  The vehicle-borne threat was raised as the one requiring the most 
consideration, due to the impacts that such attacks can have, yet there was evidence of 
changing perceptions, with examples of projects being given that are increasingly planning 
for Mumbai-style terrorist attacks (the use of firearms and hostage taking), with funding for 
HVM measures at one project being questioned and potentially diverted for use to prepare 
for such an attack.  Commenting on the CBRN threat, Littlewood and Simpson (2007, p.58) 
highlight the difficulty in accurately assessing such threats: 
“Difficult as it may be to admit, those outside the intelligence and counter-terrorism 
community or without access to such information are in many cases simply guessing” 
This places emphasis and importance on the need for and engagement with CTSAs and 
GSAs, as they have access to such information and will be able to offer advice on 
appropriate threats and on incorporating proportionate solutions.  Evident in the literature 
was a lack of guidance in relation to the assessment and incorporation of proportionality, with 
such absences also being raised by participants during the research itself, as was the need 
for experienced CTSAs.  An example of a project was highlighted where a CTSA had carried 
out an assessment of designs for a new city-centre office building, yet had argued that 
terrorists could use monster trucks to traverse steps and that ditches would be required to 
prevent such a method from being achievable.  Such an example highlights the influence 
CTSAs have on the perceptions and assessments of proportionality, and ultimately, the 
design of the built environment.  What is evident is a lack of literature on the assessment of 
proportionality.  Such a gap in knowledge contributes to the under-engineering and 
vulnerability, as well as the over-engineering and obtrusiveness, of crowded places (Harre-
Young et al., 2010, p.1126) and as a result, their influence on the value of CTMs can be 
significant.  Further research, debate and knowledge is required in order to provide a solution 
to these issues. 
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“Although many stakeholders apparently agree that these allocations should reflect 
the magnitude of risks to which different areas are exposed, no consensus has 
emerged on how this might be accomplished” (Willis et al., 2005, p.vii) 
 
7.2.1.4 Perceptions and moments of terrorism 
Section 3.4.4 presented a wealth of literature on the significance of perceptions of terrorism 
and how those perceptions are influenced by terrorist attacks.  As stated by Little (2008, p.3): 
“…there can be little question that current concerns about terrorism and the risk it 
poses to individuals or society are shaped as much by perception as by objective risk 
assessments” 
The most notable „influence‟ that was evident in the literature was the terrorist attacks in the 
USA of September 11th, 2001 and its wide-ranging implications and reactions.  Evident was 
how such influences acted as catalyst for the protection of crowded places.  Such effects 
were also evident in the results of the research, which concurred with the impetus given to 
those attacks and others, most notably the attacks on London‟s transport infrastructure in 
July 2007, as well as the attack on Glasgow Airport.  Whilst it was argued that such actions 
were partially as a result of „needing to be seen doing something‟, the fading of memories 
and ignorance towards the threat was also raised as an influence, with attacks bringing the 
threat of terrorism to the forefront of peoples‟ minds and increasing their perceptions of its 
severity, influencing whether vulnerable places were protected.  Such influences were stated 
by one participant (a Director of a construction company who was responsible for the security 
and counter-terrorism department), who highlighted that after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001 and July 7th 2005, the amount of requests they received for their 
products dramatically increased (I18. Director, Construction Company). 
 
7.2.1.5 Stakeholder understanding and engagement 
Whilst the potential for stakeholder understanding and engagement to influence whether 
crowded places were protected was not evident in the literature, but two related factors were 
made apparent through this research.  Firstly and in relation to engagement, it was raised 
that CTSAs and ALOs have been intentionally ignored and „left out‟ of the design process for 
some projects until the designs have been given approval and changes could not be 
incorporated (I24. CTSAs B and C).  This indicates that stakeholders are aware of the 
terrorist threat and the services that are available in relation to its mitigation, but also 
highlights the exploitation of the perceived absence of legislated requirements.  Secondly 
and in relation to understanding, it was raised that businesses that were adjacent to crowded 
places (whether they were crowded places themselves or not is irrelevant) would not 
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consider incorporating CTMs as they were not potential or likely targets of a terrorist attack.  
This highlights a lack of understanding regarding risk and the potential implications of a 
terrorist attack (or other incident that can result in an explosion); whereas neighbouring 
businesses may not be the intended target of an attack, their properties will more than likely 
suffer the implications of the blast and incur the impacts of an attack.  Efforts need to be 
made, therefore, in order to enhance the understanding of not just crowded places 
themselves, but businesses that surround such places, in order to ensure they take such 
matters into consideration. 
 
7.2.1.6 Economic influences 
Evident in the literature was the influence that economic downturn can have on the ability of 
organisations to incorporate CTMs, as well as the prioritisation of other agendas over the 
incorporation of such measures (HM Government, 2010a, p.21; Coaffee and Bosher, 2008, 
p.81; Mignone, 2007, p.5409; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005, p.141; Swanstrom, 2002, p.138; 
Carmichael and Gartell, 1994, p.9).  Such influences were also evident in the results of the 
research, which also highlighted examples of organisations who wanted to further their 
understanding of the terrorist threat through attendance at Project Argus events hosted by 
their local CTSAs, but couldn‟t due to not having adequate staff cover due to cut backs (I3. 
CTSA A).   
 
7.2.1.7 Local policy 
Counter-terrorism has become increasingly embedded into local policy, most notably through 
the incorporation of „rings of steel‟ in Northern Ireland and London and how such policies 
have transcended into the more permanent protection of crowded places in urban areas.  
Evident in the results of the research was the influence of local policy in relation to what 
CTMs are incorporated and how they align (or not) with different agendas that such 
authorities encourage.  As noted by one participant: 
“…putting buildings on the backs of footpaths, we have to put in this deep concrete 
wall, which was effectively a metre high and about 500mm deep, anchored back to 
the buildings and we‟re supposed to have a retail environment.  Now, you know, 
having this big bunker around the building is exactly counter to the other policies that 
City have, in terms of actually attracting high-quality retail” (I15. Director, 
Development Company) 
Examples were also given of different local authorities who preferred different traffic 
management approaches.  While the nature of the crowded place was notably a factor in 
such decisions (how much of a target they were perceived as being or how much influence 
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they had due to their size), varied preferences in relation to the protection of such places was 
evident. 
 
7.2.1.8 Building stock rotation 
The influence of building stock rotation was apparent in both the literature and the results of 
the research.  Due to the nature of such rotation (cited as being between 1-2% a year), the 
vast majority of terrorist targets therefore exist today and as noted by Ravetz (2008, p.4462), 
75% of buildings that will be present in 2050 already exist.  The aging of such places and 
their resulting increased vulnerability is also a factor that influences whether such places are 
protected, all of which highlights the longevity of ensuring the protection of such places not 
just from terrorism, but in relation to the mitigation of all hazards, threats, major accidents 
and applicable risks. 
 
7.2.2 Influences on the value of counter-terrorism measures 
Three influences on the value of CTMs are evident, those being TARAs, stakeholder 
understanding and engagement, and auditing.  Discussions on each of these influences will 
now be presented, drawing on the appropriate literature and results of the research.   
 
7.2.2.1 Stakeholder understanding and engagement 
The value of CTMs can also be influenced by stakeholder understanding and engagement, 
which encompasses the engagement between stakeholders themselves, their understanding 
of CTMs, vulnerable points in protection, training, testing and exercising, and understanding 
of risk. 
 
Stakeholder engagement 
The literature review highlighted that whilst there is a definitive role for those who design, 
construct and operate the built environment to protect vulnerable infrastructure from a range 
of hazards, threats and major accidents, professional fragmentation is a „hallmark‟ of the 
construction industry itself (Bosher and Dainty, 2010, p.6) and that where stakeholders do 
not engage and interact, crowded places could be under-engineered and vulnerable, or over-
engineered and obtrusive, if they are protected at all.  The results of the research highlighted 
that stakeholders will always be at odds with each other, due to their different requirements 
and wishes, which puts an impetus on requirements to engage and share information at the 
earliest opportunity, as participants raised that design decisions occurring later on in projects 
can have major implications (see section 7.3.1 for further information on the importance of 
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the design stage).  Most notably, interactions with the end-users of the projects was raised, a 
factor which as previously highlighted, is somewhat lacking in relation to counter-terrorism 
and perceptions of security and insecurity.  Proving the benefits of protecting crowded places 
would incentivise stakeholders changing their working practices and engagement with one 
another, but current perceptions of such benefits are relatively unknown, with one participant 
stating that trying to highlight such benefits was like being „a voice in the wilderness‟ (I11. 
Director, Construction Company).  The findings of this research, therefore, could aid in 
evidencing the benefits of protecting crowded places and provide incentives for those who 
design, construct and operate the built environment to interact more effectively.  However, 
such interaction is currently not occurring.  As highlighted in section 3.5.1.1, Glass (2008, 
p.180) highlights that a potential solution to such issues is through the use of charette-type 
meetings, where architects could invite relevant stakeholders (such as security experts) to 
work through ideas and potential solution in order to enhance the quality of the design being 
produced, as well as enhance their own learning and understanding about designing in such 
measures.  Arguably, such an approach would facilitate the relatively expedient identification 
of potential solutions, their performance and their consequences. 
 
Understanding of CTMs 
How understanding of CTMs influences the value of CTMs was evident in the literature 
review, with gaps in understanding of what CTMs are available and associations with those 
methods, and the ability of „lesser‟ crime prevention measures to double-up as CTMs.  
Guidance does not exist on the CTMs that can be used to protect crowded places, which is 
arguably exacerbating current perceptions of „target hardening‟ and „fortress mentalities‟.  
The results of the research highlighted that knowledge of what CTMs were available was 
lacking, as was information on their performance and requirements, and consequences of 
attempting to reproduce CTMs.  Participants questioned what else could be done except 
incorporate bollards, whereas others recognised that there were numerous ways to „secure a 
building‟.  Examples were also given of businesses who tried to reproduce CTMs in order to 
save money.  In the instances given, the reproduced CTMs were not fit-for-purpose and 
resulted in their removal and replacement with appropriate CTMs, costing more money than 
would have otherwise been spent if the recommended CTMs had originally been 
incorporated.  Understanding of CTMs therefore influences the value of CTMs themselves in 
a number of ways, issues that will be resolved through the identification of the potential 
requirements, performance and consequences. 
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Vulnerable points in protection 
“There is also a danger that we place misguided trust in technology to deliver security, 
forgetting that technological „kit‟ is only as effective as the socio-technical systems it 
is employed within, and the humans operating it” (Briggs, 2005, p.24) 
Such notions (whilst having broader meaning than solely counter-terrorism) were evident in 
the results of the research, as well as the literature, with participants emphasising having 
greater faith in „passive‟ CTMs than in „active‟ ones.  VSBs left in open positions, CCTV 
cameras being left in positions that facilitate „blind spots‟ that can be exploited and the 
insecure protection of supporting infrastructure were all cited examples of the inherent 
vulnerability in „active‟ CTMs.  Also, the design of places themselves was raised, with 
examples of buildings surrounded by VSBs, enforcing stand-off distances, yet at the rear of 
buildings were plastic barriers that could easily be penetrated, so a VBIED could get 
underneath the building and undermine the value of the CTMs themselves. 
 
Training, testing and exercising 
“Too many plans are based around what the company would like to happen in a crisis 
rather than what might happen…On paper the plans may appear to work fine. 
However, the real test would be in a crisis situation. During a real crisis is not the time 
to be testing procedures for the first time” (Curtin et al., 2005, p.155) 
Such an emphasis on training, testing and exercising was also apparent in the results of the 
research.  Occupiers and business owners would need to evaluate the potential implications 
of not testing their procedures and the costs and other implications that would occur as a 
result of their untested procedures, against the time and disruption that would be incurred as 
a result of running such exercises.  The influence of such planning can detrimentally impact 
preparedness for and responses to a terrorist attack, as well as a range of other scenarios 
that can result in the evacuation or invacuation of users, which again can undermine the 
value of other CTMs that have been incorporated. 
 
Understanding of risk 
The importance of understanding that risk can only be mitigated and not eliminated was 
raised in the results of the research with binary perceptions (i.e. it will either happen, or it 
won‟t; it is either secure, or it isn‟t) being questioned, and the importance of aiding 
organisations in accepting and taking risks being of importance.  Attempting to eliminate risks, 
which in relation to counter-terrorism would be attempted through the incorporation of overly 
robust and obtrusive CTMs, results in a disproportionate solution.  As has been previously 
highlighted, understanding of risk was also evident in relation to potentially being impacted 
  
201 
 
by a terrorist attack, regardless of whether such places were targets or not, and that by 
protecting buildings, damage to neighbouring properties can be increased due to the 
increased reflection of blast waves.  Although such a factor incentivises the protection of 
wider areas (which has its own benefits in terms of traffic exclusion and pedestrianisation), it 
indicates a greater understanding of the risks involved in relation to terrorist attacks and the 
protection of crowded places. 
 
7.2.2.2 Auditing 
Evident from the results of the research was the importance of auditing and how the process 
can influence the value of CTMs themselves and the protection of crowded places.  Whilst 
only raised by one participant, its importance was made clear by the participant who gave 
examples of projects where millions of pounds worth of glazing had failed because it was the 
wrong type, which would have failed badly in the event of an attack and which had to be 
replaced at additional cost.  If auditing of the protection of crowded places is not undertaken, 
not only can inappropriate CTMs be incorporated that will have to be removed and replaced 
(at a cost), but in the event of an attack, the CTMs themselves would fail and in some 
instances therefore, exacerbate the impacts of an attack.  Auditing, therefore, can have 
significant influences on the value of CTMs themselves and the protection of crowded places.  
Considering such influences are not apparent in the literature and were only raised by one 
participant, greater awareness of the process seems vital. 
 
7.3 Two Pertinent Design Considerations 
Throughout the literature review and the results of the research, two design considerations 
are consistently evident, those being designing-in versus retro-fitting CTMs, and sufficient 
versus insufficient stand-off.  Literature and several participants asserted that designing-in 
CTMs is cheaper, retro-fitted CTMs are less effective, and incorporating sufficient stand-off is 
the most effective CTM, evidenced arguments have not been forthcoming.  It is the aim of 
this section, therefore, to explore these design considerations, utilising the scenario-based 
research instrument where appropriate, to provide an evidence-based account of the relative 
performance and consequences of the different approaches. 
 
7.3.1 Designing-in and retro-fitting 
“Designing-in such measures at the pre-construction phase is vital, as retrofitting will 
be much more costly and reduce the effectiveness of the measures” (Coaffee, 2008b, 
p.4637) 
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Such a perspective is evident in a number of other works (RIBA, 2010, p.3; Forman et al., 
2009, p.257; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.86; Thompson and McCarthy, 2004, p.213).  
Yet whilst the perspective is evident, it is not evidenced.  However, Thompson and McCarthy 
(2004, p.213) offer more of an insight into the reasons as to why the stage in which 
incorporation of CTMs matters: 
“The importance of planning ahead cannot be overemphasized – entire building 
systems, site planning, floor layouts, room sizes, adjacencies, construction materials, 
and project schedules may be impacted by security design decisions. In new 
construction or major renovation projects, architectural solutions are often the most 
cost effective”. 
This insight offers potential implications, yet a systematic and evidenced account of how the 
design stage influences the design process itself, the requirements of the CTMs and the 
performance of the CTMs, is not offered.  It is these factors that will now be explored through 
the use of the scenario-based research instrument.  The scenario utilises the same plot that 
was used during the research, and is based on the occupiers of an office block (that is 
positioned in the aforementioned plot) requiring protection for their premises.  The plot, as is 
evident in Figure 7.6, is a dense, city-centre environment, which rules out traffic exclusion 
solutions due to their impracticality considering the surrounding infrastructure.   
 
Figure 7.6. The location of the office block in the scenario 
The scenario encompasses the occupier requesting HVM measures to be incorporated, 
reducing the vehicle-borne threat and the impacts of an attack should one occur, or any 
damage from a nearby attack. 
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7.3.1.1 A retro-fit scenario 
As previously mentioned, HVM measures were requested.  In order to prohibit vehicles from 
being able to park alongside or penetrate the building itself, passive bollards and street 
furniture were chosen to line the two sides of the building running parallel to roads (as 
evident in Figure 7.6) and active bollards were chosen to be located at each of the four 
entrances to the pedestrianised area surrounding the other two sides of the building.  
Although bollards already existed, they were not sufficiently robust to perform the 
requirements now that vehicle-borne threats were being considered.  This resulted in the 
original bollards being removed and were replaced with the new, appropriate bollards.  
Existing utilities and services also had to be diverted, in order to install the foundations for 
the passive bollards and the infrastructure required to operate the systems for the active 
bollards.  Where utilities could not be diverted, the robustness of the passive bollards had to 
be increased, due to the inability to obtain the required foundations. 
 
7.3.1.2 A designing-in scenario 
When considering the same specifications, but being designed-in prior to the construction of 
the building, there are less inherent implications.  Firstly, the replacement of any existing 
street elements with CTMs is not required, reducing time requirements on contractors, costs, 
and disruption to the users of the building and the public.  Secondly, the diversion of existing 
utilities is also no longer required, as the incorporated CTMs and utilities are designed 
around one another, which again reduces time requirements of contractors, costs, and 
disruption.  Thirdly, more robust (and potentially obtrusive) CTMs are avoided through the 
removal of the need to locate them on top of utilities, reducing the cost of the CTMs 
themselves.  Designing-in CTMs therefore has significant advantages when compared to 
retro-fitting such measures, through reductions in time and costs, as well as disruption to 
building occupants and neighbouring premises.  However, the design stage does not solely 
influence the time, cost and disruption considerations, but also the feasibility of CTMs that 
can be used.  Taking protective construction as an example, if laminated glazing (and the 
required frames and fixings) were being considered, retro-fitting such CTMs would be 
unfeasible, due to the need to replace all the existing frames and fixings, which may not be 
possible in some buildings.  It therefore forces less effective CTMs to be incorporated, 
increasing vulnerability to an attack.  Designing-in CTMs can therefore have a number of 
advantages over retro-fitting such measures, through reductions in the time, cost and 
disruption implications of: 
 stakeholder engagement and deciding on appropriate courses of action; 
 removal, making safe, and replacement of existing street elements or inappropriate 
CTMs with the required, fit-for-purpose CTMs; 
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 diversion of existing utilities; 
 robustness (and potential obtrusiveness) of CTMs; and 
 nullifying restrictions in relation to the feasibility of incorporating CTMs that could be 
used. 
Based on guiding principles that they have been given, CTSAs assert that retro-fitting is ten 
times more expensive than designing-in CTMs (I22. CTSA A).  However, it is not possible 
here to make evidenced judgements on the scale of time, cost and disruption implications 
that are inherent in retro-fit situations, informed and evidenced judgement as to whether such 
assertions are accurate is not possible.  Rather, the highlighted implications verify the 
assertions that retro-fitting CTMs will be more costly and, in certain situations, less effective, 
as suggested in literature (RIBA, 2010, p.3; Forman et al., 2009, p.257; British Council for 
Offices, 2009, p.86; Coaffee, 2008b, p.4637; Thompson and McCarthy, 2004, p.213).  The 
highlighted implications should be considered as indicating the scale of the challenges 
involved in retro-fitting CTMs and be used as benchmarks from which to work out cost 
estimations on a case-by-case basis. 
 
7.3.2 Sufficient and insufficient stand-off 
Evident in the literature and the results of the research (most notably from non-security 
professionals) were associations with stand-off being external, whereas internal stand-off 
distances can also be incorporated, in order to protect vulnerable assets within the building 
itself.  Elliott et al. (1992, p.296) assert that there are, therefore, two phases of stand-off: 
“First, it is accomplished by a physical barrier, such as a ditch, a low concrete wall or 
bollards, that prevents vehicles driving close to a target…Second, stand-off is 
accomplished by rearranging the inside of a building so that valuable assets are as 
remote as possible from the greatest threat” 
Considerable emphasis is placed on the importance of stand-off, due to the extent of 
damage that a blast can have on a building (CPNI, 2011, p.8; Tomlinson and Nelson, 2010, 
p.56), although there is recognition that in locations such as city-centres, high value land can 
render its incorporation impossible or unrealistic (Bosher and Kappia, 2010, p.1145; Mays 
and Hadden, 2009, p.12).  Where sufficient stand-off can be incorporated, the extent to 
which protective construction measures are required decreases (CPNI, 2011, p.20; HM 
Government, 2010b, p.7; Lavy and Dixit, 2010, p.545; British Council for Offices, 2009, p.162; 
Forman et al., 2009, p.254).  As expressed by one participant: 
“…the closer the stand-off distance is, the stronger the building has to be” (I6. Urban 
Designer, Local Authority) 
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Evident in the literature and the results of the research was the specification of such 
„sufficient‟ stand-off being 30m, when considering a VBIED in the form of a car.  The „30m 
rule‟ exists due to analysis of blast dissipation, but should not be solely relied upon, as the 
situational context of each building varies, influencing blast dynamics and requiring 
subjective assessments at each site to determine the required distances.  Whilst Forman et 
al. (2009, p.12) purport that the cost of protective construction measures due to insufficient 
stand-off could be greater than incorporating HVM measures, the implications of 
incorporating such distances (and the feasibility of doing so in dense, urban settings), is 
unclear.  Scenario-based discussion will therefore explore the incorporation of sufficient and 
insufficient stand-off. 
 
7.3.2.1 Sufficient stand-off 
30m of stand-off is mapped on to the scenario-based research instrument in Figure 7.7.  Its 
enforcement through traffic exclusion (or restriction) requires the use of numerous VSBs and 
traffic calming measures, as shown in Figure 7.8.  The benefits of incorporating such stand-
off to the occupier of the main building are in not having to expend 4-15% of building costs 
on protective construction measures (depending on the extent of glazing within the building; 
figures based on interview data), but the consequences are profound.   
 
 
Figure 7.7. Sufficient stand-off mapped on to the scenario 
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Figure 7.8. Required VSBs and traffic calming in order to enforce sufficient stand-off 
The benefits of incorporating such an approach would also encompass the benefits that have 
been cited for traffic exclusion and pedestrianisation, most notably the increase in footfall and 
revenues of businesses, as well as the reductions in pollution.  The consequences, however, 
would be disruption to traffic on the surrounding roads, due to the traffic calming measures 
that would be required, as well as the increased congestion as a result of the exclusion zone.  
If traffic calming measures weren‟t used, the requirements of the VSBs to withstand greater 
impact would potentially result in their increased cost and obtrusiveness.  The cost of 
incorporating such an approach may be minimal compared to potentially 15% of a building‟s 
cost that would have to be spent in order to incorporate protective construction measures, 
but the spatial implications of such an approach would require reconciliation with the affected 
stakeholders and the inherent consequences of such an approach.  As noted by one 
participant however, in relation to the means by which sufficient stand-off could be 
incorporated: 
“…the only way you‟re going to do it is to pedestrianise places” (I21. Technical 
Director, Construction Company) 
 
7.3.2.2 Insufficient stand-off 
If insufficient stand-off was available (or the means through which sufficient stand-off could 
be incorporated were denied), the impetus is then placed on protective construction as 
opposed to HVM.  Whilst VSBs could be used to enforce some form of stand-off, as „every 
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metre counts‟ (CPNI, 2011, p.9), protective construction would be required to enhance the 
robustness of the building and protect the glazing.  Such enhancements were stated as 
costing between 4-15%, dependent on the extent of glazing used (I17. Technical Director, 
Construction Company).  Intrinsically linked to this scenario is the influence of the design 
stage in which such protection is being considered, as there are cost implications as well as 
restrictions in terms of what is feasible and what is not.  If it was a designing-in scenario, 
laminated glazing could be incorporated, significantly reducing the impact of a blast and 
providing some environmental benefits in terms of UV ray reduction.  If it was a retro-fit 
scenario, ASF could be applied to the existing glazing (and anchored within the frames if 
required, also dependent on the robustness of the frames and fixings due to the increased 
weight of the glazing).  Internal partitions could also be incorporated or enhanced in order to 
protect users of the building, as could the relocation or reorganisation of offices, moving 
relatively redundant or less used offices towards the more vulnerable areas (i.e. those facing 
the roads).  A secondary layer of glazing could also be incorporated, providing a „sacrificial 
layer‟ of protection for users.  Some of the aforementioned CTMs could be incorporated at no 
additional cost, but the impacts of blasts are entirely contingent on context, therefore 
subjective assessments of the damages (and their costs) are required on a case-by-case 
basis to identify cost-effective solutions.   
The relationship between HVM and protective construction is clear; stand-off.  Incorporating 
sufficient stand-off has inherent benefits for the occupiers of protected buildings, with cost 
savings being accrued through not having to incorporate protective construction measures.  
Benefits resulting from traffic exclusion, pedestrianisation and regeneration would also be 
accrued, however the consequences are profound, as was demonstrated in Figure 7.8.  
Where such stand-off is not feasible, or allowed, CTMs can be incorporated at no additional 
cost that provide cost-effective solutions to reducing the impacts of an attack.  A negative 
consequence, however, could be the impact of sacrificial design and office relocation on 
productivity and user experience, which require further research.  Only the subjective 
assessment of the impacts of an attack will determine the cost implications inherent in 
incorporating HVM measures to enforce external stand-off, and/or protective construction 
measures to incorporate internal stand-off.  With the prominence of dense, urban settings 
evident today, the use of both will arguably provide the most cost-effective solution, 
especially considering the relatively low likelihood of an attack occurring. 
 
7.4 Four Prominent Agendas 
Throughout the literature review and the results of the research, four agendas have been 
consistently prominent, due to perceptions of them being at odds with counter-terrorism, or 
simply as a result of their importance in the design of crowded places.  Those agendas are 
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cost and return on investment, un-impinged design and permeability, user experience, and 
environmental and energy concerns.  Each of these will now be explored, analysing their 
prominence and ascertaining the extent to which the protection of crowded places can 
contribute to or reconcile each one. 
 
7.4.1 Cost and return on investment 
The cost of incorporating CTMs has been seen as a key issue in relation to their 
incorporation (Andrew, 2009, p.695; Coaffee, 2008a, p.300; Little, 2004a, p.55).  Yet, as 
highlighted by Little (2004, p.55), there is a paucity of data to support a convincing 
calculation of the costs and benefits of such measures and the issue remains evident to this 
day.  There have been sporadic statements of potential costs of specific CTMs (see 
Crawford‟s (1995a) account of ASF, BBNC and protected spaces costing between 0-5% of 
building costs) and of cost-benefit analyses in relation to crime (Armitage, 2000) and natural 
hazards (Multihazard Mitigation Council, 2005), whereas others have offered insights into 
how costs can potentially vary.  Forman et al. (2009, p.254) and Marshall (2002, p.9) have 
both raised how costs can vary depending on the design stage in which the CTMs are being 
incorporated (see section 7.3.1).  Whilst the research has been unable to provide specific 
data in relation to the costs of CTMs (most notably due to participants stating that they felt 
this was not realistically achievable and would not be accurate), the research has presented 
a typology of CTMs that can be used to protect crowded places, as well as their relative 
performance and consequences.  CTMs that can significantly reduce the risk to the health 
and safety of users of crowded places can be incorporated at no additional cost, through the 
organisation of the space plan of a building and by utilising existing assets and arrangements 
to fulfil counter-terrorism purposes, such as evacuation planning.  Cherry et al. (2008, p.88) 
stated that: 
“Because terrorist attacks are relatively rare and design elements to deter terrorism 
are very expensive, these design elements must serve multiple purposes in order to 
be justified” 
This research has highlighted that CTMs can be incorporated at no additional cost, but it has 
also shown that no single CTM explicitly benefits counter-terrorism and so such justification, 
as alluded to above, seems relevant.  The incorporation of HVM measures can generate 
revenue and the exclusion of traffic can increase footfall and revenues for businesses, as 
well as catalyse the regeneration of areas.  Protective construction mitigates the impact of a 
range of hazards, threats and major accidents and the protection of glazing can reduce 
energy costs.  Planning, detection and procedures can facilitate the identification of hostile 
reconnaissance and interrupting of plots before attacks are carried out, the training for which 
is provided for free by CTSAs.  Some cost data has been forthcoming, most notably the 4-15% 
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of building costs required to incorporate protective construction measures (dependent on the 
level of glazing and stand-off distances incorporated), and returns on investment are 
achievable.  What has been presented are the inherent requirements, performance and 
consequences of CTMs that can be used to protect crowded places, as well as influences 
that can contribute to or nullify the value of CTMs themselves, all of which influence required 
costs and their resulting returns on investment.  What has been presented therefore aids 
those tasked with the protection of such places to understand the influences on the 
protection of crowded places and on the value of CTMs, as well as the performance and 
consequences of the measures themselves, so that they can make informed decisions in 
relation to the subjective and individual context that each will face. 
 
7.4.2 Un-impinged design and permeability 
Evident in the literature was a plethora of work focussing on the symbolism and physical 
appearance of CTMs, with connotations of target hardening, architecture of fear, and the 
militarisation of public places and spaces.  Such connotations of counter-terrorism therefore 
seem in direct contrast to un-impinged design and permeability.  However, whilst the 
literature purported to the militarisation of such places and spaces, the demise of 
iconography, the decentralisation of places, increased fear, reductions in civil liberties and 
the increase in security zones, the research provides evidence to the contrary.  During an 
interview with an architect, they stated that their ultimate goal when incorporating CTMs is to 
make the place or space look like it would have otherwise looked, yet still meet the security 
requirements (I8. Architect).  This is the essence of un-impinged design and permeability and 
its achievement whilst incorporating CTMs is possible.  Street furniture can be structurally 
enhanced to provide HVM functions and yet appear unprotected.  Landscaping and nature 
can be used too, again providing HVM functions, replacing the bollards and planters to 
provide more aesthetically pleasing and „environmentally friendly‟ CTMs.  Protective 
construction can result in buildings being structurally enhanced and robust, mitigating the 
impacts of hazards, threats and major accidents whilst appearing indifferent; protection in 
stark contrast to perspectives of „architecture of fear‟ and „target hardening‟.  Where 
connotations of such hardening are apparent, most notably through the protection of glazing, 
again, glazing can appear unprotected, yet be able to mitigate the impact of a blast.  A 
negative consequence of incorporating such „invisible‟ CTMs, however, is evident in both the 
literature and the results of the research.  Literature purports to the use of such measures 
resulting in users of protected places feeling vulnerable to attack (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.499; 
Zilbershtein, 2005, p.812), yet Guidry (2007, p.69) highlights that it would alleviate such fears 
and enhance the quality of the area.  As raised by one participant: 
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“Half the value of a camera is knowing the camera‟s there…if you don‟t make it 
foreboding enough, then maybe you‟re actually encouraging threats” (I7. Associate 
Director, Design Consultancy) 
The design of crowded places can appear to be un-impinged and facilitate permeability, yet 
concerns regarding perceptions of security and insecurity remain and directly relate to user 
experience. 
 
7.4.3 User experience 
“When we consider the architectural environment as a caterer for the physical and 
physiological comfort of its users, issues as image and functioning of a facility 
become very relevant” (Zilbershtein, 2005, p.809) 
As highlighted by Coaffee et al. (2008, p.104), however, academic work fails to address 
these issues.  The literature review highlighted that further research was needed into the use 
of visible and invisible CTMs and how they influenced perceptions of the places where they 
were incorporated, as well as comparisons against unprotected sites.  This was an issue 
informed by the results of the research, in which participants believed that visible CTMs lead 
to a perception of protection, yet the use of invisible measures would result in a perception of 
vulnerability and the attraction of an attack.  Whereas such data provides an insight into the 
perspectives and inclinations of those who design and construct crowded places, specific 
data from end-users is lacking in the literature and this research.  As suggested by Richards 
(2011, p.192), it is difficult to know which CTMs reassure the public and users of such places, 
and what CTMs cause greater anxiety.  As discussed in the previous section, CTMs can be 
incorporated that do not appear to impinge on the design and permeability of crowded places, 
and should not increase the vulnerability to attack due to hostile reconnaissance and „trained 
eyes‟ being able to identify that it is physically not possible to attack such places, yet how 
such measures influence the perceptions of those who use the places is unknown.  It is not 
known whether visitors to crowded places are aware of CTMs and are therefore consciously 
aware of feelings in relation to protection or vulnerability, and neither is it known how staff in 
such places, especially previously targeted crowded places, perceive protection and the use 
of such measures.  A pertinent recommendation, therefore, is for future research to address 
these issues, as such findings will influence the value of CTMs themselves and therefore 
influence whether crowded places are protected, and/or by what means. 
 
7.4.4 Environmental and energy concerns 
“In future decades it is most likely that the sustainability agenda will provide the most 
appropriate policy vehicle for the achievement of resilience, with security seen as an 
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essential element of corporate and organisational responsibility alongside economic, 
environmental and social concerns” (Coaffee, 2008b, p.4636) 
Such environmental concerns were evident in the literature review (see section 3.3.2).  A 
move towards a „turquoise agenda‟ was explored, in which the merging of security and 
sustainability inherently results in the achievement of resilience.  How the protection of 
crowded places and CTMs themselves can contribute to such agendas has also been made 
evident through this research.  In terms of environmental benefits resulting from CTMs 
themselves, reductions in noise and air pollution are evident where traffic is excluded and 
restricted from areas, the protection of glazing can reduce energy consumption, and the 
incorporation of landscaping and nature can encourage biodiversity and „green spaces‟, with 
the latter also being achievable through traffic exclusion also.  The protection of crowded 
places can therefore positively contribute to environmental and energy concerns, proving that 
there are inherent synergies between the agendas.  In relation to the broader resilience of 
such places and of organisations, the research contributes to the three-generation definition 
of resilience that was presented in the literature review (section 2.2.3).  The definition of 
resilience purported that: 
 First Generation resilience is concerned with the ability of systems to absorb shocks 
and to return quickly into operation 
 Second Generation resilience relates primarily to community resilience and the 
recognition of social and psychological dimensions 
 Third Generation resilience involves anticipation, as well as recognising that the 
system is often better off not „bouncing back‟ to its original state (IPPR, 2009, p.73) 
The research has highlighted that in terms of first-generation resilience, the incorporation of 
CTMs can aid organisations, built assets and urban areas to absorb shock and return to 
operation quickly, through the mitigation of the impacts of an attack and resulting reductions 
in damage, and more expedient responses and recovery (through such means as business 
continuity planning).  In relation to second-generation resilience, findings have highlighted 
that greater research into the psychological dimensions of resilience are required, although 
significant benefits can be gained from protecting wider areas.  Also evident through the 
research is the benefits of anticipation and pro-activity, most notably through the 
incorporation of CTMs prior to an attack and as a means of accruing the benefits of doing so 
in relation to the incentives of protecting crowded places.  The research highlights that the 
relative performance and consequences of CTMs provide indications as to what can be 
expected when incorporating elements of resilience into crowded places and organisations, 
as terrorist attacks are one type of „shock‟, many more pose risks to the built environment 
and require consideration and mitigation. 
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7.4.5 A reconciled design? 
Having identified the aforementioned agendas, and analysing the extent to which this 
research contributes to their understanding in relation to CTMs, it could be questioned 
whether a design is achievable that reconciles those four agendas.  When considering cost 
and return on investment there are two inherent issues; incorporating CTMs at no cost, and 
incorporating CTMs that provide a return on investment (albeit at a cost to implement them).  
Section 7.1.2.4 highlighted that the space plan of a building can be organised so as to 
reduce the impacts of a blast, and that a range of planning arrangements that are typically 
already used in businesses can be modified to incorporate counter-terrorism arrangements.  
Modifying the space plan of a building impinges on the design and permeability and on user 
experience of a building, and therefore conflicts with two of the identified agendas.  Obtaining 
a return on investment, which is achievable through the use of advertising boards as VSBs 
and excluding traffic from a wider area (resulting in pedestrianisation, regeneration and 
increased property and area values in the long-term) also conflicts with design and 
permeability, and therefore the user experience as well. 
Ensuring design and permeability appear/are un-impinged can be achieved through the use 
of laminated glazing in terms of protective construction, and the use of VSBs in the form of 
landscaping and nature, as well as street furniture.  Depending on the VSBs used, the user 
experience would at least be un-impinged (although arguably it could be enhanced if 
landscaping and nature are used to improve the quality and amenity of the area), and 
environmental issues could be contributed to.  Those CTMs, however, have cost implications 
and could only potentially provide a return on investment if the increased quality of the area 
(as opposed to the quality that would be gauged if SEBs had been incorporated) was seen 
as worthy of such increased property and area values.  Linked to the design and permeability 
of buildings and areas is user experience, which as highlighted in section 7.4.3, is uncertain 
in relation to the impact of CTMs on users of visibly or invisibly protected, as well as un-
protected, crowded places; further research is required on this issue in order to ascertain the 
extent to which user experience is affected by CTMs, which will in turn create the ability to 
discuss the implications of the range of CTMs available in relation to this.  Environmental and 
energy issues can be positively contributed to through the use of glazing that reduces energy 
costs and the incorporation of traffic exclusion or restriction, which will reduce noise and air 
pollution, soiling of buildings and accidents involving pedestrians.  The CTMs required to fulfil 
these concerns, however, have cost implications and therefore conflict with the cost agenda, 
but do provide a return on investment in the form of reduced energy consumption and the 
increases in property and area values as evident through the exclusion of traffic.   
Whilst a design is achievable in which CTMs can be incorporated at no cost (the space plan 
of a building) and provide a return on investment (the use of advertising boards, and the 
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exclusion of traffic resulting in increased property and area values), these impact the design 
and permeability, as well as the user experience, of a building and area.  However, the 
incorporation of pedestrianisation was proven to increase footfall for businesses within the 
protected areas, due to the increased comfort and safety of pedestrians (which provides an 
insight into the findings of investigations into the experience of those using crowded places).  
Environmental and energy concerns could be contributed to by reductions in pollution and 
building soiling, as well as increased safety of users, whilst glazing could reduce energy 
consumption.  Figure 7.8 shows how such a design would be achieved.  Evident in the 
Figure is the disruption to the permeability of the area outside of the protected „zone‟; whilst 
reconciling the agendas as much as possible, significant implications are inherent for those 
outside the exclusion.  Therefore, a reconciled design based on the four prominent agendas 
is not achievable; the extent to which any reconciliation could be achieved is dependent on 
the values of those involved in the design or retro-fitting of crowded places, which will inform 
the trade-offs made to incorporate CTMs that vary in terms of cost and return on investment, 
un-impinged design and permeability, user experience, and environmental and energy 
concerns. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The relative performance and consequences of CTMs used to protect crowded places show 
that no single CTM explicitly mitigates the impact of a terrorist attack; additional benefits are 
inherent in every measure that has been identified and analysed during this research.  The 
notions of single-purpose products and the protection of vulnerable places only being 
achieved through „target hardening‟ have been proven to be misleading.  The benefits of 
HVM includes the increased safety and comfort of pedestrian users of spaces, the removal of 
the need to modify the design and structure of a building, the increased footfall and revenue 
for protected businesses, the ability of CTMs to generate revenue, as well as the 
environmental benefits in terms of reduced pollution.  Anecdotal evidence even asserts the 
ratio that for every £1 spent on HVM and street enhancement, increases in value of £5 can 
be gained.  However, the implications of such CTMs includes the displacement of traffic and 
increased congestion in areas surrounding traffic exclusion and restriction.  The benefits of 
protective construction includes the robustness of buildings to the impacts of a range of 
hazards, threats and major accidents, as well as reductions in energy costs.  Protective 
construction measures can also be incorporated at no additional cost, although others can 
result in 4-15% of building costs being spent, and impacts of sacrificial design and the 
specific organisation of space plans require further attention.  The benefits of planning, 
detection and procedures includes the resilience of businesses to a plethora of potential 
disruptions and challenges, as well as the free training of staff to enhance their skills and 
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awareness of a range of security threats, which can even interrupt plots prior to their 
manifestation into attacks.  Encompassed CTMs typically already exist in organisations and 
therefore provide additional incentives for their use. 
The benefits and implications of the CTMs that have been identified are somewhat objective; 
determined positive and negative consequences of a specific set of decisions.  Their 
perceived value will depend on the values of those involved in the decision-making 
processes and the context in which the crowded place is being designed or retro-fitted.  It is 
the subjective assessment of the relative performance and consequences of the CTMs that 
will aid in the reconciliation of differing perspectives and agendas.  The incorporation of 
CTMs can lead to revenue generation and returns on investments, can incorporate un-
impinged design and permeability, enhance the aesthetics and functions of an area, and 
positively contribute to environmental and energy concerns.  However, this research has also 
shown that a number of influences determine whether crowded places are even protected, 
before consideration of CTMs has begun.  Influences on the value of the CTMs themselves 
are also apparent, with TARAs, stakeholder understanding and engagement, and auditing 
having the potential to nullify any benefits that have been accrued through the incorporation 
of CTMs. 
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8.0 Conclusions of the Research 
In fulfilment of the aim and objectives of the research, this chapter presents the conclusions 
of the research, highlighting its key findings and contribution to knowledge, with the validity 
and reliability of the research itself also being examined.  Recommendations for further 
research and practical recommendations will then be presented, followed by a final thought 
that emanates from the research. 
 
8.1 Fulfilment of the Aim and Objectives of the Research 
The aim of the research was to examine the relative performance and consequences of 
protecting crowded places from VBIEDs (as presented in section 1.2.1), which was to be 
achieved through the fulfilment of five objectives, each of which will now be explored. 
 
8.1.1 Objective one 
Objective one of the research was to “examine current research on protecting key 
components of the built environment from terrorism and on the emergence of the terrorist 
threat”.  Chapters Two, Three and Four examined such literature, most notably identifying 
the emergence and evolution of the threat that is faced from terrorism, and the means 
through which the built environment is protected from it.  Analysis of the literature highlighted 
that the crowded places are at particular threat from the use of VBIEDs, and three categories 
of CTMs are used to protect them, those being HVM, protective construction, and planning, 
detection and procedures.  The research also found that several factors influence the 
protection of crowded places and the value of CTMs themselves (section 8.2.1). 
 
8.1.2 Objective two 
The second objective of the research was to “develop a typology of CTMs that are used to 
protect crowded places from terrorist attacks, specifically in relation to the mitigation of 
VBIEDs”.  The typology, which presents the relative requirements, performance and 
consequences (including additional information such as cost data and reconciliatory 
comments) is presented in Appendix C7.1.  The typology was formed from Chapter Four, 
with its completion and validation being achieved through research in both the UK and USA, 
as discussed in Chapter Five.   
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8.1.3 Objective three 
Objective three of the research was to “evaluate the relative performance of CTMs in relation 
to their cost, effectiveness and impact for a range of scenarios”.  The typology (Appendix 
C7.1) presents the relative performance of each CTM that can be used to protect crowded 
places, yet exploration of their performance was also made in Chapter Seven.  The research 
found that every CTM has additional benefits (section 8.2.2), with CTMs being able to be 
incorporated at no cost, and generate revenue (section 8.2.3). 
 
8.1.4 Objective four 
The fourth objective of the research was to “identify the impacts, positive and negative 
consequences, and trade-offs that derive through designing in and retro-fitting CTMs”.  The 
typology (Appendix C7.1) also presents the consequences and trade-offs that are inherent in 
the incorporation of CTMs, as does Chapter Seven.  The research found that the negative 
consequences of incorporating CTMs can be profound (section 8.2.4), and that retro-fit 
scenarios reduce the feasibility of their incorporation, increase their cost, and can reduce 
their effectiveness (section 8.2.5).  
 
8.1.5 Objective five 
Objective five of the research was to “produce guidance for key decision makers who are 
responsible for the protection of crowded places, to inform future legislation, guidelines and 
codes of practice”.  The research itself can be seen as guidance as it has presented its 
findings in fulfilment of its aim and objectives, yet it also makes a number of practical 
recommendations that directly relate to those who are responsible for the design, 
construction and operation of the built environment.  Publications that are already in the 
public domain are presented in Appendix C8.1, and it is anticipated that forthcoming 
publications based on the findings of the research will form a significant part of the impact of 
the research itself. 
 
8.2 Key Findings of the Research 
In line with the above, there are five key findings of the research, those being: 
 several factors influence the protection of crowded places and the value of CTMs 
themselves; 
 every CTM has additional benefits; 
 CTMs can be incorporated at no cost and can generate revenue; 
 the unintended consequences of incorporating CTMs can be profound; and 
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 retro-fit scenarios reduce the feasibility of incorporating CTMs, increase their cost, 
and can reduce their effectiveness. 
 
8.2.1 Several factors influence the protection of crowded places and the value of 
CTMs themselves 
The research developed a theoretical framework, identifying that eight factors influence 
whether the protection of crowded places occurs, and three factors that influence the value of 
CTMs themselves (section 7.2).  A summary of the influences that result in the protection of 
crowded places not occurring is presented in Figure 8.1.  Whilst the literature interprets 
existing legislation encompassing duties of care in relation to the mitigation of terrorist 
attacks, the empirical findings of the research do not concur.  As a result, CTSAs and ALOs 
have been intentionally left out of the planning and design of some crowded places, and 
organisations have fired employees in order to ensure protective measures are not 
incorporated into developments.  The incentives of protecting such places are widely 
unknown and under acknowledged, with empirical findings highlighting evident reductions in 
risk and impacts of hazards, threats and major accidents, competitive advantages, revenue 
generation, conducive agendas and possible insurance benefits.  TARAs can result in 
excessive outcomes that are disproportionate to the threat; perceptions of terrorism can be at 
odds with the reality of the situation and leave places vulnerable to attack.  Stakeholder 
understanding and engagement can also leave such places vulnerable, through the 
intentional avoidance of security professionals (as already stated) and a lack of 
understanding regarding risk, with neighbouring businesses to high-profile crowded places 
not incorporating protective measures due to perceptions of „not a target, not at risk‟.  
Economic influences, varying local policy, and building stock rotation can also influence 
whether such places incorporate protective measures.  
 
8.2.2 Every CTM has additional benefits 
The empirical findings of the research have highlighted that every CTM that can be used to 
protect crowded places has inherent additional benefits.  While some HVM measures 
perform security-specific functions (and are therefore termed „security-explicit barriers‟, their 
incorporation results in protection from a range of threats.  Street furniture that can be 
enhanced to perform HVM functions evidently perform additional functions in providing forms 
of public amenity and in some instances, revenue generation.  Landscaping and nature, 
whilst also having the capability to perform HVM functions, also evidently perform additional 
functions.  Protective construction results in the mitigation of hazards, threats and major 
accidents, enhancing the robustness of a building, so incurring less damage as a result of 
the manifestation of any of the aforementioned risks. 
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Figure 8.1. A fish-bone diagram summarising the influences that prevent the protection of crowded places 
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The vast majority, if not all, of the CTMs within planning, detection and procedures typically 
exist in crowded places due to the functions they provide and/or fulfil; an example being the 
use of security guards to deter, identify and respond to crime, as well as business continuity 
planning which aids businesses in preparing for, mitigating, responding to and recovering 
from a plethora of potentially disruptive events.  None of the CTMs examined here are 
counter-terrorism-explicit. 
 
8.2.3 CTMs can be incorporated at no additional cost and can generate revenue 
Evident in the literature was the association of CTMs with expenditure, however, the 
empirical findings of the research have highlighted that a number of CTMs can be 
incorporated at no additional cost, most notably when being considered during the planning 
and design stages of a project.  The organisation of structural columns, location of services, 
and the organisation and positioning of space plans can all be incorporated without cost, 
enhancing the robustness of structures to mitigate a plethora of hazards, threats and major 
accidents, as well as reducing the impacts of such events.  There may be disruption costs 
and implications if the space plan of a building is changed in a retro-fit scenario, nonetheless 
it provides a cost-effective means of reducing potential impacts, especially when considering 
the implications of enforcing sufficient stand-off to reduce blast impact.   
CTMs can also generate revenue, through their inherent functions or through the increase of 
property and rental values (most notably advertising boards, although such means of 
advertising could be incorporated onto/in any large CTM and provide income streams for 
building owners/occupiers).  Through the incorporation of CTMs, empirical findings suggest 
building owners could charge increased rent, due to the increased security of the building 
and the resulting reduction in damages that would be incurred in the event of an attack or 
other such event.  Also, the incorporation of traffic exclusion and the resulting increases in 
footfall and revenues of businesses, as well as the facilitation of pedestrianisation, 
regeneration, environmental enhance and holistic design, can lead to increased property 
values, providing returns on investment for those who own, rent and lease developments. 
 
8.2.4 The unintended consequences of incorporating CTMs can be profound 
Unintended consequences are inherent in relation to HVM.  The findings of the research 
highlight that traffic exclusion can result in increased congestion within the surrounding areas, 
and that where traffic restriction is incorporated, users of the protected site and users of the 
road networks that are external to the site can be impacted.  Authenticating and searching 
vehicles has inherent time implications that, dependent on the vehicle throughput and the 
juxtaposition of the site to its surrounding area, can cause queues that can encroach onto 
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external road networks and disrupt traffic.  Where traffic calming measures are incorporated 
into road networks, disruption to traffic is also evident.  The consequences of visible CTMs 
and the organisation of space plans to shelter critical areas from vulnerable locations require 
further research: the findings of the research highlighted concerns in relation to increases in 
fear and the reduction of productivity, but evidenced accounts (either way) have not been 
forthcoming. 
 
8.2.5 Retro-fit scenarios reduce the feasibility of incorporating CTMs, increases their 
cost, and can reduce their effectiveness 
Retro-fit scenarios can restrict the feasibility of incorporating CTMs, most notably through a 
number of protective construction measures not being physically achievable in such 
circumstances, and can result in less effective CTMs being incorporated.  The design stage 
in which CTMs are incorporated also has implications in terms of time, costs, and disruption.  
Designing-in CTMs can therefore have a number of time, cost and disruption advantages.  
Designing-in CTMs can therefore have a number of advantages over retro-fitting such 
measures, through reductions in the time, cost and disruption implications of stakeholder 
engagement and the deciding on appropriate courses of action; the removal, making safe, 
and replacement of existing street elements or inappropriate CTMs with the required, fit-for-
purpose CTMs; the diversion of existing utilities; the robustness (and potential obtrusiveness) 
of CTMs; as well as nullifying restrictions in relation to the feasibility of incorporating CTMs 
that could be used. 
 
8.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
Knowledge can be seen as a justified true belief (Knight and Turnbull, 2008, p.65); a belief in 
itself is not enough, it has to be justified.  Through the interpretation and analysis of existing 
literature and collected and analysed data, the findings of the research assert such beliefs 
through methodological, empirical, theoretical and industrial contributions to knowledge.  
 
8.3.1 Methodological contribution 
Methodologically, the research contributes to the knowledge on the conduciveness of 
qualitative research methods to inductive research.  The research adopts an interpretivist 
epistemological position, and a critical realism position in relation to ontology.  The 
constructed research design facilitated the development of a provisional typology that was 
validated through a preliminary study, from which a theoretical framework that underpinned 
the collection and analysis of data also emerged.  A scenario-based research instrument was 
also developed, from which the main study was conducted both in the UK and in the USA.  
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The research highlights the capacity of inductive research to represent the reality of a 
situation that is being investigated, through the exploration of the subjective interpretations of 
participants who work in the area being investigated.  The use of observations during site 
visits, as well as document analysis, result in the research adopting a qualitative research 
design of international scale that is not evident in any prior counter-terrorism research.   
 
8.3.2 Empirical contribution 
Empirically, the research provides original, previously uncollected data on the protection of 
crowded places from terrorist attack, most notably in relation to what measures can be used 
(Objective Two), the relative performance of those measures (Objective Three), and their 
implications (Objective Four).  As a result of the inductive nature of the research and its 
informed direction, the research also provides empirical data on the influences that 
determine whether such places are protected and which can impact the value of their 
protection.  The research therefore provides a significant body of empirical knowledge that, 
whilst being pertinent to those who influence the protection of crowded places from terrorist 
attack, is also of relevance to those who are responsible for the design, construction and 
operation of the built environment more broadly. 
 
8.3.3 Theoretical contribution 
Theoretically, the research provides an original and up-to-date account of the protection of 
the built environment (Objective One), whilst advancing debates surrounding the perceived 
implications and (lack of) benefits from protecting vulnerable places.  It provides a theoretical 
framework that identifies influences on the protection of crowded places, as well as on the 
value of CTMs that can be used to protect them.  Literature on those influences is explored, 
with the empirical findings of the research also being used to conduct a thorough analysis of 
their implications.  By developing a typology of such measures (Objective Two; Appendix 
C7.1), which also captures their relative requirements, performance and consequences 
(Objectives Three and Four), the research contributes to theory in relation to the protection of 
vulnerable places, not just from terrorist threats, but from a range of threats, hazards, major 
accidents and other disruptive events.  The creation of the theoretical framework is also 
pertinent here, as the research is the first to produce such a framework and investigate the 
protection of crowded places in such a way.  It therefore provides a significant amount of 
theory that is pertinent to those who study counter-terrorism specifically, as well as those 
who research the design and resilience of the built environment and the socio-institutional 
systems that exist within them. 
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8.3.4 Industrial contribution 
Practically, the research has importance for those who have a role in the protection of 
crowded places from terrorist attack, as well as those who are responsible for the design and 
resilience of the built environment more broadly.  The research has highlighted the scale of 
factors that are evident in the design, construction and operation of such places, most 
notably in relation to the obligations, incentives, risk assessments, perceptions of risks, 
understanding of (and engagement between) stakeholders, economic situation, local policies, 
and building stock issues that influence the incorporation of protective measures.  As well as 
this, influences on the value of incorporating such measures have been made evident, so 
that stakeholders are aware of the factors that can potentially nullify any value that has been 
accrued through the protection of such places.  Most notably and specifically in relation to the 
protection of crowded places from terrorist attack, the research indicates that there are both 
legislative and non-legislative obligations to incorporate CTMs into such places, but also 
significant incentives for a range of stakeholders who adhere to them.  The research also 
provides those stakeholders with a typology of CTMs that can be used to protect crowded 
places, as well as providing information on their relative performance and consequences, 
guiding those who are responsible for the protection of such places (Objective Five). 
 
8.3.5 Policy contribution 
Considering the contributions of the research (section 8.2) and the aforementioned 
contributions to knowledge (section 8.3) that have been made, the research concludes that 
the encouragement of incorporating CTMs into crowded places should receive greater 
emphasis considering the evident benefits.  The implications, therefore, of incorporating 
CTMs (and of the „Protect‟ strand of CONTEST), result in a number of other agendas being 
positively impacted, such as increased quality and amenity of public space, regeneration, 
and holistic approaches to security and resilience.  As a result of CTMs being able to mitigate 
a range of other threats, hazards and major accidents, greater consideration of the range of 
risks that a crowded place can face is required; a more inter-connected and over-arching 
strategy is therefore required for the resilience (as opposed to „protection‟ in relation to 
counter-terrorism) of crowded places.  NaCTSO and the CPNI should therefore continue to 
increase cohesion between other institutions, and governing and regulatory bodies. 
 
8.4 Research Validity and Reliability 
“…unless you can show your audience the procedures you used to ensure that your 
methods were reliable and your conclusions valid, there is little point in aiming to 
conclude a research dissertation” (Silverman, 2010, p.274) 
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Silverman (2010) asserts that there are four „quality criteria‟ that can be used to ensure such 
rigour, those being the use of theory and analytic depth, the use of a self-critical approach, 
the use of appropriate research methods, and the making of a practical contribution.  The 
rigour of proposed or carried out research can be checked by reflecting on those criteria in 
the form of questions.  Each question will now be presented and reflected on, in order to 
ascertain the validity and reliability of the research itself whilst also identifying and reflecting 
on the limitations of the research and acknowledging the need for and use of reflexivity by 
the researcher. 
 
8.4.1 Analytic depth 
“How far can we demonstrate that our research has mobilized the conceptual 
apparatus of our social science disciplines and, thereby, helped to build useful social 
theories?” (Silverman, 2010, p.303) 
Prior to any data collection and analysis, an extensive literature review was undertaken for a 
period of over 12 months, which constructed an informed account of the plethora of design 
considerations that are evident in the agendas of those who design, construct and operate 
the built environment.  How they are designed in order to incorporate resilience was also 
examined, which lead to the specific investigation of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the 
UK.  A provisional typology of measures that can be used to mitigate the impacts of terrorist 
attacks was then formed, from which the consideration of research methodology and the 
subsequent construction of a research design were formed.  The adopted research design 
and subsequent analysis of data resulted in the identification of a number of influences on 
the protection of crowded places, as well as on the value of measures used to protect them.  
This lead to the re-visiting of the literature in order to construct a theoretical framework that 
was based on the aforementioned influences and under-pinned the remaining collection and 
analysis of data, as well as its presentation, discussion, and verification.  The empirical 
results of the research were compared and contrasted against the literature, in order to 
provide informed and evidenced findings.  It is therefore argued that the analytical depth of 
the research is its inherent strength, through the iterative nature of the collection and analysis 
of data with the identification and analysis of literature, resulting in the internal validation of 
the findings themselves, as was evident in Chapter Seven. 
 
8.4.2 Self-criticality 
“How far can our data, methods and findings satisfy the criteria of reliability and 
validity or, put more crudely, counter the cynic who comments „Sez you‟?” (Silverman, 
2010, p.304) 
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What Silverman (ibid.) questions is whether the research has based its validity solely on its 
theoretical roots and has ignored conventional methodological approaches, or has applied 
such methodological rigour in order to ensure greater validity and reliability.  The theoretical 
grounding of the research and its findings are evident, with the development of a theoretical 
framework, typology, and scenario-based research instrument being informed by the 
literature.  The development of a typology was an objective of the research, but the 
formulation of a theoretical framework was not; the framework was created as a result of 
data that had been collected and the realisation that such a framework was needed to 
capture data that the participants felt were important.  It is therefore apparent that the 
research does indeed reflect the „social reality‟, and a number of conventional 
methodological approaches, as referred to above, were incorporated into the research 
design.  Firstly, the research instruments were formed through the iterative processes of 
literature review, and data collection analysis, upon which the data itself was coded.  
Procedures were incorporated to ensure that interviews were analysed cyclically, by 
repeating their analysis during a „second round‟ once all of them had been originally 
analysed, in order to ensure that any new themes or categories that emanated towards the 
end of the research were then analysed against earlier interviews.  Additional, internal 
validation of the data and findings was also undertaken, through the use of discursive 
analytical chapters, evidencing the typology itself, as well as the theoretical framework and 
emanating key issues (Chapter Seven).  However, the adopted sampling methods are at 
odds with objectives of representativeness and unbiased collection of data because of the 
theoretical and snowball sampling methods that were chosen for the research.  While those 
sampling methods do not support claims of representativeness, it is argued that they do 
adhere to being reflective of the „social reality‟ and that the analytical methods used are of 
such rigour to warrant the research being determined as both valid and reliable. 
 
8.4.3 Appropriate research methods 
“To what extent do our preferred research methods reflect careful weighing of the 
alternatives or simple responses to time and resource constraint – or even an 
unthinking adoption of the current fashions?” (Silverman, 2010, p.304) 
Considering the inductive nature of the research, a qualitative research strategy and design 
were adopted, in order to understand and probe the subjective interpretations of participants.  
An objective of the research was to develop a typology of CTMs that can be used to protect 
crowded places (Objective Two), which could not be achieved without the creation of theory, 
through findings (inductive process requiring qualitative research methods).  The same can 
be said for the examination of the relative performance and consequences of the CTMs 
themselves, as only sporadic data on such attributes was evident in the literature, and the 
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use of qualitative research methods was required in order to ascertain participants‟ 
knowledge regarding these issues.  The research was predominantly based on interviews, 
but observations during site visits and document analysis were also used, as was a scenario-
based research instrument that graphically aided participants in exploring the performance 
and consequences of CTMs (the need for such an instrument was evident from the initial 
responses of participants).  However, the lack of specific data in relation to the monetary 
costs of the majority of the identified CTMs is clear, despite the collection of such data being 
part of one of the objectives of the research (Objective Three).  Participants felt that the 
accurate collection of such data was unachievable, as reflected on in section 5.4.2.2, but the 
construction of a quantitative research instrument that created price brackets, whilst also 
utilising qualitative research methods to explore the subjective reasoning of such assertions, 
could have provided, at the very least, indications as to the potential expenditure required.  
Yet, as mentioned previously, the decision was taken to adhere to the importance of the 
influences that determine whether crowded places are protected, and the performance of the 
CTMs themselves, that was made evident by the participants.  The research was therefore 
unsuccessful in fulfilling that particular component of Objective Three, and is therefore a 
recommendation for further research. 
 
8.4.4 Practicality of the research 
“How can valid, reliable and conceptually defined qualitative studies…contribute to 
practice and policy by revealing something new to practitioners, clients and/or policy 
makers?” (Silverman, 2010, p.306) 
Discussions on the industrial/practical contribution to knowledge (section 8.2.4) highlighted 
that the research contributes to such practice in a number of ways.  Firstly, it has developed 
a typology of CTMs that can be used to protect crowded places.  This aids those who are 
responsible for the protection of such places to make informed decisions, through having all 
the possibilities that can be used presented to them.  Secondly, and in line with the 
development of the typology, the performance and consequences of the CTMs themselves 
has been presented, again to inform those responsible as to the potential benefits and 
consequences of their actions.  In addition, influences on the protection of crowded places 
have been identified, one aspect of which is the identification of six over-arching incentives to 
protect such places, as were influences on the value of CTMs themselves, which can nullify 
any value that has been accrued.  Therefore, the research presents a significant body of 
knowledge that is relevant not only to stakeholders who are responsible for the protection of 
crowded places from terrorist attack, but also to those whose roles influence the design and 
resilience of the built environment, as well as its socio-institutional systems. 
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8.5 Recommendations 
The research has produced guidance for key decision makers who are responsible for the 
protection of crowded places (Objective Five), guidance that has examined how the built 
environment is protected, most notably in relation to the mitigation of terrorist attack 
(Objective One), and has developed a typology of CTMs that can be used to protect such 
places (Objective Two), which highlights the relative performance and implications of doing 
so (Objectives Three and Four).  However, in doing so it has also uncovered a number of 
areas that require further attention, and therefore makes practical recommendations, as well 
as recommendations for further research. 
 
8.5.1 Practical recommendations 
Practical recommendations made by the research are: the clarification of the legislative 
situation in regard to duties of care as a result of the terrorist threat; the need for governing 
bodies and institutions to disseminate and promote the incentives for, and benefits of, 
protecting crowded places; the need for further debate on what constitutes proportionality 
and proportionate protection of a crowded place; and encourage greater engagement 
between stakeholders and the means through which this can occur. 
 
8.5.1.1 Clarification of the legislative situation in regard to duties of care 
Whilst literature states that there are obligations to protect crowded places under existing 
legislation, notably the Management of Health and Safety at Work Act (1992), and the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007), empirical findings of the 
research do not reflect such assertions; there is confusion and uncertainty regarding the 
legislative requirements to protect such places, which is resulting in CTSAs being 
intentionally avoided and CTMs not being incorporated into vulnerable places.  There is 
therefore a need for greater clarity regarding the legislative situation in relation to the 
protection of such places, with a clear statement from a governing, regulatory or authoritative 
body (such as NaCTSO, CPNI, the Home Office, or the Health and Safety Executive), 
articulating the extent to which existing legislation is applicable to terrorism-related scenarios, 
and therefore, the extent to which duties of care apply to crowded places. 
 
8.5.1.2 The dissemination of the incentive for and benefits of protecting crowded 
places 
Evident in literature and the empirical findings of the research is the notion that the incentives 
for, and benefits of, protecting crowded places from terrorist attack are not widely known.  
  
227 
 
The incentives, as presented in section 7.2.1.2 and Figure 7.5, highlight that incorporating 
CTMs can result in reductions in risk and impacts of an attack, create competitive 
advantages, generate revenue, be conducive with other agendas, and can result in 
insurance benefits.  If those responsible for the design, construction and operation of 
crowded places are to continually be encouraged to incorporate CTMs, then the incentives 
for them to do so (regardless of any legislative requirements) must be made publically 
available and appropriately disseminated.  It is therefore recommended that information on 
this is made publicly available, which could be achieved through the publishing of such 
guidance by NaCTSO, based on this research. 
 
8.5.1.3 Further debate and transparency on what constitutes proportionality and 
proportionate protection 
Coupled with the recommendation for further research in relation to this (section 8.5.2.3) is 
the need for public debate on how proportionality is assessed, by CTSAs and others who 
undertake TARAs, and how crowded places are thus „proportionately protected‟.  Empirical 
findings of the research highlight that a lack of transparency by CTSAs in relation to this is 
acting as a barrier between them and the stakeholders they are trying to work with, which 
transcends to the incorporation of CTMs (or not) being affected.  Guidance is therefore 
required to aid those responsible for undertaking TARAs and creating designs in gauging 
proportionate responses and being able to have transparent discussions on how such 
responses are formed, whilst also acknowledging and understanding that there will always 
need to be a secrecy surrounding intelligence regarding terrorist threats. 
 
8.5.1.4 Encourage greater engagement between stakeholders and the means through 
which this can occur 
Empirical findings of the research have highlighted that numerous benefits exist in relation to 
the incorporation of CTMs into crowded places, and in designing-in such measures as 
opposed to retro-fitting them; designing-in CTMs has a number of advantages over retro-
fitting, through reductions in the time, cost and disruption implications of: 
 stakeholder engagement and deciding on appropriate courses of action; 
 removal, making safe, and replacement of existing street elements or inappropriate 
CTMs with the required, fit-for-purpose CTMs; 
 diversion of existing utilities; 
 robustness (and potential obtrusiveness) of CTMs; and 
 nullifying restrictions in relation to the feasibility of incorporating CTMs that could be 
used. 
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Findings also highlighted that engagement between stakeholders responsible for the design, 
construction and operation of crowded places is not occurring to the extent it could, which 
impacts the stage in which CTMs are considered and incorporated, and as demonstrated 
above, can influence their cost and effectiveness.  Greater encouragement by governing and 
authoritative bodies and institutions, such as NaCTSO and RIBA, therefore needs to be 
forthcoming, with one solution being the use of charette-type meetings (Glass, 2008), which 
would provide a platform for stakeholders to quickly assess potential solutions and their 
benefits and consequences.   
 
8.5.2 Recommendations for further research 
Further research should be undertaken in relation to the monetary costs of incorporating 
CTMs, user experience of protected crowded places and the implications of „invisible‟ CTMs, 
and the assessment and incorporation of proportionality. 
 
8.5.2.1 The cost of incorporating CTMs into crowded places and organisations 
The literature review highlighted that there was a paucity of data in relation to the costs of 
CTMs, a paucity that has not been contributed to as was previously intended and 
documented in the objectives of this research.  The research has presented findings in 
relation to the relative performance and consequences of CTMs, but only sporadic data on 
the monetary costs of such measures has been forthcoming.  Considering a crucial 
component of risk assessments and the carrying out of TARAs is the assessment of the cost-
effectiveness of such solutions, such assessments cannot be carried out without specific cost 
data.  Such costs are specific to the subjective and unique nature of each area, site and 
building, but there is potential for the quantitative investigation of such costs, or their 
investigation through case study research, which ideally suits the context-dependent nature 
of such research, especially considering the establishment of a typology of CTMs that can be 
used and the identification of factors that influence their incorporation.  The need for detailed 
research into the cost-effectiveness of such measures, as previously highlighted by Harre-
Young et al. (2009, p.1290) remains.  A recommendation is, therefore, that such research is 
carried out in order to contribute to the growing body of research on the value, not just cost-
effectiveness that is inherent in the mitigation of hazards, threats and major accidents. 
 
8.5.2.2 User experience of protected crowded places and the implications of ‘invisible’ 
CTMs 
Whilst the development of the typology of CTMs identified that connotations of such 
measures solely encompassing „architecture of fear‟ and „target hardening‟ were misleading, 
  
229 
 
and that CTMs can be incorporated that do not appear to be performing counter-terrorism 
functions, the implications of those measures on the users of such places is unknown.  
Whilst a range of benefits of CTMs is evident, their value could be somewhat nullified or 
irrelevant if users of crowded places are detrimentally affected by their use.  Whether 
obtrusive, proportionate yet visible, or invisible, the visibility of CTMs requires further 
attention in order to identify the subjective interpretations of such protection by those who 
come into contact with them.  For example, while the exclusion of traffic results in numerous 
benefits, including increased revenue for businesses and reductions in pollution, if the 
productivity and psychological comfort of staff within protected buildings is negatively 
impacted, such benefits will be irrelevant if the measures incorporated to increase the 
security and safety of those people actually makes them feel less secure and/or safe. 
 
8.5.2.3 The assessment and incorporation of proportionality 
The research has highlighted what CTMs can be used, as well as their performance and 
consequences, yet there is a lack of clarity regarding how proportionality is assessed and 
incorporated into urban and building designs (again, whilst acknowledging the need for 
secrecy surrounding intelligence on terrorist threats).  TARAs influence both the protection of 
crowded places, and the value of the CTMs that are used to protect them.  Proportionality is 
the essence of such assessments, yet little is known regarding how such a phenomenon is 
assessed or translated into the design of crowded places.  The clandestine nature of the 
assessment of risks to crowded places by CTSAs was made apparent by participants, who 
felt that being told what level of risk they faced but not being told why was not helpful in 
holding open discussions about the ways to reduce the vulnerabilities of such places.  This 
leads to the question of „what is proportionate?‟.  How can the proportionate protection of 
crowded places occur if the risk assessments that highlight their vulnerabilities (and the 
proportionate means through which they can be mitigated) are not made available to those 
who are designing the places themselves?   
“Anecdotal evidence suggests that architects and other consultants engaged on 
sensitive projects are not able to divulge information to anyone outside the immediate 
project team, so published case studies of benefit to other designers are hardly likely 
to become readily available” (Glass, 2008, p.179) 
Whilst this may be so, sensitive information in relation to the vulnerabilities of sites only 
needs to be known by those involved on that particular project, in order to formulate 
proportionate solutions.  The research therefore recommends that further debate is 
embarked on in relation to this matter, as well as research being carried out to identify the 
components of urban and building design that influence proportionality.  This should be done 
in order to aid those who are responsible for the protection of crowded places to fully 
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understand why and how such places are vulnerable, to identify the most proportionate 
means through which such vulnerability can be mitigated, and to fully understand why certain 
information (such as in relation to specific threats) cannot be made public.  This, in turn, will 
result in the chances of such places and the CTMs used to protect them being over-
engineered and obtrusiveness, or under-engineered and vulnerable, being significantly 
diminished.   
 
8.6 A Final Thought 
Why should organisations spend money incorporating counter-terrorism measures 
when they don‟t have to? 
This was the question repeatedly asked by participants whilst the research was being 
undertaken in meeting rooms throughout the UK and USA.  However, the findings of the 
research conclude that, as well as moral obligations to protect users of vulnerable buildings 
being evident, there are legislative requirements for organisations to incorporate CTMs, with 
interpretations of existing legislation encompassing the applicability of duties of care to the 
mitigation of terrorist attacks.  However, the research also found that CTMs can be 
incorporated at no additional cost, as not all of the measures that can be used to protect 
such places involve capital outlay.  In providing an answer to the question above, therefore, 
this research suggests that: 
Organisations should incorporate counter-terrorism measures, but that does not 
necessarily have to involve spending money 
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Appendix C5.1. Participant Information and Ethical Consent Form 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SECTION 
Research Title 
The Relative Performance and Consequences of Protecting Crowded Places from Vehicle-
Borne Improvised Explosive Devices. 
Research Aim 
The aim of the research will be to evaluate the relative value and systemic implications of 
counter-terrorism measures (CTM‟s) that are used to protect built assets in crowded places, 
within the context of varying design parameters and criteria. 
Main Objectives 
The main objectives of the research will be to: 
 Examine current research on protecting key components of the built environment and 
the emergence of the terrorist threat 
 Develop a typology of CTM‟s used to protect built assets within crowded places 
 Evaluate the relative value of CTM‟s in relation to their cost, effectiveness and impact for 
a range of scenarios 
 Identify the impacts, intended and unintended consequences and trade-offs involved in 
designing in and retro-fitting CTM‟s into built assets 
 Produce guidance for key decision makers who are responsible for the protection of 
crowded places, to inform future legislation, guidelines and codes of practice 
Investigator(s) 
The research is being undertaken by a team in the Department of Civil and Building 
Engineering at Loughborough University.  The team consists of Professor Andrew Dainty 
(Principal Investigator), Dr Lee Bosher, Dr Jacqueline Glass and Steven Harre-Young. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to identify the implications and value of measures that are used 
to protect crowded places from terrorist attack, in order to contribute to the knowledge of this 
subject and inform future guidelines, codes of practice and legislation. 
Organisation of the Study 
In relation to data collection, the study has been organised into two main stages.  Those are: 
Stage 1: Discussions on the protection of the built environment, the emergence of the 
terrorist threat and the possibility and feasibility of a typology of CTM‟s 
Stage 2: Population and validation of the CTM typology, alongside the examination of 
their relative value and systemic implications 
Contributors to the Research 
This study is part of a student research project, which is funded by an Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council grant, awarded through the Innovative Manufacturing 
and Construction Research Centre at Loughborough University.  The research project is 
supported by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office. 
Withdrawal from the Study 
All participants are able to withdraw their involvement at any time.  No explanation is required 
and all data collected will be destroyed. 
Involvement in the Study 
Each interview is expected to last between 1 to 2 hours.  Participants will be asked whether 
they would be willing to attend any future interviews.  Future participant is entirely at the 
participant‟s discretion. 
Expectations 
During an interview, participants will be asked to answer questions relating to the stage of 
the research that the interview is being conducted in. 
Personal Information Requirements 
None. 
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Confidentiality 
All information given from participants will be treated as confidential and not identifiable 
unless agreed otherwise.  All storage of data will comply with the Data Protection Act 1998.  
All data will be kept secure, not released to any other party and will be destroyed within six 
years of the completion of the investigation. 
Results 
Results of this study will form an integral part of a thesis that will be submitted to 
Loughborough University, in partial fulfilment of a Philosophical Doctorate.  Findings will also 
be given to the National Counter Terrorism Security Office, in order to inform their knowledge 
and working practices.  Findings will also form integral parts of future academic and industrial 
publications relating to this research. 
As a Result of Participating 
As a result of participating, participants will be asked whether they would like to be sent any 
publications that contain the findings of this study. 
Points of Contact 
If you have any general enquiries regarding this study, then please contact: 
Name:  Steven Harre-Young 
Email:  S.N.Harre-Young@lboro.ac.uk 
Telephone:  [Withdrawn from Appendix] 
Address:  Department of Civil and Building Engineering, Loughborough 
University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU. 
If you are not happy with how the research is being conducted or wish to talk to the Principal 
Investigator regarding any other serious matter, then please contact Professor Andrew 
Dainty at the Department of Civil and Building Engineering.  Loughborough University 
Switchboard‟s telephone number is 01509 263171. 
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INFORMED CONSENT SECTION 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that this 
study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been approved 
by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee. 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form. 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason and 
that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and will be 
kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the statutory obligations 
of the agencies which the researchers are working with) it is judged that confidentiality will 
have to be breached for the safety of the participant or others. 
I understand that on this occasion, I am being interviewed during Stage 2 of the study, 
which encompasses the “population and validation of the CTM typology, alongside 
the examination of their relative value and systemic implications”. 
I agree to participate in this study. 
Participant’s Name:  __________________________________________________ 
Participant’s Signature: ____________________ Date: _____ / _____ / _______ 
Investigator(s) Present:  __________________________________________________ 
Investigator(s) Signatures: ____________________ Date: _____ / _____ / _______ 
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Appendix C5.2. Pre-Interview Letter 
 
The Relative Performance and Consequences of Protecting Crowded Places from 
Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices 
 
Introduction to the Research 
The aim of this research is to examine the value and wider implications of counter-terrorism 
measures used to protect crowded places and when design parameters vary.  The research 
responds to the increase in the use of suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices and 
vehicle-borne devices, which has resulted in a need to reassess how crowded places and 
open areas are protected, whilst ensuring that proportionate responses are provided.  
However, in order to design and retro-fit crowded public places, the relative value and 
implications of counter-terrorism measures and approaches need to be understood.   
This research aims to examine the relative value and systemic implications of counter-
terrorism measures and approaches through the use of scenario-based interviews, which will 
collate individual perspectives and knowledge regarding the protection of different places. 
This research will culminate in informed guidance for key decision makers, so that such 
places are neither under-engineered and vulnerable, nor over-engineered and obtrusive. 
 
Interview Information 
The interviews, which will take no more than 60 minutes, will explore your perspectives on 
the issues surrounding the incorporation of counter-terrorism measures into urban and 
building design, to protect crowded public places. 
 Although the interviews can involve scenarios, you are encouraged to provide information 
and reflect on any real examples of which you have prior knowledge and experience. 
The interview will be split into four parts:  
 
Part 1: Working Practices and Perspectives 
Your current / future working practices, structure and roles 
Your thoughts on the design, construction and operation process, plan of works and counter-
terrorism in relation to these 
Your perspectives on the incorporation of counter-terrorism measures into urban and building 
design 
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 Part 2: The Protection of Open Spaces & Individual Buildings 
Your perspectives on the protection of open space, considering: 
 different counter-terrorism approaches, i.e. total traffic exclusion, traffic exclusion with 
screening, traffic inclusion and temporary barriers 
 different counter-terrorism measures used in conjunction with the approaches named 
above 
 whether the approaches and measures are being designed-in or retro-fitted 
 
Part 3: The Value and Implications of Counter-Terrorism Measures 
Your perspectives on the protection of individual buildings, considering: 
 the relative value of each counter-terrorism approach and counter-terrorism measure 
 the implications of the different counter-terrorism approaches and measures 
 how these attributes vary between being incorporated during the early design stages 
and retro-fitted into an existing site 
 
Part 4: Final Thoughts 
Any final thoughts on the matters discussed during the interview or on any matters that you 
feel would be appropriate and valuable 
 
Contact Details 
For further information on either the interviews or the research project itself, do not hesitate 
to contact Steven Harre-Young… 
…directly on:  [Withdrawn from Appendix] 
…by email at:: S.N.Harre-Young@lboro.ac.uk 
…via the Web: http://saferspaces.lboro.ac.uk  
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Appendix C5.3. Post-Interview Letter Template 
 
Name 
Organisation 
Address Line 1 
Address Line 2 
Address Line 3 
Postcode 
 Steven Harre-Young 
 Direct Line: [Withdrawn from Appendix] 
 E-mail:  S.N.Harre-
Young@lboro.ac.uk 
  
Date 
 
Dear  
 
Subject – Thank You 
 
Please accept my sincerest thanks for becoming involved with and participating in the 
counter-terrorism research that is being carried out here at Loughborough.  I found our 
discussions incredibly interesting and it was immediately clear that the wealth of experience 
and knowledge that you have has informed and will continue to inform the research and its 
findings tremendously.   
 
As you requested, I will send anything interesting that we do your way and I look forward to 
hearing your thoughts on the outputs of this research when these are nearing completion, 
which is expected to occur in early 2011. 
 
Please do not hesitate to get in touch if there is ever anything that I can do for you or if you 
have any questions regarding the research or any other issue that I can help with. 
 
It was a real privilege to talk to you and I thank you once again for your time and hospitality.   
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Steven Harre-Young 
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Appendix C7.1. A Typology of Counter-Terrorism Measures 
The typology itself is split into three sections, according to the classification of CTMs that has 
been adopted throughout the thesis. 
 
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation 
HVM encompasses the control of vehicles within a given area, in order to deter an attack 
from occurring, deny methods of attack from being achievable and to minimise the impacts of 
an attack should one be carried out.  This is achieved through the consideration and choice 
of specific traffic management, access and calming approaches, which would be enforced 
through the use of VSBs.  The requirements, performance and consequences of each CTM 
will vary depending on the measure themselves.  HVM comprises: 
 Traffic management 
 Vehicle access control points 
 Traffic calming 
 Vehicle security barriers 
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Traffic management 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Traffic 
Exclusion 
The exclusion of traffic would 
need to be enforced through 
the use of VSBs, which have 
their own requirements 
Public amenity and safety of 
pedestrians.  Increase in 
footfall, resulting in higher 
turnovers for businesses.  
Reduction in pollution also 
evident 
Blast impact and level of 
protective construction 
required reduced (if needed).  
Stand-off distances and 
surrounding area would 
determine extent of protection 
Disruption due to vehicles 
unable to get close to 
destinations and increased 
walking time.  Traffic 
congestion would increase in 
the surrounding area 
Increased revenues and 
property values could 
reconcile any unintended 
consequences and provide 
additional incentives on top of 
the security benefits 
Traffic 
Restriction 
The enforcement of a 
perimeter and access point(s) 
would be achieved through 
the use of VSBs, each of 
which have their own 
requirements 
Environmental and safety 
benefits, yet relatively less 
than those experienced 
through traffic exclusion.  
Access control can be 
escalated and de-escalated, 
aiding permeability 
Risk of an attack would 
decrease, subject to access 
control approach.  Day-to-day 
impact reduced, due to 
throughput of traffic (also 
dependent on access control 
approach) 
Traffic disruption, dependent 
on access control approach 
used.  Less than 100% 
screening increases risk of 
attack.  Traffic displacement 
and disruption due to queuing 
Traffic restriction can be 
incorporated with no 
protective construction, but 
human reaction is then relied 
on to stop an attack.  Off-site 
screening would reduce risk 
Traffic 
Inclusion 
Including traffic would require 
VSBs around individual 
buildings, which have their 
own requirements 
Allows permeability and un-
impingement of traffic 
Results in less business 
disruption and maximum 
throughput of vehicles 
Increased risk of attack and 
impacts of a blast.  Greater 
need for protective 
construction 
Un-impingement of traffic 
needs to be reconciled 
against the cost of protective 
construction 
Temporary 
Barriers 
Possible specialist 
transportation and 
deployment.  No permanent 
foundations 
Escalation/de-escalation 
ability.  Moves on impact, low 
aesthetic performance and 
permeability 
Reduces blast impact 
(dependent on stand-off) and 
traffic throughput (if any) 
Incorporation based on 
intelligence increases risk of 
attack 
Reduced (relative) cost needs 
to be reconciled against less 
performance and increased 
risk 
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Vehicle access control points 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Single-Line 
A single line of VSBs, each of 
which have their own 
requirements.  Rejection 
facilities for unauthorised 
vehicles 
More aesthetically pleasing 
than other approaches.  
Depending on VSBs used, 
can be escalated and de-
escalated 
Reduction in risk of an attack 
occurring, although searching 
less than 100% of vehicles 
diminishes such gains 
Traffic disruption, dependent 
on time taken to search 
vehicles.  Vulnerable to 
tailgating 
Least secure form of access 
control, yet relatively high 
aesthetic performance and 
least disruptive, compared 
with others 
Inter-Lock 
Two lines of VSBs, which will 
have their own requirements, 
with no ability for vehicles to 
encroach whilst in-between.  
Rejection facilities for 
unauthorised vehicles 
Less aesthetically permeable 
than a single line of barriers.  
Could be escalated and de-
escalated through use of one 
access point 
Removes risk of tailgating, 
increasing the effectiveness 
of the VACP.  Greater 
deterrent than a single line of 
barriers 
Greater disruption than a 
single line of barriers, due to 
increased time taken for each 
vehicle to gain access 
Larger amount of space 
required than a single line of 
barriers and more disruptive.  
Reconciled against greater 
effectiveness 
Final Denial 
Access point and route to 
final denial line enforced 
through VSBs, which have 
their own requirements.  
Rejection facilities for 
unauthorised vehicles 
Ability to escalate and de-
escalate, most conducive to 
high vehicle throughput 
Ability to stop an attack from 
occurring whilst minimising 
traffic disruption 
Increased risk of an attack 
due to the stopping of an 
attack being dependent on 
guard force reactions 
Increased risk of an attack 
being attempted and being 
successful.  Reconciled 
against it being less 
disruptive than an inter-lock 
system 
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Traffic calming 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Horizontal 
Deflections 
The creation of chicanes or 
bends that cannot be 
traversed, enforced through 
VSBs, which have their own 
requirements 
Aesthetic performance 
dependent on VSBs used to 
enforce deflections.  Ability to 
escalate and de-escalate, 
depending on VSBs used 
Reduced speed of vehicles, 
resulting in less impact 
energy and therefore, less 
robust/obtrusive VSBs 
required 
Increased time to travel 
through deflections and site 
Consideration must be given 
to size of vehicles travelling 
through deflections.  Space 
required reconciled by 
reduced impacts of an attack 
Vertical 
Deflections 
Requirements will vary 
depending on scale of vertical 
deflections, i.e. road humps, 
inclines etc 
Aesthetic performance 
dependent on VSBs used to 
enforce deflections.  Ability to 
escalate and de-escalate, 
depending on VSBs used 
Reduced speed of vehicles, 
resulting in less impact 
energy and therefore, less 
robust/obtrusive VSBs 
required 
Increased time to travel 
through deflections and site 
Consideration must be given 
to size of vehicles, ability of 
road humps to stop a hostile 
vehicle and the impact of 
ground conditions.  Space 
required reconciled by 
reduced impacts of an attack 
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Vehicle security barriers 
VSBs are themselves categorised into three groups, those being security-explicit barriers, street furniture, and landscaping and nature. 
 
Security-explicit barriers 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Barriers 
Foundation and infrastructure 
requirements will vary 
depending on type of barrier 
used 
Less aesthetic performance 
and permeability than 
bollards and planters.  Ability 
to raise and lower 
As with any VACP or active 
measure, ability to stop 
hostile and unauthorised 
vehicles 
As with any VACP or active 
measure, disruption to traffic 
and throughput 
As a trade-off, barriers could 
be kept raised during lower 
threat levels, although this 
increases risk of an attack 
Blockers 
Foundation and infrastructure 
requirements will vary 
depending on the individual 
blocker used 
Less aesthetically pleasing 
than more permeable 
measures.  Ability to raise 
and lower 
As with any VACP or active 
measure, ability to stop 
hostile and unauthorised 
vehicles 
As with any VACP or active 
measure, disruption to traffic 
and throughput 
As a trade-off, blockers could 
be kept lowered during lower 
threat levels, although this 
increases risk of an attack 
Bollards 
Foundation and infrastructure 
requirements will vary 
depending on bollards used.  
Minimum air gap of 1200mm 
and height of 500mm 
Most visually and functionally 
permeable SEB.  Ability to 
raise and lower 
As with any VACP or active 
measure, ability to stop 
hostile and unauthorised 
vehicles 
As with any VACP or active 
measure, disruption to traffic 
and throughput 
Robustness of bollards will 
vary depending on the 
possible impact of a vehicle.  
Obtrusiveness reduced 
through traffic calming 
Fencing 
Foundation requirements will 
vary depending on the 
fencing used 
Aesthetic performance 
dependent on the nature of 
the fence, its robustness and 
size of area being protected 
Deterrence of crime and 
increased risk of intruders 
being caught 
Low aesthetic performance 
and visual permeability 
More conducive to the 
enforcement of large 
perimeters and sites, not 
individual buildings 
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Gates 
Installation and infrastructure 
requirements will vary 
depending on the gate(s) 
used 
Aesthetic performance 
dependent on the nature of 
the gate and its robustness 
As with any VACP or active 
measure, ability to stop 
hostile and unauthorised 
vehicles 
As with any VACP or active 
measure, disruption to traffic 
and throughput 
Robustness is dependent on 
potential impact of a vehicle.  
More conducive to the large 
perimeters and sites, not 
individual buildings 
Planters 
Requirements will vary 
depending on the planter.  
Maintenance will be needed 
to ensure aesthetic 
performance and un-
impingement of other CTMs 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance compared to 
other SEBs, although less 
permeable than bollards.  
Minor environmental benefit 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetically 
pleasing means 
Can create a new risk in 
impinging surveillance and 
obstructing other CTMs, if not 
maintained appropriately 
Less permeable but provides 
better aesthetic performance.  
Can be surface-mounted, 
reducing installation costs 
Walls 
Requirements will vary 
depending on the nature of 
the wall.  May require 
enhanced/additional 
structural reinforcement 
Least permeable SEB.  Could 
incorporate advertising 
boards etc as means of 
generating revenue 
Deterrence of crime and 
increased risk of intruders 
being caught 
Arguably creates new risks 
through the impingement of 
surveillance 
More conducive to the 
enforcement of large 
perimeters and sites, not 
individual buildings 
 
Street furniture 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Advertising 
Boards 
Dependent on nature of the 
boards.  Lethal fragmentation 
would need to be within lethal 
radius of a blast itself 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance compared to 
SEBs.  Provides public 
amenity and revenue 
generation 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetically 
pleasing and functional 
means 
Construction of board must 
take fragmentation into 
account, so as to not create 
new risks and worse impacts 
Relatively low permeability is 
reconciled against aesthetic 
performance and generation 
of revenue 
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Art 
Dependent on nature of 
artwork and whether it was 
surface-mounted or required 
foundations.  Lethal 
fragmentation would need to 
be within lethal radius of a 
blast itself 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance, compared to 
SEBs (and perception of art).  
Public amenity.  Permeability 
dependent on nature of the 
artwork 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetically 
pleasing means 
Could hinder surveillance 
opportunities and impinge on 
other CTMs 
Potentially high cost 
implications for testing of 
robustness of artwork to 
ensure appropriate for use 
Bicycle 
Racks 
Requirements will vary 
dependent on the nature of 
the bicycle rack 
Permeability will depend on 
size and number of racks.  
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance, providing public 
amenity 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetically 
pleasing and functional 
means 
Could create a new risk 
through the concealment of 
IEDs 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance and function 
reconciled against potential 
for additional risks 
Furniture 
Requirements will be 
dependent on the nature of 
the furniture itself  
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance and provides 
public amenity 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetically 
pleasing and functional 
means 
Could create a new risk 
through the concealment of 
IEDs 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance and function 
reconciled against potential 
for additional risks 
Lamppost 
Requirements will vary 
depending on the nature of 
the lamppost, earthworks 
underneath and potential 
impact of vehicles 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance, providing public 
amenity 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetically 
pleasing means, also aiding 
in surveillance and 
deterrence/detection of crime 
Consideration must be given 
to interaction with other 
CTMs, as lighting could 
impinge on CCTV for 
example 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance and 
permeability, with additional 
deterrence/detection benefits 
  
  
271 
 
Landscaping and nature 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Bunds 
Sufficient height and incline to 
stop vehicle encroachment.  
Maintenance and monitoring 
requirements to ensure not 
being tampered with 
Environmental benefits and 
relatively high aesthetic 
performance, dependent on 
nature of the bund 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetically 
pleasing means 
Could create new risks in 
hindering surveillance and 
concealing persons 
Conducive to large sites and 
perimeters.  Cost savings 
could be accrued through 
recycling of spoil 
Ditches 
Depth and width to be 
sufficiently maintained to 
ensure they cannot be 
overcome 
Relatively low aesthetic 
performance and 
permeability.  Provides no 
amenity 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles 
Potential health and safety 
issues and accidental 
incursion by vehicles 
Unfeasible in dense, urban 
settings.  Conducive to large 
sites and perimeters 
Topography 
Stability, compaction and 
erosion must be considered, 
ensuring it is not traversable 
by vehicles 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance, environmental 
benefits and public amenity 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetically 
pleasing and functional 
means 
Could create new risks in 
hindering surveillance and 
concealing persons 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance and function 
reconciled against potential 
for additional risks 
Trees 
Sufficient girth, rooting and 
spacing so encroachment 
cannot occur.  Maintenance 
to ensure they are not 
climbed to overcome CTMs 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance and 
environmental benefits 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetic and 
environmental means 
Could create new risks in 
hindering surveillance and 
concealing persons/IEDs 
Realistically unlikely to be 
used solely, due to spacing 
and size of trees required 
Water 
Sufficient depth and width 
when considering large-scale 
features, topography when 
considering smaller scales 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance and 
environmental benefits, also 
providing public amenity 
Ability to stop hostile vehicles, 
through a more aesthetic and 
environmental means 
Could create new risks in 
relation to health and safety, 
hindering surveillance and 
concealing persons/IEDs 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance and function 
reconciled against potential 
for additional risks 
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Protective Construction 
Protective construction encompasses the robustness and design of a building, in order to 
mitigate the impacts of a blast.  The requirements, performance and consequences of each 
CTM will vary depending on the measure themselves.  Protective construction comprises: 
 Skin 
 Structure 
 Services 
 Space plan 
Costs of protective construction varied, with a range of 2-5% of budgets being sufficient 
when designing in CTMs, and 10-15% when retro-fitting them.   
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Skin 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Cladding 
Attached directly to floor 
slabs using robust 
connections and access for 
inspection and replacement 
Aesthetic performance will be 
dependent on the cladding 
itself, can appear no different 
than if not protected 
The reduction in impact of a 
blast or similar damage, 
mitigating impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
Blast wave reflection will 
result in increased damage to 
surrounding buildings 
Increased cost of robust 
connections reconciled 
against potential re-use of 
connections and performance 
Façades 
Convex in form and 
avoidance of re-entrant 
corners, recesses and set-
backs 
Dependent on materials 
used.  Aesthetic performance 
can be relatively high and can 
appear no different than if not 
protected 
The reduction in impact of a 
blast or similar damage, 
mitigating impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
Blast wave reflection will 
result in increased damage to 
surrounding buildings 
Convex façades will cost 
more than a straight ones.  
2% of façade budget can be 
sufficient, yet depending on 
extent of glazing used, can be 
as much as 15% 
Glazing 
(Anti-Shatter 
Film) 
Adhesive film applied to the 
inside of glazing.  Can be 
anchored into frames for 
additional protection and 
retro-fitted with minimal 
disruption 
Aesthetic performance can be 
high if transparency is not 
reduced significantly.  
Reductions in energy bills. 
50% less risk of injury 
compared to annealed glass 
The reduction in impact of a 
blast or similar damage, 
mitigating impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
Blast wave reflection will 
result in increased damage to 
surrounding buildings.  If not 
properly anchored, whole 
pane can be forced inwards 
Cheapest option in terms of 
protecting glazing.  Potential 
negative impact on 
transparency reconciled 
against performance.   
Glazing 
(Bomb-Blast 
Net Curtains) 
Length and width typically 
double that of glazing, with 
the excess stored at cill level.  
As with ASF, suits retro-fitting 
Relatively low aesthetic 
performance, with little or no 
visibility and light permeability 
and restricted ventilation 
Reduction in impact of a blast 
or similar damage, mitigating 
impacts of hazards, threats 
and major accidents.  
Removal of air-borne 
fragments 
Can be penetrated if 
annealed glass is used 
Less effective than other 
forms of glazing protection, 
but relatively cheap solution, 
suiting temporary protection 
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Glazing 
(Toughened 
Glass) 
Reheating of annealed glass 
to a plastic state, followed by 
controlled cooling 
Four- to six-fold increase in 
strength compared to 
annealed glass.  Relatively 
high aesthetic performance 
and transparency 
The reduction in impact of a 
blast or similar damage, 
mitigating impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
Will shatter if it breaks, but 
will produce smaller 
fragments than annealed 
glass 
Whilst more effective than 
ASF and BBNCBs, no 
environmental benefits and 
less effective than laminated 
glazing 
Glazing 
(Laminated 
Glass) 
Two or more plates of glass, 
held together by a flexible 
plastic layer (PVB layer).  
PVB should be a minimum of 
0.76mm and be secured into 
frames 
Relatively high aesthetic 
performance, as well as 
environmental benefits from 
removal of UV rays and noise 
pollution 
The reduction in impact of a 
blast or similar damage, 
mitigating impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents.  
Little or no fragmentation 
Could shatter, but the glass is 
held to the PVB layer 
Most expensive form of 
glazing protection, but is the 
most effective in terms of 
protection and performance 
 
 
Structure 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Columns & 
Frames 
As a minimum, measures for 
robustness against 
disproportionate collapse for 
Class 2B building as in Part 
A3 of Building Regulations.  
Tensile capacity and ductility 
in elements and connections   
Mitigates impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
The enhancement of 
robustness, most notably 
through alternate load paths 
None 
Evident preference for steel 
or reinforced concrete 
frames, with enhanced 
robustness mitigating multiple 
risks 
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Floors 
Tied into structural frames 
and have the ability to 
withstand load reversal.  
Continuity of flood spans and 
their reinforcement in both of 
the slab faces (lower floors) 
Mitigates impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
The enhancement of 
robustness and the 
prevention of uplift of floors 
None 
Enhanced protection on lower 
floors is due to increased 
pressure from blasts 
Roofs 
Roofs and components of 
them should be 150mm thick 
reinforced concrete 
Mitigates impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
The enhancement of 
robustness due to blast loads 
Implications of the increased 
weight on the structural 
requirements of the building 
Enhanced protection, most 
notably from blast and mortar 
attack 
Stairwells 
At least two stairwells, no 
more than 50m apart, 
orientated towards different 
escape routes or exits 
Mitigates impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents, 
also providing protected 
spaces in buildings 
(dependent on construction) 
The enhancement of access 
and egress routes, facilitating 
evacuation or the protection 
of residing persons 
The greater the number of 
stairwells, the less usable 
floor space 
Aids in evacuations and 
invacuations, benefitting 
responses to multiple risks 
 
Services 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Services 
Located away from 
vulnerable façades.  HVAC 
systems should be located on 
third floor or above 
If enhanced to scrub for 
additional contaminants, 
enhanced air quality and 
reductions in sickness 
Mitigation of damage 
resulting from blasts, as well 
as reduced risk of persons 
throwing substances in to the 
system 
None 
When used in conjunction 
with mitigation air-borne 
threats, performance benefits 
obtained 
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Space plan 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Evacuation 
Routes 
Routes to be duplicated and 
be sufficiently protected from 
impacts of a blast 
Aids in the mitigation of and 
response to hazards, threats 
and major accidents, as well 
as other emergencies 
The enhancement of access 
and egress routes, facilitating 
evacuation or the protection 
of residing persons 
None 
Evacuation routes can be 
used as protected spaces, if 
robust enough.  See 
„Protected Spaces‟ for 
requirements 
Internal 
Partitions 
Robust partitions capable of 
stopping fragmentation from a 
blast, without adding to it 
Dependent on nature of 
partition, reduces visual 
permeability 
Mitigation of damage 
resulting from a blast, through 
the removal of an amount of 
air-borne fragments 
Questionable impact on 
workplace productivity.  
Unprotected partitions can 
result in additional 
fragmentation 
Possible workplace 
productivity decreases, 
reconciled against increased 
protection of life and property 
Protected 
Spaces 
Ability to contain occupants of 
buildings, minimum 0.66m
2 
space per person.  Ideally 
deep within buildings with no 
glazing
 
Aids in the mitigation of and 
response to hazards, threats 
and major accidents, as well 
as other emergencies 
The reduction in impact of a 
blast or similar damage, 
mitigating impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
None 
Can be incorporated at no 
additional cost during the 
planning and design stages 
Sacrificial 
Design 
Use of secondary layers of 
glazing or the positioning of 
less critical offices closest to 
vulnerable areas 
Dependent on glazing used, 
environmental benefits.  
Mitigates hazards, threats 
and major accidents 
The reduction in impact of a 
blast or similar damage, 
mitigating impacts of hazards, 
threats and major accidents 
Potentially moves most used 
areas away from externally-
facing glazing, as opposed to 
internal courtyards, impacting 
productivity and usable space 
ratios 
Can be incorporated at no 
additional cost during the 
planning and design stages 
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Planning, Detection and Procedures 
Planning, detection and procedures (PDP) encompasses the detection of hostile vehicles 
and/or suspicious behaviour, through the human, technological and procedurally-based 
CTMs that aid in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks.  PDP comprises: 
 Security culture 
 People and technology 
 Planning and procedures 
 
 
  
278 
 
Security culture 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Security Culture 
Staff adopting a „security 
first‟ habit, overseen by 
supportive management and 
effective support and 
communications 
Aids in the mitigation of and 
response to hazards, threats 
and major accidents, as well 
as other emergencies 
Increased mitigation of, 
preparedness for and 
response to threats, as well 
as other risks 
Questionable 
disproportionate focus on 
such threats, inciting 
disproportionate levels of 
fear 
Management and support 
infrastructure could already 
be in place, reducing costs 
and increasing capacity to 
incorporate such a culture 
 
 
People and technology 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Capable 
Guardians 
Persons who are able to 
identify suspicious 
behaviour and act on it 
Aids in the deterrence and 
identification of numerous 
threats 
Deterrence of attacks and the 
identification of suspicious 
behaviour, which is acted on 
„False alarms‟ or 
inconvenience to staff 
Encompasses any user of a 
place or space, resulting in 
no cost implications 
CCTV 
Appropriate training of 
staff using such 
technology to ensure no 
blind spots are left etc 
Can aid in the deterrence 
and mitigation of, as well as 
the response to, a range of 
threats 
To deter an attack from 
happening, aid in a response 
to an attack and in any 
investigations afterwards 
Could be left in inappropriate 
positions, leaving places 
vulnerable to attack and no 
ability to identify perpetrators 
afterwards 
Typically already 
incorporated for other crime 
prevention purposes 
Communication 
Systems 
Protection from impacts of 
a blast.  Ability to send and 
receive communications 
from protected spaces 
Aids in the co-ordination of 
responses to a range of 
threats and emergencies 
Increased capacity to 
respond to a range of 
emergencies, enhancing 
communication 
None 
Typically already 
incorporated for other 
purposes 
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Intruder Detection 
Alarms 
Integrated into a wider 
security system, including 
lighting and response 
provisions 
Can aid in the deterrence 
and mitigation of, as well as 
the response to, a range of 
threats 
Deterrence of attacks and the 
identification of suspicious 
behaviour, which is acted on 
None 
Typically already 
incorporated for other crime 
prevention purposes 
Lighting 
Placement of lighting so 
that surveillance is not 
impinged 
Can aid in the deterrence 
and mitigation of, as well as 
the response to, a range of 
threats 
Deterrence of attacks and the 
identification of suspicious 
behaviour, which is acted on 
Can detrimentally impact 
surveillance 
Typically already 
incorporated for other 
purposes 
Security Guards 
Trained personnel who are 
able to identify and 
respond to suspicious 
behaviour and attacks 
Can aid in the deterrence of 
and response to a range of 
threats and other 
risks/emergencies.  Can be 
escalated and de-escalated 
Deterrence of attacks and the 
identification of suspicious 
behaviour, which is acted on 
Can leave CTMs in 
vulnerable positions if not 
properly trained and 
motivated 
Typically already 
incorporated for other crime 
prevention purposes 
 
 
Planning and procedures 
The CTM Requirements Performance Positive Consequences Negative Consequences Additional Information 
Awareness 
Training of staff to be able 
to identify and respond to 
hostile reconnaissance, 
suspicious behaviour and 
attacks 
Applicable to all threats, 
with ability for heightened 
senses during times of 
increased threat 
Deterrence and 
identification of , and 
response to, hostile 
reconnaissance, suspicious 
behaviour and attacks 
„False alarms‟ or 
inconvenience to staff 
Typically already 
incorporated for purposes 
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Business 
Continuity 
Planning 
BCP incorporated into the 
organisation, with senior 
management responsible for 
it 
Increases the resilience of 
businesses to a range of 
disruptive events 
Increased mitigation of, and 
preparedness and response 
to, a range of emergencies 
and disruptive events 
None 
Typically already 
incorporated for business 
purposes.  There are British 
Standards for BCP 
Contingency 
Planning 
Adequate and tested plans 
that aid in the response to a 
range of scenarios 
Applicable to planning for all 
hazards, threats, and major 
accidents, as well as other 
emergencies/disruptions 
Increased mitigation of, and 
preparedness and response 
to, a range of emergencies 
and disruptive events 
None 
Typically already 
incorporated for business  
purposes 
Evacuation & 
Invacuation 
Planning 
Multiple protected routes 
that are known by staff and 
regularly exercised 
Applicable to planning for all 
hazards, threats, and major 
accidents, as well as other 
emergencies/disruptions 
Increased mitigation of, and 
preparedness and response 
to, a range of emergencies 
and disruptive events 
None 
Typically already 
incorporated for business  
purposes 
Housekeeping 
Regular cleaning and 
inspection of areas within 
crowded places 
Increases the aesthetics and 
safety of places and spaces 
Increased mitigation of, and 
preparedness and response 
to threats 
Possible increase in number 
of „false alarms‟, suspicious 
packages identified 
Typically already 
incorporated for business 
purposes 
Search Planning 
The searching of evacuation 
and invacuation routes, prior 
to and after such 
movements occur 
Applicable to planning for all 
hazards, threats, and major 
accidents, as well as other 
emergencies/disruptions 
Increased mitigation of, and 
preparedness and response 
to, a range of emergencies 
and disruptive events 
Possible increase in number 
of „false alarms‟, suspicious 
packages identified 
Risk of secondary devices, 
especially at rendezvous 
points or on the way to them, 
must be considered 
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